Current Research Journal of Social Sciences 2(4): 233-241, 2010 ISSN: 2041-3246 © M axwell Scientific Organization, 2010 Submitted Date: July 06, 2010 Accepted Date: August 09, 2010

Published Date: September 06, 2010

Corruption: The Bane of Democratic Stability in Nigeria I.S. Ogundiya Departm ent of Political Science, Usmanu D anfodiyo University, Soko to, Nigeria Abstract: Nigeria’s dem ocracy has remaine d grossly un stable since the co untry returned to d emoc ratic form of governance in 1999. The political terrain has been characterised by violent ethno-religious crisis, contract killing and political assassinations, inter and intra-party fracas and civil disobedience. At the heart of dem ocratic instability in Nigeria is pande mic bureaucratic and p olitical corruption. This study shows that political and bureaucratic corruptions have grave implications for dem ocratic stability in N igeria. It is argued that democratic stability will be difficult to attain as long as corruption remain pandemic and unchecked. Key w ords: Corruption, democracy, democratic consolidation, instability, legitimacy, violence John ston, 1991; Obayelu, 2007; HRW , 2007; Fjeldstad and Isaksen, 2008). These theoretical stance is depicted in various works and analyses as “amoral politics”, “amoral f am i li sm ” (Osa gha e, 199 5; O gundiya, 2009), “prebendalism” (Joseph, 1987), “patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism”, “clientelism” (S eteolu, 2005 ) to mention a few. Corrupt ridden states are also captioned by scholars as “predatory”, “soft state” (Myrdal) and so on. The problem w ith Nig eria is that all these descriptions are suitable to analyse Nigerian situation. Though amorphous, corruption in its popular conception is define d as the exp loitation of public position, resources, and pow er for private gain (Nye, 1967; Dobel, 1978; Amuwo, 2005; Obayelu, 2007; Fjeldstad and Isaksen, 200 8; Ogundiya, 2009). For instance Dobel (1978) define corruption as “the betrayal of public trust for ind ividual or grou p gain ”. In a sim ilar vein, Obayelu (2007) ide ntifies corruption as “efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means for private gain at public expense; or a misuse of public po wer for private benefit”. It is important to note that corruption is neither system specific nor culture bou nd. It is ubiquitous. Therefore, corruption as a phenomenon, is a global problem, and exists in varying degrees in different countries (Agbu, 20 03). C orruption is no t only found in dem ocratic and d ictatorial politics, but also in feudal, capitalist and socialist economies. Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist cultures are equally bedevilled by corruption (Dike, 2005 cf Obayelu, 2007). Corrupt practices, in all its manifestations are as old as human race (Lipset and L enz, 2000). However, the nature, form, dimension, character and the severity of corruption differs from one nation to the other. W hile corruption is mo re prevalent in the developing world, the developed world experience corruption at a minimal level. The important reason for the low level of corruption in the advanced democracies is that the control mechanisms are more

INTRODUCTION Nigeria’s democratic project has been under perpetual threat since 19 99 w hen the country returned to dem ocratic governance especially as a result of high prevalence of corruption. Put differently, corruption is a major challenge to democratic stability in Nigeria. The political climate, to say the least has been ho stile to democracy. The general scepticism has been whether the current experience will last. This cynicism is justifiable when one consider the fact that all the factors that precip itated the collapse of the First and Second Republics are currently at play. Widespread violence, electoral frauds, political assassination, politically inspired ethno-religious conflict, apathy, evitable econom ic woes and its attendant consequences (abject poverty, slums etc.,), flagrant disregard for the rule of law, disrespect for human rights and pandemic corruption remains the key features of Nigerian political life. These manifestations of demo cratic instability are the symptoms and consequence s of basic system pathology, majorly, political corruption. Corruption has become prevalent and has not only greatly eroded the basis of the authority of the state but also challenge the legitimacy of democracy as the best form of governance. The problem of democratic instability persists because the political system has failed to engender, maintain and sustain the belief in Nigerians that democ racy is the most appropriate system for the society. This study demonstrates that corruption has robbed Nigerians, the government which they chose to represent and pursue their interests and the consequ ence - dem ocratic instability is inevitable. Defining corruption: The theoretical thinking perceiving corruption as a m ajor factor that poses serious threat to dem ocratic stability, sustainab ility and c onso lidation is not uncommon in the literatures (Osaghae, 1995; 233

Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010 developed and effective than in the developing countries. The efficacy of the control mechanisms in the advanced democracies further accounts for the relative political and dem ocratic stability tha t these countries enjoy. Before going on to examine the nexus of corruption and dem ocratic stability, let us briefly elaborate on the concept of democratic stability and its connection to democratic consolidation.

In a similar vein, Mishler and Rose (2001) maintained that a defining feature of democratic regimes is that they depend for their survival and effective functioning on the public’s willing acquiescence and supp ort. Democratic stability, therefore, presupposes “that people have, at any given time, the go vernment which they choose and that, being rational beings, they are most likely to support a government which represents and pursues their interests” (Osaghae, 1995). A government which represents and pursue peoples’ interest must be responsive, responsible and accountable to the people. Responsiveness and accou ntability enhance p eople’s affection and support for the system . This further enhances the growth and development of democratic culture, which is a sine qua non for democratic survival. In essence, a developed democratic culture is a sine qua non for democratic stability. Here, Linz and Stephan’s (cited in Um ar, 2002) illustrative phra se that stable democracy depe nds o n ave rage citizens accep ting it as “the only game in town” is critically instructive. Cultural theorists like Almond and Verba (1963) and Lipset (1994) for instance, clearly recognised that cultural variables, especially legitimacy , can be critical for the survival of democratic regimes once they are established. In his mo re recent work Lipset (19 94) stated that: “Political stability in democratic systems cannot rely on force. The alternative to force is legitim acy...” (Lipset et al., 1993; Lipset, 1994). Seligson (2000) also found an inextricable connection between levels of support and tolerance and democratic stability. Seligson (2000) declared that: ‘in situations of low support and low tolerance, democracy is clearly at risk and dem ocratic breakdown seems to be the most likely ultimate outcome”. The belief in the rightness of the political arrangement or what Lipse t (1959) called legitimacy is a function of the cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations of the citizens. This is also influenced by the nature of politics, quality of governance, leadership performance, and the character and nature of the relationship among the contending elites. Regimes characterized by higher level of dem ocratic legitimacy are more likely, according to Fails (2008), “ to c omplete the pro cess of democratisation”. This process has been described by Diamond (1999) as “democratic deepening”, reflecting the continuous ability of democratic institutions to improve political participation; to become more open and vigorous; and enhance accountability. The underlying assumption here is that how average citizens perceive democracy has an important impact on its stability. B ased on this assumption, this study shows that political and bureaucra tic corruption in Nigeria, as experienced in the past ten years has made nonsense of and threatens Nigeria’s nascent democracy.

Towards explaining democratic stability theoretical and conceptual explorations: Research on de moc ratic stability in the developing countries, cu rrently experiencing the “third wav e”, is problema tic for a number of reasons. “Po litical traditions are not yet developed, party systems are fragile and electoral formulas are changed, and in addition, one cannot always separate personal influence of exceptional political leaders from th eir institutionally capabilities” (Pugaciauskas, 1999). Another analytical problem stems from the fact that dem ocratic stability could be confused with regime stability. However, the term demo cratic stability is preferred to “regime stability” as the former carries considerab le normative charge. Rather than define the essence of democratic stability, some authors have confined themselves to presenting the criteria of democratic instability: cancellation o f constitutionally required democratic elections; usurpation of governmental powers- usually through fraudulent elections; unconstitutional impeachments etc. (Pugaciauskas, 1999). The conc ept of demo cratic stability is synonymous with legitimacy, especially if legitimacy is conceived as the belief in the moral rights of a regime to govern. Therefore, the ingredien ts of these mo ral rights that a regime enjoys are inherent in the concept of dem ocratic stability. According to Osaghae (1995) “the premise of dem ocratic stability is that what sustains government and ensures stability is voluntary support or consent of the citizens rather than reliance on coercion”. In the words of Diamond (1999) “it is by now a central tenet of empirical theory that stable democracy also requires a belief in the legitimacy of dem ocrac y”. Th ese demo cratic ingred ients of stability have been well summarized by Diamond et al. (1987 cf Osaghae, 1995) thu s: All governments rest on some kind of mixture of coercion and conse nt, but democracies are unique in the degree to which their stability depends on the consent of a majority of those governed. Almost as a given, theories of dem ocrac y stress that democ ratic stability requires a widespread b elief am ong both elites and masses that democracy is the best form of government for their society, and hence that the democratic regime is morally entitled to rule. 234

Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010 Other writers argue that the choice of institutional model is central to democratic stability. Pugaciauskas (1999) argue s that “the cho ice of institutional model matters- and matters, first and foremost, from the viewpoint of democratic stability”. Bernhard et al. (2001) also relate the survival of democracies to econ omic performance and institutional design. If this view is right one can conclude that the failure of the First and Second Nigerian Republics were caused by the wrong choice of institutional frameworks/models. Though this assertion may be plausible, it is important to note that, one major flaw of this theory is that it failed to appreciate the role of the operators. There is no perfect institutional frameworkeven a perfect institution in the hand of political scoundrel is nothin g but a misguided missile. For example, dem ocratic instability in Nigeria, as shall be argued later, is exacerbated not only by institutional flaw s but mos tly by deviations from institutional prescriptions- tested and stable mode ls of presidentialism. W hile some sc holars paid considerable attention to the role of culture, institutional model, and the econo mic w ell-being of a state, others emphasize the nature and character of elite, the nature of and role of ethnicity to m ention a few . Przeworski and h is colleagues have shown that once democracy is stable, the level of economic development has a great deal to do with its ability to survive. The Przeworski et ál study, limits itself to macro-level econ omic and institutional data (Cited in Seligson 20 00). Since the publication of the L ipset’s early sem inal, it has been demonstrated that macro-level variables such as GNP, literacy, and regime type all play very important role in creating the necessary conditions for the emergence and survival of democracy. Huntington (1991) concludes that econom ic developm ent is far more important than culture, and points to the contradictions in the argument that suggest that Confucianism and Islam present obstacles to democratisation. The existing emp irical research o n dem ocratic consolidation typically follows one of two strategies which are called “substantive” and “prospective” (Svolik, 2007). According to Svolik (2007), “The substantive approach focuses on a set of ideal outcomes that we should be observed in a mature democracy and then evaluates to what extent a polity approaches them”. Such ideal outcomes frequently concern the functioning of political institutions (Grzyma la-Busse, 2007); respect for the democratic “rules of the game” (Diamond, 1999; Levitsky and Way, 2002 cf Slovik, 2007); as well as popular and elite attitudes towards democracy (Almond and Verba, 1963; Guillermo and Schmitter, 1986; Putnam, 1993; Bermeo, 2003; Cleary and Stokes, 2006; Bernh ard and Karakoc, 2007). The second, prospective approach associates consolidation with the durability of democracy. According to Schedler (1998, 95 cf Svolik,

2007), for instance, “consolidating democracy means reducing the probability of its breakdown to the point whe re [we] can feel reasonably confident that democracy will persist”. There fore, democ ratic consolidation is about regime maintenance and about regarding the key political institutions as the only legitimate framew ork for political contestation and ad heren ce to the dem ocratic rules of the game. Consolidation, according to Diamond “is the process of achieving broad (and) deep legitimation such that all significant political actors, at both elite and mass level believe that the democratic system is better for their society than any other realistic alternative they can imagine”. Schedler (1998) in a related argu men t, describes democratic consolidation as the challenge of making new demo cracies secure, of extending their life expectancy... of making them immune against the threat of autho ritarian reg ression , of building da ms against the eventual reverse waves”. Suffice to say that this cannot be achieved except stability is attained. The tiny gap b etween stability and con solidation is that stability begets consolidation. Indeed democracy must be stable for it to be consolidated. By implication dem ocrac y mu st mak e sense to the people fo r it to enjoy considerable support required for its consolidation. In this work, demo cratic stability is seen as a step tow ard dem ocratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is as earlier discussed is also a function of so many factors, including enhanced economic development, developed dem ocratic culture, stable party system etc. Corruption and dem ocratic instability in Nigeria 19992009: Events in N igeria since 1999 have shown that the tidal waves of reversal have been con tending with Nigeria’s demo cratic project. Consequently, democracy has remained g rossly unstable and the future seems to be very bleak because of rampant systemic bureaucratic and political corruption. Corruption has reached a high crescendo such that an average N igerian now possibly associates dem ocrac y with corruption. The consequences of political corruption are patently manifest: cyclica l crisis of legitimacy, fragile party structure, institutional decay, chronic economic problem and underdevelopment and, above all, general democratic volatility. Then, what are the effects of corruption on de moc ratic stability? This shall be discussed paying attention to the effects of corruption on the economy and the socio-psychological and political behav iour of b oth the politicians and the electorates. Let us briefly examine some o f these linkages. Corruption, economic developm ent and d em ocra tic stability: The effects of corruption on a nation’s economy are damaging. Indeed a nation inundated with corruption cannot be viable economically neither can the system generate enough support/affection required for the

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Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010 survival of democratic system. This is the situation in Nigeria where corruption has become part and parcel of the political culture. Corruption has indeed robbed Nigerians the benefit of economic development because scarce availab le resources that should have been deployed to execute developmental projects have gone into private foreign accounts. For instance in 2006, the head of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nuhu Ribadu, estimated that Nigeria lost some US$380 billion to corruption between independence in 1960 and the end of military rule in 1999 (BBC, 2007). According to Tony Blair (2005 cf Ogundiya, 2008), the former Prime Minister of Britain, this amount is equivalent to all the western aid given to Africa in almost four decades and also equivalent to 300 years of British aid for the continent. It is also said to be six times the A merican aid given to post-war Europe under the Marshall plan. Nigeria’s corruption epidemic has continued since then. Some western diplomats estimated that Nige ria lost a minimum average of $4 billion to $8 billion per y ear to corruption over the eight years of the Obasanjo administration (HRW , 2007). That figure would equal between 4.25% and 9.5% of Nigeria’s total GDP in 2006. To put those numbe rs in perspective, a loss of 9.5% of the United States’ GDP to corruption in 2006 would have translated into $1.25 trillion in stolen funds or $222 billion (GBP 108.6 billion) in the case of the United Kingd om’s econom y (HR W , 2007). Though these figures may not be very reliable, it is incontestable that corruption has assumed a ludicrous dimension in Nigeria. Nigerian situation aptly fit into what Myrdal (cf Amuwo, 2005) described as the “folklore of corruption”. Expectedly, this has had a debilitating impact on the nation’s socioecon omic and p olitical development. Significantly, the levels of economic development and d emo cratic stability have been found to be mutually supporting. The bulk of liberal demo cratic theory establishes a close relationship between the economies, refers to as development, and a stable dem ocratic rule (Lip set et al., 1993; Ak e, 2001). How ever, the link betw een d emo cracy and economic prosperity is not as simple as it has been taken to be, because the democratic process and the fortunes of the economy have a cybernetic feedback interaction. Democracy facilitates economic develo pme nt, wh ile econ omic backwardness and decline impedes democratisation. The contention here is that the level of corruption in Nigeria has adversely affected the performance of economy in that the resources which would have been deployed to facilitate development have found their ways into private pockets and individual accounts in foreign countries. This is indeed the reason for high level of poverty, insecurity, widespread diseases, and high unemployment rate. All these provide unsu itable ground for dem ocrac y to thrive. Observing the trends in

the development of the Nigerian democratic project, the Hum an Right W atch (2007) comments: Despite record-setting, government reven ues in recent years, corruption and m ismanageme nt remain a major cause of Nigeria’s failure to make meaningful progress in improving the lot of ordinary Nigerians. These finan cial facto rs are clo sely entw ined with the rampant political violence in Nigeria. Public revenues are not only stolen and misused, but often pay for the services and weapons behind the political violence. Because violence and corruption mak e political competition a very expensive endeav our in Nigeria, many p oliticians are far more accountable to powerful and violent political godfathers who spo nsor them than they are to their constituents Therefore, in the face of economic hardship, believed to have been propelled by widespread corruption, it is an herculean task to convince an averag e Nigerian to continue to make unending sacrifices and swallow without a limit, the b itter econ omic pills wh ich is no t a natural consequence but an inevitab le effect of a corrupt system. Therefore, to say that support for democ racy is weakly strong in Nigeria is not an ov erstatem ent. W eakly strong is deliberately used to describe a situation whereby Nigerians though prefer civilian to military rule, have a cold affection for democracy. This is indeed a problematic situation, created by the glaring and prevalent corruption that has pervaded Nigeria’s democracy in the past ten years. Corruption, political violence and democratic stability: Political violence is the bane of dem ocratic stability in Nigeria and its major cause is the over-permissiveness of corruption by the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, political power guarantees unlimited and uncontrolled access to the resources of the state and society that are then appropriated for personal and parochial use and advantages. Nigerian brand of civilian politicking is therefore no more than a prebe ndal enterprise eng aged in largely for the crude appropriation of national resources (Joseph, 198 7; Fawole, 2005; Ibeanu, 2007). Consequently, contestants deploy terror tactics and violence to intimida te out or elimina te the opponents in what Ibeanu (2007) conceived as ‘machine politics”. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between corruption and political violence-many public officials use stolen public revenues to pay for p olitical violence in support of their ambitions (HRW , 2007). Since 1999 when the country returned to democracy, it is estimated that more than ten thousan d lives h ave b een lost in politically motivated violence and properties w orth

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Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010 billions of naira have been destroyed. There is little doubt that there is an inextricable nexus between corruption and the crises in the Nigerian state. Nigeria provides a fertile ground for political corruption. Political corruption in a dem ocratic context refers to the problem of agency between citizen and elected official, and the w ay it is affected by institutions that define the electoral process, such as division of powers between different branches of and levels of government, the role of the legal system med ia and civil society in influe ncing public policy and its implementation. In short, it deals with the policy formulation process and high level of corruption among politicians. Political corruption is evident when governmental power is abused for illegitimate private, group, or sectional ad vantage. T his is the trading of influence and authority by political leaders and may extend to granting favours, irregularities in campaign financing and electoral fraud. It is an effort to secure wealth for private benefit at public expense (Lipset and Lenz, 2000). Forms of political corruption includes, rigging, vote buying , vote selling, cancellation of votes, ballot stuffing, manipulation of electoral registers, inflation of electoral votes and the employment of political offices for personal advantage at the expense of the pu blic interest. It is impo rtant to point ou t that the lev el of political corruption has affected the cognitive perception of Nigerians, first about the ability of the state to organise a free and fair electoral contest; and second, perception that political appointments are one sure way to wealth and elevation of social status; and third, perception that the political office holders cannot be responsive and acco untab le to the citizens. T he impact of this on dem ocratic stability is clear. Electoral contest has become a do or d ie affair, turning Nigeria’s political milieu to a Hobbesian state of nature- w ar of all ag ainst allcharacterised by what Ibeanu (2007) aptly described as the “primitive accumulation of votes” or “machine politics”. This, according to Ibeanu (2007) is to sustain the belief tha t a legitimate way of securing political office is to steal the peoples’ mandate. This has produced several consequences with serious implication for democratic stability: Contract killings, political assassination, electoral violence resulting in the general destruction of lives and properties. Moreover, on the part of the Nigerian voters and the politicians, the consequences are very apparent. Ibeanu (2007) trenchantly summarised the consequences:

voters and politicians alike know that votes are unequal and that the ac tions of corrup t electoral official, party leaders, security agents and the presidency do count more in determining electoral outcomes than votes... the bulk of N igerian voters have no illusions about the importance of their votes and there is no psychological satisfaction in voting because they know that either the votes will not be counted o r the votes will not cou nt. Consequently, as the p hilosophica l basis and fundamental ethos of democracy are been swept under the carpe t, the Nigerian electorates expectedly lost fate not only in the electoral process, but fundamentally on the government which a fraudulent process produced. Such fraudulent electoral process with the benefit of hindsight has produced irresponsible and unaccountable governance in Nigeria. Impliedly, the legitimacy of democracy as the best form of g overnance has been seriously corroded. M ore distressing to demo cratic stability is the godfatherism in Nigerian politics. One of the major damaging consequences of corruption in Nigeria in the recent time is the emergence of political “kingmakers” and gladiators commonly known as the political godfathers. A ccording to H uman Right W atch (2007 ): Godfathe rism is both a symptom and a cause of the violence and corruption that together permeate the political proce ss in N igeria. Public officials who owe their position to the efforts of a political godfather incur a debt that they are expected to repay without end throug hout their tenure in office. Godfathers are only relevant because politicians are able to deploy violence and corruption w ith impu nity to compete for office in contests that often effectively, and sometimes actually, exclude Nigeria’s voters’ altogether. But their activities also help to reinforce the central role of violence and corrup tion in politics by making it even more difficult to w in elected office without resorting to the illegal tactics they represent. Political corrup tion and the politics of godfatherism and the attendant political violence pose more dang er to demo cracy than any other factor. The con tention here is that, the state of contemporary electoral compe tition in Nigeria is far from mak ing de moc racy m eanin gful, sensible and far from been durable. Corruption, legitimacy and democratic stability: Legitimacy is the moral rights of a government to be obeyed. It is also seen as the belief by the majority of citizens that the regime, defined as the constitutional order is the most appropriate one fo r the society (L ipset, 1959). W ith legitimacy the business of governance is made

On their part Nigerians voters do not attach great promissory, content or psychological values to their votes. The vote is grossly devalued and the mandates claimed by politicians are effectively dubiou s... In term of the content value of their votes, Nigerian

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Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010 simple. Democracy provides the ingredients through which the moral basis of au thority is justified. Therefore, the essence of demo cracy is to lay a solid moral foundation for the authority of the state, the incumbent political head and other state institutions. Democracy therefore, not only prescribes how political pow er should be acqu ired bu t also w hat to do with it and h ow it must be exercised (Ogundiya, 2008). One of the hallowed procedures of dem ocrac y is the electoral contest to determine who will be allow ed to hold p ublic offices at all levels (Fawole, 2005). An impo rtant ingredien t of this procedure, as Diamond (Cited in Faw ole, 2005) w ould have us believe, is the strict adherence to the rules of the electoral system. Therefore, when power is acquired and exercised contrary to democ ratic prescriptions and norms, the moral basis of authority becomes questionable and unjustifiable. This is the situation in Nigeria since 1999 when the country returned to democratic governance because fairness and objectivity, which are irreduc ible prerequisites for democratic stability, have been thrown overboard. Thus, elections have failed to produce a legitima te and acceptable government in Nigeria. As discussed earlier this has frustrated dem ocratic stability in the country. The 1999, 20 03 and 2007 general elections w ere adjudged to be worse than the previous general elections. A fraudu lent election can produce n othing except a fraudulent government, unacceptable to the people. Expectedly, the advent of civilian rule in Nigeria in 1999 after a decade and half of military rule has not autom atically translated into dem ocratic governance, in a strict sense. Rather than put the blame on the prolonged military rule and the authoritarian imprints it left on the psyche of Nigerians, the fault should be properly placed at the corridor of the kleptomaniac political and bureaucra tic elites (Ogundiya, 2009). Indeed, rather than authoritarian imprints (Fawole, 2005), the insa tiable taste for stealing among the political elites has dulled the democ ratic sensib ilities of Nigerians, thereb y posing a serious threat to democratic stability.

the nature of the party system, party formation, composition (ethnic and religious) and geographical spread, others stressed the conflictual interparty and intraparty relationships. One major development in the recent years is that political parties in Nigeria have become a liability to democratic stability instead of asset. Party procedures for the appointm ent of candidates are usually scuttled and n on-transparent, as political godfathers have taken over the affairs of the parties. Corrupt political financing has adversely affected democracy in two fundamental ways. First, it has generated serious intra party feuds between and among the followers and loyalists of the competing political godfathers resulting in political assassinations and contract killings. Intra party feuds since 1999 have assumed alarming and ludicrous dimension. Between 1999 and 2009 over 10 0 party stalwarts and thousands of party supporters have been assassinated including: Odunayo Olagbaju (AC party stalwarts in Osun state), M arshal Harry , Dikib o, Funso W illiams (PDP Gubernatorial aspiran t in Lagos state), Dr. Ayodeji Daramola (PDP stalwarts and Gubernatorial aspirant in Ekiti state) among others. Secondly, corrupt political financing has made ruling political parties at all level of governance reluctant to pass strict laws on political party financing, since some of the funds on which they rely for their survival are obtained from dubious so urces and corrupt practice s. This further explains the weak support for anticorruption posture of the Federal government by the political parties. In a study in Kenya, Akivaga (2001) found that the ineffectiveness of the political parties in the crusade against corruption can be attributed to: first, lack of com mitment to a national agenda even when it is formulated; second, the pursuit of short term personal interest as opposed to the long term interest of the nation; third, obsession with ethnic considerations as the basis of politics; fourth, lack of leadership with vision, that is , an absence of leaders w hose word is their bond, who po ssess principles and w ill, and who put integrity and character above wealth. While this is true in the case of N igeria, it needs be reiterated that political parties in Nigeria are corruptly constituted and as well managed by corrupt past military, burea ucratic and p olitical class. In such situation, political parties, as a demo cratic institution cannot afford to be an agent of democratic stability but rather an agent of decay.

Corruption, political party (ies) and d em ocra tic instability: Political parties are central to demo cratic stability. It is one of the indispensable institutions of democracy. It is perhaps incontrovertible to argue that political parties constitute one of the major clog in the wheel of dem ocratisa tion and dem ocratic stability in Nigeria since th e cou ntry re-d emo cratise in 1999. Indeed a bulk of literatures on Nigerian government and politics rightly associated the demise of the First and Second Republics to the Party system (Adamolekun, 1985; Agbaje, 1990, 1996; Suberu, 1990; Fawole, 2005; Ogundiya and B aba, 2007). However, various authors differ in terms of emphasis. Some writers lay emphasis on

Corruption, the legislature and dem ocrati c breakdown: Nigeria presents a typical case of failed democracy in Africa due largely to corruption (Maduagwu, 1996). Another institution of democracy that has been ravaged by corruption is the legislatures (both at the state and the F edera l levels). Indeed Ogbam O gban Iyam’s trenchant hypothetical statements are to a large

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Curr. Res. J. Soc. Sci., 2(4): 233-241, 2010 extent valid from the experience of Nigeria since the return of the country to civilian rule in 1999. Ogban-Iyam (1996) propositions which are considered relevant for the understanding of the defective functionalities of the legislatures to demo cratic stability are: C W hen the few co ntrol the governance of a polity and have the preponderance of force to continue to maintain such control, the National Assembly that emerges from the dictation of such a grou p is likely to be more corrupt and subversive of democracy and democratisation than the one that emerges from the dictates of the popular forces. C A National Assembly which is recruited and constituted through corrupt and anti-democ ratic mea ns tends to be corru pt. C A corruptly recruited National Assembly tend s to subvert democracy, and hinders democratisation. C A citizenry that is essentially corrupt tends to have and tolerate a corrupt National Assembly.

naira from Professor Osuji (the former Education Minister) to inflate the budgetary allocation to education ministry. Senator Chimaroke Nnamani also faced about 124 count charges of fraud, conspiracy, concealment and money laund ering totaling ab out 5.4 billion na ira (Vang uard newspaper Saturday February 16, 2008). Madam Patricia Etteh, the first female Speaker of the House of Representatives, resigned following her indictment over the misa ppropriation of pub lic funds in multiple contracts of N 628m (US$5 million) for the renovation of her official residence and the purchase of 12 official cars. Suffice to say that many legislators bought their ways into the legislative house. Corruption has also had debilitating impacts on the rule of law , hum an righ ts and other supportive ingredients of democracy. The implication for dem ocratic stability is apparently detrimental. CONCLUSION

W ith the benefit of observation of the practices and legislative activities from 1999 to date one can conclude, without fear of contradiction that first, the few powerful individuals popularly known as godfathers have forced mem bers of the various houses of assemblies on Nigerians through dubious and fraudulent electoral process. Hence, the Legislatures existing since 1999 does not have its source in the popular will. Therefore, members of National and State Houses of Assemblies were recruited through corrup t and antidemocratic means. Third, the leaders of the National and State H ouses of Assemblies have, as various revelations have shown, embarked on stealing spree instead of legislating for good governance and development of the country. Fourth, National and State Houses of Assem blies are undoubtedly products of a corrupt society. For example, questions bordering on corruption have created serious instability in the upper and lower legislative Houses. From 1999 when the country returned to electoral democracy, the lead ership in the Senate and the House of Representative have not been stable. Chief Evans Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo and Adolphos Nwabara were impeached on account of mismanagement and corrupt enrichmen t. For instance, Senator Idris Kuta led panel that investigated the allegation of corruption against Senator Chuba Okadigbo found out among others that he was involved in the inflation of the street light project to the tune of 173 million naira; authorized the payment of 37.2 million naira to furnish the Senate president’s residence, an amount above the approved 25 million; installed and commissioned a 100 KV A genera ting set at the Senate President’s residence at an inflated price of 15million naira. Adolphu s W abara , also an impeache d Senate President was also guilty of receiving bribe of 55 million

Democracy cannot be predicated on a fragile and unstable political base. Corruption, the paper argues has been responsible for the fragility and volatility of democracy in Nigeria. Corruption has greatly eroded the fundamental values of democracy and the essential princip le that government should be representative and accou ntable to the citize ns. Invariably, the Nigerian political leaders as it is presently constituted lack the moral fibres to champion the cause of the Nigerian society. W hen political leaders are perceived to be pursuing their persona l interests excessively, citizens become disenchanted, questioning the legitimacy of leaders and the state, and even the legitimacy of the process and system that produced them. This is what constitutes democratic instability. Democratic stability simply presupposes “that a people have, at any given time, the government which they choose and that, being rational beings, they are most likely to support a government which represents and pursues their interests. Though this is not to suggest that corruption explains everything- ethnicity, religious bigotry, recycling nature of the political elites, bad governan ce, fragile party structure, deteriorating economy etc- are o ther variables that accoun t for democratic instability in Nigeria. Importantly, all the above factors are both symptoms and consequences of political corruption. Therefore, to en sure stable demo cracy anticorrup tion policies devo id of mere speechifying must be put in place. REFERENCES Adamolekun, L., 1985. The Fall of the Second Republic. Spectrum, Ibadan.

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