Democracy on the edge Populism and protest A research paper for the BBC’s Democracy day, January 20th 2015, by The Economist Intelligence Unit
www.eiu.com
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Contents Introduction
2
Highlights and key findings
3
Part I: Populism
6
Rise of the populists
1
6
Main drivers of populism
11
Future shock
25
Part II: Protest
31
A new age of protest?
31
Types of protest movement
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Catalysts and common denominators
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The shape of things to come
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Appendix I: Populist party profiles
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Appendix II: The world in protests
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Introduction
T
his paper explores the recent upsurge of populist and protest movements, especially in Europe, but also in other regions of the world. In Part I, we look at how the ascendancy of populism in Europe has been driven by the exhaustion of historical political parties and their estrangement from their old social constituencies. In Part II, we look at how protest movements demanding political and social change in many developing countries are being mobilised by the increasing social weight of their middle classes and their dissatisfaction with political elites. The report examines the broader political, social and cultural mainsprings of contemporary populist and protest movements. We conclude by discussing what it all means for the future of democracy. Do populist and protest movements pose a threat to democracy or are they potentially a vehicle for reviving its fortunes?
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Highlights and key findings l With 10 parliamentary elections being contested in Europe in 2015, there is ample scope for populists to cause political earthquakes, by winning elections and forcing the mainstream parties into previously unthinkable alliances. l The appeal of populism is not confined to any particular subregion of Europe, whether the richer countries of Scandinavia, the euro zone core, the euro zone periphery or the Eurosceptic UK. l The emergence of many populist movements in the richer north European countries, or in the heartland of the euro zone (Germany), indicates that they are not the product solely (or even primarily) of the economic crisis that has consumed Europe since 2008. l Populism is not the exclusive preserve of the right. There have been "right-wing" movements in places such as the UK and Sweden, but "left-wing" parties have emerged in Spain and Greece. l The defining feature of contemporary populism is that it articulates a deep-seated antagonism between the European populace and political elite. l Populism as a political discourse is essentially positing a moral contest between the people and the elites. l Populism attempts to mobilise and cohere communities on the basis of the alternative choices and policies it offers. It provides a rallying point for those wanting to be part of a political culture that acknowledges their values. l The exhaustion of the historical mainstream political parties that commanded the post-war (post1945) political landscape in Europe has opened up a space for the populists to occupy. l The tendency to dismiss the upsurge of populism in Europe as a "protest vote" or an anti-austerity "backlash" is a way of evading some uncomfortable truths about what the rise of Euro-populism represents. l The assumption that populism is a passing fad that will fade away once conditions in Europe return to "normal" is misplaced. l The rise of populist parties is the flip side of the high level of abstention in European elections: both are expressions of the dwindling popular appeal of the mainstream political parties. l Parties of both the left and the right—which dominated the post-war body politic—have lost touch with their traditional supporters and lost votes and influence. l Despite a clear correlation between equality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) and voter commitment, the examples of Norway, Denmark and Sweden show that even the most equal and prosperous societies are not immune to the appeal of populism.
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l Increasingly technocratic political parties end up not only alienating their own members, but also their broader support base: the decline of party membership is paralleled by the breakdown of relations between parties and their traditional electoral, class and social constituencies. l The emergence of a chasm between “us and them” is at the root of the decline in party memberships and the growing political disengagement of European electorates. l Convergence towards the centre, with parties espousing the same ideology-free policies, means that mainstream politics has become devoid of real content and made populist parties look positively appealing by comparison. l The rupturing of the relationship between Europe's post-war political parties and their traditional supporters has paved the way for the rise of populist parties. l There has been a long-term secular trend of declining trust in politicians and in parties throughout the Western world since the 1970s, which now amounts to a full-blown legitimacy crisis. l The UK is on the cusp of a potentially prolonged period of political instability. The fragmentation of voters’ preferences, combined with the first-past-the-post electoral system, will make it increasingly difficult to form the kind of single-party governments with a parliamentary majority that have been the norm. l If there is a crisis of democracy, it has not been created by the populists now bestriding Europe's hollowed-out political centre. The crisis is about the growing gap between elites and electorates; it is about a widening cultural divide between the worldview of Europe's elites and the values of Europe's voters; and it is about a gaping big hole at the heart of European politics where big ideas should be. l Alongside the rise to prominence of populist movements, an upsurge of popular protest has swept across the global map in recent years, and no region has been immune to its spread. l We estimate that significant protest movements occurred in more than 90 countries in the period we have examined (2009-14), that is, in 56.4% of all countries. l There are three broad types of protest movement: anti-austerity; anti-authoritarian; and anti-elite or what we call New Social Movements. l The catalysts for these various types of protest movement vary, but all of them share some common features—a disavowal of politics and ideology, and a self-conscious rejection of organisation and leadership—that set them apart from the sorts of protests that were common in the 20th century. l What appears to be decisive in recent times in firing unrest is the erosion of trust in governments, institutions, parties and politicians—what is generally termed "the crisis of democracy". l In the main (although not exclusively), they are led by young, educated, middle-class individuals who resent their political leaders. They do not generally belong to political parties or trade unions, and prefer Twitter and other social networks to the traditional political soap box.
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l Insofar as many recent protest movements express a widespread sense of disappointment with democracy and a distrust of political leaders and institutions, we believe there are likely to be more of these types of protest.
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Part I: Populism Rise of the populists* *In the appendix at the end of the report, we have provided profiles of 20 European populist and anti-mainstream parties. Populist parties and movements, of the left, the right and the indeterminate, are cutting a swathe through the European political landscape and leaving the political establishment quaking in its boots. These parties are moving into the space that has opened up between the old political parties and their traditional social base. Opposition to governance from Brussels, immigration and austerity are key themes and rallying cries for many of these parties. With 10 national elections being contested in 2015, there is ample scope for the new populists to cause political earthquakes, by winning elections and forcing the mainstream parties into previously unthinkable alliances. Even where there is no election on the immediate agenda, the populist parties are likely to make further inroads into the support of the mainstream parties and set the terms of political debate. As Greece prepares to vote in the snap parliamentary election on January 25th 2015, polls show the far-left Syriza Unifying Social Front (Syriza) party leading by a margin of 3 percentage points, with between 27% and 32% of the vote, over the centre-right, senior government party, New Democracy (ND). A Syriza win would send shock waves through the EU and act as a catalyst for political upheaval elsewhere. In the UK, the anti-EU and anti-immigrant UK Independence Party (UKIP) won the May 2014 European Parliament elections and was polling 13-14% in YouGov polls of voting intentions in early 2015. The UK electoral system is likely to prevent UKIP from achieving parliamentary representation commensurate with its nationwide polling average, but it has already scored a victory in shifting the political agenda onto its terrain. The Danish People's Party (DF) broke new ground on a populist, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration platform in Denmark's May 2014 European Parliament elections, increasing its share of the vote from 15.3% in 2009 to 26.6%, setting a marker for the national general election in September 2015. The DF pushed the governing Social Democrats into second place with 19.1%, while the crisis-ridden Liberal Party was reduced to 16.7%. The Finns Party (or "True Finns") is typically left-wing, but the party programme contains elements of nationalism and social conservatism, which has drawn support from the right in Finland. Many of its supporters consider themselves to be centrist. The party is Eurosceptic, and although it does not seek to leave the EU, it would cut Finland's contributions to the EU budget and control immigration. Support for The Finns surged from 4% in the 2007 election to 19.1% in 2011. The formation in June 2011 of a diverse, six-party coalition government in Finland was a direct response to this resurgence in support for The Finns. The party was polling around 13-14% in late 2014.
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In Spain, the region of Catalonia is pushing for independence, while at a national level the traditional two-party dominance of the governing Popular Party (PP) and its main rival, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), is on the verge of collapse as disaffected voters turn to the left-wing anti-establishment party, Podemos. Founded only in 2014, Podemos could form part of a coalition government after the December 2015 election. In France, the electorate's patience with the mainstream parties has evaporated and there is a surge in support for anti-establishment politics, in this case the far-right Front National (FN). It remains to be seen how the Charlie Hebdo killings by French Islamist extremists will affect the approval ratings of the president, François Hollande, and the support levels of the FN. Regional elections in March 2015 will be a key test for both the FN and the mainstream political parties. In Sweden, the far-right, anti-immigration Sweden Democrats (SD) more than doubled their share of the vote in the September 2014 election, compared with the previous election, winning 12.9% and 49 seats in parliament, giving them the balance of power between the governing Social Democratic Party (SAP), with 113, and the main opposition Moderate Party, with 84. In the so-called December Agreement of 2014, the two mainstream parties joined forces to avoid holding an early election and to marginalise the SD. In Germany, approval ratings of around 7% for the anti-euro Alternative for Germany (AfD), formed in 2013, suggest that it will easily pass the threshold for entry into parliament at the next election in 2017. The AfD achieved a significant share of the vote in three state elections in eastern Germany in October 2014, after winning 7% at the European Parliament elections in May 2014, and is breaking new ground in a country where many would least have expected a populist party breakthrough. In the US, the Tea Party wing of the Republican Party, which encapsulates populist, conservative and libertarian elements, has pursued a similar agenda to some of the right-wing variants of the European populist movements, since its leaders first came to prominence in the aftermath of the 2007-08 global and financial crisis. Its focus has lately shifted from advocacy of fiscal restraint and small government towards opposing the immigration policies of the president, Barack Obama. In Ireland, immigration is not such an issue, but popular discontent with the results of Ireland's austerity programme is rife and so is popular disappointment with the EU. The May 2014 European Parliament elections were a vehicle for Irish people to express their anger against the ruling parties, Fine Gael and Labour. The left-wing nationalist Sinn Fein made the most gains and polled 19.5%, winning support from Labour Party voters for its anti-austerity stance.
Geography of populism Our database of populist parties (see Appendix I) provides profiles of 20 of Europe's populist-type parties. It profiles the most influential parties, but is by no means exhaustive. What is immediately obvious at a glance, however, is the wide geographical spread of the populists. It is apparent that the appeal of populism is not confined to any particular subregion of Europe, whether the richer countries of Scandinavia, the euro zone core, the euro zone periphery or the Eurosceptic UK. Only
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in eastern Europe are high-polling populist parties of the sort seen in western Europe conspicuous by their virtual absence (although in government in Hungary is a party that possesses many of the attributes of western Europe's populists). Here abstention and cynicism, rather than mobilisation behind populist parties, have been the norm, reflecting the region's particular post-communist experience. The wide geographical spread of populism casts doubt on the notion that populism is primarily a reaction generated by anger at the austerity policies pursued in the aftermath of the euro zone crisis. That many populist movements have emerged or come to prominence in the richer northern European countries, or in the heartland of the euro zone (Germany), indicates that they are not the product solely (and not even primarily) of the economic crisis that has consumed Europe since 2007-08. Indeed, as will be seen, populism's mainsprings and focus are not primarily economic ones. It is also worth noting that many European populist movements predated the economic crash of 2007-08, even if they achieved greater prominence in ensuing years.
Political anatomy of Euro-populism The term "populism" has acquired negative connotations in political and media discourse in recent years—but that was not always the case historically (see the section entitled "Theorising populism", below). Indeed, the terms in which established politicians, and even sections of the media, discuss populism have become increasingly condemnatory as populist movements have come to threaten the political status quo in Europe. We do not attach any negative connotation in our usage of the term. Populism in its contemporary manifestation in Europe is, however, a difficult concept to pin down. Typically, the designation "populist" is used disparagingly to denote parties of the right and extreme right espousing anti-immigrant, xenophobic and socially conservative values and views. However, in Europe in recent years populism has not been the exclusive preserve of the right. There have been "right-wing" movements in places such as the UK and Sweden, but "left-wing" parties have emerged in Spain and Greece.
Left and right Historically, populism has been as much associated with the left as the right. One of the first populist movements to emerge in the early days of capitalism in Britain, the Chartists of the 1830s and 1840s, whose concerns were shaped by the nascent class relations spawned by the industrial revolution, was recognisably of the leftist variant. In the US too, a Georgetown University historian, Michael Kazin, emphasises the importance of populism for the left (The Populist Persuasion: an American History, NY, 1995). Another US historian and social critic, Christopher Lasch, pointed to the democratic and egalitarian impulses that made populism a source of inspiration for the left, even if from the 1940s onwards populist movements came to be associated more with the right wing (The True and Only Heaven, NY, 1991). Populism's appeal to both left and right in the US derived from its emergence as a reaction to both the free market and state intervention. We use the terms "right" and "left" very loosely to describe a broad political orientation, but many populist parties are not easily classified by using the political terminology of the 20th century.
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Many populist parties do not easily fit into such standard categorisation or tick a "right" or "left" box. For example, the Eurosceptic Finns Party in Finland espouses economic policies that are characteristically left wing, but its programme is socially conservative and insular (see Appendix I). Some populists combine views that are typically regarded as right-wing with others that are seen as left-wing. In keeping with this more fluid political orientation, many parties have managed to attract support from voters from both sides of the political spectrum, who had previously voted for centre-right or centre-left parties. For example, in the October 2014 German regional elections in the eastern länder of Brandenburg, Thuringia and Saxony, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 12.2%, 10.6% and 9.7% of the vote, respectively, attracting support from voters who had in the past voted for the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SDP), the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP).
Theorising populism In a recent review of the literature, two Harvard scholars, Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, outline three potential directions from which one could analyse the concept of populism.1 First, they conceptualise populism as a kind of “thin-centred” ideology that does not quite answer all the pressing socioeconomic questions but does capture the antagonism felt between the public and the elite. Second, populism is a political discourse that constructs a moral battle between the public and elite. Third, populism is a strategy of sorts, which focuses on choices, policies and acts of mobilisation. A broad conception of populism (illustrated in Figure 1) is a particularly useful one, which we believe points to some of the key factors behind the appeal and rise of modern-day Euro-populism. Figure 1 Three aspects of populism
Able to seize upon the issues of the day
Discursive style
Ideology
Gidron and Bonikowski. Source: http://scholar. harvard.edu/ files/gidron_ bonikowski_ populismlitreview _2013.pdf 1
Constructs a moral struggle between public and elite
Uses antagonism between public and elite
Anti-system and anti-establishment appeals
Strategy Economic and social policies of mass mobilisation Source: Gidron and Bonikowski (2013).
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First, we would agree that the defining feature of contemporary populism is that it articulates a deep-seated antagonism between the European populace and political elite. That conflict between the man on the street and a distant and increasingly alien political class is at the heart of the populist challenge to the old political order in Europe. As we have discussed, populism comes in many shapes and sizes, but its basic premise that the existing political establishment no longer represents the people is the key to unlocking its widespread appeal. As we discuss in subsequent sections, the estrangement of the European political establishment from the mass of ordinary voters is now profound. This has allowed populism to come into its own over the past decade. Second, the idea that populism as a political discourse is essentially positing a moral contest between the people and the elites is very helpful. Contrary to the widely held view that Europopulism's rise is just a protest vote or a backlash inspired by economic grievances against politicians who have mishandled the euro zone crisis, populism's challenge is not founded on resentment at economic circumstances that will eventually dissipate. The factors that have propelled the populists to prominence, and to the verge of political power in some countries such as Greece and Spain, cannot be reduced to narrow economic matters. Populism today represents a much broader moral, social and cultural challenge to the old established parties, one that offers an alternative between two different ways of life—one that expresses the technocratic, metropolitan values of the political elites and one that gives due consideration to the concerns, values and traditions that ordinary people hold dear. In this sense, populism represents not just a political challenge to the mainstream parties, but a moral and cultural one too. The third element of populism which Gidron and Bonikowski highlight is its attempt to mobilise and cohere communities on the basis of the alternative choices and policies it offers. This is something that unites all the populist movements, regardless of their orientation to the right or left. They provide a rallying point for the million of people across Europe who feel disconnected from the political mainstream and yet want to be part of a political culture that recognises their concerns and aspirations and gives them due consideration. The importance of populism's ability to mobilise people in a common cause should not be underestimated in an era characterised largely by abstention and disengagement from the democratic process, based on popular alienation from the technocratic-style politics on offer from the mainstream political parties. Underneath the demonstrations mobilised by the anti-Islamist Pegida movement in Germany or Podemos in Spain lies a seldom-articulated desire for people to feel a sense of belonging to society. So when the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, tells people to stay at home and not attend the demonstrations, because they do not express German values or are a threat to democracy, she is an unwitting recruiting sergeant for the very movement which she feels threatens the political monopoly of the three established post-war parties.
Why now? Populism in all its guises has been around for a long time, in Europe, the US and elsewhere. The history of populist movements is an interesting one, but history can reveal very little about the
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nature of the phenomenon today and why it has suddenly become a potent political force. In our discussion of the political anatomy of contemporary populism, we have tried to elucidate what is specific about populism today. The emergence of so many variants of populism in Europe over the past decade is striking, but it is only over the past few years that populism seems to have captured the popular imagination and catapulted onto the political centre stage. In fact, some of the most successful populist-style parties, such as the Front National (FN) in France, have been around for decades and have even had great success in the past. However, the FN today is a different beast from its 1990s incarnation, both in terms of its political appeal and its support levels. A new political space seems to have opened up in the second decade of the 21st century in Europe, which is increasingly being filled by new-style populist parties of varied hues. To understand why that space has been created and what has shaped the particular modern manifestation of populism, we need to take a closer look at what has happened to the historical mainstream political parties that commanded the post-war (post-1945) political landscape in Europe. A political vacuum has opened in Europe as a result of the exhaustion of those parties' ideologies and the dissolution of their previous strong connections with their social constituencies. This process has been in train for decades, and has been widely commented on in the academic and political literature, so it is surprising that it has taken so long for the populists to make the breakthrough that occurred in the most spectacular way at the European Parliament elections in May 2014.
Main drivers of populism The tendency to dismiss the upsurge of populism in Europe as a "protest vote" or anti-austerity "backlash" is a way of evading some uncomfortable truths about what the rise of Euro-populism represents. The assumption is that populism is a passing fad that will fade away once conditions in Europe return to "normal". By definition a protest vote is different from a normal vote and should not be taken that seriously. It is a way of registering anger and nothing more. It is certainly not something that presents a real challenge to the political system. Eventually Europe's protest voters will calm down and see sense and return to the mainstream political fold. These rather patronising assumptions are likely to be exposed as fallacies in 2015, when around a dozen European countries go to the polls and some shocks are administered to the post-war political system in the region.
Democracy in decline The rise of populist parties is the flip side of the high level of abstention in European elections (see Figure 2 on turnout in European Parliament elections). Both are expressions of the exhaustion of traditional, mainstream political parties in Europe and the latter's dwindling popular appeal. Voter turnout in European Parliament elections has declined over the past 20 years, from already low levels in the mid-1980s, even in core member states such as Germany and France. In the UK, where Euroscepticism was strong from the outset, the voter turnout percentage has remained in
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Figure 2 EU parliamentary election turnout (% of voting age population)
Overall turnout
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Source: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
the 30% range. What is striking is how Euroscepticism, or at the very least disappointment with the workings of the EU, as expressed in growing abstention levels, is now spreading among previously devout pro-Europeans in France and Germany. The rising abstention trend since 2000 has coincided with the rise of generally Eurosceptic populist parties more or less across the board. Figure 3 shows the growing share of the vote in European Parliament elections for anti-EU parties in France and Austria in the form of the Front Figure 3 Share of vote in parliamentary elections (%)
FPO (Austria)
FN (France)
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Source: Mudde and Kaltwasser (2011).
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National (FN) and the Freedom Party (FPO), respectively. In the May 2014 euro elections populist parties of both left and right made sweeping gains (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 Share of vote in 2014 EU elections (%)
Mapping the decline
UKIP
26.8
Syriza
26.6
FN
24.9
The decline of the traditional left and right parties 21.2 M5S in Europe has been evident since the late 1970s 19.7 FPO and especially the 1980s. Parties of both the left Source: European Parliament. (social democratic, socialist, communist) and the right (Christian Democratic, conservative, etc)— which dominated the post-war body politic—have lost touch with their traditional supporters and lost votes and influence. During the 1970s (see Figure 5), more than 90% of all eligible Italians voted in their parliamentary elections. This has now fallen to less than 70%. The decline accelerated in the 1990s. Popular disaffection with government and traditional parties has been expressed in rising abstention and, more recently, rising support for the Five Star Movement and Lega Nord. In fact, a revamped Lega Nord under the renewed leadership of Matteo Salvini has shown signs that it could challenge Forza Italia (FI) as the dominant party on the centre-right. In Germany, voter turnout has also been declining in recent decades, and that has been the case across all age groups, especially among younger people (see Figure 6). Anti-politics and anti-system sentiment is on the rise. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, voters initially flocked to the ballot box.
Figure 5 G7 parliamentary election turnout (excl. US) (% of voting age population)
UK
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
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40 1976
40 1978
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
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Source: IDEA.
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Figure 6 German non-voters at 2013 election (%) 50
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Source: Konrad-Ardenauer-Siftung, Der Spiegel.
Yet gradually the numbers have dwindled. No longer are electoral abstainers made up of the poor and poorly educated. Now even people who used to vote regularly are choosing to abstain. In the past, abstaining in parliamentary elections in Germany would have carried a social stigma and been considered embarrassing. However, as popular disillusionment with political parties has grown, the idea of not voting has become acceptable and even fashionable (there is even a “non-voters” movement). In the UK, electoral turnout has fallen from around 75% in the 1990s to 60% and below in the new millennium. The ("New") Labour Party under Tony Blair won three landslide elections, but, to put "landslide" into perspective, only around 60% of the population voted in 2001 and 2005, which was 10 percentage points lower than in 1997 when he came to power. Labour received 43.2% of the vote in 1997, 40.75% in 2001 and 35.2% in 2005.
Equality trumps apathy—but not voter dissatisfaction When we look at the five most equal societies in the world, as measured by the Gini coefficient—Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Belgium—there appears to be a correlation between equality and voter commitment. Figure 7 shows the electoral turnout in these five nations over the past 40 years. Although
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Peter Mair’s data, discussed below, show a big decline in political party membership in these countries, there is not the same kind of fall in electoral turnout as occurred in the G7 countries. In the five countries with the greatest equality of income, the decline in electoral turnout of the votingage population is much less pronounced than in the G7. There has been a downward trend in voter turnout in these five egalitarian societies, but in only one has it decreased by more than 10 percentage points.
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Equality trumps apathy—but not voter dissatisfaction (continued) That there is a correlation between levels of equality and levels of voter participation seems to be supported by the example of the Scandinavian countries. Yet populist parties are making their mark here too, even if voter abstention is not really a serious issue. In Finland, The Finns Party, which has been winning popular support with its antiimmigration and anti-euro policies, won 19.1% of the vote in the most recent national election and 12.9% of the vote in the May 2014 European Parliament elections. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party polled 12.3% of the vote in the most recent national election and 26.6% at the May 2014 euro elections. The Progress Party in Norway won 16.3% of the vote
in the most recent national election. The Sweden Democrats won 12.9% of the vote in the 2014 national election, having won a 9.7% share at the euro polls. The implications of the Scandinavian example are disturbing for the mainstream parties. Voter turnout is high in these prosperous countries because the system functions effectively and voters believe that their voices will be heard. Yet even here, where voters are relatively well off, where electoral democracy and government function well, where there is a democratic political culture and civil liberties are upheld, voters are turning to the populists for something that they feel the mainstream parties are not providing. The inability of the mainstream parties to connect with the broader cultural and existential concerns of their electorates is fuelling the rise of the populists here as in the rest of Europe.
Figure 7 Electoral turnout in the most equal societies (% of voting age population)
Peter Mair. Source: http://www. versobooks.com/ books/1447-rulingthe-void. Cited in: http://blogs.ft.com/ off-message/2014/ 11/19/the-void-inbritish-politics/ 2
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Norway
Denmark
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Finland
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60 60 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Source: IDEA, World Bank.
Party membership in decline Another feature of political decay in recent decades has been the secular decline in membership of the mainstream political parties across Europe, on both sides of the political spectrum. As Peter Mair shows in Ruling the Void, there is a staggering fall in membership numbers across a range of major democracies.2 Figure 8 shows that the decline from 1980 to 2009 was as much as 66%, 62% and 56% in the UK, Norway and France, respectively.
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Figure 8 Statistics taken from The World Values Survey Change in party membership 1980-2009 reveal that for most countries, political party (%) membership is below 15% of the population, UK and of those 15%, the vast majority is comprised Norway of “inactive” members (see a selection of these France countries in Figure 9). Membership of the mainstream UK political Sweden parties has been in long-term decline, but this Ireland became marked in the 1970s and precipitate Switzerland in the late 1980s (see Figure 10 for post-war Finland party membership). By the turn of the century, Denmark UK political parties were pale shadows of their Italy former selves, struggling to retain members and to finance themselves. In recent years, the only Belgium party whose membership has been growing is Austria the UK Independence Party (UKIP), and by 2013 Netherlands membership of the two major parties had fallen Germany below 200,000 (see Figure 11). -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 Paul Whiteley, an academic at the University Source: Peter Mair, John McDermott. of Sussex, considers two possible reasons for the decline in party membership across the democratic world.3 The first is that voluntary activity has been Figure 9 Political party membership (%)
Paul Whiteley (2010). Source: http://www.tcd.ie/ Political_Science/ undergraduate/ module-outlines/ss/ political-parties/PolP/ WhiteleyPartyPols11. pdf
Inactive members
Active member
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le ap or e Ro m an ia Ge rm an y Br az il Li b Ne ya th er la nd s Ja pa n Tu rk ey Po la nd Sp ai n Eg yp t
Ch i
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Si
ca Af ri
US Ni ge r ia Me xic Ne o w Ze al an d Sw ed en Ar ge nt in Au a st ra lia
So
ut h
In
di a
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Source: World Values Survey.
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Figure 10 Post-war UK political party membership (000s) 3,000
3,000
2,500
2,500
2,000
2,000
1,500
1,500
1,000
1,000
500
500
0
0 1947 1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: House of Commons Library.
undermined by the relationship between political parties and the state. This is his “state capture” idea, which hypothesises that the proximity of the party to the state turns volunteers into unpaid state bureaucrats. The second possible cause he argues is the rise of relatively new forms of political participation, which are not party-membership-oriented, driven by developments in social media and technology in the 21st century, for example.
Figure 11 2013 UK Party Membership (000s) 200
200
150
150
100
100
50
50
0
0 Labour
Cons
Lib Dems
UKIP
SNP
Green
BNP
Source: HoCL.
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Figure 12 Number of elections with record low turnout or volatility (15 Western European countries)
Low turnouts
Volatile elections
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0 1950-59
1960-69
1970-79
1980-89
1990-99
2000-09
Source: Peter Mair (2013), John McDermott.
The empirical evidence examined by Mr Whiteley seems to support the first explanation more than the second. He writes that “as parties get closer to the state and become more professionalised, they find it easier to ignore their volunteers.” Increasingly state-oriented and technocratic political parties end up not only alienating their own members, but also their broader support base. The breakdown of relations between parties and members is paralleled by the breakdown of relations between parties and their traditional social constituencies. Figure 12 shows how the breakdown in party identification has led not only to growing abstention but also to greater volatility across major democracies. The emergence of a chasm between “us and them” is at the root of the decline in party memberships and the growing political disengagement of European electorates. In his 2010 article, Mr Whiteley writes, somewhat prophetically, that “such a development [of weakened party identification] is likely to lead to lower turnouts, more support for anti-system parties and problems of governance in general”. Whiteley’s prediction that the traditional European parties would face an increasing challenge from anti-system parties is most prophetic of all.
Parties have lost their moorings The rupturing of the relationship between Europe's post-war political parties and their traditional support base—especially, but not exclusively, the relationship between social democratic, labour and other left-wing parties and their working-class supporters—has paved the way for the rise of populist parties.
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The erosion of the post-war political order began in the 1970s, as the post-war economic boom came to an end. It accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, so that by the turn of the century the political system and the parties that represented it bore little relation to their forebears of the 1950s and 1960s. The traditional parties of the left and right in Europe are at the tail end of an identity crisis that began several decades ago. The right-wing conservative and Christian-democratic parties that dominated the political scene in the post-war period have been losing their connection with their former voters. The social democratic and labour parties have likewise experienced a dramatic decline in influence as a result of the breakdown of their relationship with their social base. The large communist parties that had such influence in continental Europe in the post-war years have disappeared from view. The decline of the UK Labour Party is one of the most dramatic examples of this trend. Up until the late 1970s, the Labour Party's identity as the party of the trade unions and of the working class was unquestioned. In the era of consensus politics, Labour's role as the parliamentary representative of the trade unions was to mediate the often conflictual relationship between the employers and the working class. But, as the long economic boom after the second world war came to an end, everything began to change. The austerity policies of James Callaghan’s Labour government of 1974-79 demoralised the unions and helped to prepare the ground for the subsequent more confrontational approach of the Conservative prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and her war against the unions. Many of the policies pursued by the Thatcher governments of the 1980s found their echo in Reaganomics across the Atlantic and in the austerity policies pursued across the Channel by Socialist governments in France and Spain. In the post-war years after 1945, when the British economy was growing and prospering in the 1950s and 1960s, consensus politics was the order of the day. British politics was characterised by a tripartite system of bargaining involving the state, the employers and the trade unions. Leaders of the TUC (Trades Union Congress) walked in the corridors of power and played a central role in managing industrial conflict and ensuring that the capitalist system operated smoothly. Economic recession in the 1970s put this system under strain, as employers sought to restore profitability by shaking out industry and the state imposed cuts in welfare spending. When Mrs Thatcher declared her commitment to “killing socialism in Britain”, the greengrocer’s daughter from Grantham, who despised the unions and everything they represented, was declaring her intention to dismantle the politics of consensus and its institutions and to pursue a confrontational approach more suited to the crisis conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The damage done to Labour under the Callaghan and Thatcher governments was extensive. Labour's state socialist policies were seen to have failed and the Labour government's "betrayals" of the late 1970s were not forgotten. Between 1945 and 1979, one-half of Britain’s trade union members voted Labour, but by 1983 that figure had fallen to 39%. During the 1960s, approximately 65% of the working-class vote went to Labour; by the 1980s, this had fallen to 50%.
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As increasing numbers of workers voted for the Tories under Margaret Thatcher, attracted by the offer to buy their own council houses and to move up the social ladder, Labour leaders and acolytes accused the working class (especially the C2s, the skilled manual workers represented by "Basildon Man") of "selfishness" and individualism. The aspirations of millions of working-class people to own their own home and make a better life for themselves were dismissed out of hand by a Labour Party that had lost touch with its former social base. Basildon Man, the caricature of the greedy, upwardly mobile, parvenu worker, was followed by Essex Girl and comic Harry Enfield's "Loadsamoney", in the sneering lexicon of Labour's celebrity cheerleaders, signalling the growing distance in values between the Labour elite and many of its former working-class supporters.
The bland politics of the centre The story of how Labour lost its once-privileged relationship with the British working class finds its echo in the rest of Europe, where left- and right-wing parties have lost touch with their former social constituencies and are suffering a crisis of identity. The result, in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, has been convergence of left and right towards the political centre and the emergence of technocratic parties and centrist politics. The political landscape of the early 21st century is a barren one, devoid of big ideas, debate, passion and contestation. The traditional parties that inhabit it are colourless and bland. They have all the appeal of processed white bread. They are rudderless and lacking direction, and have drifted far away from their former support bases. The contrast with a century ago could not be more stark. For much of the 20th century, political life was dominated by radically different alternatives. Competing political philosophies offered contrasting visions of the good society. The clash of ideologies was intense, and this gave individuals an identity that said something important about how they saw themselves. Contrasting views about society informed political discourse and also shaped the conduct of everyday politics. Today there has been a convergence towards the centre, with all parties essentially espousing the same ideology-free policies. Where political life was once defined by debates about the very nature of the economic system, today the search by political parties for a "big idea" has run aground. The disappearance of compelling political ideologies of right or left has meant that politics has become devoid of real content. This has fed popular cynicism with the mainstream political parties and made the populist parties look positively appealing by comparison.
A legitimacy crisis There has been a long-term secular trend of declining trust throughout the Western world since the 1970s. This accelerated and spread after the collapse of communism in 1989, and has sped up again since the 2008-09 crisis, as has been well documented in regular surveys by Gallup, Pew, Eurobarometer and others. In 2007 trust in the EU and in national governments and parliaments peaked according to Eurobarometer's bi-annual surveys (see Figure 13). Since then there has been a steady decline in popular trust in governments and political parties in Europe (although the latest survey in late 2014 shows a modest upturn).
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Figure 13 Trust in EU political institutions (% who tend to trust)
EU
National governments
National parliaments
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20 2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: Eurobarometer.
Polling from Pew Global Research reveals widespread “disillusionment with elected leaders”. Apart from Angela Merkel, people in the core EU economies do not think that their respective leaders have dealt with the economic crisis well. In Spain, the UK, France and Italy, less than 40% of the population think that their leaders have handled the crisis well, according to Pew (see Figure 14). The biggest falls in the percentage of people who thought that their country’s leaders were dealing well with the euro zone crisis were in France and Italy, both with a decline of 23 percentage points Figure 14 Leaders in disrepute (% who think leader has dealt with economic crisis well)
2012
80
2013 80
70
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
0 Germany
Spain
France*
Britain
Poland
Italy
Greece*
Czech Rep.
Note: * Change of leader between the two polls. Source: PEW Research.
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between 2012 and 2013. In 2012, France elected the Socialist Party candidate, François Hollande, as president. (This change in the executive is shown by the * next to France in Figure 14.) Mr Hollande has become one of the most unpopular French presidents of all time. Figures 15 and 16, from the World Values Survey, show that confidence in political parties tends to be even lower than confidence in government (China's higher approval ratings stand out). Figure 15 Confidence in government (%)
A great deal
7
Tunisia Libya
Spain
5
United States
Other
45
8
38
8
27
36
32 1 30 2
48
18 4
Germany
None at all
32
9
2
Not very much
29
11 13
Brazil
Quite a lot
14 2
51
29 6
44
39
China
38
10 2 61
47
8
Source: WVS.
Figure 16 Confidence in political parties (%)
A great deal
Libya
3
3
15
Spain 1
China
61 60 25
14
53
10 9
30 2 65
21
20 2 58
27
Other
59 1
11 3
None at all
28
Brazil 1
Germany
Not very much
23
Tunisia 1 2
United States 1
Quite a lot
47
16 3 12 1
12
Source: WVS.
In the UK, the general opinion of politicians is exceptionally poor. A poll by Ipsos Mori in 2013 found that 52% of people thought that politicians put their own interests first, in front of the interests of their constituents, country and party (see Figure 17). This view of MPs as venal and selfinterested is characteristic of recent decades, but stands in contrast to the state of affairs in the first few decades after the second world war.
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Figure 17 Whose interests do you think MPs put first? (% of respondents)
Their own
1994
Their party’s
1996 2006
Their constituents’
52
26 56 28
2013
62 52
Other
Don’t know
11 27
45
2009
The country’s
5 1 7
9 21 31
7 8
5
5 1
4
14 1
3
5 1
4
6 1 2
Source: Ipsos Mori.
The chart illustrates well the divide felt between the average Briton and politicians. Even with the constituency-based electoral system, Britons feel that MPs on the whole have little regard for their constituents. In Figure 19 there is no particularly noticeable trend since January 1994, when the poll was first conducted. Yet, what remains constant is that the public feels that their representatives are more concerned with their own gain and their parties’ gain.
Enter the populists Into the gap that has opened up between elites and electorates have stepped the Euro-populists. Over-emphasis on economic mainsprings of the new populists ignores an important dynamic of populist politics—its appeal to electorates who feel completely alienated from their own political elites. The growing distance between the political mainstream, whether in Brussels or Westminster or Paris, and the mass of the population is now being filled by Europe's populist parties. They have been able to connect with people's hankering for a sense of belonging and community through focusing on issues of identity, culture, tradition, and so forth. The populists present themselves as the champions of the people in their revolt against remote, out-of-touch, privileged political elites. This is the overall context in which we should understand the appeal of populism in Europe.
Democratic decay: a developed-country disease? The regressive trend in electoral turnout in the developed countries is less prevalent in developing nations, whose democratisation is still in progress or not at the same level as those in the G7 (see Figure 18). There is a trend towards declining turnout over the past decade in these countries too. However, turnout has not fallen below 70% as has been the case for the G7 countries. In these countries, it has not yet been the case
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that populists have been able to profit from an anti-establishment zeitgeist. Nevertheless, in some developing countries, populist-style leaders and parties have come to power in recent years. As an example of populist ascendancy in Latin America, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2011) look at the electoral successes of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. After their elections, support for Mr Chavez and Mr Morales remained very high (note that in Figure 19, we plot a data point for 2013 in Venezuela, which was after Chavez’s death, since when support for his party has declined).
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Democratic decay: a developed country disease? (continued) Figure 18 Turnouts in parliamentary elections in developing countries (% of voting age population) Brazil
India
Turkey
Indonesia
100
100
90
90
80
80
70
70
60
60
50
50
40
40 30
30 1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: IDEA.
There is a very long tradition of populism in Latin America that has responded to high levels of poverty and especially income inequality in the region, which pits the poor masses against an elite that is often viewed as corrupt. Mr Chavez and Mr Morales came to power promising to address the problems of the poor majority. More specifically, Mr Chavez came to power on an anti-corruption ticket that promised to sweep away the corrupt institutions of the two-party elite that had dominated power in the country for decades. Mr Morales came to power some years later promising to address the needs of the neglected, poor indigenous majority. In this sense, it is appropriate to call them populists—but of a distinctive, modern Latin American type. The mainsprings and the make-up of Latin American populism today is quite different from the trend in Europe, even if superficially they have some common features.
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Popular disappointment The problem is that, despite constitutional reforms early on in both the Chavez and Morales governments, results have inevitably failed to meet the heightened expectations that their electoral victories created. In the Venezuelan case, persistent corruption and weak institutions, combined with economic mismanagement, have meant that the state, under Mr Chavez’s successor, Nicolas Maduro, is now failing to meet basic needs for security and housing. The Chavez movement has been so reliant on the man himself, and the devotion that he inspired, there is only so long that the Bolivarian movement can continue without him. Things are going better for Mr Morales, but there is still disappointment from the indigenous community and from the right of the political spectrum. Another disappointment, relevant certainly to
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Democratic decay: a developed country disease? (continued) the Venezuelan case at least, is that populism has sometimes gone hand in hand with caudillo politics that in its most severe form has led to dictatorship, but has in a weaker form just meant that charismatic presidents in political systems with a strong executive have dominated politics—partly because of weak institutions and partly to the detriment of institutions.
The use of mass mobilisations by populist governments can work against them if things go wrong. Argentina, for example, has a very strong tradition of public protest precisely because of this history. Governments have sometimes harnessed it to their benefit, but it can backfire once things go wrong.
Figure 19 Share of vote in parliamentary elections (%)
Morales
Chavez*
80
80
70
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
0
0 1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
* Chavez did not contest the 2013 election himself, as he died before it took place. Source: Mudde and Kaltwasser (2011).
Future shock The year 2015 may come to be remembered as the year that populist parties broke the mould of traditional politics in Europe. It is due to be a busy year for politicians across Europe, where parliamentary elections are being held in Greece, the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Portugal and Spain, and where we expect an early election in Italy. In most of these elections there is no obvious clear winner. There is a common denominator in these countries: the rise of populist parties. Anti-establishment sentiment has surged across the euro zone (and the larger EU) and the risk of political disruption and potential crises is high. Political contagion is also a possibility in a number of instances, particularly but not solely in the euro zone, where a disruptive result in one country would adversely affect the wider regional political climate and most likely to feed through to economic policy and the financial markets.
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European elections Presidential
Parliamentary
Albania
2016
2017
Austria
2016
2017
Belarus
2015
2016
Bosnia and Hercegovina
2018
2018
Bulgaria
2016
2017
Croatia
2015
2015
Cyprusa
2018
2016
Czech Republic
b
2018
2017
–
2015
Estonia
2015b
2015
Finland
2018
2015
France
2017
2017
Germany
2017
2017
Greece
b
2015
2015
Hungary
2015b
2018
Denmark
b
Ireland
2018
2016
Italy
2020b
2018
Latvia
2015
2015
Lithuania
2019
2016
–
2018
Macedonia
2019
2018
Malta
2019
2018
Moldova
2016
2018
Montenegro
2016
2018
Netherlands
–
2016
2015
2015
Portugal
2016
2015
Romania
2019
2016
Russia
2018
2016
Serbia
2017
2016
Slovakia
2019
2016
Slovenia
2017
2018
Spain
–
2015
Sweden
–
2018
–
2015
2019
2019
Luxembourg
Poland
UK Ukraine a
Republic of Cyprus. Indirectly elected. b
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit.
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Greece contagion The most immediate political challenge is in Greece, where the failure on December 29th 2014 of the Greek parliament to elect a new president triggered a pre-term general election, to be held on January 25th, and a spike in concerns about the return of the euro zone crisis to an acute phase. Opinion polls suggest that Syriza will emerge from the election as the strongest party. If it does, Greece's electoral system would reward it with a bonus of 50 parliamentary seats in the 300seat parliament, making it difficult for the second-placed party to muster the numbers needed to command a majority. Our baseline view is that Syriza will come first, but we expect its lead to narrow ahead of the election and the possibility cannot be discounted of the governing New Democracy (ND) gaining sufficient ground to overtake Syriza. Also, even if Syriza emerges as the biggest party, it may find it difficult to form a government, resulting in repeat elections. The election of a Syriza government would be highly destabilising, both domestically and regionally. It would almost certainly trigger a crisis in the relationship between Greece and its international creditors, as debt write-offs form one of the core planks of its policy platform. With similar anti-establishment parties gaining ground rapidly in a number of other countries scheduled to hold elections in 2015, the spillover effects from a further period of Greek turmoil could be significant.
UK instability is here to stay The next major election in the region will be the UK general election in early May 2014. Owing to rapidly changing electoral arithmetic, there is a much higher than usual chance that the election will produce an unstable government. The UK's political culture is ill-prepared for the era of multiparty politics that voters' disaffection and fragmenting preferences are fostering (see box, "The UK's political market is failing"). Our baseline view remains that the governing Conservative Party, despite trailing in opinion polls for years, will emerge as the largest party after the election, owing to its high approval ratings for economic management and the relative popularity of its leader, David Cameron. However, the risks to this forecast are significant as the insurgent anti-immigration UK Independence Party (UKIP) will steal votes from both the Conservatives and the centre-left opposition Labour Party, making it unusually difficult to predict results at the local level under the UK's highly non proportional electoral system. Labour will be the chief loser from a surge in support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), while the Conservatives' current junior coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats, are likely to see their representation in parliament tumble as huge swathes of their more left-leaning supporters have deserted them over their compromises in government. Even if it does not win a large number of seats, because the electoral system will work against it, UKIP has already exerted a huge influence on the political scene, most notably in relation to the UK's vexed relationship with the EU. Pressure from UKIP was an important contributor to the promise
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made by the prime minister, Mr Cameron, to hold an in/out referendum on EU membership in 2017 if he is re-elected. This referendum commitment will have a significant bearing on the formation of a government in May 2015, as it will narrow the range of parties with which the Conservatives could hope to work.
The UK’s political market is failing The UK is on the cusp of a potentially prolonged period of political instability. The fragmentation of voters’ preferences will make it increasingly difficult to form the kind of governments that have been the norm: single-party administrations with a parliamentary majority. There is a rapidly widening gap between what voters want and what the political system is capable of delivering to them. Supply and demand are out of whack. The political market is failing. The market analogy is a useful one and it is becoming more so. Part of the explanation for the current malaise in UK politics is the fact that voters are approaching electoral contests as if they are—or should be—responsive to their individual preferences in the way that is now the norm in much of the rest of life in an advanced economy. They are looking for a degree of suppleness that the system simply is not capable of providing.
Out of sync The structure of the electoral process is quaintly unchanged when compared with the rapid evolution of our social, cultural and economic patterns of life. UK citizens are asked to cast their vote for a set of political services that will last five years, the character of which will be one-size-fits-all and determined by the preferences of a minority of the eligible pool of voters. (Since 1945, the closest a governing party has come to winning the support of a majority of eligible voters was in 1951, when the Labour Party was supported by 39.3% of the electorate. In 2005, the figure dropped to 21.6%.) In what other sphere of life are we faced with anything similar? Perhaps it has ever been thus, but the disconnect between politics and most of the rest of life has become more profound. The youngest voters in the May 2015 election will have been one year old when Google was founded. The world in which they have grown up is not one in which the concepts “one size fits all” or “for five years” occur with great frequency. Immediacy and consumer choice prevail. The period during which winning parties’ popular mandates have shrunk coincides with a period of significant deregulation.
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Squeezing the others The UK’s electoral system is starkly majoritarian in character. Its first-past-the-post system is designed to sacrifice proportionality (the relationship between a party’s share of votes and its share of seats in parliament) in favour of facilitating stable government. Small parties—and, by extension, newer parties—are squeezed particularly badly. That may have made sense in quasi-duopolistic circumstances, but not when the combined support of Labour and the Conservative Party is in steady decline. What this chart tells us is that voters are no longer content with the range of options offered by a more-or-less two-party system. As many voters now support parties other than the Conservatives or Labour as support either of those two parties. This is a trend that feeds on itself. As support grows for smaller parties, they become a more attractive option for other disaffected voters. This, in turn, affects the dynamics within the two main parties, making it more difficult for their leaders to hold together broad coalitions of parliamentarians and supporters. The risk of schisms and defections increases, as the Conservatives have discovered recently with their loss of two MPs to UKIP.
The system is not working If current trajectories persist, something is going to have to give. The most likely candidates over the next few electoral cycles are political stability and government effectiveness. In the medium term, however, a correction of some sort seems inevitable. Voters will either have to swing back to the two main parties to give them the seats needed to form stable single-party governments, or they will have to accustom themselves to the idea of a fragmented political landscape and adapt the electoral system to reflect that shift. At the moment they want conflicting things. They chose overwhelmingly in a 2011 referendum to retain the first-pastthe-post system because of its historical efficiency at delivering strong governments. But they are also distributing their support among the various parties in a way that is going to make it all but impossible for first-past-the-post to deliver a government with a solid popular mandate and parliamentary majority.
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Spanish upset The general election that is due in Spain in December 2015 will be one of the most disruptive since the restoration of democracy in the 1970s. The political mould has been shattered by the emergence within a year of the anti-establishment Podemos as a third force in Spanish politics. It has not had the same amount of time as Syriza in Greece to develop a strategy, but its recent publication of a draft economic policy suggests that Podemos is preparing to smooth the more radical edges of its policy platform so as to guard against accusations that it would plunge the country into crisis. A coalition of the centre-left PSOE and Podemos is a possibility. However, given the range of constitutional and political challenges facing Spain—including growing calls for independence in the region of Catalonia—the conditions may now favour the establishment of a reforming "grand coalition" of the governing centre-right PP and the PSOE, with a mandate that stretches across much of the political spectrum. On balance, we now view this as the most likely outcome, but this forecast is subject to large risks given the extent to which Spanish politics is currently in flux, the scale of the break with tradition that a grand coalition would entail and the fact that the surge in support for Podemos is predicated on widespread public rejection of the political culture over which both the PP and PSOE have presided. Although Podemos has begun to moderate some of its most radical proposals, like Syriza in Greece its platform is far to the left of the mainstream consensus across the euro zone. The party's election would therefore pose political challenges not just for Spain but for the bloc as a whole, which would struggle to adapt to the shock of an insurgent party moving into power.
Snap election in Italy? In Italy, the next general election is not due until 2018, but we do not expect the current parliament to serve a full term. Our baseline forecast is that a general election will take place in 2015, but the timing will depend on whether electoral and institutional reforms are passed as well as on the outcome of regional elections due in March next year. A Constitutional Court ruling in 2013 effectively returned the Italian voting system to one based on pure proportional representation, which increases the influence of small parties in government formation and policymaking. The prime minister, Matteo Renzi, has proposed an electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) that explicitly favours large parties. To avoid voting with two different systems for the two houses, the reform is tied to Mr Renzi's proposed transformation of the Senate (the upper house) into an unelected regional assembly with limited powers. Under the constitution the Senate currently has equal legislative powers, requiring all laws to be passed in the same form by both houses. Reforming the Senate requires changes to the constitution, which entails a lengthier legislative procedure with higher voting thresholds than the proposed electoral reform. As public support currently stands, under the existing electoral laws, amended to take account of the Constitutional Court's ruling, another hung parliament would be the most likely outcome at the next election. Under the new system, Mr Renzi would be the favourite to obtain an absolute majority in parliament.
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A threat to democracy? The rise of populist parties is often presented by European politicians as a threat to democracy and the European way of life. But populism can also be seen as a response to the exhaustion of the postwar political system that has been in place for the past 70 years. The hostile response of Europe's leaders to the populist challenge is symptomatic of their failure to take seriously parties and people whose values and beliefs are different from their own. They may end up paying a very high political price in 2015 and beyond. If there is a crisis of democracy, it has not been created by the populists now bestriding Europe's hollowed-out political centre. The crisis is about the growing gap between elites and electorates; it is about a widening cultural divide between the worldview of Europe's elites and the values of Europe's voters; and it is about a gaping big hole at the heart of European politics where big ideas should be.
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Part II: Protest A new age of protest?* * In the appendix at the end of the report, we have provided a database of the main protests that have occurred around the world over the past six years (2009-14). Alongside the rise to prominence of populist movements, an upsurge of popular protest has swept through Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America in recent years. Other regions such as Asia and North America have been less susceptible, although have not escaped entirely. The mainsprings of the protests have been different—some have been responses to economic distress, others are revolts against dictatorship; some are expressions of a popular desire to have their voices heard by political elites, others express the aspirations of new middle classes in fast-growing emerging markets. We estimate that significant protest movements occurred in more than 90 countries in the period we have examined (2009-14), that is, in 56.4% of all countries (see Appendix: The world in protests). The protests have varied in nature by country and context, but one striking feature is the rise of new social movements that defy easy categorisation and reject conventional modes of political engagement. Judging by recent events in countries as diverse as Bulgaria and Brazil, these movements do not fit into the usual narratives about political mobilisation.
Types of protest movement Without suggesting that all the protests we have documented can be easily compartmentalised, as they are the products of specific times and circumstances, we have identified several broad types of protest movement: anti-austerity; anti-authoritarian; and anti-elite or what we call New Social Movements, whose characteristics we discuss below (see Appendix II). We have documented the incidence of these various types of protest movement, across all regions of the world over the past six years (2009-14). There has been a large-scale incidence of anti-austerity-type protests in recent years. These encompass more traditional types of protest, such as strikes and demonstrations, and other forms of social unrest, primarily, but not exclusively, in response to the negative economic and social consequences of the global economic and financial crisis of 2008-09. This led to rising unemployment, poverty and inequality in many countries. In parts of Latin America, protests over the use of natural resources and indigenous rights also fall into this category. Anti-authoritarian-type protests refer not only to those associated with the “Arab Spring”, the wave of anti-regime and pro-democracy protests and conflicts that began in December 2010 in Tunisia and spread to Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen and other countries. Anti-authoritarian protests have
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also occurred in Russia and several countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) too. The category of anti-elite-type protests, what we have termed “New Social Movements”, is more difficult to define as the protests are more amorphous both in terms of their targets and their protagonists. These types of protests have been directed against corruption and other perceived failings of political rulers and have generally demanded that elites pay more heed to the concerns of citizens. This protest group is exemplified by the Turkish protesters of Taksim Square, the Indignados in Spain (who later became part of Podemos), the Occupy movements in New York and London and the “Umbrella” movement in Hong Kong. Emerging middle classes in countries such as Brazil and India, Venezuela and Taiwan have taken to the streets to protest against corruption and to demand better health, education and other services and, in India, safety for women. Their causes are diverse, their participants are mainly young and middle-class, and their demands are inchoate, but their targets are generally political elites who are regarded as distant, self-serving and corrupt.
Catalysts and common denominators The catalysts for these various types of protest movement vary (the decades-long dictatorships in the Middle East, austerity policies in Greece, the government’s increasingly unchecked power in Turkey, the building of megaprojects in Brazil and Macedonia, etc), but all of them share some common features that set them apart from the sorts of protests that were common in the 20th century. The backdrop to the wave of protest is the 2008-09 crisis and its aftermath. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s own social unrest index found that Europe was the region most susceptible to social unrest as a result of the economic repercussions (recession, rising unemployment, growing income inequality) of the crisis and the post-crisis policy responses (austerity policies and regressive democratic trends). This has been borne out by the actual wave of protest in Europe, east and west, in recent times. But the negative economic and social fallout from the crisis cannot alone explain the upsurge of unrest. Economic distress is almost a necessary condition for serious instability, but by itself it is not a sufficient one. Declines in incomes are not always followed by unrest. It is only when economic distress is accompanied by other structural features of vulnerability that there is a high risk of instability. The underlying vulnerability to unrest depends on a host of factors, including the degree of income inequality, the state of governance, levels of social provision, ethnic tensions, public trust in institutions and a history of unrest. The economic, social and political fallout from the 2008-09 global economic and financial crisis helps only partially to explain the upsurge of protest, but what appears to be decisive in recent times in firing unrest is the erosion of trust in governments, institutions, parties and politicians—what is generally termed “the crisis of democracy”. Only by giving due consideration to this political dimension can we understand the mainsprings of the new age of protest and see the common denominators of seemingly diverse protests. It is the growth of popular distrust in governments,
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institutions, parties and politicians that is driving many of today’s protest movements, whether in austerity-hit Europe or fast-growing Latin America. A Bulgarian political scientist, Ivan Krastev, says that the new populism and protest is best understood as “the frustration of the empowered”: the spread of democracy worldwide is coinciding with a growing sense of disappointment with democracy. This decline of public trust in democratic institutions helps to explain what the impoverished inhabitants of Sofia, Bulgaria have in common with the middle-class demonstrators in Taksim Square, Turkey. The protesters in Turkey were not motivated by economic hardship or dissatisfaction with the Erdogan government’s handling of the economy. The unifying issue is dissatisfaction with Erdogan’s style of government, his playing loose with the rule of law, his divisiveness, and his increasingly heavy-handed and dismissive attitude towards those who do not share his party’s views. In Bulgaria, what started off as protests against higher electricity bills metamorphosed into generalised anti-government demonstrations complaining of corruption and lack of transparency, resulting in the fall of the centre-right government of Bojko Borisov. Within weeks of its election, the new centre-left government found itself on the receiving end of popular protests against cronyism and corruption, and also subsequently collapsed.
The shape of things to come The striking features of many of the protests are their diffuse, inchoate character, their disavowal of politics and ideology, and their self-conscious rejection of organisation and leadership. In the main (although not exclusively), they are led by young, educated, middle-class individuals who resent their political leaders. They do not generally belong to political parties or trade unions, and prefer the anonymity of Twitter and other social networks to the traditional political soapbox. A US historian, Francis Fukuyama, argues that new protest movements are the result of the rise of a new global middle class, which feels alienated from the ruling political elite and which has a sense of entitlement that is not being fulfilled. He notes that historically such movements have rarely succeeded in bringing about long-term political change, because they are minorities in their societies and have proved incapable of linking up and uniting with other social forces. All this is true, as far as it goes, but there is a more fundamental reason why today’s protest movements are unlikely to challenge the status quo or bring about substantive political changes. There is a hole at the heart of the new protest movements, and that is the absence of a clearly defined political purpose. Some have called them “post-ideological”. We have the paradox of protests without politics in the classic sense of a contest of ideas. Most of these movements centre on demands for dignity, inclusiveness, recognition and respect. From Istanbul to Rio, London to New York, and Madrid to Greece, protesters have self-consciously refused to engage in a process of political clarification—in favour of just making an emotional statement (indignation, victimhood, leave me alone, not in my name, etc). Many protesters refuse to clarify what it is they are protesting against or fighting for, and even make a virtue of having nothing to say. The “silent man” in Taksim Square, Turkey, who stood without moving or speaking for eight hours, was a fitting symbol of the new-age protests. 33
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Behind this silence is a sense of impotence. Many protests are not about opposing specific government policies as much as expressing a general belief that powerful interests have captured democratic institutions and ordinary citizens are powerless to bring about change. This sense of powerlessness, of being on the receiving end of changes wrought by forces beyond the control of ordinary people, runs through many of the protest movements. Insofar as many recent protest movements express a widespread sense of disappointment with democracy and a distrust of political leaders and institutions, we are likely to see more of these types of protest/we believe that more of these types of protest are likely. They may be catalysed by a single issue, but could easily metamorphose into a more generalised anti-government reaction, as occurred in Taksim Square. These types of protest will be fuelled also by the rise of aspirant middle classes in developing markets, which share a sense of entitlement and will demand better treatment and better services from their governments. The “frustration of the empowered” is likely to grow.
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Appendix I: Populist party profiles The parties below vary widely in their origins and ambitions; there is no single label that applies neatly to them all. Words and phrases such as populist, protest, anti-establishment, anti-elitist, radical, nationalist and traditionalist will apply to some but not others. What is common among them is the context in which they are prospering: one of intensifying public discontent with the political process, particularly in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis. Appendix I Name
Share of vote (most recent national parl. election)
Share of vote (2014 European Parliament elections)
Key policy 1
Key policy 2
Key policy 3
Brief history
Front national
17.9% (presidential 24.9% election)
Curb immigration, particularly by Muslims
Economic protectionism and nationalism, including an “orderly dismantling” of the euro zone and a renegotiation of EU treaties to restore national sovereignty
A strong state, notably with regard to enforcing key law’s setting out France’s secularist character.
The Front national has been an important feature of the French political scene for decades. Prior to the global economic crisis that began in 2008, the party’s electoral high-water mark came in 2002, reached the second round of voting in the presidential election. The crisis has significantly increased its support, as has the leadership of Marine Le Pen, who is a more astute and charismatic leader than her father, whom she succeeded as leader. The party received the largest share of the vote in the European Parliament election in May 2014 and it now routinely comes first or second in opinion polls. It is likely to reach the second round of voting again in the 2017 presidential election, but its opponents on the centre-left and centre-right will unite to ensure the FN does not win the presidency. The terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists in Paris in early January are likely to boost the FN, which has long argued that France is allowing itself to be “Islamised”.
Podemos
N/A
8%
Expansionary demand-side economic policy; ie, anti-austerity, both domestically and at the European level.
Reversal of some of the structural reforms introduced in the wake of the crisis. These include, notably labour-market deregulation that is widely credited with kick-starting Spain’s recovery.
“Public control” of strategic sectors of the economy, including telecommunications, energy, food, transport, health, pharmaceuticals and education.
The rise of Podemos has been more rapid than that of any of its peers elsewhere in Europe. A year ago it did not exist. In May 2014 its 8% share of the vote in the European Parliament election was viewed as a remarkable achievement for a party so new in a country with as rigid a two-party system as Spain has had since the restoration of democracy in the 1970s. The European election result was a springboard for a sustained surge in popularity, and multiple opinion polls since late 2014 putting it in first or second place. Its draft economic plan, published in November 2014, rolled back some of its more radically left-wing views, with a view to proving its preparedness for the transition from protest movement to party of government.
The Finns Party
19.10%
12.90%
Curb immigration
Social conservatism: opposes gay marriage.
More progressive taxation
Described as a non-socialist workers' party, the economic policies of The Finns Party (or 'True Finns') are typically left-wing, but its idealism and programme are rooted in nationalism and social conservatism, which has drawn support from the right. Many of its supporters consider themselves to be centrist. The party is Eurosceptic and although it does not seek secession from the EU, it would cut Finland's contributions to the EU budget and gain more control over immigration. Support for The Finns surged from 4% in the 2007 election to 19.1% in 2011. The formation in June 2011 of a diverse, six-party coalition government in Finland, was a direct response to this resurgence in support for The Finns, despite the party's declaration that it wanted to remain outside the government. Its share of support has been falling since then, polling around 13-14% by the end of 2014.
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Appendix I Name
Share of vote (most recent national parl. election)
Share of vote (2014 European Parliament elections)
Key policy 1
Key policy 2
Sweden Democrats
12.90%
9.67%
Curb immigration
Social conservatism Increase welfare spending: child benefits, unemployment benefits, healthcare. Cut taxes for pensioners
For many years after the party was founded, the Sweden Democrats were little more than a small antiimmigration sect that counted Nazi veterans among its ranks, and used slogans such as "Keep Sweden Swedish". A modernisation process began in the 1990s, and intensified after 2005, when Jimmie Akesson became leader. Mr Akesson has altered the party's image to make it a more accessible and acceptable alternative to the established parties. It was critical of immigration, partly in reaction to the open immigration policies of the Moderate- and SAP-led governments of previous years, and wanted to renegotiate the terms of Sweden's EU membership. The party also took a more conservative view on other issues such as gay marriage. At the same time, public hostility to immigration has been rising. Now the third largest party in Sweden, the rise in support for the Sweden Democrats is largely interpreted as a sign of failed integration policy following an upsurge in immigration over recent years.
The Progress Party
16.30%
Reduce the size of the public sector
Restrict immigration
Stimulate free trade by reducing import and export duties
Created as an prospective alternative to successive conservative and socialist governments which consistently increased taxes. Initially named Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention before changing its name to the Progress Party in 1977. The party's policies are driven by free market economics and the belief in an individual's right to self-determination. Although the party lost seats and its proportion of the vote fell in the last election held in September 2013, it entered government for the first time.
Golden Dawn
Polled 6.9% and gained 18 of 300 seats in 2012 election.
9.39%
Anti-immigration/ immigrant, islamophobic, homophobic
Anti-bailout Defence of racial (imposed by purity and religious foreigners, orthodoxy especially Germans, who are puppets of a Jewish conspiracy)
Around in various incarnations since the 1980s, the extreme nationalist movement broke through on the national stage in the aftermath of the European debt crisis and Greece's bailout. In the June 2012 parliamentary election, Golden Dawn polled 6.9% and won 18 parliamentary seats. In the May 2015 euro elections, the party improved on this by 2.5 percentage points, despite the fact that many of its MPs are facing criminal charges ranging from extortion to racketeering to grievous bodily harm, its leader included. In a 697page report, describing Golden Dawn as a "criminal organisation", Greece's Director of Public Prosecutions accuses 69 members and supporters of the party, including 16 members of parliament, of participating in murder, serious bodily harm, violent crimes, theft, blackmail and arson.
Syriza Unifying Social Front (Syriza)
Gained 71 of 300 seats in 2012 election.
26.57%
Debt relief/writedown
Renegotiate bailout Roll back austerity measures (raise minimum wage, reverse labour market deregulation, cancel privatisation, etc)
An alliance of left-wing splinter groups, socialists and former eurocommunists, the radical left Syriza registered as an official party officially only in 2012 and entered a new stage in its life in July 2013 when it held its first congress as a single party. Led led by the charismatic, 40 year-old Alexis Tsipras, who rose to prominence as a mayoral candidate in Athens in 2006, the party has risen from being a marginal protest party polling around 4% to the leading party in the country with support of 27-30% in early 2015 for opposing EU bailout austerity measures. Syriza moderated its radical demands as it came closer to power in 2014-15, no longer pledging to rip up the country’s agreement with foreign creditors.
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Key policy 3
Brief history
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Appendix I Name
Share of vote (most recent national parl. election)
Share of vote (2014 European Parliament elections)
UKIP
3.10%
The Freedom Party
Key policy 1
Key policy 2
Key policy 3
Brief history
27.5%
UK exit from the EU
Curb immigration
Change judicial system to move away from ECHR.
UKIP's central ambition is for the UK to leave the EU. It reasons that the UK could be more prosperous without the burden of immigration, funding the EU and EU judicial bureaucracy. In 2014 UKIP won two by-elections, thereby entering parliament for the first time. A thorn in the side of UK mainstream political parties, more defections are expected before the 2015 election.
10.1%
13.3%
Dutch exit from the EU
Curb immigration
The PVV has performed less strongly in recent elections than previously. However, as the sole representative in the current parliament of anti-EU, anti-establishment sentiment, it continues to exert considerable influence.
SNP
1.7% (UK parliamentary election)
2.40%
Committed to Scottish independence
Fiscal independence, with full tax-raising powers
In 2011, the SNP achieved its first majority in the Scottish Parliament, paving the way for a referendum on Scottish indpendence from the UK, held on 18th September 2014. Independence was rejected by a margin of 55% to 45%. The SNP's membership and popularity have risen sharply since the referendum, suggesting a strong performance in Scotland at the forthcoming general election, at the expense of Labour. The SNP has indicated it would prospectively support a Labour minority government.
FPO
20.51%
19.72%
Halt to immigration and deportation of foreign criminals
Leave the euro zone
Social conservatism: against gay marriage, supportive of the role of the Church.
"HC" Strache took over the leadership of the FPO in 2005, following the departure of previous leader Joerg Haider, who left to set up a new organisation (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZO). Mr Haider had taken the party into coalition government with the centre-right Austrian People's Party (OVP) in 2000-05. The FPO is aggressively populist and reactionary in its views and rhetoric, with a particular antipathy to immigration and Islam. However, Mr Stache has also sought to play up a focus on social welfare in an attempt to broaden its appeal, while also emphasising the importance of the family and Christianity in Austria. Under Mr Strache the FPO has experienced a steady rise in popularity at the ballot box (although not quite back to the levels of the late 1990s, before it entered government), and most recent national polls indicate that it is (marginally) Austria's most popular party.
Alternative for Germany
4.70%
7.10%
No bailouts of other euro zone countries; countries allowed to leave the euro; no sovereign bond purchases by the ECB; weaker members should leave.
Take pack most powers from Brussels to national level.
Canadian-style immigration policy with focus on attracting skilled workers
The AfD was only formed in 2013, but in the same year won 4.7% of the vote in the federal election, just below the 5% threshold required to enter parliament. In the process it effectively wiped out the Free Democratic Party (FDP), previously the coalition partner of Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union (CSU)/Christian Social Union (CSU) party. The AfD has since established itself as the main alternative to the CDU/CSU on the right, as Ms Merkel's party have gradually moved to the centre. In 2014 the AfD won 7.1% of the vote at the European Parliament election, taking 7 seats in the European Parliament and joining the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. The party is not ostensibly as far-right as many other protest groups in Europe. Led by Bernd Lucke, a macroeconomics professor and former advistor to the World Bank, it has called for a Canadian-style immigration policy focused on skilled workers, and has demanded that all new arrivals learn German. It's main focus remains anti-euro, although it has sought to broaden its appeal to social conservatives by promising to increase police powers and introduce tax breaks for families with children.
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Appendix I Name
Share of vote (most recent national parl. election)
Share of vote (2014 European Parliament elections)
Congress of the New Right
1.06% (no seats; 2011)
Five Star Movement
Key policy 1
Key policy 2
Key policy 3
Brief history
7.15% (4 seats; 2014)
Anti-EU
Classic economic liberalism
Social conservatism (apart from decriminalisation of drugs)
Formed from a merger of two other populist parties following the success of Janusz Korwin-Mikke, an outspoken free-marketeer, in the 2010 presidential election, when he came 4th. Winning four seats in the 2014 European elections was the party's first real Poland-wide success.
25.50%
21.20%
Hold a referendum on the euro
Opposed to fiscal austerity policies
Sustainable environmental policies, free access to Internet, anicorruption
The Five Star Movement began as a web-based protest movement. At its first general election in February 2013 the Five Star Movement shocked the political establishment by obtaining 25.5% of the vote, making it the second largest party. It lost some ground in the May 2014 European Parliament elections, but it was still the second largest party by vote share with just over 20%. Against a backdrop of a protracted economic contraction and fiscal austerity, Mr Grillo's populist, vaguely Eurosceptic anti-establishment rhetoric resonates strongly with voters disillusioned with the mainstream parties on both the centre left and centre right, virtually all of which in recent years have been embroiled in corruption scandals at some level, whether national or local.
Lega Nord
4.10%
6.20%
Increased autonomy/ secession for the north of Italy
Criminalisation of illegal immigration/halt immigration from outside the EU
Opposed to fiscal austerity policies
The Lega Nord was formed in 1992 from a merger of regional protest movements. The Lega's founder and leader, Umberto Bossi, headed the party until 2012. The party's original objective was the secession of the North from the rest of Italy. In government with Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 and again in 2001-06 and 2008-11, the Lega Nord focused on obtaining greater autonomy for Italy's regions and tighter immigration laws. Following a party expenses scandal and a disastrous performance in the 2013 general election, the party looked to be on the brink of collapse. Under a revitalised leadership, it appears to be recovering, advocating Italy abandons the euro.
Sinn Fein
9.90%
19.50%
Establishment of a united Ireland
Opposed to fiscal austerity policies
Nationalisation of core public services
Sinn Fein, which became the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, was founded in 1905 as a nationalist pressure group. In 1918 the party won 73 of the 105 Irish seats at Westminster, refusing to take its seats and instead formed an Irish parliament in Dublin, the Dail Eireann, which declared Ireland an independent republic. In 1916-21 Irish nationalists waged a political and military struggle against British occupation, but Ireland was partitioned into the 26 and Six Counties (Northern Ireland) by an Act of Parliament at Westminster. After the brutal suppression of the Irish Catholic civil rights movement in Northern Ireland and the despatch of British troops in 1969, Sinn Fein re-emerged as the political wing of the modern IRA, which waged war against British rule in the 1970s-80s. Sinn Fein emerged as a political force in the Republic of Ireland only after the signing in 1998 of the Good Friday Agreement, the peace agreement that brought an end to the worst of the Northern Ireland conflict. The left-wing nationalist party polled 6.5% in the 2002 election , up from 2.5% in 1997, but came into its own in the aftermath of the euro zone crisis of 2007-08, which led to Ireland having to surrender a large measure of sovereignty and submit to austerity policies under its bailout programme. The party polled 9.9% in the 2011 election. Sinn Fein made further gains for its antiausterity stance in the May 2014 European Parliament elections, when it polled 19.5% and took three out of Ireland 11 seats.
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Appendix I Name
Share of vote (most recent national parl. election)
Share of vote (2014 European Parliament elections)
Jobbik
20.30%
Danish People's Party
Pegida
39
Key policy 1
Key policy 2
Key policy 3
Brief history
14.70%
Hostility to Hungary's Roma population
Opposition to globalisation, support for national sovereignty over economic and political affairs. Opposed to EU membership, the US, and foreign investment (particularly investments by Israelis, and particularly purchases of land)
Welfarist policies to provide more state support for the ("deserving") poor and families
Jobbik is the latest incarnation of a radical Hungarian nationalist intellectual tradition that dates back to the 1930s, and that has been incarnated in various parties and organisations on the right of the political spectrum since 1990. Jobbik's immediate precursor was founded as a student organisation in 1999, which converted itself into a party in 2003 after the previous leading radical right-wing party failed to make it into the 2002 parliament. Jobbik made its political breakthrough in the 2009 European Parliament elections and entered the national parliament in 2010. Jobbik representatives continue to make anti-Semitic and anti-Roma statements, and the party's links to uniformed "selfdefence" organisations have been controversial. Jobbik is regarded as too toxic to join any party group in the European Parliament. However, Mr Vona has increasingly positioned Jobbik as an anti-government party with more general appeal, campaigning on anti-corruption and economic issues and developing a slicker public presence. Since 2014, Jobbik claims to be Hungary's main opposition party and it now routinely rivals the Socialists, who previously held that position, in opinion polls. A key question for the 2018 parliamentary election will be whether the governing nationalist Fidesz party wins another two-thirds ("constitutional") or even simple majority alone and if not, whether it and Jobbik would launch formal cooperation.
12.30%
26.60%
Support for traditional Danish culture, the evangelical Lutheran church and family values. Advocates tougher restrictions on immigration and opposes European integration, including freedom of movement.
Strong welfare state including social care, health and education.
Tough stance on law and order
The DF emerged as a successor to the Progress Party during the Danish debt crisis of 1995, when it was wrongly viewed as a populist protest party that would not last. Instead, it has evolved into a pioneer of the modern, polished and electable "new right". Founder Pia Kjaersgaard retains a key role as "values spokesperson". The current leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, was elected to the post in 2012 and by December 2013 a national poll by Ugbrevet A4 magazine named him the best party leader in Denmark. With 12% of the vote at the 2011 general election and 22 parliamentary seats, the DF already has a strong national profile. It then scored an unprecedented victory with 26.6% of the vote at the European Parliament election in May 2014. The DF has had a long-lasting effect on the political debate, pushing immigration to the top of the agenda. Its influence will continue to be felt at the general election in September 2015; the Liberal Party would now consider the DF as a coalition partner, although both are polling well in their own right and arguably the DF could wield greater parliamentary influence from outside government.
-
-
The protection of Germany's JudeoChristian culture and norms
A duty for immigrants to assimilate to German society
A central refugee agency for the EU, tasked with allocating refugees "fairly" between member states
Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West) is a protest movement rather than a political party. There is a significant overlap with the platform of the Alternative for Germany party; given this overlap, the two have been in talks.
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Appendix I Name
Share of vote (most recent national parl. election)
Share of vote (2014 European Parliament elections)
Key policy 1
Key policy 2
Key policy 3
Party of Miro Cerar
34.61%
-
Privatisation
Restoring budget deficit to manageable levels.
Labour market reform The Party of Miro Cerar (SMC) was established only weeks ahead of the 2014 election, in which it won more seats in parliament than any other party had managed in the preceding ten years. This result was fuelled by voters' disenchantment with the political mainstream. However, in the first months of the government's term it suffered a number of embarrassing reverses--for example, its economy minister resigned over a cartels scandal-raising questions about its ability to fulfil a pledge to restore high standards to public office.
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Brief history
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Appendix II: The world in protests Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Albania
2009, Jan, May 2011, Nov 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; regime change/anti-authoritarian)
2009 protests triggered by alleged ballot-rigging in June election; these erupted again in January 2011, in copycat of Tunisia protests, and also had an anti-corruption focus. Four protesters killed by Republican Guard outside PM's offices. The May 2011 protests were triggered by alleged ballot-rigging in the Tirana mayoral election that month. Tens of thousands joined opposition-organised anti-government protests in Tirana in November 2014, to oppose tax increases and austerity measures and to complain about high unemployment.
Algeria
2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
A string of anti-government protests took place in 2014 (mainly in relation to April 2014 presidential election), as well as numerous protests over access to jobs, housing and public services.
Angola
2011-13
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Angola has very little tradition of public protest, but discontent about economic conditions, the lengthening tenure of the president (in power since 1979) and the authorities' intolerance of dissent is fuelling protests. These remain small-scale, but heavy-handed shutdowns could backfire, provoking more serious tensions.
Argentina
Ongoing, large protests in 2012 and 2013, 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Argentina has a strong tradition of protest, and demonstrations and labour strikes are frequent. Above and beyond these protests, a series of very large anti-government demonstrations (against corruption, insecurity and economic mismanagement) has taken place in the past six to nine months. Two major strikes in April and August 2014, which is a rare occurrence for the country.
Armenia
Feb 2011, Apr 2013, Oct 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
2011 protests led by opposition Armenian National Congress Party; 5,00010,000 people marched through Yerevan to protest at democratic deficit, low growth and corruption. Linked to anniversary of 2008 protests, when ten people died in protests questioning the presidential election result. In 2013 opposition protesters contested the presidential election result, claiming electoral fraud. Major rallies coordinated by the three largest opposition parties took place in October 2014, demanding the immediate resignation of the president, Serzh Sargsyan.
Azerbaijan
Jan-June 2011, intermittent, Jan 2013, Oct 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
2011 protests led by opposition calling for early elections and questioning legitimacy of government. Explicit links to Arab Spring made by leaders, although demonstrations minuscule by comparison. Demonstrators arrested by police as soon as they started to gather. A series of small-scale protests in early 2013 focused on corruption in government and abuse of power. Another demonstration took place in October 2014 to protest against the authorities' crackdown on human rights activists and the media.
Bangladesh
2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Protests by opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party have continued over the January 2014 election, which the BNP boycotted. Supporters of the opposition Islamic Jamaat-e-Islami party have also held protests in 2014 over an ongoing war crimes tribunal that has sentenced several of its senior leaders to death.
Bahrain
Feb-Mar 2011, further sporadic protests since including Jan 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Resentment continues to fester, especially among the predominantly Shia underclass, in the wake of the heavy-handed suppression of prodemocracy demonstrations in early 2011, and the continued periodic harassment of opposition leaders.
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Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Belarus
2010
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Big, mostly peaceful protests following the presidential election—put down by force and suppression since.
Belgium
2014
Traditional focus
Series of trade-union led strikes and demonstrations triggered by the new centre-right government's fiscal consolidation measures, including one large demonstration in Brussels that turned violent in November 2014, and a general strike in December 2014.
Benin
2014
Regime change change/antiauthoritarian
A series of protests took place against the regime's suspected efforts to change constitution (to remove presidential term limit) and delay elections.
Bosnia & Hercegovina
Oct 2009, Apr 2010, Apr 2012, Nov 2012, Jun 2013, Feb-Apr 2014, Dec 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
2009 and 2010 protests triggered by cuts to war veterans' pensions, agreed as part of IMF stand-by credit. The 2010 and 2012 events, likewise, were triggered by overdue pensions payments for war veterans. The 2013 protests had a different focus, being triggered by failure of ethnicallybased parties in parliament to agree new system of IDs, leaving babies born since Feb 2013 without official documents. Deepening economic and social crisis spurred violent protests in Tuzla in February 2014. These spread across the country, and continued for three months, assuming anti-government focus. Smaller-scale protests occurred in December 2014 and more are likely.
Bolivia
2009-2014, ongoing
Traditional focus
Against government policies, and around disputes between communities over land and mining rights
Brazil
Jun-Dec 2014
NSM
Protests against world cup costs, corruption, and poor public services.
Bulgaria
Jan 2009, Jun 2012, Feb 2013, Jun 2013-Jun 2014
Mixed (all three types)
2009 protests had traditional focus, triggered by economic downturn, but also directed against corruption and organised crime. The 2012 protests were different, triggered by new forestry law, lifting restrictions on development of ski resort (law rescinded after demonstrations). The February 2013 mass nationwide protests were a response initially to high electricity prices, poverty and unemployment but became broader and increasingly anti-government in scope, and the government resigned. The June 2013 mass protests were triggered by appointment of a controversial media magnate to head national security agency. Reflecting broader concern over links between politicians and oligarchs, corruption, and secrecy. Protests against the new government continued until its resignation in mid-2014.
Burkina Faso
Feb-Jun 2011, 2014
Mixed (NSM; regime change/antiauthoritarian)
Triggered by soldiers mutinying over unpaid housing allowances and by a student's death in police custody. Spread to include protests over high living costs, autocratic government and official corruption. Grievances over job creation and living standards fed into further anti-regime protests in 2014.
Cambodia
2013-14
Mixed (traditional focus; regime change/anti-authoritarian)
Following disputed elections in 2013 the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party led protests. These were accompanied by unrest among garment workers seeking higher pay. Unrest has eased since the government in 2014 came to agreements with both the CNRP and garment workers.
Chile
2010-13; 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Tensions with students escalated into widespread protests over the education system in 2010-11. The government alleviated tensions by cutting the cost of student loans, regulating poorly performing schools and spending more on education. Also, in recent years Chile has experienced an escalation in violence by Mapuche indigenous groups demanding land rights and more state support. More education reform related protests (pro and against) in several instances in 2014
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Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Colombia
Mid-2012, ongoing
Traditional focus
Failure to address regional and local concerns, combined with unmet promises by the administration, has created a wide range of protests. Most damaging have been labour strikes in the mining sector and a nationwide transport strike.
Croatia
Feb-Mar 2011, 2013
NSM
In 2011, up to 10,000 protesters gathered in Zagreb every day for several weeks, initially organised on Internet. Diverse group, protesting about government corruption scandals, opposition to EU accession, and to show support for indicted Croatian war veterans. In 2013, protests against 2009 law to put public signs in Cyrillic script in areas where Serbs account for one-third of the population. Centred mostly around Vukovar (approximately 35% Serb population), but at one point 20,000 people were protesting in Zagreb (despite there being no Cyrillic signs there).
Cyprus
Mar 2013
Traditional focus
Triggered by the collapse of the country's financial sector, which brought the Cypriot economy to its knees and led to severe austerity measures.
Czech Republic
May-Jun 2011, Sep-Oct 2011, MarMay 2012, Nov 2012
Mixed (traditional focus; regime change/anti-authoritarian)
In the first mass demonstration since 1989, 40,000 people protested in early 2011 against austerity. Several months later, right-wing extremists led protests against the Roma community in northern Bohemia, in part triggered by rising unemployment there. In early 2012, 100,000 people demonstrated in Prague against the outgoing centre-right government and its austerity policies, and union-led demonstrations continued into May. In late 2012, a series of anti-government rallies took place in many towns, with an anti-austerity focus.
Ecuador
Sept, Nov 2014
Traditional focus
Union led protests against changes in labour law and president.
Egypt
Feb 2011, Jun-Aug 2013
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
In 2011, mass protests as part of Arab Spring brought down the multidecade-long regime of President Hosni Mubarak. In mid-2103, the military intervened to remove the democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, after protests against the perceived centralisation of power around the Muslim Brotherhood. Subsequent counter-protests by Brotherhood followers were violently broken up by the security forces, and demonstrations have since died down
Estonia
Mar, Oct 2012
Traditional focus
A national teachers' strike in March 2012—the largest strike in Estonia since independence—involved demands for higher wages. A month-long nationwide strike by medical personnel was held in October 2012, with unions demanding wage increases.
Finland
April, May 2014, Dec 2013, 2014
Traditional focus
Protests in Helsinki in response to the coalition government's austerity package; protests usually take place during independence day celebrations.
France
2009-13, 2015
Traditional focus
Mainly anti-austerity and anti-reform protests, especially by public sector workers, which have also taken on an anti-government hue. At various stages, rioting has been a regular occurrence, including a particularly nasty outbreak of rioting in Grenoble in 2010, sparked by a police shooting. In 2013, the government’s authority was badly dented by a series of protests against elements of its fiscal policy, notably the socalled ecotax. The same year also saw large-scale protests in opposition to a gay-marriage bill. In January 2015, there were huge rallies in response to attacks in Paris in which 17 people were killed by Islamist terrorists.
Ghana
Mid-2014, ongoing
Traditional focus
Failure by the government to stabilise the economy. High inflation and plunge in the value of the local currency have hit living standards, bringing Ghanaians out on to the streets.
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© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Georgia
Spring-Autumn 2012, May 2013, May 2014, November 2014
Mixed (all three types)
The Georgian Dream coalition held large demonstrations in advance of the parliamentary elections in October, at which the coalition ousted the United National Movement from power. An anti-homophobia rally in the capital in May 2013 was met by a large counter-demonstration, resulting in clashes. A dispute between groups of Georgians and Azeris led to a ethnic riot in the town of Garbadani in May 2014. Then in November 2014 the opposition United National Movement staged a large rally in the capital, Tbilisi, to protest at a treaty between Abkhazia and Russia, and the government’s Russia policy.
Germany
Late 2011, 2014
NSM
2011: The Pirate Party, a defiantly anti-political party, came to the fore in regional elections in late 2011, on the back of rising public cynicism about mainstream politics. The party’s causes include freedom on the Internet and government transparency. Support for the Pirate Party has since fallen back, amid a lack of policy clarity. 2014: Weekly protests—mainly in Dresden but also a few other cities—by the group Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA). Police think the group is mainly comprised of regular citizens, although there are some far-right and football-hooligan elements.
Greece
2010, ongoing, May, Aug 2011, 2012-14
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Triggered by a series of public spending cuts and tax increases. Also a response to rising unemployment (especially among the young). Anti-austerity sentiment is mixed with broad public discontent with the corruption, cronyism and vested interests associated with the political elite. The 2011 protests were of a different type, starting out as antiausterity protests, but focused on rejecting the political system. The protests were organised through social media by Direct Democracy Now!, also known as the Indignant Citizens Movement, and without political party or trade union affiliation (unlike most of the anti-austerity demonstrations and general strikes). Anti-austerity, anti-government protests continued in 2013-14, but on a smaller scale. Violent protest erupted in Athens in December 2014, on the first anniversary of the police shooting of an unarmed teenager.
Hong Kong
2003 to 2014
Mixed (Regime change/antiauthoritarian; NSM)
Hong Kong has seen regular protests in favour of democracy since the return to Chinese rule in 1997. However, in late 2014 demonstrators occupied and blocked key streets in the central business district for several months. This marked the biggest demonstration of political unrest under Chinese rule. While the protests have been largely pro-democracy, they have been led by young people, mostly students, thus also resemble the new social movement protests.
Hungary
2009-12
Mixed (traditional focus; regime change/anti-authoritarian)
In 2009 thousands protested against the government's handling of the economic crisis, and disapproval of the incumbents helped Fidesz come to power. In 2011-12, tens of thousands took to the streets to protest against a new media law, the government's takeover of independent institutions and a new constitution, denouncing the government's authoritarian tendencies and demanding transparency.
Iceland
Jan 2009, Feb 2014.
Mixed (regime change; NSM)
Peaceful protests triggered by the country's banking sector collapse and motivated by unhappiness with the government's role in the economic and financial crisis. The protests were aimed at ousting the government, bringing about new elections and changing the constitution. In early 2014, the government's decision to cancel a referendum on EU membership sparked protests in Reykjavik and a petition calling for a vote was signed by 30,000 people.
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© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
India
2011, 2012-13
NSM
Anti-corruption protests (2011) and women's safety (2012-13) protests were examples of youth and middle classes protesting against failures in governance. Somewhat influenced by social media, also relying significantly on pre-existing modes of mobilisation (word of mouth, activists, traditional media).
Iran
Jun 2009
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Alleged fraud in the June 2009 presidential election triggered the "green movement" pro-democracy protests that coalesced around Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a defeated reformist candidate. Estimates of the scale of demonstrations vary, but possibly 1m people protested in the capital, Tehran. The protests petered out in the face of heavy security crackdowns.
Iraq
Late 2012-13
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Sunni protesters expressing their perception of marginalisation and unfair treatment, voicing discontent at the increasingly authoritarian rule of the Shia prime minister. The Sunni jihadist Islamic State group exploited this discontent to take territory in Iraq since June 2014.
Ireland
Mar 2012, 2014
Traditional focus
While Ireland was under its EU/IMF bail-out agreement, there were relatively few street protests, although there was significant noncompliance initially when a new flat-rate local-services charge was introduced in 2012. The most significant protests since the eruption of the crisis occurred in late 2014 in response to the government's longplanned—and badly mishandled—introduction of water charges.
Israel
2011-2013, Summer 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Mass peaceful protests occurred in 2011 against widening income inequality in a once fairly egalitarian society and also against the high cost of living, especially rising house prices. Further smaller protests along these lines in 2012 and 2013. In summer 2014, several small protests occurred against the then war against Hamas in Gaza in with the largest 2 in Tel Aviv attracting around 7-10,000 protesters
Italy
2009-14, ongoing
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement). Founded 2009 but came to the fore in February 2013 general election, when it won 25% of the vote. Anti-establishment protest movement, but also populist, anti-austerity, Eurosceptic. Ongoing street protests and industrial action against the government’s economic reforms and fiscal austerity measures.
Jordan
Early 2011-13
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Protests against political system by Islamists and other disaffected groups including leftists and youth groups. Some modest electoral reforms but no major change in regime. Subsequent protests have been mostly smaller in scale, except in November 2012 when a major reform of subsidies was introduced.
Kazakhstan
Dec 2011
Traditional focus
Oil workers in western town of Zhanaozen went on strike for improved pay and conditions; violently quelled by authorities.
Kuwait
2011-14, ongoing
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
There were demonstrations in Kuwait during 2011-12 calling for political reform. This led the then government to resign and a parliamentary election was held at the end of 2012, the results of which were annulled by the Constitutional Court, leading to another election in mid-2013. Since then there have been demonstrations every few months protesting against corruption and lack of government accountability and calling for the release of prominent jailed activists; the most recent one in July 2014 attracted around 2,000 protesters and saw some violence and arrests.
Kyrgyz Republic
Apr-Jun 2010; sporadic since
Mixed (regime change/antiauthoritarian; traditional focus)
The overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in April 2010 was followed by large anti-Uzbek protests calling for nationalisation of flagship Kumtor gold mine, often linked to rising Kyrgyz nationalism. Periodic Kyrgyz nationalist protests, often centred around ownership of the Kumtor gold mine.
45
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Latvia
Jan 2009
Traditional focus
10,000 protesters gathered in Riga to air political and economic grievances; several hundred were more militant and attacked government buildings.
Lebanon
2013, 2014
Traditional focus
Lebanon saw only modest protests during the Arab Spring but protests resumed, including extensive industrial action, in 2013 over income inequality, wages and the cost of living. When parliament returned in Spring 2014 after a year-long hiatus further protests resumed on a similar theme but have since largely dissipated.
Libya
2011, Feb, May, Jul 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Arab Spring protests led to civil war that culminated in the ousting (and death) of Muammar Qadhafi. Protests erupt in Tripoli and other Libyan cities in response to the refusal of the Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC, the parliament) to disband itself after its mandate expired. An anti-Islamist military alliance led by ex-chief of staff Khalifa Haftar is formed to regain Benghazi from jihadi groups in the city. An umbrella of Islamist militias, known as Libya Dawn, launched an offensive on Tripoli, forcing the internationally-recognised government of the prime minister, Abdullah al-Thinni, to relocate to the remote eastern city of Tobruq (and later to Bayda). A self-declared National Salvation government – backed by Libya Dawn – was erected to rule Tripoli, and the rump GNC was brought back to life.
Lithuania
2009
Traditional focus
Anger at falling living standards and austerity measures led to protests of around 7,000 people in Vilnius, the largest since independence.
Macau
May 2014
Traditional focus
The protests in 2014 were the largest since Macau's return to Chinese rule and were driven by concerns over a bill granting generous remuneration to retiring officials. Macau also saw unusually prominent protests by workers over working conditions and quality of life issues in 2014.
Macedonia
2010-14
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM; interethnic)
Anti-austerity protests have merged with NSM-type protests on occasion (thousands have protested against the "Skopje 2014" mega-building project), and have sometimes had an inter-ethnic dimension (e.g. Mar 2013, when Macedonians and ethnic Albanians fought with police in Skopje over a government appointment). Inter-ethnic clashes in recent years: anti-Albanian protests erupted following the 2012 murder by Albanians of five ethnic Slav Macedonian men in Smilkovci. In July 2014, ethnic Albanians protested the guilty verdict delivered at the end of the trial of the accused.
Madagascar
2009, 2012-14
Mixed (NSM; regime change/antiauthoritarian)
Public protests in 2009 about the president's increasing authoritarianism and the perception that development had benefited a small elite; protests became violent on both sides, and ultimately led to a military mutiny and the overthrow of the president, Marc Ravalomanana. Since 2012 there have been a number of explosions in Antananarivo linked to civil unrest relating to the transition from the administration of the former transitional head of state, Andry Rajoelina, to the democratically elected Hery Rajaonarimampianina. In 2014-15 there have also been violent protests about issues such as power shortages (and related concerns about the efficiency of and corruption at state power company).
Malawi
2011
Mixed (regime change/antiauthoritarian; NSM)
Protests against the government's economic mismanagement and the increasingly autocratic rule of the then president, Bingu wa Mutharika.
Malaysia
May 2013
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Opposition alliance protested against results of the May 5th 2013 general election, calling for electoral reform and a change of government.
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© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Mexico
2012-14, ongoing
Mixed (all three types)
Anti-elite, anti-corruption protests in the run-up to the 2012 election were followed by protests about education and energy reform in 2013, and by the eruption of very serious unrest in 2014 triggered by disappearance and presumed murder of 43 students in Iguala. The 2014 protests against high-level political involvement in corruption and crime presented a threat to Enrique Peña Nieto (president since Dec 2012).
Moldova
2009, late 2013
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
In April 2009, when the ruling communists lost the election and there was big shake-up of political elite, protesters stormed parliament and were beaten back. Major pro-EU and pro-Russian protests timed to coincide with conclusion of EU Association Agreement, which was signed at a summit in Vilnius in November 2013.
Montenegro
2009-12, sporadic, Apr 2013, Feb 2014
Mixed (regime change; traditional focus
Sporadic protests over low wages, energy prices, privatisations and government corruption, among other issues. Protests in the capital in 2013 over re-election of incumbent president Filip Vujanovic, involving allegations of election-rigging and corruption. A demonstration in Podgorica in February 2014 descended into violent clashes with police, as some protesters tried to attack government buildings.
Morocco
Early 2011-13
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Protests against political system. New constitution introduced and elections brought forward as a result, but little substantive change. Nevertheless, protests since mid-2011 have been very modest in scale.
Mozambique
Sep 2010
Traditional focus
Triggered by a 30% rise in bread prices and rising living costs. New communications technology facilitated the organisation of protests.
Nicaragua
Second half 2014
Traditional focus
Major protests against the construction of a planned canal involving environmental costs and displacement of thousands of people. Led by Indigenous communities and environmental activists, among others.
Niger
Feb 2010, 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Large protest occurred against amendments to the constitution aiming to prolong the rule of the then president, Mamadou Tandja, and grant him wider powers. Days later the military overthrew the president. Some further anti-authoritarian protest took place in 2014.
Nigeria
Jan 2012
Traditional focus (but with elements of regime change/anti-authoritarian)
Government cut in fuel subsidy triggered widespread protest, which came to encompass wider frustrations with corruption, living standards, etc.
Oman
Early 2011
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
As part of the unrest that affected much of the Arab world, Omani's protested seeking more political influence, as well as calling for economic issues such as unemployment to be addressed. The Sultan initiated political and economic reforms in response to protests in 2011 12. The most important political measure involved the granting of legislative powers in October 2011 to the Majlis al Shura (Consultative Council), via an amendment of the Basic Law of State.
Pakistan
Aug-Dec 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
The opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party and Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT) party held a series of rallies and "occupy" protests in 2014 seeking to force new elections.
Palestinian Authority
Early 2014
Traditional Arab-Israeli conflict
Protests against Israel's continued occupation of West Bank and blockade of Gaza
Panama
2011-12
Traditional focus
Indigenous groups protested against a new law that opened up native lands to foreign mining companies in 2011. The government repealed the law in 2012.
Peru
2011, ongoing
Mixed (Traditional focus, NSM)
Protests over environmental impact of a US$5bn mining project caused the operation to be delayed in 2012. The protests—of which there are a number ongoing at any one time around the country—also reflect a broader disillusionment with inequality and Peru's wide urban/rural divide. Protests again corruption and political establishment in the course of 2014
47
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Poland
2011-13, intermittent; 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Anti-austerity protests have been intermittent in recent years, with the focus on rising redundancies, stagnating wage growth, healthcare and pension reform (including raising the retirement age to 67 from 2020). The protests have also expressed popular dissatisfaction with mainstream politics and have been anti-government. 2014: 60,000 protested against alleged vote-rigging in local elections.
Portugal
2009-14
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Since 2009 too many anti-austerity protests to count, proliferated especially in 2013; also mixed in with NSM-type protests such as Geração à Rasca (Generation in distress), with protests focused on the plight of the disenfranchised, unemployed, etc.
Romania
Jan-Mar 2012; Sep 2013, Nov 2014
Mixed (traditional focus; antigovernment; NSM)
Mass protests erupted across the country, triggered by health service reforms, developing into generalised revolt against the government's austerity measures, corruption and lack of connection with ordinary people, leading to the fall of the government. In September 2013, large protests erupted over government plans to allow a foreign firm to develop the Rosia Montana goldmine (anti-corruption, environmental). In November 2014 large anti-government protests in big cities, protesting disorganisation of presidential election.
Russia
2011-12
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Civil unrest broke out in Moscow in late 2011 and early 2012 in protest at conduct of parliamentary elections. Since his election for a third term as president in March 2012, Vladimir Putin has tightened controls over public protests and signed laws to stamp out dissent and weaken civil society. Although the protest movement had lost momentum by mid-2012, sporadic protests meant that it had not petered out altogether. Around 2000 people participated in a rally in late December in central Moscow protesting a second suspended sentence handed down to Alexey Navalny, the country's most prominent opposition figure, and the imprisonment of his brother.
Serbia
2009-14
Traditional focus
Persistent, low-level labour unrest, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, hunger-strikes.
Singapore
2013-14
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Protests have traditionally been rare, but 2013 saw three demonstrations attended by several thousand people. Two were prompted by concerns over immigration policy and the rising cost of living, while a third was prompted by concerns over government plans to tighten the regulation of online news websites. 2014 saw another modest-sized protest, over management of the state-run pension scheme.
Slovakia
2011-13, intermittent
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Protests in 2011-12 directed against austerity and unemployment, especially in eastern parts of the country. Teachers and health workers also protested over pay. Ahead of a snap election in March 2012, thousands protested in the capital, Bratislava, against corruption in government/ business (the "Gorilla file" scandal).
Slovenia
2011-14
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Recurrent protests against recession, austerity and the banking sector crisis have come to focus also on corruption in government and business, resulting in early elections, in 2011, and the fall of two governments in 2013 and 2014.
South Africa
2009, ongoing
Traditional focus
The past couple of years have seen a marked escalation in protests—fuelled partly by the African National Congress Youth League—as well as industrial unrest across a number of key sectors, including mining, based on neverabating demands for higher wages.
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© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
South Sudan
2012-14
Mixed (traditional; regime change/anti- Security forces sent in to Western Bahr El Ghazal State to put authoritarian) downprotests: 24 killed as protests put down and during inter-ethnic clashes that broke out after the killing of protestors. However, public protest has been sporadic, not least because of the authorities' repressive stance. Country currently in a de facto civil war after President Salva Kiir (a Dinka) accused his former vice president, Riek Machar (a Nuer), of trying to stage a coup.
Spain
2011-14
Mixed (traditional focus; NSM)
Sudan
2011-14
Mixed (traditional; regime change/anti- Protests began in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring regional protest authoritarian) movement, and increased in intensity after the government passed an austerity plan in mid-2012. Widespread protests in September-October 2013 following the lifting of subsidies on some fuels. Periodic protests against austerity measures continue, with some groups calling for regime change, reflecting growing discontent over the length of time that President Omar al-Bashir has been in office (which has now stretched to more than 25 years).In addition, the government faces opposition from militant groups in Darfur and from discon¬tented populations in South Kordofan, North Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Sweden
May 2013, Aug 2014, Jan 2015
Traditional focus
Unrest in 2013 triggered by police shooting. No clear political/social agenda among rioters, but underlying issues of unemployment and immigration. Largely concentrated among disillusioned youth. In 2015 there were demonstrations against racist attacks which have been linked to the rise in support for the far-right Sweden Democrats.
Syria
2011-14, ongoing
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
The government's brutal response to protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, the president, fuelled a violent insurgency. This has since escalated into a full-blown civil war, in which more than 200,000 people have thus far been killed.
Tajikistan
Mid-2012, May 2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Army sent in to eastern province of Badakshan to put down unrest: 60 killed. Renewed violence between local strongmen and central authorities in Badakshan.
Tanzania
Sep 2014
Traditional focus
Street protests were mounted by the main opposition parties over proposed constitutional changes under discussion in the governmentdominated Constituent Assembly. A referendum on the new constitution is due to be held in April 2015 and could be accompanied by fresh protests.
Taiwan
March-April 2014
Mixed (NSM; Traditional focus)
The "Sunflower" protest movement, led by students, occupied Taiwan's legislature, as part of a demonstration against a cross-Straits trade deal with China.
Thailand
2006-2014
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Alternating and often violent protests broadly pitted the pro-royalist "yellow shirt" camp against the more populist-inspired "red shirt" camp that originally consisted of those loyal to Thaksin Shinawatra. A former prime minister, Thaksin was deposed in a September 2006 coup. The protests were brought to an end by another military coup in May 2014, but the underlying tensions that have driven them have not been resolved. (The coup itself sparked some demonstrations, but these swiftly petered out).
49
Protest focus
Discontent about economic conditions and austerity were key drivers of protests by the so-called Indignados. Initially, the protest movement’s motivation was to bring about a change in politics; this led to disdain for traditional forms of political organisation, which in turn hindered the protests’ traction. In 2014, the new political party Podemos built on the Indignados movement to mount an electoral challenge to the status quo. It has been staggeringly successful; the party is already challenging the two previously dominant mainstream parties for the position of Spain’s most popular party.
© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
Democracy on the edge Populism and protest
Appendix II The world in protests (selected protests, by type and country, 2009-14) Country
Protest date(s)
Protest type(s)
Protest focus
Togo
Jun 2012, ongoing
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
Triggered by changes to electoral constituencies, and by dissatisfaction with decades of autocratic rule by the Gnassingbe family. Led to emergence of new political movements and delays in legislative elections.
Tunisia
Dec 2010-Jan 2011, Feb 2013
Regime change/anti-authoritarian
In early 2011 the president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was toppled in a revolution that provided the template for the wider Arab Spring. In 2013 there was a continuing element of Arab Spring-type unrest, with a pro-democracy anti-Islamist influence. Triggered by assassination of opposition leader.
Turkey
Jun 2013, 2014
Mixed (regime change/antiauthoritarian; NSM)
Unrest escalated after police used force to subdue protests about the redevelopment of a park. A broader complaint was the autocratic style of the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Social media played a major part in the spread of the protests. In 2014 there were anti-government protests, but not on the scale of the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Violent clashes also took place between nationalists and Kurds over government inaction in response to attack by the Islamic State group on the Kurdish-held town of Kobane in Syria.
Uganda
2011
Traditional focus (but with elements of regime change/anti-authoritarian)
So-called "Walk to Work" protests occurred throughout 2011, triggered by the rising cost of fuel.
UK
Aug 2011, 2012-13, 2014
Traditional focus
Riots in London triggered by police shooting in 2011. The underlying causes manifold and difficult to pin down, but concentrated among disillusioned youth. Through 2012 to 2013, protests and riots took place in Northern Ireland following the decision by Belfast’s power-sharing local authority to restrict the flying of the UK flag over Belfast City Hall. A number of anti-austerity and anti-capitalist protests occurred in 201314, organised by a variety of organisations, including trade unions and the Anonymous movement.
Ukraine
Nov 2013-Feb 2014, Feb 2014-present Regime change/anti-authoritarian/ civil war
Demonstrations triggered in late November 2013 by President Viktor Yanukovych's decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. The situation was inflamed by repressive laws passed in mid-January 2014. Over 70 demonstrators were killed by snipers on February 20th; Mr Yanukovych fled the capital shortly afterwards. The anti-government protests and subsequent change of regime triggered protests in the Crimea, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. A Russian-backed insurgency led to the seizure of administrative buildings in a number of towns and cities by armed groups, which included Russian special forces. This was followed by the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and a unresolved military conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
US
2011, ongoing
NSM
Occupy protests such as Occupy Wall Street are a definitive example of the emerging new social movements. Corruption, capitalism, income inequality, and the power of political lobbying and big business are among the major themes of the protests.
Venezuela
Feb-Jun 2014, limited ongoing protests
Mixed (NSM; regime change/ antiauthoritarian, traditional)
Major student and opposition led protests against government, for regime change.
Vietnam
May 2014
Traditional focus
Anti-China protests took place after China moved an oil rig to drill in waters claimed by Vietnam. They descended into violent riots that targeted foreign investments with perceived links to China, leaving several people dead and much damage to property.
Yemen
2011, ongoing
Mixed (traditional; regime change)
Huge protests in 2011 helped bring down the long-running president, Al Abdullah Saleh. However, the subsequent administration struggled to engender stability and revive the economy. After weeks of peaceful protests opposing the ending of fuel subsidies and demanding a new government, in September 2014 the Houthis (a Zaydi Shia movement) captured the capital, Sanaa.
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© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2015
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Financial services Analysis and five-year forecast for the financial services industry throughout the world providing detail on a country by country basis
Healthcare Analysis and five-year forecast for the healthcare industry throughout the world providing detail on a country by country basis
Technology Analysis and five-year forecast for the technology industry throughout the world providing detail on a country by country basis
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