Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations

Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations Edited by Larry Crump and S. Javed Maswood Routledge Taylor hFran-s Group LONDON AND NEW YORK ...
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Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations

Edited by Larry Crump and S. Javed Maswood

Routledge Taylor hFran-s Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

1

Growing power meets frustration in the Doha round's first four years John S. Ode11

Developing country governments obviously face a highly skewed power structure in multilateral trade negotiations, but they greatly increased their preparation, organization, and active participation after the Uruguay round (UR) and creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. More governments reinforced or established missions in Geneva. In 1999, during preparations for the WTO's ministerial conference in Seattle, developing countries voiced concerns and injected dozens of formal proposals into the negotiation process. This participation explosion drew in many small trading countries that had been passive or not signatories at all prior to 1994. The European Union was attempting to convince others to launch another major round of liberalizing negotiations. Seattle was a debacle, however, and some developing country ministers publicly denounced the United States and the WTO for the way they had been treated. At their next conference in Doha, Qatar on 14 November 2001 the ministers did agree to launch a new round, the "Doha Development Agenda." They p!edged to "place [developing countries'] needs and interests at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in this declaration" (WT/MIN(OI)/DECWl).To add credibility to their commitment, they used the expressions "least developed" countries 2 9 times, "developing" countries 24 times, and "LDC" 19 times (Panagariya 2002). The work program was daunting. It encompassed no fewer than 19 technical issues, each reflecting major differences between states that would have to be bridged. In addition, the ministers adopted a separate decision on 12 implementation-related issues and a special declaration interpreting the TRIPS agreement on questions of public health, both in response to developing country demands. Ministers set themselves the deadline of 1 January 2005 for completing the round, and they set interim deadlines for steps along the way: a plan for WTO technical

8 John S. Ode11

assistance was due by December 2001; a solution for legal problems of developing countries that lacked capacity for making medicines was to be reached by the end of 2002; modalities for agricultural commitments were t o be agreed by March 2003; in services, initial requests were due by June 2002 and initial offers by March 2003; and improvements t o the Dispute Settlement Understanding were to be finished by May 2003. At the end of the planned three years, however, member states had greed to almost nothing on the Doha agenda. Delegations and chairs of negotiating bodies had made many proposals to one another, but they missed one interim deadline after another, as some held one issue hostage until seeing greater concessions on another issue. There was significant movement trom opening positions, and elements of a provisional deal were set provisionally. But after major players deadlocked over remaining key elements, the Doha round was suspended indefinitely in July 2006. Several parties expressed a preference to revive the talks, but the future was unclear. Everyone remained frustrated and the WTO's credibility as negotiating forum was widely questioned. This chapter offers some thoughts that might help us understand reccnt facts and grasp forces that will shape future negotiations. The main points will be that on the one hand, WTO member states have significant opportunities to create joint gains through new agreements, as judged by many independent analysts. Many developing countries (DCs) have also improved their negotiation capacity and have shown they can influence this process to some extent if they negotiate shrewdly. As long as a substantial set of these governments prefers no deal, there will be no deal. O n the other hand, the Quad countries still hold disproportionate power to shape the process and the outcome. The EU, Japan, and the US adapted slowly to the longterm power shift, especially on high-priority issues for DC governments such as agriculture, implementation of past agreements, special and differential treatment, and the so-called Singapore issues (a high defensive priority). Groups of DCs responded by refusing t o make concessions demanded by the North on other issues. The first bection will summarize the round's setting, highlighting major opportunities and problems tor developing countries. A second section will present evidence suggesting that despite their relative political weakness, they do have some space in which to negotiate, and that their strategy choices have made a difference. A third section will document the limited gains and deadlocks on major issues after four years, and a concluding section will draw provisional lessons from recent experience.

The Doha round's first four years

9

T h e negotiation setting f o r developing countries Developing countries face a mix of opportunities and obstacles to achieving their goals in WTO negotiations. This setting gives low and middle income countries some space for negotiating, and that space has been growing slowly at the expense of traditional industrial states.

The pull of market opporhrnities World market conditions, given present policies, offer WTO members the opportunity to create significant new joint economic gains through new WTO agreements, according to many analysts. Present policies are blocking trade that would otherwise flow in response to differences in comparative advantage. Exchanges of concessions on remaining goods tariffs and barriers to services trade would allow those differences to expand trade and improve economic efficiency in many countries. This could include substantially greater flows among developing countries and China as well as in the traditional North-South channel. Cline (2005) offers the optimistic estimate that if all world trade barriers were eliminated, developing countries would gain approximately $200 billion a year in income, half of which would come from industrial countries removing barriers to their exports. He claims that 500 million people could be lifted out of poverty over 15 years. A World Bank simulation of a different outcome put the gains for developing countries at $350 billion and 140 million people lifted out of poverty by 2015 (World Bank 2003: uxix).' Even if these figures prove exaggerated, these opportunities are pulling governments toward i~egotiation and encouraging them to L.0nsidt.r compromises to achieve gains. At the same time, all negotiated joint gains must be distributed among the parties, and within the zone of agreement, the more one player grabs the less is left tor the others. If players anticipate this and believe that a11 others will do so too, negotiators can be expected to use distributive vactics during the process to establish the credibility of their respective commitments to claim their shares in the end.l When these players' demands are inconsistent with one another, they generate an impasse to be resolved or not. 4nd in distributive bargaining especially, we would expect differences in power to set boundaries on the likely process and outcome.

10 John S. OdeN

The skewed power structure Quickly we come to the most obvious obstacle to developing countries' efforts to achieve their goals, at least their distributive ones. They still face a highly skewed international distribution of power, one skewed spectacularly against the many small states. Few insiders speaking privately would quarrel with Richard Steinberg when he observes that the WTO actually makes decisions with "invisible weighted voting" (Steinberg 2002). By power I have in mind one of the two traditional meanings in political science - the presence or absence of assets that give a state the capacity to achieve influence abroad and resist influence attempts from abroad on the issue in question. Power refers here to a potential, not realized, influence, the second traditional meaning. One useful indicator for the structure most relevant for global trade negotiations is the share of world goods imports each member buys. One prominent objective of each negotiating government is to increase its country's exports. If so, the larger the import market a government commands, the more it has t o offer or threaten to withhold, as a way to induce concessions from others in market access talks. This is only one indicator. Governments have other objectives, including increasing their own imports of goods and services, improving various rules such as property rights and dumping, and protecting the intangible value of the WTO as an institution. Governments have other power assets and weaknesses. In principle some governments could deploy financial or other assets to influence trade negotiations, and some small states are weakened by severe political instability. What affects state behavior most directly is the governments' perceptions of their relative alternatives to agreement in a particular situation, which can vary from this measure. But this indicator gives us one reasonable first approximation. Table 1.1 shows that this distribution is still extremely skewed, as it always has been. Even though we are aware of this in general, looking at current data leaves a striking impression. Tables in this chapter treat the European Community as a single player because that is how it negotiates in the WTO, delegating standing authority t o the European Commission to speak for the members. EC imports are defined as imports from outside the Community. By this indicator the median WTO member states are Uruguay and Zimbabwe, each buying 0.04 percent of world imports. The hierarchy consists of two superpowers (the US and the EU) at the top, followed far below by two major powers (China and Japan), then by 13 others (including five DCs) whose individual shares of world imports ranged from 1 to 4 percent each,

The Doha round's first four vears

II

Tobie 1.1 WTO members' trade power. 2004 ishares of world merchandise imports) Serinl rio.

I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 IS 16 17 1R I9 20 21 22 23 24 2.7

26 27 28 29 10 31

Mevrher n~~fions uf W T 0 USA European Communities iEU) China Japan Canada China, Hong Kong SXR Korea, Repuhlic of hlexico Chinese Taipei Singapore Switzerland .Iustralia Malaysia Turkey Thailand India Brazil South Africa Norway United Arab Emirates Indonesia Israel Philippines Romania Chile New Zealand Argentina Pakistan Morocco Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Croatia Colombia Bulgaria Nigeria Egypt. Tunisla Bangladesh Kuwait Peru Costa Rica Sri Lanka Jordan Oman Ecuador

Share in ~vorld

imports (%) 21.95 18.40 8.07 6.54 3.97 3.93 3.23 2.97 2.41 2.36 1.60 1.55 1.51 1.40 1.37 1.37 0.95 0.79 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.47 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24

GDP i r ~2004 (US$ hillio~~s) 11,750.41 12,481.83 1,601.02 4-62 1.20 970.34 164.03 667.38 663.06 307.48 103.62 351.89 602.75 112.52 312.60 165.72 654.82 558.42 174.46 242.82 93.08 222.04 1,130.03 84.21 67.00 89.3 1 92.89 144.84 81.85 49.29 104.12 33.01

Serml rzo.

hfeiizber rratrotu ut WTO

Share in u,orld

inzpurts

Domlnlcan Republic Guatemala El Sdlvddor QdtX

Bahrain Tr~nldadand Tobago Angola Cuba Kenya Ghma Honduras Iceland C6te d'lvorre Jamaica China. Macao SAR panama Uruguay Zimbabwe C.~mbodia Paraguay TFYR of Macedonia .Mauritius Senegal Botswana Tanzania Namibia Ivlyanmar Albania Cameroon Swaziland Democratic Republic of the Congo Nicaragua Neoal Georgia Reoublic of ,Moldova ~oiivia blozambique Papua New Guinea Zambia Congo Uganda Armenia Haiti Barbados Gabon .Madagascar Lesotho

~.

0.03 0.03

1%)

GDP in 2004 iL1SS bil11o11s)

The D o h a round j first four yeurs

13

Share in ujurld imports 1% j

G D P in 2004 (USS billion)

Share in world inrports (0.4%)

G D P in 2004 (US$billion)

Fiji Brunei Darussalarn Mali Burkina Faso ~Mongolia Kyrgyz Republic Togo Chad Suriname Benin Malawi Guinea Maldives Guyana Niger Belize Antigua and Barbuda Mauritania Djibouti Sierra Leone Rwanda Grenada St. Vincent and the Grenadines St. Kitts and Nevis Gambia Burundi St. Lucia Central African Republic Dominica Solomon Islands Guinea Bissau TOTAL SUM

Serial no. I 2 3 4

Non-member nations of WTO Russian Federation Saudi Arabia Vietnam Ukraine TOTAL

Sources: Imporrs, W T 0 Trade Statistics; GDP, lnternatiunal Monetary Fund, World Economic Ourlook Database, September 2004. Norer: lrnporrr of the EC and world imports are after subtracting trade between EC members. Data ire missing for Llechrenrrein ~ n A4alta d Imports and Cuba GDP Four srleited non~membercountries are also shown.

14 John S. OdeN followed by another 4 3 countries that each accounted for 0.05 percent to 1.0 percent, and finally another 62 (roughly half the membership) whose world trade power ranged from tiny to imperceptible. The shares of 12 members even failed to reach 0.01 percent that year. Thus if we considered individual trade power alone - before introducing bargaining coalitions and the existence of the WTO as an institution - most DCs would have virtually no position at all from which to negotiate globally. Over the long term, though, the trade power structure has been shifting slowly in favor of developing countries and China, at the expense of traditional industrial states. Table 1.2, upper panel, shows the shares of world imports of five groups of countries over two decades, classifying countries according to their World Bank status in 1984 and holding category membership constant. The EC figure adds new entrants when they joined, subtracting them from other rows. The 2004 column represents the EU 25. The traditional high-income countries' power, as measured by this indicator, slipped from 63 to 57 percent. The market power of DCs in the aggregate, not counting China, expanded from 24 to 30 percent of the world market. More attention has rightly fallen on China's dramatic rise in trade - so rapid that China surpassed Japan in 2004 to become the third largest importing power in the world. The lower panel of Table 1.2 uses the World Bank's 2004 classification of countries in all columns, which moves Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Chinese Taipei from the developing to the high-income row. It shows how much of the DC expansion in the upper panel was due to expansion by these four countries. This gradual shift in the power structure will almost certainly continue into the long-term future.

The institutional context and the coalition option Developing states, notwithstanding the weakness of most, do have their numbers, their legal equality, and the WTO consensus norm. In this institutional setting there is a strong norm that decisions are made by consensus, defined as the absence of expressed dissent. This norm gives the smallest member the authority, at least, to block the whole. A threat t o do so from a tiny member by itself would not be highly credible, in view of the costs that could fall on that player. But credibility increases if the member is part of a coalition of states.' Starting in the 1950s, developing country leaders began to form groups in an attempt to combine their weight in global negotiations. Formal regional organizations have often been justified partly

The Doha round's first four years

15

Table 1.2 Changes in trade power, 1984 to 2004

A. Using 1984 country slassificarions

Developing countries Chlna Centrally planned and transition countries except China European Community High income cor~ntriesescept EC Subtotal Territories not classified by the World Bank Total

1984

1994

i%J

i%i

LOO4 /"4J

23.69 1.59

29.20 3.20

30.12 8.07

9.93 17.95 45.27 98.44

3.87 19.48 40.77 96.51

3.76 18.40 38.29 98.64

1.52 99.96

2.27 98.78

1.31 99.95

1994 ('YO)

2004

B. U s ~ n g2004 country classific~tions 1984

isbi Developing countries China Centrally planned and rransition countries except China European Community High income countries except EC Subtotal Territories not classified by the World Bank Total

['YO)

18.34 1.59 8.94 17.95 51.31 98.13 1.83 99.96

Source: WTO Trade sratistics (1984) Notes The upper panel classifies countries into rows according ro the World Bank list for 1984. Developing countries .,re defined a? all rrcrpr European Community other htgh income, China, and other centrally planned or trmsition countries. The World Bank did not classify certain cottntrles in 1984. Among those, Chinese Taipei is included here wnh devrlup~ngcounrrtes, ant3 Cuha, Kampuchea. Virmam, North Korea, and Cormer Sovet spates .Ire included with centrally planned 2nd transition countnes, or as EU anembers when appropriacc in 2004. For comparison, the lower panel uses the World Bank's 2004 classification of countnes in JII columns, except that the centrally planned and rransition countries are grouped together to match rhe upper panel, rather than scatrered .,mong the middle or low income groups.

16 John S. Odell on these grounds. Bargaining coalitions have become common in the WTO, though they vary on several dimensions. Many select members according not to geography but to a common interest in a trade sector or specific product, or a common concern about the international trade rules. Some cover a narrower scope of issues while others range more widely. Some operate for a short time and do not become institutionalized. Others develop a regular schedule of meetings, issue statements and proposals in the coalition's name, establish a website, and even a secretariat. We could get a first impression of different groups' capacities for influence, if they stay unified, by summing the respective trade weights of the members. Table 1.3 compares the 2004 power of a diverse sample of relatively established W T O coalitions. Each has defended a common position at least on occasion. The Quad countries clearly would carry the largest sway of the groups listed if they unified behind the same position. Together the US, the EC, Japan, and Canada alone command half the trade power in the system by this measure. The tour met occasionally during the UR and after, but they have also lined up on opposite sides of a variety of commercial issues, which opens space for weaker countries. The Textile and Clothing Bureau, formed in 1984, consists of 25 developing countries that fund a secretariat in Geneva and cooperate to oppose restrictions against their exports. Australia led the formation Table 1.3 Coalition trade power (combined shares of world merchandise imports 2004)"

Coalitions

Shore in world imports

f%)

Quad Countries (US, EC, Japan, Canada ITCB (International Textiles and Clothing B u r e a ~ ) ~ Group of 20 Cairns Group ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) ACP (Africa. Caribbean and Pacific Countries1 ' AFR (~frican Union) MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) LDC (Least Developed Countries) ' Notes a World

50.86

30.05 18.70 13.01 7.07 2.49 2.36 1.35 0.99

imports and EC imports exclude intra-EC rrade. b Includes Vietnam, a non-member of WTO; dara nor avatlahlc fur D e m o c ~ t l c People's Republic ot Korea. c Includes some countries not members of rhe WTO. d Dara not available for I3 countries ("on-members

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