Decision Making in International Organizations Abstract: The nineteen and twenty century, International organizations developed and exist in large numbers. Their relationships with states raise issues and questions about the decision making in international organization. This discussion examines the decision making in universal and regional organizations by establishing a typology and developing certain aspects of these from an analytical point of view. The law of international institutions has clarified legal issues common to all international organizations, such as international legal personality, sovereign equality of States, accountability and structure and functioning in decision-making process. Nowadays the law of international institutions draws attention to the extent of operation of international organizations to all areas of decision making and to their contribution to the development of international law. In the first part describes the conditions under which sovereignty and decision making of international organization works. In second part describes in general terms of legal personality and its role in decision making. Later in which it has been share with the decision making methods in international organization. This study has concluded with some general reflections on the tension of decision making.

Keyword:Decision Making, International Organizations, legal personality, Methods. I.

Introduction:

The life of international organs marked by certain nodal points called resolutions, that is to say formal decision.1 Most activities of international organs are molded according to a pattern consisting of the preparation and the implementation of resolutions. 2The decision making of the international institutions and organs of international organizations may take various forms and have various legal effects even outside the organizations own memberships.3 The decisions of the organs, binding or nonbinding but primarily in case of binding decisions, must be in line with the primary law in the form of the founding treaty of organization. A standard doctrinal definition of an "international organization" can be found in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO): “international organization” means an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality. International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other entities. 4 Jose Alvarez lists three somewhat similar elements for use in defining 1

A.J.P Tammes, “Decisions of international organs as a source of international law” (1958) 94 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, Hague Academy of International Law 265. 2 ibid 265. 3 Inger Osterdahl, „Internation organizations- institutions and organs‟ in Jan clabbers and A. Wallendahl (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 174 4 Article 2 (a) of Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO).

international organizations: (1) establishment by agreement between states; (2) existence of at least one organ capable of operating separately from member states; and (3) operation under international law.5 These also are largely important doctrinal parameters, but Alvarez's second parameter captures a fundamental analytical characteristic: independence.6 Independence is at the heart of delegation.7 DARIO also mentioned that “rules of the organization” means, in particular, the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions and other acts of the international organization adopted in accordance with those instruments, and established practice of the organization. 8 The essence of an international organization is the delegation of decision making authority from individual states to the organization, representing the collectivity of member states.9The idea of the autonomy of international organizations classically reflects the political independence of the organization when it comes to making its own decisions.10 II.

Sovereign Equality and Decisions of International organizations:

A significant development in the international order has been the adaptation of many decisions by states through the international organizations as the expression of collective will of sovereignty. The decisive factors such as size, population of Member States are not relevant and all sovereign governments have the same voting powers in international organizations. Pre 1945, the sovereign equality of States was a debated political issue in the area of international legal system. Sovereign equality, although politically of the highest importance, may be logically classified as pertaining to a secondary normative category since they are designed to ensure and guarantee the effectiveness of sovereign

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Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law : Unity Within Diversity (The Hague and Boston : M. Nijhoff, 4thedn.,2003) 26-39. See also Jose E. Alvarez, International organization as lawmakers (Oxford University Press 2005) 6. 6 Abbott and Snidal provide a functional definition: "Two characteristics distinguish [international organizations] from other international institutions: centralization (a concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities) and independence (the authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres)." Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations”(1998)42 J. CONFLICT RESOL.3, 9. 7 Joel P. Trachtman „The Economic Structure of the Law of International Organizations‟ (2014)(15)1Chicago Journal of International Law 146. 8 Article 2 (b) of Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO). 9 Trachtman (n 7) 146. 10 On the question of the autonomy of international organizations in law-making, see N. White, „Separate but Connected: Inter-Governmental Organizations and International Law‟ (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review175–95.

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equality, still the principal Grundnorm of the present-day international legal order. 11 Sovereign equality cannot be explained merely as a principle based on treaty law (Art. 2 (1) of the UN Charter) or on custom.12 This would presuppose that sovereign equality came about as an offshoot of the law-making processes of the international community.13 The fact that international treaties constitute the main instrument for the regulation of matters transcending national boundaries is a direct consequence of the failure of a fullfledged international system of governance. 14 It can be said that sovereign equality belongs to the constitutional premises of the international legal order. 15 Since sovereignty is qualified as belonging to all States, the sovereign power of one State finds its natural limitation in the equal sovereign power of other States. 16 Sovereignty in the sense of international law can mean only the legal authority or competence of a State limited and limitable only by international law and not by the national law of another State. 17 Autonomy as political independence essentially touches upon the different relationships–e.g.of control, subordination, partnership–existing between the organization and member states. 18 Decision making seeks to strike a balance between the rules enshrined in the constituent instruments and formally accepted by the members of the organization and the need for the organization to develop as an institution, on the other hand. That means a functional structure between sovereign equality and independence of international organizations. As the International Court of Justice said in its advisory opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations: “Whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice.”

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It is precisely this wealth of references which has prompted P. Weil‟s criticism: “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” (1983) 77 AJIL 419,441. 12 Christian Tomuschat, “International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the eve of a New Century” (1999) 281 General Course on Public International Law 162. 13 ibid 162. 14 ibid 162. 15 A. Verdross, DieQuellen des universellenVölkerrechts (Freiburg, Rombach 1973) 20-21. 16 G. Abi-Saab, „Whither the International Community?‟ (1998) 9 EJIL 251,254,257. 17 Hans Kelson, “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization” (1944) 53YLJ (1944) 208. 18 N. Blokker, “International Organizations and Their Members-„International Organizations Belong to All Members and to None‟– Variations on a Theme” (2004) 1 International Organizations Law Review 139–6.

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By performing its functions, an international organization takes continual decisions, makes recommendations and carries out a whole series of actions on the basis either of its statute or by virtue of its statutory powers as authorized by the various organs established within it.19 These decisions are put into effect either by the organization itself or by member States. In fact we can speak of two faces of the decision-making process.20 First there are the substantive decisions which are within the scope of the activities of the organization and serve directly the purpose for which it was called into being; some may contribute to the development of law and the law-making process in international relations.21 Secondly, there are other decisions which are not of a binding character and are rather recommendations, the implementation of which is left to the free discretion of member States of the organization. 22 The present exposition of decision making process in international organization may be a blended form of sovereign equality and independence of international organizations. III.

Legal Basis for Decision Making in International Organizations:

If the primary subject of international law (i.e. States ) created international organizations for specific purposes in good faith through the treaties; then international law endow some normative powers to the international organizations through tacitly accepted and presupposed agreements founded upon functionalism, reason and usage for the achievement of the aims of the organizations. International legal personality for international organization is very essential which want to active involvement in international legal system. The legal personality of international organization sometimes described from the fact and from the prescription or treaty. This view has not always accepted. International organization comes in the world theatre before First World War (e.g.International telegraphic Union, 1865; The Universal Postal Union, 1874; International Railway Congress Association, 1884.).A legal person is being described right and duty bearing unit. The term international legal personality describes the capacity to bear rights and duty in international legal system. The legal personality reflects the legality of decision making powers to the achievement of organizations objectives. A fundamental assertion in international organizations, about the characteristics of the international 19

Manfred Lachs, “The development and general trends of international law in our time” (1980) 169 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 139. 20 ibid 139. 21 ibid 139. 22 ibid 139.

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personality arises from the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on April 11th, 1949 in the case of Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Reparation Case).23The first question asked by the General Assembly to newly established International Court of justice is as follows: "In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons entitle through him?”.24 The capacity to bring claim is a powerful indicator of international legal personality for international organizations. According to the ICJ: “The Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person…What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims”. 25 The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States. This development culminated in the establishment in June 1945 of an international organization whose purposes and principles are specified in the Charter of the United Nations. But to achieve these ends the attribution of international personality is indispensable.26 Legal personalityis the basis of the decision making of international organization would be to ascribe the implied powers, „at the heart of the implied powers doctrine lays the finding

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Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J Reports 1949, p. 174. 24 ibid 176-177. 25 ibid 189. 26 ibid 178.

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of a functional necessity‟27. Functional necessity is a tool for necessity determines and constitutes the justification of activities. 28 Function create obligations for states (not to hamper the organization in its pursuit of its purposes), but also oblige the organization both to carry out its functions, and not to assume functions other than those for which it was created.29The organ must determine the limits of its own competence, because no other organ can do so; but its decisions will be illegal if it assumes powers that it does not have. 30 The legality of decisions of international organization will require the proper interpretation of the constituent instruments and its relations with others organs. IV.

Decisions Making Methods:

The decision making of international organization touches different points of methods. The decision-making processes in international organizations can take multiple mapping that ranges and domains from anywhere between consensus, voting and unanimity. The first international organizations originally took decisions almost exclusively by unanimity, up until the beginning of the 20th century.31 The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) confirmed this in its advisory opinion on the Treaty of Lausanne32 and stated that, “from whom they receive instructions and whose responsibility they engage [...] observance of the rule of unanimity isnaturally and even necessarily indicated. Only if the decisions [...] have the support of the unanimous consent of the Powers composing it, will they possess the degree of authority which they must have.” International organizations frequently resort to adopting decisions by means of consensus, even though decisions by majority vote are often constitutionally possible, which implies that they continue to debate and discuss options until a general agreement is reached. Unanimity must not be confused with consensus which „is usually defined as the making of decisions without a vote and without formal objection by any member state‟.33,34While it is possible that one 27

ViljamEngstrom, „Reasoning on powers of organizations‟ in Jan Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 63. 28 Engstrom (n 27) 64. 29 Engstrom (n 27) 64. 30 HG Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law (5th revised edn, MartinusNijhoff 2003)503. 31 ibid 783. See also R. Monaco, „Les principesrégissant la structure et le fonctionnement desorganisationsinternationales‟ (1977) 130Rec. Cours. 32 PCIJ, Advisory Opinion Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne [1925] Publ. PCIJ 29. See also J. Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law, Cambridge, CUP, 2002, 227-228. 33 Frederic L. Kirgis, „International organizations in Their Legal Setting „(2ndedn., St Paul, West Publising Company 1993) 215.

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or more Member States have some reservations on the outcome, they decide, for various reasons, not to block it.35 Nevertheless, constituent treaties of international organizations from time to time resort to majority voting if no consensus can be reached. 36 The decision making of international organizations by consensus can be found in the practice of the United Nations Security Council since as early as 1948. Occasionally,when a decision of substance has to be taken, the President of the UNSC would propose astatement, which, if no member voices express disagreement, would be accepted byconsensus. 37 Consensus offers the rewards that the decision is supported by all members for promoting its implementation. No formal vote is taken, as opposed to decision taken by unanimity. Decision making of World trade Organization (WTO) defined as follows: „…..if no members, present at the meeting where decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision‟. 38 The practiceof deciding by consensus has subsequently been adopted by a number of organs of theUnited Nations, and increasingly by the General Assembly itself.39It should come as no surprise then, that, even though most constituent instruments of international organizations to some extent provide for a majority vote, in practice,

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Niger D. White, „Decision -making‟ in Jan Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 228. 35 The UN defines consensus as the “adoption of a decision without formal objections and vote; this being possible only when no delegation formally objects to a consensus being recorded, though some delegations may have reservations to the substantive issue at issue or a part of it” (definition proposed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, UNJY 1987, 174). Compare the description of consensus decision-making in footnote 1 to Art. IX.1 of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994 (WTO Agreement) (“The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision”). 36 See, for example, Art. 7 (1) and 11 (1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000; Art. 9 (6) of the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 5 November 1993 and Art.IX.1 of the WTO Agreement. The latter provision states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be decided by voting.” However, the practice in the WTO is that a vote is never taken: see J. Wouters and B. De Meester, The World Trade Organization. A legal and institutional analysis, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007, 180-182 for the decision-making modes in the WTO (including „explicit consensus‟ and „reverse consensus‟). See also, for the difference between „passive consensus‟ and „active consensus‟ in the WTO, M. Footer, An institutional and normative analysis of the World Trade Organization, The Hague, Nijhoff, 2005, 138–139. 37 S.D. Bailey and S. Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, (Clarendon, Oxford 1998) 260. 38 Article XI (1) footnote 1 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 39 K. Zemanek, “Majority rule and consensus technique in law-making diplomacy” in R.S.J. MacDonald and D.M.Johnston (eds.),The structure and process of international law: essays in legal philosophy, doctrine and theory(Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1989) 862-863.

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organizations nevertheless often resort to decision-making by consensus.

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This

motivation became particularly widespread in the second half of the 20th century and was subsequently often formalized and codified in the treaties of the respective organizations, some examples, the decision-making rules of MERCOSUR 41 , the WTO

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, the

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 43 , the African Economic Community (AEC) 44 , ECOWAS 45 , the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 46 , the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 47 ,the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) 48 and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court.49 This shift in practice from majority voting toadopting decisions by consensus is most commonly explained by the huge expansion of the membership of many international organizations in the second half of the 20th century, especially following the coming into being of a great number of new States as part of the decolonization process. 50 The founding members of most international organizations created an agent with common expectationsand conceptions as to the functions and goals

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Jan Wouters and Philip De Man „International Organizations as Law-Makers‟ Working Paper No. 21 – March 2009, The Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and the Institute for International Law, University of Leuven 12. 41 Art. 16 of the Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, 26 March 1991 and Art. 37 of the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR, 17 December 1994 (“ the decisions of Mercosul organs shall be taken by consensus and in the presence of all the States Parties”). 42 The Consensus was also the main decision-making method under GATT. See Art. IX.1 of the WTO Agreement, which provides that “[t]he WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT1947”. 43 Art. 23 of the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 22 January 1993. 44 Art. 10 of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, 3 June, 1991. 45 Art. 9 (2) and (3) of the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 25 May 1975.(“Unless otherwise provided in this Treaty or in a Protocol decisions of the Authority shall be adopted, depending on the subject matter under consideration by unanimity, consensus or, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States. […] Matters referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be defined in a Protocol. Until the entry into force of the said Protocol, the Authority shall continue to adopt its decisions by consensus”). 46 Art. 10 (8), 11 (6), 13 (6) and 19 of the Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity, 17 August 1992. 47 Art. 8 (7) and 9 (6) of the Treaty establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 5 November1993. 48 Art. 20 (1) of the Charter of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations, 20 November 2007 (“As a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus”). 49 Art. 112.7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 and Rule 61 of the Assembly‟sRules of Procedure. 50 B. Buzan, “Negotiating by consensus: developments in technique at the United Nations conference on the law of the sea” (1981) AJIL 326 and H.G. Schermers and N.M Blokker, International institutional law, (Leiden, Nijhoff 2003) 784.

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to be realized for the interest of States.

An important number of international

organizations require unanimity for all or certaincategories of decisions. An example from the past is the League of Nations, whichnotoriously required unanimity for all the decisions of the Council and the Assembly, exceptfor procedural matters. 51 Unanimity requirement is the rule in the followingregional organizations: the Benelux52, OECD53, the Organization of the Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC)54, CARICOM55, the African Union (AU) 56 , the West African Economic andMonetary Union (WAEMU) 57 and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation(SAARC)58 . Further, this method of decision-making is also used for some subject matters in,among others, the European Union 59 , the European Space Agency (ESA) 60 , the ArabLeague 61 and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)62.Voting as a method of decision-making can take many forms and can run the gamut from asimple majority vote with equality of voting power to qualified majority with weighted voting. 63 Following the years of decolonization, more and more international organizations had optedfor majority voting in their constituent treaties, not in the least the United Nations, which,unlike its predecessor, the League of Nations, requires that all decisions be taken by majorityvote (notwithstanding the veto power of permanent members in the UN Security Council 64 ). 65 Despite the political desirability of consensus decision making, most constituent documents allow for resolutions to be adopted by a simple majority, sometimes

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Art. 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919. Art. 8 of the Treaty establishing the Benelux Union, 3 February 1958. 53 Art. 6 (1) of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“mutual agreement of all the Members”). 54 Art. 11 (c) of the Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, 14 September 1960. 55 Art. 9 (2) and 13 (2) of the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community, 4 July 1973 (“an affirmative vote of all its members”). 56 Art. 7 (1) and 11 (1) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000. 57 Art. 114 of the Treaty on the West African Economic and Monetary Union, 10 January 1994. 58 Art. X of the Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 8 December 1985 (“Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity”). 59 See, for example, Art. 57 (2) and 93 of EC. 60 See Art. V (3), VII (1)(d) and XI (5)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the Convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency, 30 May 1975. 61 See Art. 6 of the Pact of the Arab League of States, 22 March 1945. 62 See Art. 9 (2) of the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States, 25 May 1975. 63 Schermers and Blokker (n 50) 791-856. 64 In the case of UN Security Council the right of veto of the permanent members does not apply in decision making on procedural matters. 65 Art. 18, 67 and 89 of UN Charter provide for a majority vote. 52

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a qualified majority (normally two thirds of members).66In practice, majority voting is the method of voting in many a specialized agency of the UN, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) 67 , ICAO 68 , WHO 69 , theFood and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 70 , WMO 71 , IMF 72 , the International Bank forReconstruction and Development (IBRD)73,the World Tourism Organization74 and WIPO75.Various regional organizations also took this recourse; this was, for example, OAS 76 , theAsian Development Bank (ADB)77 and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)78.This change of heart was probably spun by the realization that giving a de facto veto to each and every member of an international organization could lead to full-fledged paralysis 79 , while this has happened are very rare indeed. The practice of majority decision making fits better to the functionalist approach than unanimity and „underpins a functionalist approach in that if it proves necessary to ignore the votes of a minority of dissenting states, to fulfill the functions of the organization, then avote can be taken‟.80It is sometimes noted that very little practical difference exists between unanimity, thepreferred method of decision-

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Niger D. White, „Decision -making‟ in Jan Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 230. 67 Art. 19 (2) of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, instituted by the Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919 (two-third majority). 68 Art. 48 (c) and 52 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944 (simple majority). 69 Art. 60 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, 22 July 1946 (two-third majority for decisions on important questions, otherwise simple majority). 70 Art. III (8) and V (5) of the Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization, 16 October 1945 (simple majority). 71 Art. 10 (b) of the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, 11 October 1947 (in principle two-third majority). 72 Art. XII, Section 5 (c) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 22 July 1944 (simple majority). 73 Art. V, Section 3 (b) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 27 December 1945 (simple majority). 74 Art. 29 of the Statutes of the World Tourism Organization, 27 September 1970 (simple majority for most issues, two-thirds for some, including budgetary and financial questions). 75 Art. 6 (3) of the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 14 July 1967 (twothird majority for most issues, three-fourths or nine-tenths for some). 76 Art. 59 of the Charter of the Organization of American States (simple or two-third majority, depending on the organ and subject matter). 77 Art. 11 (iii) of the Agreement establishing the Asian Development Bank, 4 December 1965 (majority of the total number of Governors, representing a majority of the total voting number) and Art.30 (1) (ii) (simple majority of the number of Governors, representing a two-third majority of the members‟ total voting power). 78 Art. V (3) of the Charter of the Islamic Conference, 4 March 1972 (two-third majority). 79 See J. Charney, „Universal international law‟ (1993) AJIL 529-551. 80 Niger D. White, „Decision -making‟ in Jan Klabbers and A. Wallendahl (ed), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011) 231.

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making in the early days of international organizations, and themodern-day practice of decision-making by consensus.81 V.

Conclusion:

Each international organization has its own rules on voting and decision making. International organizations are functional entities, it is also necessary to take into account the relevant practice of the organizations in decision making. Today world society is apparently ready for general application of majority voting in international organization. The discipline of international organization law in the wider world may be agreed that international organizations need to meet standard of democratic legitimacy under international law for transparence and open decision making for all members of the organization. The adherence to fundamental rule of law and accountability of international organization can play an important role regarding decision making of international organizations.Reform of voting rules in international organizations has been hampered by the absence of a consensus on how best to design voting rules to ensure efficient decisions that the input and output functions of organization can co-exist and supplement to optimal solution of international public good such as peace and security, development, human rights, financial stability and trade liberalization. In the absence of uniform understanding of decision making, different types of decision making which are used in the debates can be used in a realistic reform proposal is best left for future work.

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J. Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law (Cambridge, CUP 2002) 229 and U. Lindell, Modern multilateral negotiation: the consensus rule and its implications in international conferences (Lund,Student literature 1988).

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