Demands for welfare state provisions by a powerful generation? Comparing babyboomers in Germany and the UK Achim Goerres [email protected], www.achimgoerres.de Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Cologne Paper presented at the annual conference of the Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, Forschungsnetzwerk Alterssicherung 22-23 February 2007, Erkner, Germany Version 23-03-2007 Abstract: The baby-boomers, a large cohort born between about 1946 and 1972, are the next generation of older people in many European democracies. Due to demographic change and the high voting probability among older people, baby-boomers will soon have a sizeable proportion of all votes cast that could lead to a political representation skewed in their favour. This paper compares Britain and West Germany with regard to differences between the baby-boomers and preceding generations. It applies various regression techniques to a series of cross-sectional international surveys, the International Social Survey Programme Role of Government I-III from 1985, 1990 and 1996, and the British Household Panel Study (1991 – 2004). The main finding is that baby-boomers are hardly different from earlier generations as to their expectations from the major areas of re-distributive welfare policy (health, unemployment, education, pension). It is a myth that the baby-boomers have a different stance towards the state and its welfare objectives than earlier generations. Thus, it also does not seem plausible to expect the retirement wave of this group of citizens to have a major political impact apart from its numerical weight. Data: University of Essex. Institute for Social and Economic Research, British Household Panel Survey; Waves 1-14, 1991-2005 [computer file]. 2nd Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], June 2006. SN: 5151. Central Archive Cologne, International Social Survey Programme, Role of Government I-III, 1985, 1990, 1996.

“The [British] baby boomers, having throughout their lives been at the forefront of radical attitudinal and social change, are different to current generations of older people and will redefine the meaning of retirement” (Demos report quoted in Womack 2006). There is a new type of hysteria in journalism about baby-boomers, the large birth cohorts in many European societies after World War II, and their imminent retirement. The assumption is that baby-boomers are very different in their social and political attitudes from earlier generations of retirees. Political reforms in the face of a large chunk of the diligently voting electorate, which is supposed to be somehow different, seem to be demanding a lot from political entrepreneurs. Especially aching welfare systems will soon need to be reformed to deal with the consequences of societal ageing. Thus, it seems necessary to have a closer look at what the members of the baby-boomer generation want from the welfare state and how theirs might differ from those of earlier generations. Theoretically, it is possible that the babyboomers – if they are very different –block political reforms, because (a) of their massive numerical size and (b) the fact that they are about to retire, i.e. that they are more likely to be beneficiaries of the welfare state than contributors. From a more theoretical point-of-view, the underlying assumption is that World War II and the two periods, which it separated, shaped individuals growing up in them very differently. After the World War II, many European democracies experienced a massive expansion of the welfare state, economic boom and the mass expansion of higher levels of education. Does growing up in two very different eras shape generations so differently with regard to their political attitudes and expectations that they are still different in later life? The baby-boomers are insofar very interesting as they represent a numerically very large cohort whose time of growing up could be very distinct from, for example, that of their parents’ generation. This paper compares Britain and West Germany with regard to differences between the baby-boomers and preceding generations. It applies various regression techniques to a series of cross-sectional international surveys, the International Social Survey Programme Role of Government I-III from 1985, 1990 and 1996, and the British Household Panel Study (1991 – 2004). The main finding is that baby-boomers are hardly different from earlier generations as to their expectations from the major areas of re-distributive welfare policy (health, unemployment, education, pension). It is a myth that the baby-boomers have a different stance towards the state in its welfare functions than earlier generations. Thus, it also does not seem plausible to expect the retirement wave of this group of citizens to have a major political impact, apart from its numerical weight. Section 1 gives an overview of the various strands of literature. In section 2, I describe the methods and the data. Section 3 presents the various regression results. In section 4, I review the results in the light of broader discussions about the baby-boomers being about to retire a critical stage in the process of welfare reforms. Section 5 concludes the paper.

1. Theoretical discussion “Baby-boomer” discourse started out as a US American phenomenon. From the 1980s onwards, historians, sociologists, political scientists, popular writers, and journalists were wondering what the United States would be like with the large cohort that was born between about 1940 and 1960 progressing through the life course. There is a growing body of literature that pains abysmal pictures of U.S. old age programmes that are unsustainable with 2

the baby-boomers being about to take up the benefits of these programmes (Kotlikoff and Burns 2004; Wallace 1999). Whereas these accounts are only concerned about the sheer numbers of American baby-boomers (about 77 million), others stress the fact that the baby-boomers are not only numerous, but also different in their political and economic expectations. For instance, the attributed characteristics are a greater rebellion against their parents’ generation (compared to other generational schisms), a more consumerist outlook on the material world and a stronger urge to “seek the true self”. However, this characterisation is mostly founded on the evaluation of prominent individuals of that generation rather than on systematic mass surveys (see also Light 1988; Strauss and Howe 1991: 299-316). A 1998 issue of the ageing studies journal “Generations” dealt with the baby-boomer generation from various social science perspectives. Here, we find a systematic evaluation of their political attitudes by Alwin (1998). The author holds that they are several myths about the baby-boomers that are not supported by survey evidence. Baby-boomers are not generally more liberal (in the American sense) on all dimensions of policy despite growing up in the liberal era of the 1960s and 1970s. Whereas the generation was much more minority-friendly than other cohorts in the 1970s, this difference became smaller in later decades. Other studies find some small cohort differences towards greater liberalism among those who were young in the 1960s (Davis 2004). A second body of literature deals with differences in social and political attitudes between generations in general. The basic idea is that a group of individuals who are born during the same period share certain common political and social experiences in early life. These experiences leave a trace on members of that generation as they grow older because impressions in earlier life are more likely to influence political attitudes than at later stages of the life cycle. Although these early preferences are far from monolithic, they are remarkably stable into later life (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991). This notion is sometimes referred to as the “tree ring hypothesis”. Traces of early political experiences can be found in the behaviour of European citizens with regard to voting participation (Franklin 2004) and party choice (Goerres 2006). If the members of a cohort are aware of the fact that they share certain preferences with other members, one tends to call them a “political generation”, following an essay by Karl Mannheim (1997 [1928]). Applying this notion to the baby-boomer generation in Britain and West Germany, one should expect its members to be different from their parent or grandparent generation because the baby-boomers grew up after World War II and during an era of economic boom, of a massive expansion of the welfare state and with no direct memory of the War. The Second World War should be a decisive collective division line in early socialisation experience. The relationship between the individual and its perception of the welfare state should be very different for someone who grew during an era of welfare state expansion and could benefit from its new services (most importantly mass education and better health services). Someone who grew up during the inter-war years will have a recollection of the welfare state in its smaller scope than a baby-boomer. An additional decisive difference between the baby-boomers and its preceding generations are the political experience of the late 1960s in some countries: student revolution, Vietnam War, and other events. However, it remains unclear how this experience should influence the baby-boomers’ attitudes to the welfare state in later life. Will the differences in early political experience create differences in perception towards the welfare state in later life? If yes, in which areas, and in which direction? One area where we should see definite differences is the support for educational programmes. The 3

baby-boomers benefited from the expansion of mass education and should thus have grown more supportive of educational spending than others. If we find generational differences that we can explain by the varying historical circumstances at the time at which the generation was young, this hints at the importance of socialisation and the process of early preference formation. Later influences would be less important from this perspective. A third body of literature covers general accounts on the questions which individuals demand how much and what kind of welfare provisions. Bean and Papadakis (1998) review three perspectives to explain differences in support for the welfare state: class politics (how and when did social classes in a society coalesce at critical junctures in history?), social location/self-interested middle class (which social class does one belong to? Does the middle class support welfare state provisions in a given society?), and interests of transfer classes (do you belong to a social group that is dependent on the transfers of the welfare state e.g. unemployed or retirees?). These perspectives suggest that the baby-boomers might represent a different composition of social classes (namely more middle-class individuals) than earlier generations because they benefited from the impact of the availability of mass education. Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest a simple rational choice model that just assumes that a voter supports welfare state expansion as long as she still earns a net gain. This influential theoretical model does not give us indication whether or not the baby-boomers should be any different. An expansion of this model is the asset theory of social policy preferences (Iversen and Soskice 2001). Its authors find support for their model that assumes that individuals not only see the benefit character of re-distributive policy, but also its insurance characteristic. Thus, individuals who expect longer spells of unemployment are more supportive of the welfare state than others. This expectation is directly linked to the specificity of their skills. The more portable their skills are, the less likely individuals are to be unemployed for a longer time. Again, the composition of the baby-boomer cohort as a whole could be different because they accumulated a different set of economic skills on their way into the labour market. Their differences in socialisation would be less relevant than their stratification by certain social characteristics like their endowment with specific or general skills. A fourth body of literature is only of peripheral importance for this study that only includes two countries. There are systematic differences between democratic societies as to the support of the welfare state. These are due to the historically evolved paths of policy decisions. Certain coalitions at particular points in time took defining decisions that shaped the welfare state of that society for the future (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984). However, earlier survey analysis hint at a low level of difference in attitudes to the welfare state due to the institutional regime (Papadakis and Bean 1993). If country differences play a role, we should see differences in the absolute levels of welfare support. Generational differences should be on top of these absolute country differences. Britain is normally considered a liberal welfare state in which minimal and universalist welfare provisions exist. Germany is considered to be a conservative welfare state where the thrust of welfare programmes is aimed at maintaining the status and standards of living of those who fall unemployed and their families. Summed up, one can differentiate between two major contrasting propositions. The socialisation school (the US baby-boomer literature and political sociologists following Karl Mannheim) predict that members of the baby-boomer generation are systematically different from earlier generations with regard to their demands on the welfare state. This difference is due to the rupture of the Second World War in many European countries. The end of the War marked the beginning of a massive expansion of the welfare state. The baby-boomers were 4

the first to benefit from that expansion and should thus be more supportive of the welfare state. The political economy school (Meltzer, Soskice and Iversen) does not deal with issues of preference-formation. It assumes that the socio-economic position, especially on the labour market, should influence an individual’s position towards the welfare state. Along similar lines, Neo-Marxist authors (like Esping-Andersen) argue with the use of social classes. This latter group only predicts a difference between baby-boomers as far as socio-economic interests are distributed unevenly between generations.

2. Research design, data and methods I will make two kinds of comparisons: across time and across countries. Survey research on generational effects is confronted with three different confounded effects: cohort, life cycle and period effects. Cohort or generational effects are shared by those citizens that were born around the same time and thus form a cohort. The baby-boomers’ being different belongs to this category of effects. Life cycle effects affect those who are at the same stage in their life cycle. Period effects subsume all those effects that stem from the point of time of data collection. They are strictly speaking not age-related effects, but can affect those. Period, life cycle and cohort effects are always perfectly multicollinear in a cross-sectional survey (Glenn 1976). If you take, for example, West German surveys in 1985 and 1990 and compare the attitudes of 50 year olds, one cannot say whether their behaviour comes from the fact that they are 50 year olds or a combination of cohort effects of those born in 1935 or 1940 and period effects of 1985 and 1990 affecting only these cohorts (a two-way interaction effect). One of the three effects can always be exchanged by the interaction of two other confounding effects. Therefore, any serious analysis of generational effects needs to use some kind of longitudinal data, in my case a series of cross-sectional data from multiple points in time and a panel study. The comparison of two countries increases the range of contexts in which the main hypothesis – the experience of growing up after the war shapes the expectations towards the welfare state differently – can be tested. Even though general levels of support for the welfare state should be different for the two countries, the differences between the baby-boomers and earlier generations should be the same. I will apply various statistical techniques to survey data. The data comes from two sources: the International Social Survey Programme (Role of Government I-III) from 1985, 1990 and 1996 and the British Household Panel Study (waves 1-14, 1991-2004). Both surveys are available (almost) free of charge from the Central Archive in Cologne or the British Data Archive. Questions on the welfare state are on spending (more/less/the same amount of spending in a certain area) or on the degree of support for a particular welfare state objective (do you think that the state should guarantee a minimum level of existence for the unemployed?). The ISSP is a cross-sectional survey that covers several areas of welfare spending and scope of state activities. Its disadvantage is that it only consists of three waves with no repeated measures on the same respondents. Thus, we are unable to follow intra-individual change and stability through time. Also, it is impossible to accumulate the three waves of cross-sectional data for multivariate analysis. This is because the estimation of generational effects cannot only be based on three points in time. Severe collinearity would make reliable estimation impossible. The advantage of the ISSP data is its relatively wide range of questions on attitudes towards the welfare state and other state activities and relatively easy comparability of attitudes across nations and time because the principal investigators had the same items asked in the same ways. If generational effects exist, the direction (and more 5

strictly magnitude) of the coefficient of the baby-boomer generation should be the same across surveys, compared to the baseline generation. If this is the case, the finding could still be interpreted as a linear life cycle effect because all generations are equally distant from each other in terms of age in each survey. In that case, the researchers need to check whether all differences between generations behave in the same way. If they do, it would be a strong indication of a life cycle effect. The use of the BHPS data is to counterbalance some of the disadvantages of the ISSP because it roughly covers the same points in time. The BHPS is a panel study where the same individuals are repeatedly asked. Therefore, we can follow intra-individual change and stability. However, the BHPS data is relatively meagre on questions on the welfare state, meaning that we cannot analyse the same items for both data sources. Obviously, it also only covers Britain and does not allow us to make any inferences for West Germany. The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. Firstly, I analyse an aggregate measure of welfare spending in the two countries at three points in time. This is to see whether there are any general differences between generations that are stable across time. Since this is not the case, the latent measure is, secondly, disaggregated again and the various dimensions are investigated separately. I will demonstrate that the only systematic differences between generations can be found in the areas of education and pension. Thirdly, I will conduct a multi-level analysis of the British panel data in order to see whether the lack of findings might be an artefact of the cross-sectional nature of the ISSP data.

3. Empirics Defining the baby-boomers In everyday English, the “baby boomers” are often casually referred two as the strong birth cohorts after World War II. The term was first used in the context of American demography and subsequently used in many post-war democracies. [Insert figure 1] Figure 1 shows the development of birth rates in Germany and England/Wales. In both instances, there was a steep rise after 1945, which abruptly fell in England/Wales in 1948 before it rose again in 1956. In both countries, the curve peaked in 1964/5 and sloped downwards into the 1970s (due to the large scale availability of the birth control pill). The post-war mean was reached in 1972 (Germany) and 1973 (Britain). I define “baby-boomers” as all individuals born between 1946 and 1972. This definition is warranted due to the numeric-demographic component and the socialisation component. Numerically speaking, these birth cohorts represent the strong demographic “wave” after World War II that includes many voters. In addition, the post-war experience of growing up can be seen to be fundamentally different with regard to the economy and the welfare state. In both countries, the welfare state was massively increased in terms of spending levels and scope. The babyboomers were the first generation to grow up with the benefit of such a massive democratic welfare state. If socialisation in late childhood and young adulthood matters for the formation of political attitudes and expectations, the baby-boomers should – in both countries – be fundamentally different from earlier generations. The baby-boomer generation is compared against two preceding generations. The majority of the “Passive War” generation (born between 1928 and 1945) grew up with immediate memories of World War II without having been actively involved with it. The third generation, the “Active War” generation are all those 6

born 1927 and before. This generation (effectively limited by about the year 1900 due to the first survey period in 1985) were adults at the end of World War II and had to serve their countries actively during the war.

The baby-boomers – a bulge in the age pyramid [Insert figure 2 here] The US American literature is very much focussed on the demographic weight of the babyboomer cohort. The numerical “threat” of the baby-boomers is also apparent in Britain and West Germany. Figure 2 shows a projection from the German Federal Bureau of Statistics (the British projections are somewhat similar), with the structure of the age pyramid in 1977, 2007 and 2037. The baby-boomers are marked with a black column on the side. First of all, we can see that the baby-boomer cohort is the biggest bulge at all three points in time. Secondly, we see that in 2007 the first baby-boomers are about to retire as they cross the age of 60. Thirdly, in 2037, all retirees will be baby-boomers. If you are a political entrepreneur who needs to find majorities to support your welfare policies, you must be very interested in the baby-boomers: they are numerically strong (and thus have a lot of voting power that increases as they age (Goerres 2007)), they are nowadays at critical stage in their life cycle as they enter retirement. They move from the active contributors of the tax system (with little probability of still rearing minor children) to its beneficiaries as pensioners and ageing individuals. Re-distributive welfare policies must take them into account as a major group that can benefit from certain programmes and that can also vote in favour or against certain programmes.

The dependent variables The ISSP data includes various items capturing the individual’s attitudes towards the welfare state. There are four areas of-distributive welfare policies: unemployment, education, pension and health. There are two types of questions, one on spending and one on the role of the state in guaranteeing a minimum level of living in a certain area. The question wording on spending reads: “Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. More or less government spending on: health, education, old age pensions, unemployment benefits. Answer categories: Spend much more, spend more, spend the same as now, spend less, spend much less.” The other question wording is: “On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility to: Provide health care for the sick, provide a decent standard of living for the old, provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed. Answer categories: definitely should be, probably should be, probably should not be.” I conducted a factor analysis of all these seven items that yielded a one-factor solution that explained about 47 % of all variance, which I call welfare state expectation. The higher the value on that latent variable, the more the individual favours a stronger activity of the state 7

on welfare policies, either in form of spending or in form of maintaining a certain qualitative standard for certain social groups. This variable is used first for a general OLS analysis of welfare attitude on one general dimension. The four items on spending are employed for detailed analysis thereafter. I treat these four as ordinal variables with ordered logistic regression with higher categories standing for a stronger agreement with spending in that particular area. The dependent variable for the multi-level analysis of the BHPS is “People have different views about society. I'm going to read out some things people have said about the UK today and I'd like you to tell me which answer off the card comes closest to how you feel about each statement. It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one. Answer categories: strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, strongly disagree.” Due to its relatively normal distribution, I treat it as an interval variable coded from 1 to 5.

The independent variables The main independent variable is a three-fold categorical variable with one dummy for each generation. Baby-boomers are coded as all those born between 1946 and 1972. The Passive War generation members are defined as those who were born between 1928 and 1945. The Active War generation are those individuals born between 1900 and 1927. The few individuals born before 1900 or after 1972 are deleted. In addition, I make use of a range of control variables. Not all of them are available for the analysis of the BHPS. All are coded in a categorical manner in order to allow for easy comparability of the impact across variables, across time and (to a lesser extent) across surveys: •

Gender (1 = female, 0 = male): older generations comprise more women because of different mortality rates between men and women;

•

Education (1 = whether someone finished secondary education, BHPS: whether someone was 18 or older when she finished education, 0 = otherwise): newer cohorts are on average more formally educated;

•

Union membership (1= union member, 0 = otherwise): union membership declined across generations;

•

Employment status (1 = self-employed, 0 = otherwise): depending on the employment situation, individuals are likely to have different expectations as to welfare state activities

•

Size of household (1= household consists of 3 or more people 0 = consists of 1 or 2 people, BHPS: 1 = has natural children 0 = otherwise): bigger households are likely to stand for children living in them; parents are likely to favour more welfare state activity, especially on education

Modelling welfare state support [Insert table 1 here] Table 1 lists the OLS regressions for the latent variable welfare state expectations. There are six regressions: one for each point in times (1985, 1990 and 1996) and for each country (Britain and West Germany). The generational dummies do not capture any systematic 8

variation of the dependent variable. Compared to the baseline of the Active War Generation, being a baby-boomer does not make any difference, neither does being a member of the Passive War Generation. This is a remarkable finding because it holds for all three points in time in both countries. World War II is not a formative experience that shapes political expectations of generations differently with regard to the role and spending activities of the state in general. [Insert table 2 here] The next series of regressions disaggregates the latent variable again (see table 2). There are four areas of spending that respondent can assess as to whether they want more, less or the same amount of spending to go into: health, unemployment, education, and pension/retirement. Health spending There are no significant differences between the baby-boomers and the active war generation for any of the years, neither in West Germany, nor in Britain. What is even more remarkable is that the sign of the dummy coefficients changes between positive and negative. There is no stable generational difference for the area of health spending. Unemployment spending Again, the variations between generations are not significant in most regressions. The only exception is the West German case for 1990. Here, we find a positive difference between the baby-boomers and the Active War generation (which we would expect from our theory). However, the difference is not stable across time. Neither in 1985, nor in 1996 do we see the variation in the same magnitude or direction. Varying socialisation experience seems not to have left a detectable trace with regard to expectation towards unemployment spending. Educational spending In this policy area, the baby-boomer coefficient carries a positive sign in five out of six instances. In two of those five, it is also significant. Apart from the fact that this difference is not very strong and not stable across all time periods, we also need to consider a life cycle effect. People younger than 30 (some baby-boomers in 1985 and 1990) might still have had a personal interest in benefiting from education; people between about 25 and 50 might have had children that they want to benefit from. The control variable “household size” takes out some of this effect. Indeed the variation associated with the generational variables becomes stronger as soon as one takes it out (results are not shown). This suggests the presence of this life cycle effect. Pension spending On this last policy dimension, we detect the only consistent pattern across time and across countries. The baby-boomers are always less likely to support pension spending than the active war generation, although the variation is only significant for the British countries. The passive war generation also is always less likely to support pension spending than the baseline generation. Like with education spending, this pattern cannot only be rooted in generational, but also in life cycle effects. The median individual of the active war generation (born in 1914) was close to retirement in 1985 already and retired in 1990 and 1996. Members of a generation that are already retired support, of course, pension spending more than other who are not yet retired. This life cycle effect gains further credibility through the significant impact of the household size variable. The bigger the household (and thus the higher the probability that the respondent is of working age and has children), the less and individual support increased public spending on pensions. 9

So far, we have seen that there are hardly any systematic variations between generations that are stable across time. Also with regard to magnitude, the size of the point estimate of the baby-boomer coefficient is almost always much smaller than the coefficients of other categorical variables. In most instances, the impact of higher education is much bigger than that of being a baby-boomer rather than a member of an earlier generation. Taking these results together, we must conclude at this point that being a baby-boomer did not make you any different than belong to an earlier generation for the period 1985-1996 in West Germany and Britain. As a final test of these hypotheses, I analyse panel data from the BHPS. It could be that the over-time comparison of cross-sectional surveys does not capture the generational variations very well. Also, the number of cases per year is not very large with some year/country combinations having less than 1,000 respondents. It could be that the generational differences do exist in reality, but they cross-cut with other variables or systematic dynamics. With the BHPS, we can follow close to 10,000 individuals through time. [Insert table 3 here] The BHPS only includes one item that is comparable to the ones that we could use in the ISSP analysis. The first regression in table 3 shows how it interacts with the generational and other control variables. The model includes a random intercept that takes care of the fact that each individual is likely to have a relatively stable inertia in her answers. Being a babyboomer in this context makes you less likely to support the idea that the state should provide everyone with a job who wants one. The effect is significant at the .001 level, but is a very small effect. The coefficient of being more highly educated is almost seven times bigger than the baby-boomer effect. Finally, the second regression in table 3 tests to what extent the stability of attitudes might be affected by generational membership. One explanation for the lack of consistent difference between the baby-boomers and other generations could be that baby-boomers were socialised into a different thinking about the welfare state when they were young adults, but they lost this imprint later on. This could be a side-effect of a large-scale macro process of individualisation. To test the idea, that members of the baby-boomer generation are more likely to change their attitudes towards the welfare state, I created the absolute difference in the 5-point answer categories between 1991 and 2004. The higher the number, the more an individual changed her position. This left me with a sample of 4,806 respondents. Again, we find that none of the generational dummies carries a significant coefficient. Thus, the stability of expectations is independent of generational membership. Overall, the attitudinal stability on this item is very high. 45 % of individuals did not change their answers at all, and a further 35 % only changed it by one point, meaning that four fifths of British people between 1991 and 2004 more or less maintained their attitude towards the state’s role to provide the unemployed with work.

4. Discussion of implications The results clearly indicate that belonging to the demographically strong baby-boomer generation does not make citizens in Britain and West Germany any different with regard to their expectations from the welfare state. The few significant coefficients that we found could also very plausibly be life cycle effects (pension and education). Anyhow, the magnitude of these effects is also negligible. There are limits to the analysis. We only looked at general questions about the welfare state. It might be that the baby-boomers are fundamentally different with their attitudes 10

towards certain types of welfare programmes, e.g. means-tested instruments. However, it would be unclear at this point how we could explain this attitudinal difference by the different socialisation experience of the baby-boomers. The problem of some of the existing research is the inference of generational differences from cross-sectional data at one or two points in time. Just showing that individuals who belong to the baby-boomer cohort have a certain attitude at time point t does not suffice to show that this difference is (a) stable across time and (b) that it can be traced back to a hypothesised causal chain that could explain why babyboomers are different as a generation. Also, there might be a certain media hysteria about the baby-boomers because the story – wave of very different citizens hits retirement – might sell well. These findings thus mean that the demographic wave that is starting to retire now does not pose any political challenges with regard to the average preferences of its members. There remains, of course, the actual numerical challenge of the state having to deal with a previously unseen number of retirees. This will represent challenges to system of public pension and social care. However, the fundamental reforms of the welfare state that are necessary to deal with an ageing citizenry are not made more difficult or easier because the baby-boomers are any different from earlier generations. The results also imply that World War II does not matter with regard to the expectation towards the welfare state. Whereas some researchers hypothesise that the experience of the war as an adult (the Active War generation) or as a teenager (the Passive War generation) influence feelings of national identity (Vincent 2005), this experience does not shape the fundamental expectations towards functions of the welfare state. How can we explain this lack of influence of the War? World War II was probably the most important division line in European societies. Why doesn’t growing up before and after make any difference? One plausible explanation could be that the welfare state is just universally accepted by almost everyone. Differences in attitudes are due to very minor social differences. Paul Pierson (1994: 2) – when analysing the efforts of scaling back the welfare state in the United Kingdom under Thatcher and in the United States under Reagan – concluded: “Welfare states have created their own constituencies. If citizens dislike paying taxes, they nonetheless remain fiercely attached to public social provision. That social programs provide concentrated and directed benefits while imposing diffuse and often indirect costs is an important source of their continuing political viability.” In other words, since welfare states benefit so many over the life course (as children, students, parents, sick, retirees), it might not matter what you first believed about the state and its role in welfare policy, you might just grow to “love” it because of its extensive scope in advanced liberal democracies.

5. Conclusions Baby-boomers, born between 1946 and 1972, are not different from earlier generations as to their expectations from the welfare state. Various regression models with West German and British data demonstrate that there are almost no significant variations between them and the generations that fully experienced World War II as adults (born between 1900 and 1927) or as children/teenagers (born between 1928 and 1946). The finding is stable across various areas of welfare activity (health, unemployment, education, pension), across time, and across the two countries. The numerical power of the baby-boomers as voters does not pose any particular challenge because their attitudes towards the welfare state follow the same logic as 11

those of other generations. The next generation of retirees is not different from the present one. The findings weaken the importance of the political socialisation literature in the area of welfare state attitudes. Knowing where and when you are first politically socialised does not help to explain you later attitudes towards the welfare state. In contrast, the political economy literature finds indirect support for their claim that socio-economic stratification and the experiences of risks and opportunities on the labour market are crucial to understand welfare support rather than historical socialisation experiences. Finally, the findings add to the still small body of literature that deals with the state capacity for reform in the face of demographic challenges: generational differences are of minor concern to any political reformer.

12

Figures and Tables Figure 1: Birth rates Germany and England/Wales 1946 - 2005 1,600,000

1,400,000

1,200,000

1,000,000 Births

England and Wales Germany

800,000

Mean England/Wales Mean Germany

600,000

400,000

200,000

2003

2000

1997

1994

1991

1988

1985

1982

1979

1976

1973

1970

1967

1964

1961

1958

1955

1952

1949

1946

0

Years

Source: (Office for National Statistics 2007; Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2006; 2007). Figure 2: The transformation of the German age pyramid, 1977 – 2007 - 2037

Source: German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2007). 13

Table 1: OLS regressions, welfare state expectation, West Germany and Britain, 1985 - 1990 - 1996 West Germany 1985 1990 1996 b p-value b p-value b p-value Active War (1900-29) 0.00 0.00 0.00 Passive War (1928-45) 0.04 0.751 0.02 0.855 -0.18 0.329 Baby-boomers (1946-72) -0.15 0.294 0.19** 0.048 -0.16 0.368 Education -0.24** 0.030 -0.22*** 0.001 -0.34** 0.003 Female 0.03 0.794 0.19*** 0.005 0.44*** 0.000 Union member 0.09 0.478 0.33*** 0.000 0.26* 0.037 Self-employed -0.75*** 0.000 -0.12 0.306 -0.70*** 0.000 Size of household >2 -0.31*** 0.006 -0.13* 0.065 -0.07 0.520 Constant -0.18 0.194 -0.39*** 0.000 -0.47** 0.005 Valid cases Adj. R²

Active War (1900-29) Passive War (1928-45) Baby-boomers (1946-72) Education Female Union member Self-employed Size of household >2 Constant

872 0.04 Britain 1985 b 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.52*** 0.04 0.19** -0.58*** 0.82***

2492 0.01

p-value 0.886 0.708 0.000 0.582 0.043 0.000 0.000

Valid cases 1404 Adj. R² 0.04 */**/*** significant at .10/.05/.01, weighted cases.

1990 b 0.00 -0.18 -0.05 -0.41*** 0.15* 0.24** -0.51*** -0.14 0.81*** 1083 0.04

14

1066 0.05

p-value 0.160 0.728 0.000 0.083 0.019 0.000 0.157 0.000

1996 b 0.00 0.04 -0.20 -0.46*** 0.26* 0.37** -0.25 0.14 0.82*** 905 0.05

p-value 0.819 0.232 0.000 0.013 0.002 0.107 0.214 0.000

Table 2: Ordered logistic regressions, 4 dimensions of welfare spending, West Germany and Britain, 1985 - 1990 - 1996 West Germany Health

Unemployment

1985

1990

Active War (1900-29)

0.00

Passive War (1928-45)

0.13

Baby-boomers (1946-72)

0.10

Education 1996

1985

Pension

1996

1985

1990

1990

1996

1985

1990

1996

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.06

-0.55**

0.12

0.02

-0.35

0.29

0.28**

-0.23

-0.32*

-0.15

-0.33

-0.24

0.04

0.45***

-0.39

0.27

0.52***

-0.34

-0.15

-0.11

-0.37

-0.60***

-0.05 0.34***

-0.76***

-0.18

-0.31***

-0.05

0.22

0.43***

0.91***

-0.47***

-0.60***

-0.77***

Female

0.24*

0.31***

0.37***

0.19

0.16**

0.33***

-0.24*

-0.18**

0.07

0.07

0.25***

0.39***

Union member

0.22

0.31***

0.26*

0.19

0.38***

0.39**

0.18

0.13

0.33**

0.18

0.23**

0.27*

Self-employed

-0.12

-0.30**

-0.42*

-0.73***

-0.26*

-1.16***

-0.30

-0.09

-0.19

-0.62**

-0.13

-0.71***

-0.50***

-0.04

-0.13

-0.13

-0.25***

-0.16

-0.10

-0.05

0.13

-0.30**

-0.41***

-0.20

Valid cases

850

2441

1051

840

2410

1038

844

2400

1042

850

2421

1034

McFadden's~²

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.03

1985

1990

1996

1985

1990

1996

1985

1990

1996

1985

1990

1996

Active War (1900-29)

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Passive War (1928-45)

0.06

-0.06

0.33

0.04

-0.03

0.22

0.44***

-0.17

0.17

-0.59***

-0.61***

-0.04

Education

Size of household >2

Britain Health

Baby-Boomers

Unemployment

Education

Pension

0.22

0.28

0.08

0.19

0.02

-0.20

0.80***

0.26

0.28

-0.57***

-0.56***

-0.61***

-0.53***

-0.29**

-0.55***

-0.68***

-0.46***

-0.34**

-0.05

-0.21

0.00

-0.88***

-0.75***

-0.79***

0.05

0.15

-0.02

0.04

0.13

0.20

0.06

0.20

0.15

-0.04

-0.14

0.08

Union member

0.46***

0.30*

0.07

0.00

0.18

0.11

0.21

0.27*

0.07

0.19

0.14

Self-employed

-0.18

0.20 0.59***

-0.15

-0.68***

-0.63***

-0.72***

-0.07

-0.40**

0.10

-0.58***

-0.03

0.23

0.14

0.18

0.20

0.39***

Education Female

Size of household >2

-0.46**

0.04

-0.42***

-0.03

Valid cases

1372

1059

886

1344

1035

847

1356

1046

879

1363

1056

886

McFadden's~²

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.04

0.05

0.03

*/**/*** significant at .10/.05/.01, weighted cases.

15

Table 3: Regressions (ordered logit, multilevel interval), changes in expectation state provides jobs, Britain, 1991- 2004 Ordered logistic Regression type Multilevel interval regression Change between 1991 and 2004 attitude Dep. Variable: Attitude in each year b p value b p value Active War (1900-29) 0.00 0.00 Passive War (1928-45) -0.02 0.370 -0.08 0.422 Baby-boomers (1946-72) -0.07*** 0.001 -0.03 0.770 Education 0.41*** 0.000 0.00 0.949 Female 0.18*** 0.000 0.03 0.522 Natural children 0.07*** 0.000 0.01 0.918 1991 0.00*** 0.000 1993 0.07*** 0.000 1995 0.16*** 0.000 1997 0.12*** 0.000 2000 0.12*** 0.000 2004 0.02 0.112 Valid cases 16078 4806 McFadden's R² 0.03 0.0005 sigma_u 0.79 rho 0.53

*/**/*** significant at .05/.01/.001

16

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