C O N FL I C T A SSE SSM E N T A FG HA N I STA N FEBRUARY 2009

(Mausoleum of King Nadir Shah in Kabul / April 2006)

Written by:

Corinna Vigier

Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................................... 12 PREFACE ................................................................................................................................. 13 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ........................................................................................ 15 I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................... 16 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................18 The formation of an Afghan State (1747 – 1963) .................................................................................19 The end of the monarchy and the Soviet invasion (1964 – 1979) ........................................................21 The soviet occupation and the communist regime (1979 – 1988)........................................................23 The civil war and the rise of the Taliban (1989 – 2001) ......................................................................25 The US-Led Invasion and the first years after the Fall of the Taliban (2001 – 2006)..........................28

II. AFGHANISTAN IN NUMBERS ............................................................................................... 31 PEACE AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 34 I. CONFLICT LINES ................................................................................................................ 34 1. International conflicts affecting Afghanistan .......................................................................................36 2. Conflicts on the national level ..............................................................................................................44 3. Conflict potentials on the local Level ...................................................................................................47

II. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 58 1. International / External actors .............................................................................................................58 2. National Actors.....................................................................................................................................65

III. ROOT CAUSES AND ESCALATING FACTORS ....................................................................... 80 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Political ................................................................................................................................................81 Social ....................................................................................................................................................85 Economic / Environmental ...................................................................................................................88 Security related.....................................................................................................................................89 International .........................................................................................................................................91

IV. LOCAL STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE INITIATIVES .......................... 94 1. 2. 3. 4.

Traditional structures of conflict resolution .........................................................................................95 Kinds of legitimization of a local mediator/arbitrator .........................................................................95 Drawbacks of traditional conflict resolution structures .......................................................................96 Peace Initiatives and Examples of peacebuilding Activities.................................................................97

V. THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT AND THE INSECURITY ON THE LOCAL POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ................................................................................................. 103 1. The security situation in general ........................................................................................................103 2. Impact of the security situation on I(N)GOs .......................................................................................109

VI. UPCOMING CHALLENGES ....................................................................................... 115 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 119 ANNEX.................................................................................................................................... 120 1. The impact of the relationships Iran - Saudi Arabia – US on Afghanistan ........................................120 2. ISAF Map (December 1, 2008)...........................................................................................................125

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 126

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Figures Figure 1: Political Map of Afghanistan ..................................................................................................................................15 Figure 2 : The Realm of Ahmad Shah Durrani .....................................................................................................................19 Figure 3: Warlordism and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan at the beginning of the 21st century .............................30 Figure 4: Topography of Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................................32 Figure 5 : The international, national and local conflicts affecting Afghanistan ..............................................................35 Figure 6 : International Conflicts affecting Afghanistan (Conflict Mapping) ...................................................................36 Figure 7 : The Durand Line and the maximum claimed extent of the Pashtunistan area. .............................................38 Figure 8 : The Pakistan Tribal Areas .......................................................................................................................................40 Figure 9: Ethnic groups in Afghanistan .................................................................................................................................54 Figure 10 : ISAF RC and PRT Locations .................................................................................................................................63 Figure 11 : “The Afghan Insurgent Front” ..............................................................................................................................68 Figure 12 : Political Alliances in summer 2008 ........................................................................................................................75 Figure 13 : Attacks from insurgents 2006-2008 (ANSO).................................................................................................... 103 Figure 14 : Security Incidents 2003 – 2008 (UNDSS) ......................................................................................................... 104 Figure 15 : Security Situation in Afghanistan in winter 2008/2009................................................................................... 105 Figure 16 : Reported Civilian Casualties in Armed Conflict (2007 – 2008) ..................................................................... 107 Figure 17: Categorization of insurgent's attacks on NGOs, 2008 .................................................................................... 109 Figure 18 : Categorization of criminal attacks against NGOs, 2008 ................................................................................. 110

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Preface As part of a strategic planning process for the American Friends’ Service Committee (AFSC)’s program in the Middle East region, a conflict assessment was conducted between October and December 2008 in Afghanistan. Unlike most other conflict analyses which focus only on the main conflict(s) in the country itself, the final paper gives an introduction to the various conflicts on international, national and local levels that directly or indirectly affect the conflict situation in Afghanistan. It can offer no more than an introduction to the various conflicts that play a role in Afghanistan. This executive summary follows the same structure as the complete paper. It starts with an overview of the historical background in Afghanistan, followed by the conflict analysis (including conflict lines, involved stakeholders and root causes) and a short description of national and local peace initiatives and conflict resolution structures. After that, some information is given about the security situation and the upcoming challenges. Historical Background The current situation in Afghanistan is the result of a long history of events that includes a significant amount of influence of foreign powers. In the 19th century – around 100 years after the formation of the state of Afghanistan in 1747 – the British and the Russian Empires competed with each other in “the Great Game” for influence in Afghanistan. Due to fierce resistance from Afghan militias and a lack of political will on the part of either power to have a permanent presence there at any cost, Afghanistan became a buffer state between the two empires with artificially drawn borders in the North and East. The eastern border – the Durand Line – later became an issue of conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, in 1949 Afghanistan unilaterally declared the Durand Line as void and supported the self-determination of Pashtun and Baluch areas in Pakistan. In the growing escalation of tension between the two countries, Afghanistan increased its relations with India and the Soviet Union, giving Pakistan (which had aligned with the US) the perception of encirclement. The cooperation between Kabul and Moscow – besides attracting US attention – also contributed to a rising communist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, Afghan scholars who studied in Egypt imported Islamist concepts to Afghanistan, leading to a strong polarization of politics at the country’s universities. In 1973, after the government of the constitutional monarchy failed to cope with two droughts resulting in the starvation death of about

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100,000 Afghans, the king’s cousin, Muhammad Daoud, led a non-violent communist-backed coup and Afghanistan became a republic. Daoud himself was assassinated in 1978 in a revolt by members of the communist party and his successor was also killed by one of his communist comrades a year later. While the communist regime in Kabul launched a terror campaign against social and religious leaders who could challenge their rule, the Iranian religious revolution in 1978/79 also provided new energy for Afghan Islamists. Forced secular reforms including measures aimed at women’s education and also confiscation of property belonging to religious scholars and elders led to revolts in different parts of the country. The growing instability, combined with ongoing internal, bloody power struggles among Kabul’s communists and also fear of a potential alliance of Afghanistan with the US, led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eventually became the Soviet Union’s “Vietnam.” Due to fierce Afghan resistance and massive covert support of Islamist mujahedin resistance groups by Pakistan, the US, Saudi Arabia and China, the Soviet Union suffered significant losses and in 1986 decided to leave Afghanistan. The Geneva Accord, defining conditions for the Soviet withdrawal, was signed in 1988 between the (communist) government of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and the US and excluded the mujahedin parties. In 1989 the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the US and Pakistan’s covert support of mujahedin groups against the communist regime in Kabul continued for three more years. Eventually in 1992, the Soviet Union and the US stopped all military aid to their respective proxies in Afghanistan. Shortly after the official end of the Russian military aid to Afghanistan, the communist regime’s most important militia leader, Abdur Rashid Dostum, defected to the mujahedin which contributed significantly to the fall of the regime in the first half of 1992. With the loss of the communists as a common enemy, violent clashes between the mujahedin parties increased. The civil war in Afghanistan entered a new stage that lead to the failure of the state and the fragmentation of the country into different spheres of influence held by competing warlords. The ongoing military battles between parties destroyed vast parts of Kabul and numerous human rights atrocities were committed on civilians. In these times of violence and chaos, the rise of the Taliban movement in the South of Afghanistan in 1994 was considered a blessing by many. Getting support from Pakistan and Saudi private citizens, the Taliban were able to quickly spread their influence in the country. They conquered Kabul in 1996 and by 1998 controlled about 90% of the country. The Taliban established a strict Islamic regime based on Pashtun tribal values and a strict interpretation of sharia, the Islamic Law. The regime was most oppressive in the major cities with large non-Pashtun populations while rural areas were less negatively affected.

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The main opposition force against the Taliban was an alliance of different remaining mujahedin parties led by Ahmad Shah Massoud which became known later in the West under the name Northern Alliance. It was financially supported by India (who thus supported the opposition to Pakistan’s perceived proxies the Taliban), Iran, as well as the Central Asian republics and Russia (which feared the further spread of Islamic extremism northward). In 2001, the Northern Alliance became the local partner of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan as a result of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent refusal of the Taliban regime to hand over Osama bin Laden, who by that time was in Afghan territory. Although skirmishes with remaining Taliban forces continued in 2002, by the end of December 2001 the main strongholds of the Taliban were conquered by international forces and the militias of the Northern Alliance. Before the fall of the last Taliban stronghold, in November 2001 the UN invited a series of Afghan political groups to come together at the Bonn conference in Germany. Hamid Karzai became the interim president of Afghanistan and a draft schedule for the political transition of Afghanistan was created. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with an initial strength of 5,000 soldiers was deployed to Kabul to protect the government and the reconstruction of the state. While the presence of the ISAF apparently prevented Kabul from becoming once again the locale of violent battles between competing fractions, clashes between rival warlords did re-erupt outside the capital shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime. It was not until 2004 that these violent conflicts were reduced significantly, as a result of political moves and the strengthening of pro-government security forces. In June 2002, an emergency Loya Jirga took place in Kabul and around 1,600 representatives from all provinces attended to put together the interim government. Hamid Karzai was re-elected as interim president. In January 2004, the new Afghan constitution was passed and the first presidential elections took place later in October. Hamid Karzai won the elections receiving more than 50% of the vote. One year later the first parliamentary elections followed. Instances of intimidation and fraud took place during both elections (especially during the parliamentary elections), and a significant increase in security incidents was noted. This heralded the escalation of insurgent violence to come, from 2006 onward.

Conflict Lines There is not “one” conflict in Afghanistan. Instead, the country can be seen as entangled in a whole “conflict net” made up of a large variety of different and yet intertwined conflict (potentials) and disputes on the local, national and international levels. Thus, any single-focused conflict resolution approach to a major conflict that ignores related conflict lines is highly likely to fail in the long run. Also, the described conflicts do not affect each region to the same degree and circumstances vary

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greatly nationwide. An approach that could be the perfect solution in one area of the country could lead to a complete catastrophe in another. International conflicts that affect Afghanistan are the War on Terror, and the conflicts / tensions between (a) US and Iran, (b) Pakistan and India, as well as (c) Saudi Arabia and Iran. Afghanistan is also affected by the conflict between the Pakistani government and pro-Taliban insurgents in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) close to the Afghan border. In addition, Afghanistan has a long-standing international conflict with Pakistan regarding the Durand Line, which in most parts marks the border between the two countries, but is not officially recognized by Afghanistan. Related to the Durand Line is the unresolved “Pashtunistan” issue - the idea of one state for Pashtuns, the establishment of which could mean that Pakistan would lose governmental authority over up to about half its territory. On the national level, there is the well-known conflict over political power and international presence between the Taliban and other insurgency groups on one side and the official Afghan government along with international military forces of the US and other NATO countries on the other. Less known but of significant importance are the conflict(s) between different politicalmilitary parties and actors which has been going on in Afghanistan for at least 30 years as a form of civil war between varying coalitions. Last but not least, there are numerous conflict potentials on the local level, including conflicts over access to resources (especially natural resources such as water and land), ethnic and regional tensions, conflicts on the family level and regarding gender roles, differences between metropolitan and urban areas and last but not least returnee conflicts.

Involved stakeholders An array of stakeholders is involved in the net of conflicts in which Afghanistan is entangled. Beside the US and other NATO countries, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, all play important roles in these constellations. International military forces, namely the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) are also significant international actors on the national level. Regarding Afghan stakeholders, the Afghan president Hamid Karzai and his government as well as government security forces such as the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the national intelligence service (NDS) are key players on the progovernment side. A kaleidoscope of actors can be identified as anti-government elements, including the (“real”) Taliban and allied forces such as the Haqqani Network and the political-military party Hezbe Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Foreign resistance fighters and criminal gangs are also involved

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in activities against the Afghan government, sometimes actually being hired by the previously mentioned groups, sometimes just claiming to be “the Taliban” for personal advantage and to create the illusion that the criminal act is committed by a large and powerful group that the police shouldn’t mess with. One special group of stakeholders are the “jihadis” or “tanzims”, a number of influential political-military parties which were already active (with significant financial support from abroad) as mujahedin resistance groups during the Soviet occupation and continue to play an important role in today’s politics. Beside these, there are also a series of other Afghan actors active on the local level including different types of “shuras”/ community councils, mullahs and elders who play important roles in fueling Afghan conflicts or in their resolution.

Root causes and escalating factors Afghanistan’s long history of complex intertwined conflicts reflects the magnitude of different root causes and escalating factors. From a general perspective, not considering particular conflict fragments, it is both neither possible and nor useful to make a clear distinction between original root causes and escalating factors. On the political level, Afghanistan struggles with the effects of bad governance. This is the result of a kaleidoscope of factors such as the lack of qualified staff. There is a widespread predatory approach to governance and official posts are often considered to be primarily opportunities to enrich oneself and distribute resources to one’s followers rather than serve the public good. This approach leads to endemic corruption and widespread impunity for powerful people and their followers. Given the use of military power as a major way to claim and hold political power, there also appears to be a militarized perception of “peacebuilding” among many key persons in the Afghan government. One national interviewee described this attitude cynically with the phrase “Go there, bomb any opposition to the ground and then afterwards simply build a nicer village.” In addition to these political factors, key political players have been instrumentalizing ethnicity, religion and regionalism to mobilize their followers. On the social level, there is very high illiteracy and a lack of vocational training in Afghanistan. The adherence to archaic honor codes can lead to long-lasting blood feuds. All of this is coupled with an explosive growth in population with the average woman having more than six children. Approaches to conflict resolution have been mainly re-active and limited to compensation for damages without addressing underlying root causes.

In addition, there is a high degree of

traumatization among the population from decades of war. Economically and environmentally, Afghanistan faces a growing scarcity of natural resources such as water, arable land, pastures and wood, in combination with the fact that 80% of the population

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depends on agriculture. Droughts and other effects of global warming further exacerbate this. Unemployment is high which makes people more receptive to offers of payment from criminal/opposition groups. Insurgency and government corruption are significantly supported by revenues from the drug economy in Afghanistan. Security-related factors that contribute to existing conditions are the high proliferation of small arms and the presence of hundreds of illegal armed groups organized as criminal gangs (or) under the command of warlords who use these private militias to claim and maintain political power. National security forces, especially the police, are weak and in many cases negatively affected by corruption, and loyalty to powerful local players, as well as unqualified and ill-equipped staff. Related to that, there is a lack of security for the local population, with insurgency and criminal groups threatening civilians and/or offering “protection” in exchange for financial or logistical support. Regarding conflict factors related to international events, sources or actors, Afghanistan’s borders have been artificially formed, dividing ethnic territories and creating a multi-ethnic country. The country has faced numerous attempts at invasion or external control and has become the arena for conflicts between foreign powers that try to influence the situation in Afghanistan to their benefit. Also, insurgency groups operating in Afghanistan receive external support or at least benefit from “safe havens” outside Afghanistan’s borders. Beside these external factors, the international presence within Afghanistan has had escalating effects on conflict due to perceived injustice in the distribution of development aid, alienation of the Afghan population caused by the civilian casualties during international air strikes based on faulty information, and behavior of international soldiers considered culturally inappropriate such as night raids.

Local forms of conflict resolution and peace initiatives With large parts of the population considering official jurisdiction as ineffective and corrupt, traditional forms of conflict resolution (including shuras / local councils, mullahs or other respected members of a community) are by far the most accepted and popular methods for settling conflicts on the local level. Their approach is usually based on arbitration, often combined with building up social pressure in order to ensure that the involved parties adhere to the solution. To be selected or accepted as an arbitrator, professional knowledge in conflict resolution techniques is secondary to social status based on personal reputation, age, influence in the community and lineage. The downside of traditional conflict resolution methods is that they usually do not address the root causes of conflicts. They are mostly reactive to already escalated conflicts and apply customary law that may include severe human rights violations as a “solution” to a conflict, e.g., the practice of “baad” in which young women are given to other families in retribution for a crime committed by another family member.

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On the government level, there is little actual support and political willingness for national peace and reconciliation initiatives. One reason may be the high number of former mujahedin commanders in upper level positions who would likely jeopardize any process which might lead to accusations against them for human rights atrocities. One of the biggest blows against the National Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice was the amnesty law passed by the Afghan Parliament in the beginning of 2007. The Peace Jirga between Afghanistan and Pakistan in summer 2007, in which about 700 representatives from both countries met, was also widely criticized for not inviting representatives from Taliban forces. Saudi Arabia succeeded in September 2008 in facilitating the first preliminary talks in Mecca between members of the Afghan government and “reconciled” Taliban leaders. Yet further talks appear to be thwarted by the Taliban’s proclaimed demand that all international forces should be withdrawn from Afghanistan as a precondition for any negotiation. Although there is a lack of coordination among them, there continues to be an array of peacebuilding projects conducted at the community level by local NGOs and some international organizations working particularly on this topic. These projects include, for example, trainings in conflict resolution techniques, local events, the establishment of peace councils and other structures for conflict resolution and reconciliation. However, with very few opportunities available in Afghanistan to receive long term funding, many of these projects are limited in duration to a few weeks or months with unclear prospects of when – or if – new funding will be available.

Impact of conflict and insecurity on the civilian population and development projects Since the summer of 2005, the security situation has significantly deteriorated with 40-50% of the country now inaccessible to civilian aid programs. This has contributed to a “militarization of development aid” in which the military is using development projects as a means of “winning the hearts and minds” of the population and thus “force protection.” A consequence of that appears to be the increasing number of attacks by insurgent forces on NGOs, who are considered as “soft target” allies of international governments and their military forces in Afghanistan. Afghan civilians are victims not only of attacks from insurgent groups but also of military operations by progovernment forces that are based on faulty information. In 2008 there were more than 2000 civilian casualties – the highest number since 2002. Among these, 552 civilians were killed in air strikes from international forces. Both NGOs and the Afghan population are also subject to an increase in crime including robbery and abductions / kidnapping.

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Upcoming challenges A series of likely developments in the coming months and years have the potential to worsen the situation in Afghanistan. In the short term, a likely increase in security incidents triggered by the deployment of additional international forces and the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections will pose challenges. In the medium and long term, ongoing bad governance, increasing anger about the behavior and presence of foreigners in the country, population growth in combination with scarce resources and the effects of global warming have the potential to escalate conflicts. Last but not least, the international community faces the risk of becoming morally trapped in Afghanistan if measures aimed at a short-term reduction in insurgency increase the risk of an outbreak of a new civil war after the international presence is reduced.

Conclusion The long list of root causes and escalating factors of conflict in Afghanistan shows the complexity of the situation. While considering negotiations with “the Taliban” may be a significant step toward reducing the current amount of violence, other conflict potentials need to be addressed as well. The “bad news” is that there will not be “one solution” that can solve everything, everywhere. The very same approach could lead to positive results in one area and a catastrophe in another. The “good news” is that there are many different small ways to improve the situation. Thus, there are a variety of measures to choose from instead of a single approach that may not be “ripe” or applicable at the moment, for example, if one of the parties in conflict is not willing to negotiate at the present time. The challenge, however, is to coordinate these possibilities so that people working in different areas are aware of what is going on elsewhere and ideally can learn from the experiences of others in similar situations. Peace can never be “imported”, as tempting as the thought may be. Afghan ownership of the process is crucial. Yet the challenge remains that a number of influential Afghan and international actors have personal incentives in maintaining the current conflict situation rather than in resolving it. However, these actors are neither the majority nor are they homogenous. Allies for peacebuilding and conflict transformation can be found at each level, in each area and in each group. It may take some looking, some capacity building, some coordination and some time to find them– but they are there.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The following paper has been possible only due to the wonderful support of a series of people and organizations. I want to thank AFSC for the opportunity to write such a comprehensive study, and especially Alice Andrews, Abdul Aziz Yaqubi, Peter Lems and Patricia Omidian for their support and the wonderful cooperation we had. My gratitude also belongs to all interviewees and resource persons who devoted their time to interviews as long as three hours and who answered additional questions of clarification. I am also indebted to the former DED (German Development Service) Country Director, Dr. Andreas Schneider, for supporting my participation in this study, to the two Afghan consultants, Dr. Shams ur-Rahman and Marzia Meena, for assisting me during the interview phases and to the whole local staff of AFSC in Kabul whose forthcoming logistical support made all of these interviews possible. I would also like to thank the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), Conrad Schetter, the RAND cooperation and the UN Cartographic section for permission to use some of their maps and charts in this study. I also owe a special word of gratitude to Katja Mielke and Andreas Wilde, who – besides helping me over the past three years to achieve a better understanding of Afghanistan – provided most helpful suggestions for this paper. Special thanks for the understanding and support from my family in the weeks necessary to write this paper. Last but not least I would like to thank all those people who accompanied me during my time in Afghanistan between April 2006 and December 2008 and who significantly contributed to my getting to know the situation from an array of different angles and point of views, including my close former colleagues Arezo, Farkhunda and Shabnam. Last but not least I would like to express my special thanks for Marzia, who I had the honor and pleasure to work with in the peacebuilding department of a local Afghan NGO for two and a half years and with whom I also made my first tiny conflict survey in Afghanistan.

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PREFACE The following document is the result of a conflict assessment that was conducted as part of a strategic planning process for the American Friends’ Service Committee (AFSC)’s program in the Middle East region. This paper gives an introduction to the various conflicts on the international, national and local levels that directly or indirectly affect the conflict situation in Afghanistan. Beside the rather “new” conflict between insurgents and the Afghan government in alliance with international forces (as part of the so called “War on Terror”) most of these conflicts have a long history and have greatly affected the development of the country over the last several decades. Furthermore, one can describe the constellation of intertwined conflicts as a “conflict net” where any approach to conflict resolution which concentrates on only one conflict, is likely to fail in the long run. This document can offer no more than an introduction to the various conflicts that play a role in Afghanistan and the surroundings they take place in. There are numerous publications available including books, international magazines and the internet that provide additional information about topics such as international development activities, security sector reform, gender, the drug economy, tribal structures, the environment and education which can help one gain a better understanding of Afghanistan. It should be noted that the described conflicts do not affect each region to the same degree and circumstances vary greatly nationwide. Thus, an approach that could be the perfect solution in one area of the country may lead to a complete failure in another if not adapted.

Methodology applied and course of the assessment In addition to the study of previous articles and reports on Afghanistan, this assessment included two interview phases. The first interview phase took place between October 15-31, 2008 and the second one between November 23-28, 2008. In addition to the author and lead consultant, Corinna Vigier, Ms. Marzia Meena and Dr. Shams ur-Rahman participated in the first interview phase as local consultants/ interviewers. They also assisted in selecting interview candidates and wrote short background papers. In the second interview phase, Peter Lems from the American Friends Service Committee’s headquarters in Philadelphia talked with previous interviewees, with members of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) network and with community representatives in Kabul. In both interview phases more than 60 interviews were conducted with AFSC staff, members of AFSC’s partner organizations, the Afghan government, local and international organizations as well as experts/scholars on Afghanistan. Although it was stated at the beginning of each interview that nobody

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would be quoted personally, more than a third of the interviewees requested that their name not be noted even in a general list of interviewees. This led to the decision not to add a list of interviewees to the annex at all. 1 The document also includes information from the personal experiences and research of the author who worked and lived in Afghanistan between April 2006 and December 2008. For example, some stories are included that were told to her by colleagues and co-workers over the years and during a small conflict survey conducted together with colleagues of a local Afghan NGO in the spring/summer of 2008.

Structure of the assessment The assessment begins with an historical overview of events from past centuries which must be understood in order to assess the current situation. Then, a small chapter entitled “Afghanistan in Numbers” provides a first impression of today’s Afghanistan based on statistical data. The assessment goes on to describe international, national and local level conflicts, including the major stakeholders involved, followed by a list of political, social, economic/environmental, security related and internationally related root causes and escalating factors. Local structures of conflict resolution and peace initiatives from the government as well as international and national organizations are mentioned as well. The final chapters explain the security situation and upcoming challenges.

1

With the perceived tense situation in Afghanistan and the increasing pressure and intimidation of people who “speak out” by insurgents, warlords and members of government, it was feared that anyone on the interviewees’ list could be blamed for something one of the others had said.

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Figure 1: Political Map of Afghanistan

(Afghanistan Map, no. 3958 Rev. 5 October 2005; Map reprinted with courtesy of UN Cartographic Section)

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I. HISTORICAL B ACKGROUND Chapter Summary: The current situation in Afghanistan is the result of a long history of events that includes a significant amount of influence of foreign powers. In the 19th century – around 100 years after the formation of the state of Afghanistan in 1747 – the British and the Russian Empire competed with each other in “The Great Game” for influence in Afghanistan. Due to fierce resistance from Afghan militias and a lack of political will on the part of either power to have a permanent presence there at any cost, Afghanistan became a buffer state between the two empires with artificially drawn borders in the North and the East. The eastern border – the Durand Line – later became an issue of conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan, in 1949 Afghanistan unilaterally declared the Durand Line as void and supported the self-determination of Pashtun and Baluch areas in Pakistan. In the growing escalation of tension between the two countries, Afghanistan increased its relations with India and the Soviet Union, giving Pakistan (which had aligned with the US) the perception of encirclement. The cooperation between Kabul and Moscow – besides attracting US attention – also contributed to a rising communist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, Afghan scholars who studied in Egypt imported Islamist concepts to Afghanistan, leading to a strong polarization of politics at the country’s universities. In 1973, after the government of the constitutional monarchy failed to cope with two droughts resulting in the starvation death of about 100,000 Afghans, the king’s cousin, Muhammad Daoud, led a non-violent communist-backed coup and Afghanistan became a republic. Daoud himself was assassinated in 1978 in a revolt by members of the communist party and his successor was also killed by one of his communist comrades a year later. While the communist regime in Kabul launched a terror campaign against social and religious leaders who could challenge their rule, the Iranian religious revolution in 1978/79 also provided new energy for Afghan Islamists. Forced secular reforms including measures that aimed at women’s education and also confiscation of property belonging to religious scholars and elders led to revolts in different parts of the country. The growing instability, combined with ongoing internal, bloody power struggles among Kabul’s communists and the fear of a potential alliance of Afghanistan with the US, led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan eventually became the Soviet Union’s “Vietnam.” Due to fierce Afghan resistance and massive covert support of Islamist mujahedin resistance groups by Pakistan, the US, Saudi Arabia and China, the Soviet Union suffered significant losses and in 1986 decided to leave Afghanistan. The Geneva Accord, defining conditions for the Soviet withdrawal, was

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signed in 198 between the (communist) government of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, Pakistan and the US and excluded the mujahedin parties. In 1989 the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the US and Pakistan’s covert support of mujahedin groups against the communist regime in Kabul continued for three more years. Eventually in 1992, the Soviet Union and the US stopped all military aid to their respective proxies in Afghanistan. Shortly after the official end of Russian military aid to Afghanistan, the communist regime’s most important militia leader, Abdur Rashid Dostum, defected to the mujahedin which contributed significantly to the fall of the regime in the first half of 1992. With the loss of the communists as common enemy, violent clashes between the mujahedin parties increased and the civil war in Afghanistan entered a new stage that lead to failure of the state and the fragmentation of the country into different spheres of influence held by competing warlords. The ongoing military battles between the parties led to the destruction of vast parts of Kabul and numerous human rights atrocities were committed among the civil population. In these times of violence and chaos, the rise of the Taliban movement in the South of Afghanistan in 1994 was considered to be a blessing by many. Getting support from Pakistan and Saudi private citizens, the Taliban were able to quickly spread their influence in the country. They conquered Kabul in 1996 and by 1998 controlled about 90% of the country. The Taliban established a strict Islamic regime based on Pashtun tribal values and the strict interpretation of the sharia, the Islamic Law. The regime was most oppressive in the major cities with large non-Pashtun populations, while rural areas were less negatively affected. The main opposition force against the Taliban was an alliance of different remaining mujahedin parties led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, which became known later in the West under the name Northern Alliance. It was financially supported by India who thus supported the opposition to the Taliban, who were Pakistan’s proxies,) Iran, as well as the Central Asian republics and Russia (which feared a further spread of Islamic extremism northward). In 2001, the Northern Alliance became the local partner of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan as a result of 9/11 and the subsequent rejection of the Taliban regime to hand over Osama bin Laden, who by that time was in Afghan territory. Though skirmishes with remaining Taliban forces continued in 2002, by the end of December 2001 the main strongholds of the Taliban were conquered by international forces and militias of the Northern Alliance. Before the fall of the last Taliban stronghold, in November 2001 the UN invited a series of Afghan political groups to come together at the Bonn conference in Germany. Hamid Karzai became interim president of Afghanistan and a draft schedule for the political transition of Afghanistan was created. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with an initial strength of 5,000 soldiers was deployed to Kabul to protect the government and the reconstruction of the state. While the presence of

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the ISAF apparently prevented Kabul from becoming once again the locale of violent battles between competing factions, clashes between rival warlords did re-erupt outside the capital shortly after the fall of the Taliban regime. It was not until 2004 that these violent conflicts were reduced significantly, as a result of political moves and the strengthening of pro-governmental security forces. In June 2002, an emergency Loya Jirga took place in Kabul and around 1,600 representatives from all provinces attended to put together the interim government. Hamid Karzai was reelected as the interim president. In January 2004, the new Afghan constitution was passed and the first presidential elections took place later in October. Hamid Karzai won the elections receiving more than 50% of the votes. One year later the first parliamentary elections followed. Instances of intimidation and fraud took place during both elections (especially during the parliamentary elections), and a significant increase in security incidents was noted. This heralded the escalation of insurgent violence to come, from 2006 onward.

1. INTRODUCTION The geographic area in which today’s Afghanistan is situated has a rich and diverse history reaching back to the Stone Age. 2 Over the millennia, the area had at least three different names: the Arians who arrived in the region in the second half of the second millennium BC called it “Aryana” 3. Two thousand years later, the Persian Sassanids named it “Khorasan” (Land of the East) which by that time also included East Iran and the parts of South Asia. Eventually, during the 18th and 19th century, part of the region became known as “Afghanistan”, which can be translated into Land of the Afghans, 4 a term originally used only for the traditional land of the Pashtuns. The use of the word “Afghan” for non-Pashtuns is comparatively recent development.5 Afghanistan has a history of invasions and pillaging between its different tribes and ethnic groups and also by external forces. The first large invasion by a famous person in world history occurred 2

Tools that were found near Ghazni in archeological excavations can be dated back to 100,000 BC

3

Many Afghans are still quite proud of their Arian heritage. The national airline of Afghanistan is called ARIANA, as are many hotels in the country. Some Afghans regard themselves as a “brother nation” to Germany because the ideology of the Third Reich claimed that the German race was descended from the Arians. (Combined with the limited knowledge of German history in Afghanistan, this leads to quite interesting occasions for a person of German origin in Afghanistan. One regularly faces the challenge of explaining why one does not consider Adolf Hitler – who like the Afghans fought against the British and the Soviets – a national hero or role model at all and in fact is rather glad that Hitler did not succeed in establishing an Arian empire). 4

The suffix “stan” can be found in many country names in the region. It literally means “land”. The translation for example of Pakistan is “Land of the Pure”. The term “Afghan” stems originally from a term used solely for Pashtuns, excluding members of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Though much has been done in recent years to promote the concept that the term “Afghan” includes all ethnic groups living in Afghanistan (and that this common nationality should be more important than individual membership in a certain ethnic group), there are still noticeable traces of people using the term only for Pashtuns. 5

For a socio-historic background of the term “Afghan” see for example: Wikipedia: “Origins of the name Afghan” Online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origins_of_the_name_Afghan

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between 330-328 BC when Alexander the Great passed through Afghanistan with his army. His march included various battles against insurgent regional rulers, yet his presence had a great impact on culture and architecture in the region. 6 Over the following centuries, Afghanistan witnessed several attempted and successful invasions by central Asian nomads, 7 but also times of peace and prosperity. Wealth and a mixing of cultures resulted from the increasing importance of the Silk Road which traversed the northern and western fringes of present-day Afghanistan. Arab armies spread the Islamic religion into the region and in the 9th century AD most parts of the region were Islamized. 2. THE FORMATION OF AN AFGH AN STATE (1747 – 1963) The “birth date” of the Afghan state is commonly considered as 1747. In this year a large council meeting (Loya Jirga) of Pashtun tribes took place in Kandahar and they formed an alliance to liberate themselves from Persian rule.

Figure 2 : The Realm of Ahmad Shah Durrani

In the course of this meeting, Ahmad Shah Abdali was elected as the new king by a chosen arbitrator. The new king – whose honor title Durrani became the name of his tribal union – ruled for a quarter of a century in a loose alliance of individual chiefdoms. Its realm stretched over a significantly (Map reprinted with courtesy of Dr. Conrad Schetter)

larger area than today’s Afghanistan, and included access to the Arabian Sea. 6

Even today, people explain the presence of blond-haired and blue-eyed Afghans as a legacy of the Macedonian presence of that time.

7

For example, in the 13th century Genghis Khan invaded and looted Afghanistan, followed by Tamerlane in the next century.

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After the king’s death, however, internal conflicts arose between the individual tribes over resources and power, as well as along religious lines (Shiites vs. Sunnis). As a consequence, by the time of the 19th century, the former Durrani Empire had been geographically much reduced. In addition, as Barnett R. Rubin puts it, “The expansion of the British and Russian Empires cut off the opportunity for conquest and external predation – undermining the fiscal base of the ruler’s power and throwing Afghanistan into turmoil for much of the nineteenth century.” 8 Afghanistan turned into a buffer zone between the surrounding empires of Persia, Russia and British-India that was made up of several independent and semi-independent realms and chiefdoms which lacked any overarching coordinated power. While Afghanistan itself resisted all attempts at colonization, the struggle between Russia and Great Britain over power and influence in the region was called “The Great Game.” Great Britain fought Afghan resistance forces in three Anglo-Afghan wars. Eventually, the British withdrew their military forces, but were able to influence the new Afghan ruler, Abdur Rahman, whom it supported, to become king in 1880. Thirteen years later, in 1893, Abdur Rahman signed the Durand treaty which determined the border between Afghanistan and British India, laying the (disputed) foundation of today’s border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also received the title “The Iron Emir” following an active militarized policy of state building in which he considered local and regional leaders as obstacles. This led, as Nazif Sharani puts it, to "bloody conquests and mayhem in large parts of his domain, especially in Hazarajat, Nuristan and in Turkistan. Appropriation of land (both pastures and arable), water, women and property from these territories were handed over to a steam of resettled Pashtun tribesmen in these regions, some of them the vanquished Ghilzai who were exiled to the north. [...] This practice institutionalized discriminatory state policies leading to social fragmentation, alienation, inter-communal violence and pervasive suspicion and mistrust within society and towards the government.” 9 In the following century, Afghanistan experienced a series of aristocratic rulers all of whom except Habibullah II (1928-29) belonged to the Pashtun Durrani line. The independence and partition of India in the late 1940s inflamed tensions between Afghanistan and the newly founded Pakistan. From the Afghan point of view, Pakistan would not be the successor state to British India and thus would have no rights regarding the Pashtun and Baluchi territories that once belonged to Afghanistan. The Durand Line was unilaterally called into question and declared invalid by the Afghan Loya Jirga in 1949. The Jirga also called for self-determination of the tribal 8

See: Barnett R. Rubin: “Saving Afghanistan” in: Foreign Affairs; http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2007/March/Rubin%2003-01-07.pdf 9

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“More importantly, dehumanization and repeated decapitation of local notables as [“cutthroats”, reactionaries or “warlords” during various regimes till present day] have terrorized the people and forced local communities to keep their distance from the chronically oppressive and predatory tribal government institutions at all cost” See: Nazif Sharani: "Local Politics in Afghanistan“ Key Note Speech during the symposium "Beyond the State – Local Politics in Afghanistan“ in Bonn, Germany; 26-28 February 2009

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territories (which made up significant parts of Pakistan) as Pashtunistan. Skirmishes across the border began and the two countries aligned themselves with different international powers: “Islamabad was aligning itself with the United States in order to balance India – which led Afghanistan, in turn, to rely on aid from Moscow to train and supply its army. Pakistan, as a result, came to regard Afghanistan as part of a New Delhi – Kabul – Moscow axis that fundamentally challenged its security.”10 The increasing Soviet influence and control in Afghanistan through military aid ($32.5 million in 1956) and the training of Afghan military officers in the Soviet Union, as well as development projects drew US attention back to Afghanistan.11 Officially maintaining neutral status (and due to its geo-strategically interesting location in this time of the Cold War), Afghanistan managed to profit from both American and Soviet support. 3. THE END OF THE MONARCHY AND THE SOVIET INVASIO N (1964 – 1979) With a new constitution in 1964, Afghanistan became a constitutional monarchy under Zahir Shah who had been king since 1933. While some Afghans today refer to this era as the beginning of a “golden age” of political awakening, the following years were also marked by economic stagnation (due to reducing international development support) and internal political struggles. In the 1960s, followers of two different ideologies competed at Afghanistan’s universities: the KGB sponsored Marxists one side and the radical Islamists influenced by a handful of junior professors (Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf and Burhanuddin Rabbani) who had studied at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo on the other. As Steve Coll wrote, “In the space of just a few years during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, what little there was of the center of Afghan politics melted away in Kabul under the friction of these confrontational, imported ideologies.” 12 There was a period of severe drought between 1969 and 1972 and the government of Zahir Shah failed to deal with the crisis, leading to the starvation of about 100,000 people. Thus, there was little resistance from the population when in 1973 a cousin of the king, Muhammad Daoud – who was aligned with the communist “People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan” and military officers trained in the Soviet Union – overthrew the monarchy and declared the Afghan Republic. In 1974 Daoud went against the Islamists, arresting the leader of the movement along with 200 of his followers and causing leading figures of the Islamist Muslim Youth Organization, including

10

Barnett R. Rubin: “Saving Afghanistan” in: Foreign Affairs; http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2007/March/Rubin%2003-01-07.pdf 11

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The US had financed the “Helmand Project” in Afghanistan during the 1940s which included the construction of a series of water dams along Helmand River. However, it lost interest soon after and shifted its attention to South East Asia.

12

Coll 2004, p. 111f

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Rabbani, Sayyaf and Gulbudin Hekmatyar, to flee to Pakistan. From the Islamists’ perspective, this marked the beginning of the Afghanistan (civil) war as they prepared themselves for resistance.13 Daoud and his family were assassinated by Soviet-backed conspirators during the 1978 April Revolution which followed Daoud’s arrest of communist leaders in Kabul.14 The Afghan communist regime in Kabul then launched a terror campaign against social and religious leaders who might challenge its rule.15 At the same time, the Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran (1978/79) provided new momentum for the Islamists in Afghanistan with religious activists spreading ideas across the border. As Kabul’s communists tried to force through secular reforms, including literacy courses for girls, the banning of bride-prices and forced marriages, and the confiscation of land previously controlled by tribal elders and Islamic scholars, revolts led by Islamic radicals broke out in different parts of the country. Daoud’s successor, Taraki, ignored the KGB’s urging to work together with religious leaders and to convince “the broad number of Muslims that the socioeconomic reforms … will not affect the religious beliefs of Muslims”. 16 According to Kremlin records he instead continuously asked for Soviet troops 17 to battle the insurgency. Taraki was ousted from office and a few years later executed by command of his party comrade, rival and eventual successor, Hafizullah Amin. However, Amin also became corrupted by power and demanded more and more privileges from the Soviet Union. Rumors arose that Amin was a CIA agent and the Soviet Union feared an alignment of Afghanistan with the US that could lead to a horror scenario 18. This could only be avoided by the immediate removal of Amin and the installment of new and more responsive Afghan communist leaders even if that required a military invasion of Afghanistan.

13

Schetter 2004, p. 87-93

14

Coll 2004; p. 39

15

“Advised by the KGB, Kabul’s Marxists launched a terror campaign against religious and social leaders who might have the standing to challenge communist rule. By 1979 about twelve thousand political prisoners had been jailed. Systematic executions began behind prison walls.” See: Coll 2004; p. 39

16

A letter from KGB to Taraki quoted in Coll 2004, p. 45-46. The Soviet Union became increasingly frustrated with its Afghan clients and the situation in Afghanistan. As KGB chief Andropov put it in spring 1979: “We know Lenin’s teachings about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of revolution.” (quoted in Coll 2004, p.41). The KGB also send a top-secret report to Brezhnev on June 28, 1979, stating that “the Afghan revolution was struggling because of ‘economic backwardness, the small size of the working class,’ and the weakness of the local Communist Party, as well as the selfishness of its Afghan leaders” – See Coll 2004, p. 45f

17

See Coll 2004, p. 46 and 581 (Footnote 16)

18

“In [KGB’s chief[ Andropov’s fevered imagination, the CIA’s recruitment of Amin was part of a wider unfolding plot by the agency ‘to create a New Great Ottoman Empire including the southern republics of the Soviet Union.’ With a base secured in Afghanistan, the KGB chief feared, […] that the United States could point Pershing nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union’s southern underbelly, where its air defenses were weak. Iran and Pakistan might go nuclear as well with American support and push into Central Asia.” See Coll 2004, p. 49

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4. THE SOVI ET OCCUPATION AND THE COMMUNIST REGIME (1979 – 1988) On Christmas Eve 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Hafizullah Amin and his aides were killed in the following days; Babrak Kamal became his successor. The Soviet invasion caused a broad and emotional protest reaction by the people of Afghanistan. Hundreds of civilians died as the Soviet army violently attempted to quell street demonstrations. More and more people, including Afghan intellectuals and civil servants defected to the mujahedin, the “holy warriors” who fought in the Afghan resistance. Within a few months, the ranks of the Afghan national army crumbled from 90,000 to 30,000 due to defections. The resistance began attacks against Soviet and governmental targets, including schools. 19 The Soviets applied a strategy of “scorched earth” to reduce support for the mujahedin: “Through the bombardment of villages and the destruction of irrigation systems and agricultural areas, the population should have been forced to move to the cities or leave the country.”20 In the beginning, the mujahedin – being poorly led and badly organized – did not seem to have a chance against the communist troops. The Soviet invasion led the US to significantly increase its covert support for the Afghan resistance fighters, which they had begun on a small scale in the summer of 1979. 21 For this, the CIA cooperated with Pakistan’s primary secret service, the ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence). Pakistan’s president at that time, Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, believed in political Islam as a means to overcome the internal tensions in his country. He largely encouraged the construction of madrassas, Islamic religious schools, in which young Afghans and Pakistanis were educated in and to a certain extent prepared for the anticommunist jihad. 22 Zia also saw the Afghan jihad as a way to reduce communist supported opposition forces as well as the chances for a successful independence campaign by the Pashtun population in Pakistan. Eventually, funds provided to the ISI by the US and Saudi Arabia 23 were strategically used by Pakistan to strengthen its favored Islamist resistance groups. Other parties hardly received any support. 24 With its preference for Islamist groups (and hence discrimination against groups led by traditional Afghan royalty and tribal leaders) Pakistan aimed to increase the chances for an alliance with

19

Schools and teachers were also seen as main targets as they symbolized the communist reforms. Allegedly, the mujahedin killed thousands of teachers during the 1980s. (see Schetter 2004, p. 103) 20

Schetter 2004, p. 103

21

Coll 2004, p. 51

22

“In 1971 there had been only nine hundred madrassas in all of Pakistan. By the summer of 1988 there were about eight thousand official religious schools and an estimated twenty-five thousand unregistered ones, many of them clustered along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier and funded by wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.” (Coll 2004, p. 180)

23

Saudi Arabia effectively doubled the funds of the US “by agreeing to match the CIA’s aid dollar for dollar” (Coll 2004, p. 65)

24

As Coll described it: “By the late 1980s, ISI had effectively eliminated all secular, leftist, and royalist political parties that had first formed when Afghan refugees fled communist rule.” Coll 2004, p. 165

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an eventual pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan linked to it by shared religion. 25 Pakistan’s favored resistance leader became Gulbudin Hekmatyar who had been – all sources combined – receiving the lion’s share of the financial and technical support given to resistance groups by ISI and Saudi Arabia.26 Beside channeling funds through the ISI, the CIA also began unilaterally to put Afghan resistance commanders on its payroll 27 and to support Ahmad Shah Massood, 28 the military leader of Jamiat-e Islami, who was operating in the northern part of the country and who received relatively little of the funds given to Rabbani (Head of Jamiat-e Islami) via the ISI in Peshawar. 29 Saudi Arabia also supported Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf (head of Ittehad-e Islami; later renamed Dawat-e Islami) as its most important client among the mujahedin rebels since the very beginning. 30 With no sign of a realistic military solution and yet completely unknown to the US, in 1986 the Kremlin decided to leave Afghanistan. 31 The first change in this direction was the replacement of Babrak Kamal by the Afghan chief of intelligence, Najibullah, who was considered both loyal to Moscow and capable of uniting the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, Moscow soon discovered that the US– not believing in an actual withdrawal of the Soviets – seemed to have little interest in negotiations about the future of Afghanistan or Central Asia.32 In these years, the US Government also never responded to the Kremlin’s request for cooperation in limiting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the area, for example by reducing military aid to the Islamist resistance

25

Around 1987 some voices in Washington criticized the large proportion of funds given to Islamist leaders who – like Hekmatyar – received “several hundred million dollars in aid from American taxpayers, yet […] refused to travel to New York to shake hands with the infidel Ronald Reagan”. The CIA defended Pakistan’s policy and stated that this would be related to the actual fighting power, which parties like the royalists would not have. “The mission was to kill Soviets, Bearden [CIA Chief of Station in Islamabad] kept repeating. Gulbudddin Hekmatyar killed Soviets. The king of Afghanistan, twirling pasta on his spoon outside Rome, had not killed a single one.” (Coll 2004, 165f)

26

In the late 1980s, CIA undertook efforts to limit Hekmatyar’s (Hizb-e Islami’’s) share of the total supplies filtered through ISI to only 20-25 %, about the same as Rabbani (Jamiat-e Islami) received. In addition to that, the Islamist mujahedin received massive funds from private Saudi and Arab funding. (Coll 2004, p. 165) 27

“The payroll had several tiers. A regional commander might draw an agency retainer of $ 20,000 or $ 25,000 a month in cash. A somewhat more influential leader might draw $ 50,000 a month. A commander with influence over one or more provinces might receive $ 100,000 monthly, sometimes more. An effective commander used these retainers not solely to enrich himself but to hold together clan or volunteer militias that required salaries, travel expenses, and support for families who often lived in squalid refugee camps.” (see Coll 2004, p. 151)

28

Massood had achieved a legendary reputation by fending off six attacks by Soviet troops between 1980 and 1982, each time being significantly outnumbered (in his last battle the ratio was 7:1) – and also being less than 30 years old. 29

Coll 2004, p. 165

30

Coll 2004, p. 82

31

“´The strategic goal is to finish the war in one, maximum two years, and withdraw the troops,` Gorbachev told his colleagues that day. `We have set a clear goal: Help speed up the process so we have a friendly neutral country, and get out of there`” (Coll 2004, p. 158) 32

Coll 2004, p. 160

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groups. 33 Nor did the US accept to cut its aid to the Afghan rebels after the Soviet withdrawal as long as the Kremlin would continue to support the communist government in Kabul. The Geneva Accords were signed on April 14, 1988, ratifying by treaty the formal terms for the Soviet withdrawal. The accord was an agreement between the official governments of (communist) Afghanistan, Pakistan, the US and the Soviet Union – the Afghan resistance fighters had no part in it and felt deceived. One month later, the withdrawal of Soviet troops started. It was late 1989 when the last Soviet tank left Afghanistan. 5. THE CIVIL WAR AND THE RISE OF TH E TALIBAN (1989 – 2001) With the Soviets pulling out military forces, it was widely believed that it would be only a matter of time until the communist regime and Najibullah collapsed. Although many analysts predicted a violent power struggle between different mujahedin groups, there seemed to be nothing that could be done to stop that. Paktistan had previously announced its intention to install a friendly Islamist government in Kabul, considering it their rightful reward for supporting the jihad. 34 In the beginning of 1989, Pakistani intelligence had built up a self-declared new Islamist-dominated Afghan government in Pakistan that would be able to take over control of cities captured by mujahedin forces. 35 This was not based on the will of the Afghan population, who preferred the return of Zahir Shah to rule by any of the Peshawarbased mujahedin commanders. 36 While the Soviets forces withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s favored Islamist commander, Gulbudin Hekmatyar, prepared to seize power. With the backing of the ISI, 37 Hekmatyar, moved systematically to wipe out anybody among the Afghan resistance who could challenge his claim to

33

“No High-level Reagan administration officials ever gave much thought to the issue. They never considered pressing Pakistani intelligence to begin shifting support away from the Muslim Brotherhood-connected factions and toward more friendly Afghan leadership, whether for the Soviets’ sake or America’s. […] The warnings [of Islamic radicalism] were just a way to deflect attention from Soviet failings, American hard-liners decided.” (Coll 2004, p. 168)” 34

Pakistan’s President Zia stated in an interview: “We have earned the right to have [in Kabul] a power which is friendly towards us. We have taken risks at the front-line, and we will not permit a return to the prewar situation, marked by a large Indian and Soviet influence and Afghan claims on our territory. The new power will be really Islamic, a part of the Islamic renaissance.” (Coll 2004, p. 175) 35

Coll 2004, p. 191

36

A survey of the Afghan Information Center concluded ”that 70% of Afghan refugees supported exiled Zahir Shah rather than any of the Peshawar-based mujahedin leaders such as Hekmatyar”. In reaction, the head of the center, Sayed Bahudin Majrooh was killed by gunmen on motorcycles in Peshawar. (Coll 2004, 181f) 37

“ISI’s local office [in Peshawar] regulated food and cash handouts so that those who now agreed to join Hekmatyar would have ample supplies for fighters and civilians in areas they controlled. Those who didn’t agree to join in, however, would be starved, unable to pay their men or supply grain to their villages” and also would not receive medical assistance. (Coll 2004, p. 182)

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leadership. 38 His biggest opponent was Ahmad Shah Massood, military leader of Jamiat-e Islami, whose base was in the Panjir Valley, northeast of Kabul. They had been at war since 1985. 39 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and the US agreed to drop all military support for their Afghan proxies by first of January 1992. Najibullah’s days in power were numbered. His most important ally in the north, the Uzbek militia commander Rashid Dostum, had defected to Masood in the first weeks of 1992, so Najibullah openly announced that he would resign once a successor government was formed under UN auspices. 40 The armies for Ahmad Shah Massood and Gulbudin Hekmatyar both moved towards Kabul. They clashed in Kabul in April 1992 and a week of fighting left Masood victorious. Najibullah fled to a UN compound. The Afghan state finally disappeared from the scene, although it had already been regarded as a failing state in the late 1980’s. In April 1992, the mujahedin parties in Peshawar agreed on the establishment of an interim government. For two months, Sebqatullah Mojaddedi was the first president of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and after that Rabbani took over. The interim government failed to include all resistance parties and it was eventually dominated by Rabbani’s party – Jamiat-e Islami – which unilaterally claimed all key military and civilian positions.41 The Soviet Union as well as the US, Saudi Arabia and China had sent at least $ 42 billion of military aid to Afghanistan, so there were estimations that there were more personal firearms in the country than in India and Pakistan combined.42 The country split up into different spheres of interest dominated by the former Mujahedin parties and their armies. The civil war which followed was fueled by long lasting rivalries and personal animosities between the leaders of the former resistance parties backed by support from Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Without a common enemy in the communist regime, the different resistance groups started fighting each other over power and resources. In this conflict, Kabul became a symbol of statehood and political authority, subject to large scale destruction caused by heavy artillery attacks and human rights atrocities. 43 While the capital was reduced to ruins, prominent tanzim-leaders established independent administrations maintained by private armies and

38

Coll 2004, p. 181

39

Schetter 2004, p. 116

40

Coll 2004, p. 234f

41

Schetter 2004, p. 120

42

“The Soviet Union had sent between $ 36 and $ 48 billion worth of military equipment from the time of the Afghan communist revolution; the equivalent U.S., Saudi, and Chinese aid combined totaled between $ 6 billion and $ 12 billion” (Coll 24, p. 238) 43

During 1993 “Hekmatyar pounded the city indiscriminately with hundreds of rockets from his ample stores, killing and wounding thousands of civilians. The old mujahedin leaders realigned themselves in bizarre temporary partnerships. They fought artillery duels along Kabul’s avenues, dividing the city into a dense barricaded checkerboard of ethnic and ideological factions. Shiite militia fought against Hekmatyar around Kabul’s zoo, then switched sides and fought against Massoud. Sayyaf’s forces allied with his old Islamic colleague Rabbani and hit the Shiites with unrestrained fury, beheading old men, women, childrern, and dogs. Dostum’s Uzbek militias carried out a campaign of rapes and executions on Kabul’s outskirts.” (Coll 2004, p. 262f)

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militias within their individual spheres of power. Dostum (head of Junbesh-e melli which he formed out of his militias) established an autocratic regime in north Afghanistan, the northeast was dominated by Massoud (leading the shura-ye nazar, the military wing of jamiat-e islami), Ismael Khan controlled the western areas around Herat and the predominately Shiite Hizb-e Wahdat (under Abdul Ali Mazari and later Karim Khalili) had its territory in central Afghanistan. Due to tribal differences in the Pashtun south and southeast, no party was able to claim regional control in these areas. Additionally, the conflict slowly assumed an ethnic dimension and ethnic identity was increasingly exploited by mujahedin leaders who used ethnic categories as pools for mobilization and recruitment. In this turmoil, the Taliban (the word can be translated as “students of Islam”) movement came on the public stage in 1994 and was quickly able to conquer vast parts of Afghanistan. At first they were regarded as saviors by the Afghan population. Also, external observers saw them as having the potential to bring back peace and stability. The Taliban received support from Pakistan, which was then led by Benazir Bhutto. Bhutto saw the rise of the Taliban as a way to free transport roads from illegal road blocks and thus to create a stable situation in Afghanistan that would allow trade with the newly independent Muslim republics of former Soviet Central Asia.44 Significant financial resources and logistic support also came from Saudi sources while volunteers came from madrassas along the Afghan border. 45 By 1996, the Taliban militia controlled more than two thirds of Afghanistan including the key cities of Kandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad. In September 1996, the Taliban forces captured Kabul and established a strict Islamic regime based on Pashtun tribal values and the strict interpretation of sharia, Islamic Law. The regime was most oppressive in the major cities with a large non-Pashtun population. The fundamentalist implementation of Sharia brought further hardships to the population. However, the vast countryside of Afghanistan was much less affected by the Taliban, partly because it had been largely spared from the modernization and development that took place in the urban areas and which the Taliban opposed. Shortly after the Taliban conquered Kabul in September 1996, a number of resistance parties, which had fought against each other in previous years, formed the United Front (which became better known outside Afghanistan as the “Northern Alliance”) against the military advance of the Taliban. From the 1996 takeover onward, the civil war continued in this constellation. With the Taliban’s announced plans 44

Coll 2004, p. 289f ; Coll raises the idea that in the beginning, it may have been the Pakistani trucking overlords rather than the Pakistani government who aided the Taliban in their first military breakthrough. Through bribery, an Afghan commander in the border truck-stop town of Spin Boldak gave the Taliban the key to a huge ISI weapon depot which included “enough weaponry for tens of thousands of soldiers. The Taliban broke it open in mid-October [1994], issued public calls for volunteers from the local madrassas, and handed out assault rifles still wrapped in plastic” (Coll 2004, 291) 45

“Saudi charities and religious ministries also aided the Taliban’s rise during the 1995 and 1996. […] The madrassas along the Afghan border that had educated the Taliban’s leaders and now supplied them with new recruits also received funding. […] The Saudi Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Preservation of Vice, the kingdom’s religious police, tutored and supported the Taliban as they built up their own Islamic police” (Coll 2004, p, 296f)

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to liberate Central Asian Muslims, the Northern Alliance received financial and logistic support from Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was also funded by Iran and India which saw the alliance as an antagonist to the Pakistan-supported, mainly Sunni Taliban. 46 Yet, the anti-Taliban alliance was a very heterogeneous group not able to overcome internal power struggles which in the long term hampered all efforts to resist the growing influence of the Taliban in the country. Since the Taliban have been dominated by Pashtuns and the Northern Alliance was initially formed by non-Pashtuns (Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbeks), the civil war was interpreted as an ethnic conflict of the Pashtuns (Taliban) versus the non-Pashtun minorities, even though Pashtuns had also joined the Northern Alliance. By 1998, the Taliban were said to be in control of more than 90 % of Afghanistan’s territory, including the important city of Mazar-i Sharif in the north. The Northern Alliance was pushed back to Massoud’s home region of the Panjir valley and parts of Badakhshan. Numerous attempts by the United Nations to broker a peace agreement failed. Pakistan rejected stopping its support for the Taliban and the Taliban themselves appeared to participate in such negotiations based on mere tactical calculations, without any true interest in a peace agreement.47 Two days before the attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, Massoud was assassinated by two alleged Al Qaeda Islamists who had disguised themselves as journalists. 6. THE US-LED I NVASION AND THE FIRST YEARS AFTER TH E FALL OF THE TALIBAN (2001 – 2006) The attacks of September 11, 2001 were quickly traced back to the Al Qaeda network and its leader, Osama bin Laden, who was by that time enjoying sanctuary in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime rejected US demands to hand him over, stating that they would only put him before an Islamic court in Afghanistan – an alternative that was not accepted by the US. Having built up the Coalition against Terrorism, which included the NATO member states, Russia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the US Air Force started the bombardment of Taliban positions on October 7, 2001 in what was called “Operation Enduring Freedom”. The Northern Alliance, with US and British logistical support, attacked the Taliban forces from the North. On November 8, the Coalition forces were able to capture Mazar-eSharif and five days later the Taliban retreated from Kabul. The Taliban forces in Kunduz, their last stronghold in the North, surrendered on November 25th after negotiating safe-conduct to southern Afghanistan with Dostum representing the victorious Northern Alliance. However, Dostum and his militias did not keep their promise. It is estimated that about 2,000 Taliban fighters (believing that

46

Coll 2004, p. 345

47

Schetter 2004, p. 130

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Dostum’s militias would take them south) did not survive being transported to Sheberghan prison. 48 As soon as regions were captured from the Taliban, the mujahedin commanders of the Northern Alliance began to establish power, dividing the country among themselves. To prevent this fragmentation, the UN invited a series of Afghan political groups to come together in Germany for the Bonn Conference in November 2001. Mujahedin commanders who were in place prior to the fall of the last Taliban stronghold were also invited. After severe pressure from the US and the UN the delegates came to an agreement: Hamid Karzai became interim president of Afghanistan and a draft schedule for the political transition of Afghanistan was created. Mujahedin commanders of the Northern Alliance and especially the Panjshiris (the former followers of Ahmad Shah Massoud) succeeded in getting a disproportionately high “share” of influential posts in the interim government, including the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would be staffed primarily with their followers. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with an initial strength of 5,000 soldiers, was deployed in 2002 to Kabul to protect the government and support the reconstruction of the state. In June 2002, an emergency Loya Jirga took place in Kabul which around 1,600 representatives from all provinces attended to put together the interim government. Hamid Karzai was re-elected as interim president. However, the ousting of the Taliban did not bring immediate peace to Afghanistan. Even though the international military presence in Kabul prevented a renewed battle between warlords rivaling over Kabul, the civil war re-erupted in the provinces. Warlords and commanders established control over different parts of the country, allowing the interim government little influence outside of Kabul. Robberies, rape, expulsions (e.g. of Pashtuns from Northern provinces) and dispositions through local power brokers, their militias and marauding gangs were frequent. Competition over the control of roads, poppy fields, water and other resources led to battles between warlords. Examples of these were Rashid Dostum at war with Mohammad Atta Noor in the North or Ismael Khan fighting Amanullah Khan in western Afghanistan which led to an escalation of violence in the city of Herat in March 2004.49 The Afghan government tried to achieve control by deploying military and political measures, such as the appointment of Ismael Khan as Minister for Energy and Water (and thus moving him to Kabul from his former post as governor in Herat).

48

Dostum is blamed for one of the biggest human rights atrocities in Afghanistan after 9/11. After the Taliban surrendered in Kunduz, disarmed Taliban fighters were huddled by Dostum’s men into metal containers without water and sufficient air supply. When the containers arrived in the Sheberghan prison, as many as 2000 men had not survived the trip. Their bodies were then dumped in nearby mass graves. (For more details see Newsweek August 2002 “The Death Convoy of Afghanistan” online: http://www.newsweek.com/id/65473/page/1 ) The site was never thoroughly examined, nor was the case officially investigated due to political considerations. In 2008 the remains of the bodies were secretly dug up and removed - allegedly also on Dostum’s command – for details see the website of Physicians for Human Rights, online: http://afghanistan.phrblog.org/ 49

Conrad Schetter, Susanne Schmeidl: “Afghanistan – Aktuelle Situation und Möglichkeiten der Befriedung“; 2004; p. 2f; Online: http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/04_Schetter-Schmeidl.pdf

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Figure 3: Warlordism and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan at the beginning of the 21st century

Also, the US started a new approach in 2002 with the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, This map provides an overview of the rough spheres of in influence of major warlords as well as the planned measures routes of the were oil civil-military bases throughout the country which military and development and gas pipeline(s) from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and the location of poppy cultivation after 2001.

combined.The With of pro-governmental security has forces various political moves, the map the is notstrengthening totally accurate anymore for 2009, as the information beenand subject to frequent change. (Map reprinted with courtesy of Dr. Conrad Schetter) security situation improved significantly throughout 2004.

In January 2004, the new Afghan constitution was passed; the first presidential elections took place in October. Hamid Karzai won the elections and received more than 50% of the vote. One year later the first parliamentary elections were held. Both elections included cases of intimidation and fraud and especially during the parliamentarian elections a significant increase in security incidents could be noticed. This was a herald of the escalation of insurgency violence to come - from 2006 onward.

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II. AFGHANISTAN IN NUMBERS With no current official census50, estimates of the current size of the population of Afghanistan vary greatly between 27 and 35 million people. Given the low education level of local researchers and interviewers, and perhaps most importantly, political agendas behind most surveys conducted, the numbers describing Afghanistan’s society are at best vague. 51 While for example the CIA World Fact Book estimates a population of 32.78 million, the UNFPA report “State of the World Population 2008” estimated only 28.2 million. 52 Other UN organizations estimate something in the middle. Although the numbers may not be exact, the estimations that exist provide clear hints about the challenges the country faces. Even though Afghanistan has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world, it still has a 3.9 % estimated population growth (6-7 children per woman) resulting in the fact that, statistically, Afghanistan’s population could more than double by 2050. 53 Around 68% of the population is under the age of 25, more than 80% live in rural communities. The population is 99% Muslim (85% Sunni; 15% Shiite). At the same time, Afghanistan has scarce natural resources. Only around 12% of the land is arable and due to the arid and semi-arid climate, 85% of the crops depend on irrigated water. An estimated 99% of total water usage is for this purpose. 54 From 1990-2005, Afghanistan’s forest cover was reduced by a third. The UNDP estimated that it has been halved since 1978. In 2005 an estimated two thirds of violent conflicts in Afghanistan were related to control over the scarce resources of the country. 55 Afghanistan’s topography is dominated by the mountain ranges of the Hindu Kush which run right 50

UNFPA Afghanistan planned to start Afghanistan’s first population census in the summer of 2008, but it was postponed for two years due to worries about confusion with voter registration and poor security. The last attempt in 1979 was stopped due to deterioration of the security situation. (see Reuters: “Afghan census postponed for two years-U.N.”; 08 June 2008; Online: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/RMOI-7FEKXF?OpenDocument ) 51

Numbers are also manipulated for personal gain, especially numbers of people. Two examples: One interviewee was working as an international advisor at an institute for teacher’s training funded by international development aid. When she asked the principal of the institute how many students there would be the answer was 800, yet when she checked on various days she was never able to spot more than 250. Another example from the first years after 2001 is the long lists of staff of police departments in the regions. Though the respective departments (or to be more exact the people in charge) received the salary of all of these staff members, checks revealed that a significant percentage of people on the lists never were on duty, being just names on a list while their salary went to other pockets. Since then this issue has been recognized and tackled, although a certain percentage of “nominal members” is likely to remain in less accessible areas. 52

UNFPA: “State of the World Population 2008” ; p. 91 Online: http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2008/presskit/docs/en-swop08report.pdf 53

See IRIN: “AFGHANISTAN: High birth rate killing mothers, infants - UNFPA expert” 14 July 2008; Online: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79236 54

IWMI Working Paper N 49: A.S. Qureshi “Water Resources Management in Afghanistan: The Issues and Options"; June 2002; Online: http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/droughtassessment/Files/pdf/WOR49.pdf 55

see: Eckart Schiewek,: “Efforts to Curb Political Violence in Afghanistan: Counter Insurgency and National Reconciliation” in: Cheema, Pervaiz et al (Eds.) “Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia”; Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Asia Printers; Islamabad; 2006

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through the country from the North East to the South West. The highest points lie more than 7,400 meters above sea level, while the lowest point (at the Amu Darya River in the north) is just 258 m above sea level.

Figure 4: Topography of Afghanistan

Eighty percent of the labor force works in the field of agriculture, while official unemployment is estimated to be at 40%. 56 Estimations of the gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita vary between $ 783 (International Monetary Fund) and $ 800 (CIA World Fact Book), (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Afghan topo en.jpg )

among the lowest in the world. UNODC estimates that the Afghan opium economy had an export value of $ 3.4 billion, equivalent to 33% of the licit GDP (gross domestic product) in 2008. 57 Over 90% of the opium cultivation is considered to come from only 7 out of 34 provinces. 58 According to UNFPA, life expectancy is 44.0 years for men and 43.9 years for women, among the lowest in the world. Afghanistan is one of the very few countries where the life expectancy of women is lower than that of men. UNIFEM estimates that 70-80% of women face force marriage. 57% of the brides are younger than the legal age of sixteen, and many of them have significantly older grooms. 59 Due to years of conflict, a poor education system and less value placed on female education, 57 % of

56

See CIA World Fact Book Afghanistan; Online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

57

This means a decrease compared to the numbers of 2007 ($ 4 billion or 49%) see UNODC

58

These seven provinces are: Day Kundi, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul.

59

UNIFEM Afghanistan: “Afghanistan Factsheet 2008”; Online: http://afghanistan.unifem.org/media/pubs/08/factsheet.html

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the men and as many as 87% of the women in Afghanistan are illiterate. About 80% of the schools were destroyed over the last two decades of the 20th century. During the same period, about 70,000 Afghans were killed or injured by landmines alone. The UN estimates that today, more than 4 million Afghan live in “mine-contaminated” areas. About five million refugees have returned to Afghanistan since 2001, with an estimated three million still living in the neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan. An estimated $ 100 million a day is spent by the US military in Afghanistan while the average amount of all other international donors’ aid combined is a mere $ 7 million per day. There are also “good numbers:” the number of children going to school has grown to 5.7 million in 2007, up from one million in 2001, and two million of them are girls. The number of schools in Afghanistan has increased to more than 9,000. Also, the number of teachers is now seven times higher, with about one third of them (50,000) having received in-service teacher training. The percentage of the population with access to basic health care has increased from 9% in 2003 to 82% in 2006. About 12,000 km of road have been constructed or repaired.60

60

For further numbers about achievements in Afghanistan see: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: “Afghanistan National Development Strategy – 2008-2013”; p. 1f Online: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/SODA-7FJ8JR-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf

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PEACE AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS I. C ONFLICT L INES Chapter Summary There is not “one” conflict in Afghanistan. Instead, one can think about the conflict situation as a whole “conflict net” made up of a vast variety of different and yet intertwined conflict (potentials) and disputes on the local, national and also international levels in which the country is entangled. Thus, any single-focused conflict resolution approach for a major conflict that ignores related conflict lines is highly likely to fail in the long run. Also, the described conflicts are not affecting each region to the same degree and the circumstances vary greatly nationwide: An approach that could be the perfect solution in one area of the country may lead to a complete failure in another. International conflicts that affect Afghanistan are the War on Terror, the conflicts / tensions between US and Iran, between Pakistan and India as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Afghanistan is also affected by the conflict going on between the Pakistani government and pro-Taliban insurgents in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) close to the Afghan border. And last but not least, Afghanistan itself has a long-standing international conflict with Pakistan about the Durand Line which marks today’s border between the two countries and which is not officially recognized by Afghanistan. Closely related to the Durand Line is also the unresolved “Pashtunistan” issue, the idea of a separate state for Pashtuns, the establishment of which could mean that Pakistan would loose governmental authority over about half its territory. On the national level there is the well-known conflict over political power and international presence between the Taliban and other insurgency groups on the one hand and the official Afghan government along with international military forces of the US and other NATO countries on the other. Less well known but of significant importance is the conflict(s) between different politicalmilitary parties and actors which has been going on in Afghanistan for at least 30 years as a form of civil war with varying coalitions. Last but not least there are numerous conflict potentials on the local level, including conflicts about access to (especially natural) resources like water and land, ethnic and regional tensions, conflicts on the family level and regarding gender roles, differences between metropolitan and urban areas and last but not least returnee conflicts.

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Figure 5 : The international, national and local conflicts affecting Afghanistan USA vs. Iran

War on Terror

Saudi Arabia vs. Iran

India vs. Pakistan

The Durand Line

War in the FATA

International

Insurgency (Pro-governmental forces vs. AGEs)

Conflicts between Political-Military Parties / Actors

National Ethnic / Regional Tensions

Gender conflicts

Conflicts on family level

Metropolitan vs. rural areas

Land conflicts

Water conflicts

Other Ressource conflicts

Returnee conflicts

Afghanistan possesses a vast variety of conflicts and disputes, many of which have lasted for more Local than one generation. To outsiders, the conflict between and the national and©international C. Vigier (Not all existing connections betweenthe the Taliban conflicts are shown) governmental forces is probably the best known, and yet the apparent intractability of this conflict stems from a far more complicated constellation of other conflicts and diverging interests of local and international players. On one side, the involvement of a series of international actors in Afghanistan has at least in part been based on external conflicts and issues. Due to this there has been a growing understanding that conflicts on the national level in Afghanistan cannot be solved in an approach excluding these external powers. However, these conflicts also receive energy from smaller disputes on the local level. As the Afghan NGO CPAU wrote: “Although [local disputes] attract less attention than the threat from the insurgents, they are important as they produce an environment of insecurity which destroys all quality of life for ordinary civilians and undermines the legitimacy of the Afghan government. […] Local commanders often exploit these disputes to consolidate their position, further weakening the authority of the central government.” 61 In the following there will be first a brief presentation of the international conflicts which involve other countries, and which nevertheless have a strong influence on political conflicts and security in Afghanistan itself. After this, the two main conflicts on the national level are described, including the

61

See: CPAU / FES: “Conflict Analysis Afghanistan – Update May 2005”; p. 5 Online: http://www.cpau.org.af/Research/Docs_our_publications/Conflict_Analysis-Afghanistan-Final.pdf

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insurgency conflict involving Taliban and international forces. Last but not least, conflict potentials on the local level will be listed. 1. INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AFFECTING AFGHANISTAN

Figure 6 : International Conflicts affecting Afghanistan (Conflict Mapping)

China

Russia NATO-Alliance, but tensions about roles in Afghanistan

USA

Tribal Areas

Other

NATO countries

Interest in natural resources

Alliance but tensions about US air strikes

Nuclear Program / Regional Influence Islamist influence in Tajikistan / Uzbekistan

Iran

War on Terror Influence in Muslim World (Shiite / Sunni)

War with proTaliban militants

Pakistan

Border Issues (Durand Line)

Afghanistan

Alliance with US / Attack on Safe Havens

Westernbacked government

Kashmir / Perceived encirclement

Closest regional ally

India Saudi Arabia

Leadership in Muslim World

Al Qeda

Kashmir

While international influence and interference is not something new to Afghanistan, the situation © C. Vigier or over the last three to four decades has been far more than it was in the centuries before.Area It is Link / complex Interest Alliance LEGEND: region influenced by a series of conflicts involving countries outside Afghanistan (Past) which arethat in part fought on or group Country conflict Conflict / Issue / Kind of Kashmir

relationship

Antagonism

may still have an

of countries

impact Afghan soil. The following can only give a very brief overview of these conflicts. It should be kept in

mind that the transformation of these conflicts would have a positive impact on peace and security within Afghanistan – and any attempt to solve the overarching conflicts in the country without taking the international conflicts into account is likely to fail. a) THE WAR ON TERROR With the attacks of 9/11 the impact that terrorist networks can have on life in the Western world became very apparent. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were considered by the US as an “act of war” which triggered a series of events in their aftermath. In order to reduce or even eliminate the risk of another terrorist attack, the “War on Terror” started with the stated objectives of securing the American homeland, breaking up terror cells within the country, and disrupting the

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activities of the international network of terrorist organizations (i.e., Al Qaeda.) The official name used for the military operations of the US in the War on Terror is “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) which is taking place in several regions: Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa and the Sahara/Sahel region. As the names suggest the War on Terror and OEF have a strong military focus combined with the military thinking that the threat of an enemy can be extinguished if one eliminates the different components the enemy requires to operate and survive. For this, the following nine components are defined: “Leadership, Safe Havens, Finance, Communications, Movement, Intelligence, Weapons, Personnel and Ideology”. 62 Asked about the War on Terror most interviewees for this study stated that it had failed in Afghanistan because today, the number of terrorist attacks is far higher than before. Some stated that it was a war against Muslims in Afghanistan, while others argued that if the terrorist safe havens moved to Pakistan, the War on Terror would not concern Afghanistan anymore. b) THE DURAND LINE The conflict over the Durand Line involves Afghanistan directly and some Afghan interviewees considered this conflict to be “behind everything” in Afghanistan, arguing that it largely affected why the country did not have peace. Today’s border between Afghanistan and Pakistan runs largely along this line (see map below) which once determined the border between former British-India (and thus today’s Pakistan) and Afghanistan. It runs straight through the Pashtun areas and was part of a treaty between British-India and the former ruler of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman Khan, in 1893. However, the interpretation of Afghan perceptions regarding the Durand line is difficult. Many Afghans consider the Durand Line as a line dividing the spheres of interest of Afghan and (former) British rule rather than as an official border of Afghanistan.

62

See: US Department of Defense / Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff : “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism”; February 1, 2006; Online: http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf

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Figure 7 : The Durand Line and the maximum claimed extent of the Pashtunistan area.

CIA Map No. 800909 from 1988 (public domain) (Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/afghan_paki_border_rel88.jpg )

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In contrast to Pakistan and the international community, Afghanistan does not officially recognize the Durand Line (or any border line based on it) as the legitimate border between the two countries, arguing that the agreement was imposed on Afghanistan and thus is not legally binding – and even if it were, Pakistan would not be the successor state of British India and thus would have no rights regarding the Pashtun and Baluchi territories that once would have belonged to Afghanistan. The Durand Line was unilaterally called into question and declared invalid by an Afghan Loya Jirga in 1949 which led to tensions with Pakistan during the 1950s. Pakistan even stopped its diplomatic communication with Kabul and closed down its border as Afghanistan was supporting the separatist movements of Pashtuns and Baluchis in Pakistan (related to the Pashtunistan issue; see below). The conflict escalated again 1962/63 and included movements of troops. It de-escalated again after a change within the government of Afghanistan and through Iranian mediation, but it was never actually resolved. The issue became current again after 1993, as Afghans then argued that 100 years after the agreement the Durand line would have lapsed, although the original document contains no expiry date. Related to the conflict about the Durand Line – because it also calls for the eradication of the line – is the concept of a separate state for Pashtuns and Baluchis by the name of “Pashtunistan.” In its widest definition this state would include half of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is unclear how many supporters the idea of this new state actually has, as Pashtuns have already been the governing ethnic group in Afghanistan for centuries and as they appear to face few problems crossing the border to Pakistan.63 Supporters of the theory that the conflict over the Durand Line is significant for today’s security situation argue that Pakistan would have no interest in a strong Afghanistan that could use its regained power to alter the Afghan-Pakistan border to the detriment of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan would always attempt to keep Afghanistan at a low level, including by supporting the Taliban through its secret agency ISI. c) THE WAR IN THE F EDERAL ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (OF P AKISTAN) Within the borders of today’s Pakistan lies an area over which neither the British nor the Pakistan government ever had full control: the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The province is only nominally under the control of the central government of Pakistan. Originally controlled by the tribal Pashtun leadership (elders, chiefs), it is nowadays partly ruled by religious commanders whose power is based on local and regional network structures.

63

A colleague, who has crossed the Afghan-Pakistan border several times, stated that while non-Pashtuns would have to pay a certain amount to pass the borders, Pashtuns could travel back and forth for free. Also, another colleague stated that he once would have asked a Pashtun about what he would prefer, getting the answer that he would like it best if the situation would stay how it is as he could nowadays benefit the most from the smuggle across the border.

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Figure 8 : The Pakistan Tribal Areas

Many Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters escaped to the FATA when they were ousted from Afghanistan during 2001/2002 and are believed to have established their bases there. 64 In 2002/03 the Pakistani army – receiving funds from the US for counterterrorism – went into the FATA for the first time in history for the purpose of trying to change the political equation. However, after facing ferocious resistance, Pakistan quickly tried to negotiate a deal with the new religious leaders, including members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. With the Islamists not interested in the patronage of the Pakistani state, the negotiations failed. After two assassination attempts on President Musharraf were traced back to Waziristan in December 2003, the campaign against suspected al-Qaeda militants turned into an undeclared war in 2004 between the Pakistani military and the rebel tribesmen and pro-Taliban forces. This “Waziristan War” officially ended with the Waziristan Accord on September 5, 2006. However, the siege and attack (Source: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Volume 4, p. 45; reprinted with courtesy of the “This is a population that regards them with sympathy and active support. And it's not justRAND a fewcooperation) people -- it is the tribal leadership; it is the tribal population; it is the religious parties. They are in friendly territory. That's not to say that everyone along the frontier sympathizes with the violence that they inflicted in the United States or believes that their presence is good for the local population. But they enjoy broad sympathy, and they also enjoy infrastructure that includes communication and facilities.” See: “PBS FRONTLINE: Interview with Steve Coll on July 20, 2006”: Online: http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html 64

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on the Red Mosque in Islamabad in July 2007 led to retaliation attacks from pro-Taliban militants and the truce came to an end.` 65 Terrorist attacks and fighting between the Pakistani army and pro-Taliban militias continued throughout 2008 despite a number of peace accords. In September 2008, Pakistani tribal elders began building up their own militias (“lashkar”) in order to expel the Taliban from their territory. 66 Also, in the second half of 2008, the US increased air strikes against targets in the FATA and led its first ground forces operation on Pakistani soil in September 2008 which evoked fierce protests from the Pakistani government which considered this a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty. 67 The exact influence of the FATA on Afghanistan is disputed. While Afghan officials tend to blame Pakistan for the insurgency and state that it tolerates or even supports terrorist safe havens in the border areas, Pakistani voices stress the point that most terrorist activities stem from home-grown movements in India and Afghanistan which have little or no links to units in Pakistan 68 The truth is likely to lie somewhere in the middle. According to interviewed UN officials, research on suicide bombers in Afghanistan indicated that almost all were Afghan men who had spent time in madrassas in Pakistan 69 d) PAKISTAN VS. INDIA The two nations of Pakistan and India which were once a single British colony have been in conflict for more than five decades and have fought three wars against each other. Two of them were about the state of Jammu and Kashmir, disputed between the two countries since 1947 when the Hindu rulers of Kashmir ceded the predominately Muslim region to India. India’s support for East Pakistan to break away from West Pakistan during a civil war in 1971 led to the establishment of the new nation of Bangladesh, but further complicated relations. Since the fall of 65

In November 3, 2007, Musharraf also declared a State of Emergency in Pakistan which lasted till December 15 – officially arguing that the situation in Waziristan required it.

66

See Saeed Shah – McClatchy Newspaper “Pakistani tribesmen organize to fight Taliban insurgents” Online: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/226/story/53151.html

67

The President of the Pakistan Society of Criminology, Fasihuddin commented at the end of his analysis of US air strikes and missile attacks on FATA: “The sensational news about any secret deal of US with Pakistani government for such air-strikes will continue to appear in the media; the raids will continue with some phenomenon success against senior Al-Qaeda foreign elements; Pakistan’s paper condemnation, resentment and helpless protest will consequently appear after each strike; peace deals with militants will remain indecisive and of no tangible importance; the confusion will become greater and deeper; the masses will suffer more and more; the diplomacy will stagger amid unfriendly reports and statements from both sides calling each other ‘Great Satan’ (USA) and International Migraine (Pakistan); and the ‘Long War on Terror’ may one day become truly and seriously ‘long’ for all world players and might become a ‘lost war’.” – Source: Online in the Internet: http://www.pakistansocietyofcriminology.com/Admin/articles/LongWaron.doc 68

For similar voices of Pakistan regarding the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 see: BBC News, Barbara Plett “Pakistanis wary of Mumbai claims” Online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7757871.stm

69

This fact changes little in the Afghan perception that none of the suicide bombers could be Afghan. Even when told that the person was from their region, the answer is usually that those who have lived in Pakistan and returned are not true Afghans anymore.

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the Taliban regime, India has been very actively improving its relations with Afghanistan and has become its closet ally in the region. India has financed various development projects and has opened a number of consulates throughout the country, including in the Pashtun areas of southern Afghanistan which Pakistan considers an explicit provocation and part of an Indian strategy of encirclement. Pakistan, on the other hand, for several years followed a strategy of tolerating the training of Islamist militant groups in its territory and even used them to fight a proxy war against India. Contact with these groups – including close contact with the Taliban and a less intimate relationship with Al Qaeda in the late 1990s – was established and maintained through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). 70 Because of this India has accused Pakistan and the ISI of being behind various terrorist attacks on its territory. In the summer of 2008 the Indian embassy in Kabul was targeted in one of the most devastating suicide attacks in recent Afghan history. The Afghan government accused ISI of being involved in the planning of the attack. e) USA VS. IRAN: Tensions between the United States and Iran have existed for at least three decades with various issues at stake. In 1979 a group of Iranian activists invaded the US embassy in Teheran and took 52 American diplomats hostage for over a year, claiming that the CIA-backed coup in Iran 1953 had taken the whole nation hostage. 71 Tensions continued with the US accusing Iran in the early 1980s of supporting terrorist organizations like Hezbollah. In January 2002, US President George W. Bush named Iran as one of three states (together with Iraq and North Korea) in the “Axis of Evil” supporting global terrorism. Official attempts by Iran’s reformists to reach out to Washington failed. 72 US accusations that Iran’s nuclear program would be used for the production of atomic weapons led to a further escalation of tensions, especially after the election of conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran’s sixth president in 2005. The US also repeatedly accused Teheran of supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan by supplying Taliban groups

70

Steve Coll: “The ISI also promoted a rebellion against what it regarded as an Indian occupation in Kashmir. The Taliban in Afghanistan provided logistic support, training and other bases that the ISI could use to develop its Kashmir rebellion as well. […] The ISI had a sort of transactional relationship with Al Qaeda that was mostly focused on trainings of Kashmir militants. There were some sources of collaboration at the sort of colonel level of ISI, but there was not a strategic partnership between ISI and Al Qaeda, certainly not prior to 9/11. There were also sources of tensions between ISI and Al Qaeda ” - See: “PBS FRONTLINE: Interview with Steve Coll on July 20, 2006”: Online: http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html 71

See Democracy Now! “Stephen Kinzer on US-Iranian Relations, the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran and the Roots of Middle East Terror” - Online: http://www.democracynow.org/2008/3/3/stephen_kinzer_on_the_us_iranian 72

For example, in 2003 – a few weeks after the US invasion of Iraq – a fax from Teheran arrived in Washington which in essence was an offer for a peace treaty between the two countries. Washington never replied to it, arguing that the reformers’ government would be too politically weak and could never keep up with their promises. – See Frontline: “The ‘Grand Bargain Fax’ – A missed opportunity” Online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbargain.html

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with weapons. 73 On the other hand, a newspaper article in July 2008 revealed that Washington itself was supporting Baluchi dissidents and other groups with links to Al Qaeda through covert operations in order to destabilize the Iranian government. 74 One way tensions between the US and Iran are indirectly affecting reconstruction in Afghanistan is through a policy of the largest donor agency, USAID. According to this policy, USAID project funds may not be used to buy any Iranian products. This can pose a significant challenge, especially in project areas near the Iranian border where virtually all goods are imported from Iran. 75 f) SAUDI ARABIA VS. IRAN With both countries claiming hegemony in the Gulf region, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been strained for a long time. Additionally, while the majority of Iranians are Shiites, Saudi Arabia is dominated by the Wahhabiya, a fundamentalist Islamic sect with an ideology based on strict interpretation of the Koran and the canons of the hadiths as pillars of Sunni Islam. Moreover, adherents of the Wahhabiya generally condemn Shiites and consider them as non-Muslims. After the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 this religious and ideological cleavage increased as Shiite clergy assumed power in Iran. Thus, Saudi Arabia faced a religiously/ideologically motivated antagonist that had a sense of mission in opposition to its own. While Saudi Arabia supported social (Sunni) Islamization processes in the Islamic world by furnishing financial support, Iran’s policymakers began to selectively export the concept of a [Shiite] Islamic revolution in order to strengthen Iran’s influence in the Middle East. Each country supported different resistance groups in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, with Saudi Arabia financing Sunni political-military parties (especially Ittehad-e Islami) and Iran supporting Shiite ones (Hizb-e Wahdat). They were accused of fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan as their respective protégées battled it out in western Kabul. Yet their actual influence in Afghanistan is much less than Pakistan’s and the conflict in Afghanistan continued long after relations between Teheran and Riyadh relaxed during the Khatami government in Iran (1996-2004). It may thus be more correct to argue that the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran simply added an extra dimension to the existing conflict in Afghanistan. 76

73

Though Iranian weapons have been found with Taliban fighters, interviewed security experts believed it to be unlikely that the Shiite Iran would risk supporting the primarily Sunni Taliban and argued that it would be more realistic for the weapons to be coming from criminal sources. 74

See The New Yorker, July 7, 2008, Seymour H. Hersh: “Preparing the Battlefield - The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran.”, Online: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all 75

One interviewee told about a meeting with a USAID representative in Herat where the person explicitly stressed that policy. In reply, the USAID representative was told that it was virtually impossible or at least very harmful to the project to exclude Iranian products – and that even the carpet that USAID used for its office was of Iranian production. 76

For more detailed information about Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s role in Afghanistan, please see “The impact of the relationship Iran - Saudi Arabia – US on Afghanistan”, written by Andreas Wilde in the annex of this document.

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2. CONFLICTS ON TH E NATIONAL LEVEL a) TALIBAN / ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS VS. OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT, ISAF / OEF Outside Afghanistan, the conflict between “the Taliban” and the official government in alliance with the international forces (ISAF, OEF) is probably the most well-known. The origins of this conflict go back in time and one could regard it as a continuation of the Afghan Civil War in the 1990s or even the jihad against foreign presence during the Soviet occupation (19791989). Many of today’s Anti-Government Element (AGE) leaders were active in the resistance previously supported by international sources. It is a conflict about political power as well as to some extent the way society should be structured and whether or not there should be international (Western) influence and presence in Afghanistan. Involved in this conflict are on one side the official government of Afghanistan with its national security forces (Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army) and international military forces from ISAF and OEF. On the other side is a variety of Anti Governmental Elements (AGEs) which consist of at least four major groups (Taliban, Haqqani-Network, Hizb-e Islami, Al Qaeda). Also involved are secret service agencies especially from Afghanistan, Pakistan (ISI), the US and the UK and private security firms like Blackwater. Last but not least, the individual resistance parties receive funds from abroad, e.g. from groups within Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E, but also from some of Afghanistan’s neighbor states, adding another dimension of indirectly involved conflict parties. The conflict affects vast parts of the country but with varying intensity and different manifestations. Especially along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in all of the southeastern and southern provinces the conflict manifests in military operations against presumed Taliban hide-outs and frequent guerillalike attacks on Afghan and international military and police forces by AGEs. Other parts of the country witness smaller scale operations and attacks. 77 Terrorist attacks aimed at government structures as well as national and international security forces are committed by AGE’s forces and often involve the use of explosives 78. There are also calculated assassinations of individuals by both sides. Suspected AGE 77

One interviewee stated that insurgents are very active in creeping into new areas in the north. He mentioned an example from Maimana, the capital of the Northern Province of Faryab: “It’s a typical village in a valley with a police post. During the night they – once I would have called them ‘Taliban’ but nowadays I got more sensitive and would rather simply say ‘people from outside the area speaking a Pakistani Pashto’ – are coming down from the mountains, armed. They knock at the house of a normal farmer offering money and weapons. They would simply say ‘Just keep the money and hide the weapons. There is nothing we want you to do for us at the moment. BUT: You know the police checkpoint – one day we may give you a signal. And when this signal comes, you and everybody else will run this checkpoint over!’ If the farmer refuses to cooperate he risks that he or anybody of his family is getting murdered the next time these people return. This is what’s currently happening all over the country.” 78

There are three main types of explosive attacks: The explosive devices can be (1) “human-bound”, i.e. a vest with explosives carried by an individual “suicide bomber”, (2) installed in a car which can then be detonated from a distance or by the driver himself and (3) planted in/near roads as mines or “IEDs” (Improvised Explosive Devices) which are triggered either by movement of a “target” or through distant manual triggers like mobile phones, wires or infra-red devices. There have also been less common cases in which IEDs were loaded on a donkey or attached to a bicycle.

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key leaders are assassinated by Special Forces or private security firms (e.g. through ranged missile attacks). AGEs are executing government representatives (governors, chiefs of police) and “collaborators” with Western forces or the government. In a way, this conflict is the one most instrumentalized on the political level. The “Taliban threat” is used as an argument for local commanders to re-arm (or not to disband their illegally armed groups in the first place). This is further supported if local militias (who are then likely to be informally organized as militias of a commander) are used for fighting “Taliban” forces as part of a security policy. 79 Also, there are many rumors circulating claiming the US and UK forces collaborate with Taliban for their own profit 80 or that they would refrain from defeating them completely in order to have an official reason for a lasting military presence in Afghanistan. b) CONFLICTS BETWEEN POLITICAL-MILITARY PARTIES AND ACTORS Today over 100 groups are officially registered as political parties in Afghanistan – many of them founded in recent years. However, political power is still very much in the hands of the few major groups that fought against Afghan and Soviet communists during the jihad and against each other during the following years of civil war. With their legacy as military resistance groups they have little in common with political parties as known in Western countries. From a certain point of view, most of them are best described as loose alliances of individuals and commanders headed by a leader aiming for the personal gain of their members. As a consequence, membership in such a party does not stem from shared political goals or values (though most of these parties have a radical Islamist background) but from the belief that this alliance would be beneficial for achieving one’s own interests and goals or getting access to resources. These resources are then used to support one’s own status and clientele who would otherwise be likely to leave and follow a competitor. Thus, issues behind the conflicts between political parties include the maintenance of, or access to, power and resources. Another driver can be blood feuds and other forms of vendettas initiated by events that can lay decades into the past. The battle over these issues is fought on different levels and in different ways including the use of non-violent means such as propaganda in local media (which is often owned by the respective warlord or aligned party) or violent and illegal activities such as open 79

This tactic was already used during the time of the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. Back then, General Rashid Dostum made a career commanding local militias to fight for the Soviet-backed regime against insurgents. The idea was recently discussed again in the form of an US-backed project to form an “Afghan Public Protection Force” (APPF) recruited from 25-45 years old men from the respective areas. For further details see: Virginia M. Moncrieff: “US, NATO forces in advance plans to create citizen militias in Afghanistan”; The Huffington Post; Feb 11, 2009; Online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/virginia-moncrieff/us-nato-forces-inadvance_b_165998.html 80

One rumor was that the UK forces made a deal for their own profit with the Taliban in Helmand. In this deal, the Taliban had been given control over one or more districts (among them Musa Qala) in exchange for permitting the UK to mine uranium in Helmand. This issue led to fierce debates in the Afghan parliament and the Afghan Foreign Minister Spanta said that anybody who would sell Afghanistan to the Taliban should leave the country.

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gun fights, abductions and assassinations. In 2005, UNAMA categorized 20% of the violent conflicts in Afghanistan as having such a political background. 81 However, the high-ranking leaders of these parties can also be quite skillful in hiding their real intentions in front of their followers. Thus, a clash between armed groups from two parties can officially be because of the threat the other party poses– yet unofficially and actually the conflict is over a piece of land one or both leaders want to have. Thus, the above described conflict, between insurgent groups on one side and the Afghan government in alliance with international military forces on the other, is only a part of the national conflict. To some extent one can argue that the long-lasting Afghan civil war between different factions has never completely ended. By this logic, the US-led intervention in 2001 merely took the side of one faction and did not achieve the complete surrender and integration of the other – leaving aside a large kaleidoscope of ongoing inner-faction conflicts on both sides. Although the Bonn Conference in 2001 succeeded in bringing a certain shift from “political leadership through military might” to “political leadership through a system of state and elections”, the old factions that competed for power in the 1990s are still intact and (unofficially) armed. Allies in these political-military parties or so-called “warlords”

82

– who have come to power in the past decades of internal warfare and received funds

through international military aid and illicit trade – still compete with each other over influence and resources. Many of them maintain their entourage and still possess arms and ammunition. Many former commanders are still attached to their former patrons, the leaders of the Mujahedin groups, and thus these individual power struggles are quickly being fought out in larger coalitions. Even though many militias have been officially disbanded (in part because this was required for their leaders to be eligible for official posts) and their members transferred into the Afghan military, police or private security firms, their loyalty often still remains with their former commander. In addition, the program for disarmament and destruction of arsenals in Afghanistan was just partly successful. This is the main reason why most people interviewed expect an immediate outbreak of civil war if the international forces leave the country at the current stage.83 A high number of commanders still have private militias – some of them as part of local security firms hired (and thus funded) to provide protection for international military and civilian organizations and reconstruction projects. Interviewees claimed that once the internationals would leave, nothing would stop these commanders from using military might to attempt to maintain or increase their power, which would also lead to further human 81

see: Eckart Schiewek,: “Efforts to Curb Political Violence in Afghanistan: Counter Insurgency and National Reconciliation” in: Cheema, Pervaiz et al (Eds.) “Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia”; Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Asia Printers; Islamabad; 2006 82

Other terms used for these key actors are “mujahedin (commanders)” or “jihadis” due to their leading role in the anti-communist jihad between 1979 and 1992.

83

One interviewed Afghan human rights expert stated that these atrocities are far greater than in the previous civil war as the commanders then would have feared international intervention. If the international forces were to leave now, the commanders could be sure that they would not come again soon, leaving them with full freedom and impunity.

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rights atrocities. While little is done to reduce this problem, international forces seem to be able at least for the moment to keep the status quo, similar to a weight that keeps the lid on a boiling pot of water.

3. CONFLICT POTENTIALS ON THE LO CAL LEVEL a) LAND CONFLICTS The majority of conflicts in Afghanistan include land as a conflict issue. These conflicts can be either about property or about access to land or pastures. Conflicts about the ownership of land have different backgrounds. Many conflicts are a mixture of more than one of the following types; different legal systems supporting the claims of different people, resettlement, occupation of land by a commander, or disputed inheritance. Often, a single conflict involves two or more of these. There are three legal systems which operate simultaneously: customary law, Islamic law / Shari’a and state law. All have generated various forms of documentation or title deeds. Also, an individual name on a document can stand for shared ownership within a family whose members have different rights to the land. In combination with the fact that property deeds have been falsified on a large scale, this results in an unclear legal situation in most land conflicts. Resettlements have been ordered / conducted in Afghanistan over centuries for various reasons. Some resettlements/displacements took place due to policies associated with large dam and irrigation projects initiated in the second half of the 20th century. The series of resettlements that has influenced today’s land conflicts the most is the so called Pashtunization – a term which is in part misleading as members of other ethnic groups were also resettled. This internal colonization started during the reign of Abur Rahman Khan (1881-1901). In order to deal with resistance from rival Pashtun tribes, Abur Rahman Khan moved them to non-Pashtun areas in the North and West. These resettled Pashtuns were given the official task of ruling over the local inhabitants as well as often very good land that before had belonged to non-Pashtuns. Other ethnic groups from the North were resettled into the South. This internal colonization continued during the following decades. In course of the Soviet occupation and the civil war, many Afghans left the country and thus their land and became refugees. In the meantime, other people (re)claimed the land and today argue that the land did not belong to the people settled there during the colonization in the first place as this would have been an illegal process.

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Regarding access to land, the conflict between the mostly Pashtun nomads (commonly known as kuchis) and Hazara settlers over access to pastures in the Hazarajat 84 is the most prominent one. This conflict has a long history as well. Prior to the Soviet invasion, relations between nomads and settlers had for generations been mainly peaceful and symbiotic. Nomads brought goods to the secluded Hazarajat and traded them together with their own livestock products for harvest crops and cash. However because the prices of the goods were quite high and trading conditions disadvantageous, many Hazara peasants were eventually forced to sell their land to the nomads who then in return rented it back to them. Any resistance from the Hazara against perceived injustice was futile. Regarding the ability to mobilize people, the Pashtun nomads with their strong tribal structures were more than a match for the Hazara settlers whose own structures had been largely scattered by the invasion of Abdur Rahnan Khan. During the Soviet occupation, the Pashtun nomads significantly reduced their migration to the Hazarajat due to the ongoing fighting. At the same time, the Hazaras were the first to liberate themselves from the Soviet occupation, establishing their own state. Later on the Taliban again successfully “integrated” the Hazarajat into their territory through the use of force. Under the new rule, Pashtun nomads returned again to the area. In recent years the conflict between the Hazaras and the Pashtun nomads has escalated significantly, with regular clashes (especially in the area of Behsud) between the groups every summer when the nomads come to the Hazarajat. b) WATER CONFLICTS The arid climate in Afghanistan yields little rainfall, yet about 80% of the people depend on agriculture. The distribution of irrigation water causes increasing conflicts in years of drought. Population growth further exacerbates the issue. Traditionally, the distribution of water takes place under the supervision of the mirab, who is elected by farmers of the respective canal. A just distribution is often hindered by corruption or the presence of powerful (and armed) landlords. Furthermore, water is seldom shared equally between farmers whose land is situated at the top of the canal and those whose land is in the middle or at the end. Farmers at the top tend to take as much water as they need to plant rice, which is most lucrative but also requires a lot of water. 85 Farmers at the lower end of the canal are then limited to crops that need less water (e.g. grapes).

84

The Hazarajat is a term used for the Hazaran areas in central Afghanistan. It is made up of the three central provinces of Bamyan, Daykundi and Ghor and includes large areas of Maidan Wardak, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Balkh, Sar-e Pol, Samangan and Baghlan. 85

The German NGO “German Agro Action“ tried a project in Northeast Afghanistan in which a new kind of rice was introduced to farmers which needed less water to grow but required more labor to get the same amount of output. According to an interview with one of their staff members in fall of 2007, the farmers at the top of the canal were very reluctant to change to the new kind of rice as they apparently saw no need to do so, having access to sufficient water for the more water-expensive kind.

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c) OTHER RESOURCE CONFLICTS After years of uncontrolled deforestation 86, access to forests and thus wood is also a common issue of conflict. People need firewood for cooking, but also for heating87 in winter time. Distribution is not properly regulated by any authority. 88 In addition to uncontrolled deforestation based on people’s basic needs, local power brokers make profits by professionally cutting wood and exporting the lumber to neighboring countries. Further disputes can arise over horticultural crops such as pistachios or pine nuts. Interviewees told stories of “harvest events” in areas with such crops (like pistachios in Badghis province). For example, one interviewee explained that he once witnessed this in Badghis when a local dignitary or commander on a special day gave the starting signal and everybody in the region was allowed to rush to the hills and forests to harvest the crops. Pistachios are very valuable and whole families joined forces to claim – and defend at gun point – their part of the crop, leaving the city almost deserted. With armed harvesters and virtually no security forces maintaining law and order, such events lead to a small number of casualties each year. 89 Leaving out indirect deaths resulted e.g. from lack of water or land, drug-related conflicts cost the most lives among resource related conflicts, simply because the conflicting parties are usually armed and the issue at stake can be worth several thousand USD. Conflicts arise in the course of production (e.g. drug lords forcing farmers to plant poppy and harvest opium) as well as during the trafficking of the drugs. Official posts in local government or border police along drug trafficking routes are also quite “valuable” as they provide access to significant financial resources through cooperation with the drug traffickers. Thus, the dismissal of a person from such a post often leads to an escalation or outbreak of violence, usually in the form of insurgency or retaliation attacks. 90 It is also important to

86

Between 1990 and 2005, Afghanistan lost about a third (33.8%) of its forest cover or around 442,000 hectars. (see online: http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Afghanistan.htm ) This deforestation has also lead to an increased risk of erosion and floods. 87

The summer in Afghanistan is about 6-7 months long with short periods of spring and fall. During winter time (mid December – beginning of March) the temperature drops significantly below zero degrees Celsius. In the harsh winter of 2007/08, over 300,000 animals (sheep, cattle…) perished and more than 900 winter-related deaths were reported by the end of February 2008. 88

Although there are foresters to protect the remaining forests, corruption is still present. One person stated that a forester may wait in the valley and whenever one villager passed by with a donkey loaded with (illegally collected or chopped) wood from the forest, the forester simply requested some of the wood as his “share” and then let the villager pass with the rest of it. 89

Thus, at least one dispute about horticulture was also listed in the UNAMA Violence Study in 2005, which only included conflicts with 5 or more casualties.

90

Violence resulting from the dismissal of staff is not limited to local power brokers engaged in illegal activities. International organizations especially can face direct or indirect threats if they choose not to extend a work contract with an individual staff member or cooperation partner. In one case, a person threw a hand grenade in the middle of the night into the parking lot of an organization that did not hire him. While the actual danger from a staff member’s threat may be limited, its psychological effect can be significant – with more than one case where unqualified and corrupt national staff are kept in their posts in fear of such threats.

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stress that drug-generated income is partly used to fund private militias. Conflicts that involve drugs are thus closely linked to conflicts on the national level. Conflicts also arise over resources in a wider sense, such as development projects, job opportunities or official posts in government. d) F AMILY LEVEL CONFLICTS Conflicts on a family 91 level are probably the most common conflicts in Afghanistan. Information about such conflicts are also less likely to be shared with outsiders, partly because it is regarded as inappropriate and impolite to talk about issues that might result in members of a family losing face or which may even be harmful to the reputation of the family as a whole.92 Conflicts on a family level can be about material issues such as inheritance or the use of shared land. They also include conflicts about respective roles within a family, especially regarding the rights and duties of members from different generations. Such generational conflicts are far more common in urban / metropolitan areas than in rural ones. This may be connected to differences in education and income possibilities for young family members that can lead to younger family members providing the majority of a family’s income. 93 A common conflict issue is the question of who a younger family member should marry, a decision which traditionally is made by the parents or other older members of the family rather than by the person himself or herself. Overall, marriage-related conflicts are the “biggest conflicts” on a family level, due to their significance to the people involved but also because they often include other family members as well and thus have greater potential to spread. UNIFEM Afghanistan estimates that 70 – 80% of women face forced marriages.94 This indicates that the vast majority of marriages are arranged by families. Men can also be subjected to arranged marriages with their family sometimes prohibiting them from marrying the woman they chose, even as a second or third wife. Such arranged or forced marriages are

91

The family plays a significant role in an Afghan’s life. The family provides social security in that children support their parents in old age and unemployed relatives are supported or placed in vacant job positions. Almost all leisure time is spent with the family including wedding parties, weekend picnics or visiting relatives.

92

In a small conflict survey conducted by the author in Kunduz in spring 2008 with Afghan and international interviewees, family conflicts were listed as significant conflicts by almost all Afghan interviewees, while only a few international interviewees mentioned them at all. Most of the internationals who did mention them had been in Afghanistan for several years, apparently able to build up enough trust to actually hear about such conflicts. 93

For example, a younger member of a family may have been successful, with his (or also her) education and work skills, in getting a job in a business firm or an international organization. With a salary that can easily be 5-10 times higher than that of his or her parents, the younger member becomes a primary supporter of the family. Nevertheless the person could face situations in which he or she would feel patronized or forced against his/her will by older members of the family. 94

See: UNIFEM Afghanistan: “Afghanistan Factsheet 2008”; Online: http://afghanistan.unifem.org/media/pubs/08/factsheet.html

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particularly common if the husband of a woman dies. In this case, the woman is often re-married to a brother or other male relative of the deceased. 95 Beside conflicts arising because the family or even one of the persons to be wed does not agree with a marriage, the custom of paying a bride price96 can also lead directly or indirectly to conflict. While there can be quarrels about the amount and the time at which the bride price has to be paid, poorer families try to avoid paying money by simply “exchanging daughters” with other families. For example, during the infancy of a child, two families agree that their son can marry the other’s daughter “for free” if his sister is given to the other family’s son. Since such “quid pro quo” marriages seldom take place at the same time, conflicts can easily arise if the second marriage is delayed or even cancelled for various reasons. Conflicts between two families can escalate into blood feuds, in which formerly uninvolved family members become the victim of retaliation attacks for perceived injustice by another family. A series of interviewees stated that conflicts between the daughter-in-law and mother-in law are among the most common and problematic conflicts within families. The new wife of the son, who traditionally moves into the house of her husband’s family, is expected to subordinate herself to the authority of older family members, including the mother-in-law. The mother-in-law, being older and having given birth to at least one son, often dominates the household and executes her right to give orders. Also, as mothers in Afghanistan tend to build up strong, emotional ties with their sons (and vice versa), in the case of conflict the sons usually take the side of their mothers, isolating their wife in the new household. e) GENDER CONFLICTS Gender conflicts are very closely linked to conflicts on a family level, including marriage-related conflicts (see above). While gender conflicts were considered as “minor” conflicts in most interviews, some said that these conflicts would be likely to increase with the amount of information coming into

95

One interviewee told about a case where a teenage boy was playing soccer on a street when his mother called him in. He was told that he had to marry the significantly older widow of his deceased uncle or brother so that the woman could remain in the family. Hearing this the boy burst into tears.

96

In Afghanistan it is common that the bride price is given to the family instead of to the bride. Some interviewees argued that this is to compensate the family for the “loss of work force”. Bride prices vary greatly depending on the beauty of the woman and the social status of her family (and hence the benefits such a marriage/alliance could bring). They can easily exceed the annual income of a farmer (around 2,500 USD).. This custom leads to circumstances which from a Western point of view may approach or even cross the line into human trafficking with women being sold to the highest bidder. One example is a young woman given “for marriage” to a person to whom the family owes money, in order to get (partial) debt relief. As it is almost impossible for a woman to get a divorce on her own in Afghanistan and as it is also illegal according to customary law for a woman to run away from her (new) home, such marriages lead to a “lifelong time of service.” Also, according to some interviewees, the fact that men have to pay for their wives would in some cases lead to the belief that they have actually bought them and thus “own” them like property.

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Afghanistan from other countries and thus the realization of gender injustice that was previously accepted as “normal.” Traditionally, women (and men) are, as mentioned above, expected to obey the decision of their family when it comes to who to marry. In this regard, women in particular can also be “used” as a “means for conflict resolution.” For example in cases of “baad” in which a woman from the family of a perpetrator is given to the family of its victim as “compensation” for a crime committed. While the (recorded) number of real cases of baad is comparatively low, with 70-80% of the women facing forced marriages, the potential for “marriage conflicts” is great. Women can also face difficulties from their families if they work outside the home – including incidents where members of a woman’s family suddenly appear at work to check on her or contact her superiors. Women are also subject to harassment by men on the street or intimidation. To avoid the violence involved in conflicts over the rights of women, many Afghan women prefer not to claim these rights for themselves. In addition, women’s rights have a rather negative image in Afghanistan as many agitators have succeeded in portraying them as an attack on Afghan culture. 97 It should also be mentioned that there are a significant number of suicides committed by women in Afghanistan. 98 Afghanistan is the only country in the world with a higher suicide rate among women than men. Men at an early age are responsible for the support of the whole family, putting significant pressure on them. They are also expected to take care of the “honor of the family”, defending it (even physically) whenever “necessary.” While male gender roles appear to be far less disputed in Afghanistan, it is still likely that they have the potential to escalate other conflicts, especially at the family level. f) ETHNICAL, RELIGIOUS AND REGIONAL TENSIONS A majority of the Afghan interviewees stated that rising tensions between ethnic groups are a dominant challenge for Afghanistan. In 2005, UNAMA categorized about 32% of the violent conflicts

97

According to one interviewee, an Afghan colleague working for a human rights organization had the opinion that women’s right had first to be granted to a wife by her husband and that he would also have the right to reverse his decision to grant these “rights” to his wife. Women’s rights would thus be a set of privileges subject to the approval of the husband rather than inalienable rights a woman could demand even against the will of a male family member. 98

One infamous way of committing suicide in Afghanistan is self-immolation (see: IRIN “Afghanistan – Self-immolation on the rise among women”; Online: http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=80236 ). As one interviewee stated, some women would choose this painful way also to be sure that even if they did survive, because of the deformation from the burns they could be sure that they would not be touched again.

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in Afghanistan as between ethnic/religious groups.99 Often these conflicts are related to images and stereotypes created in recent decades. 100 Personal ethnicity is recorded on official personal identity documents. Along with numerous small ethnic groups, there are four major ethnic groups in Afghanistan: Pashtuns, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazaras. Although members of different ethnic groups have moved – or were moved – to different areas of Afghanistan, one can basically say that the majority of the Pashtuns live in the southern part of Afghanistan, Hazaras in the central and Uzbeks in the northern part. Tajiks live largely in the north; however, definitions of who is “Tajik” in Afghanistan vary greatly, making it difficult if not impossible to clearly define (at least) this group. This situation, combined with the lack of an official census, make it virtually impossible to determine the exact ratio of different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The CIA World Fact Book estimates “Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%” with 13% belonging to other ethnic groups. 101 However, when asked about this ratio, members of each group gave individually different estimations that included the doubling of the percentage for their own group. Also, during the 1990’s a series of attempts to unify the mujahedin parties failed due to their inability to find a mutually agreeable ratio formula for the proportional representation of different ethnic groups. 102

99

Definition of this category: “Both parties are defined as ethnic / religious groups and can mobilize their members for the cause. Violent action is seen in the interest of the whole ethnic / religious group, and not only in the personal interest of their leaders. While usually the cause is originally related to control over resources or perceived injustice suffered by the whole group in the past, the current dimension of the conflict has surpassed the original object of struggle” see: Eckart Schiewek,: “Efforts to Curb Political Violence in Afghanistan: Counter Insurgency and National Reconciliation” in: Cheema, Pervaiz et al (Eds.) “Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia”; Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Asia Printers; Islamabad; 2006

100

For example the Herati are commonly viewed as the fifth column of Iran because of Herat’s proximity to Iran and cultural similarities. Likewise, many people express a negative attitude towards the Pashtuns and tend to see them as Taliban. (see Andreas Wilde: „ „Imaginations of a country – Spatial perceptions and Mental Mapping in Herat” in: Asien - The German Journal on Contemporary Asia, 104; (July 2007; p. 119-134. 101

See CIA World Fact Book – Afghanistan : https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

102

During interviews in 2002, the following maximum numbers were given for the relative size of one’s own ethnic group: Pashtun 80%, Tajik 60%, Hazara 30%, Uzbek 25% (Total: 195%). See: Glatzer, Bernd: “Studien zur Länderbezogenen Konfliktanalyse – Afghanistan“; September 2003; p. 23; Online: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/01935.pdf

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Figure 9: Ethnic groups in Afghanistan

(Map reprinted with courtesy of Dr. Conrad Schetter)

The ethnicity of an individual is based on the ethnicity of the father. The mother’s ethnicity does not play any role. Inter-ethnic marriages do take place, but are not common in all variations, in part due to social pressures and the fact that many marriages are arranged for “family-political” reasons. 103 One thing that supports the mobilization of groups within conflicts is the fact that the social machinery in Afghanistan is based upon norms of reciprocity, generosity and hospitality reflected in strong patron-client relationships which play an important role in structuring social life. This will be explained below in the example of Afghan notions of leadership:

103

Marriages are frequently used as a means for politics, for officially aligning two families and/or for increasing social status or access to resources. Ethnicity can play a role here: while for example a Pashtun man may marry a Hazara woman as his second or third wife, it is very rare that a Pashtun woman would be “given” to a Hazara man in marriage. Pashtuns tend to regard themselves as the founders of Afghanistan and the ones with the highest claim to rule the country (most of the national rulers in Afghanistan’s history were Pashtuns). Hazaras, however, are usually seen to be at the other end of the scale. A marriage with them thus seems to be less “profitable” from a political, Pashtun point of view.

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Leaders as Providers: The implications of resource-based leadership and patronage in Afghanistan One element that has the potential to fuel conflicts along ethnic, religious or regional lines is the particular understanding of “leadership” that is common in Afghanistan. Judging from interviewees’ comments and my own personal experience, a “good leader” is not so much defined on the basis of the person’s ability to formulate and strive for vision or goals but to a far greater extent on the capacity to allocate and provide resources to his or her followers or kin. Resources in this regard can be elemental things like food, access to (irrigation) water and land as well as money or employment opportunities. The “binding link” can be family (including distant cousins) as well as regional (people coming from the same area) or ethnic linkages. If a leader is unable to provide these resources – or if another person is likely to provide more – it is not unlikely that his/her supporters will “change sides” and support / follow another person instead. This concept applies at all levels from the family to the nation. Many positions in Afghan “NGOs” are given to members of the families that lead them. Afghan staff from international organizations tries to promote their kin or village members ahead of international staff in recruitment processes. Whole ministries become dominated by the ethnic group of the respective minister or people in charge of recruitment. As one interviewed member of government stated, at least 70% of all Afghan officials act according to this leadership concept, providing positions and other resources mainly to their own followers. This concept can cross the line into corruption and nepotism and is dangerous for other reasons. For example, if a group is somehow not represented in official posts, chances are that group does not have equal access to resources – or at least the members of the group get that impression. This can lead to an “ethnicitization” of politics. There can be turmoil if one official is replaced by another from a different ethnic group – or if Parliament members give their vote not according to the quality of a proposal but according to the ethnicity of the person who brought it forward.

One “arena” where ethnic and regional tensions are fought out indirectly is in the use of language. Afghanistan has two official languages: Dari and Pashtu. Of these two, Dari, the Afghan Persian, is very closely related and in many parts almost identical to the Iranian Persian (Farsi). In recent years there appears to be increasing tension over which language should be used, in which form, and – when

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multiple languages are on the same sign or in the same document – which language should be first. 104 While this may sound strange to outsiders, the issue did lead to a number of physical confrontations and caused the death of one student during an incident in the northern city Mazar-e-Sharif in the autumn of 2008. g) RETURNEE CONFLICTS Since 2002, more than 5 million Afghan refugees have returned to Afghanistan mostly from Pakistan and Iran. 105 Also, about half a million internally displaced people have returned to their home areas. However, when the returnees manage to return to their home areas, they are not always welcomed by the local population. They may face difficulties such as exclusion or harassment, often related to the use of scarce resources like land and water (see above sections on land and water conflicts). Also, residents of an area often do not accept returnees from another ethnic group – which is especially the case with Pashtun returnees to the northern areas who want to reclaim the land they owned before they left the country. Residents argue that this land was not rightfully theirs in the first place as the real (non-Pashtun) landowners were displaced during the era of “Pashtunization”. There is also a social dimension to the conflict in which lines are drawn between former refugees and those who stayed in the country (or at least returned at an earlier point). Returnees may be accused by the local population of being cowards who fled, while those who remained shed their blood for Afghanistan (which is then used to legitimize claims regarding resources). Returnees who have lived in Western countries are sometimes called saq shoy (“dog washers”) or “waiters”, an accusation meaning that they went to rich and peaceful countries and would have filled the lowest and most dishonorable jobs there. Whether refugees lived in a surrounding (Muslim) country or whether they lived in a Western/non-Muslim country can also be contentious. Returnees from Western countries are accused of having lived as non-Muslims and thus having tainted or even discarded their faith and values. In part, this behavior towards returnees may be related to the fact that they may have received a better education and acquired better vocational skills abroad than was possible for those who remained in the country. Although most Afghans realize that knowledge and skills are vital for rebuilding the country, such harassment may be an attempt to raise the value of one’s own role as a “brave fighter/sufferer” above that of the “cowardly scholar”. 104

A prominent example is the quarrel over whether one should use pohantun or daneshgah for the term “university”. Pohantun is the Pashtu version, daneshgah the Persian one. In an attempt to distance oneself from Iran, one side argues that one should use Pohantun because it is a “truly Afghan” term and not an “imported” one. One interviewee noted that this quarrel was a bit odd as Afghanistan would anyway be largely dependent on books and other media imported from Iran because hardly any books and documents are published within Afghanistan. 105

An estimated 3 million refugees still remain in these two neighboring countries alone. See: UNHCR Afghanistan: “Afghanistan – Challenges of Sustaining Returns”; Online: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=intro

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Also, some Afghans argue that if somebody leaves Afghanistan, he or she stops being a “real” Afghan. Arguing in this way they claim that there has never been an Afghan suicide bomber (as a man who stayed a number of months in Pakistan would not be Afghan anymore.)

h) TENSIONS BETWEEN METROPOLITAN AND RURAL AREAS There were varying comments from interviewees as to what extent conflicts between metropolitan and rural areas actually play a significant role in Afghanistan, bearing in mind that a certain degree of tension between the two is common all over the world, even in very peaceful countries. These tensions appear to have little impact and might be referred to as “cold” conflict, since both sides have a rather negative perception of the other but also have little interest in or opportunity for interaction. However, because international presence, business and development are focused on urban areas for a variety of reasons, 106 the gap between metropolitan and rural areas is widening. Today’s Afghanistan has a central government in Kabul and insurgents appear to be successful in winning over followers and supporters in rural areas by playing the “we against them” card. As a few interviewees from the political field mentioned, Afghan parliamentarians living in Kabul rarely travel to rural areas with reputations for endemic corruption and see officials in rural areas as contributing to the “losing of hearts and minds.”

106

There is for example the expression “capital trap”, which implies that international development organizations become “trapped” in the capital city because of its far better infrastructure compared to the rural areas which are less accessible due to bad roads, missing electricity or lack of security. Although there is a growing understanding that the phenomenon of “capital trap” bears the risk that international development is benefiting only a small part of a population and thus may even raise conflicts, it remains a problem.

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II. STAKEHOLDER A NALYSIS Chapter Summary There is an array of stakeholders involved in the net of conflicts in which Afghanistan is entangled. The US and other NATO countries, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia are playing important roles in these constellations. International military forces (ISAF and OEF) and the United Nation Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) are also significant international actors at the national level. Regarding Afghan stakeholders, the Afghan president Hamid Karzai and his government as well as pro-governmental security forces like the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP) and the national intelligence service (NDS) are key players on the progovernment side. A kaleidoscope of actors can be identified as anti-government elements, including the (real) Taliban and allied forces like the Haqqani Network and the political-military party Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar. Foreign resistance fighters as well as local warlords and criminal gangs are also involved in activities against the Afghan government, sometimes actually being hired by the previously mentioned groups, sometimes just claiming to be “the Taliban” for personal advantage and to create the illusion that the criminal act is committed by a large and powerful group that the police shouldn’t mess with. One special group of stakeholders are the “jihadis”, a number of influential political-military parties who were already active (and significantly financially supported from abroad) as mujahedin resistance groups during the Soviet occupation. There are also a series of other Afghan actors active on the local level including different types of “shuras”/ community councils, mullahs and elders that are playing important roles in Afghan conflicts or their resolution.

1. INTERNATIONAL / EXTERNAL ACTORS a) EXTERNAL COUNTRIES India For most of recent history, India has maintained close ties with Afghanistan, supporting successive governments until the rise of the Taliban in the mid 1990s. After 2001, India quickly restored full diplomatic relations and provided several million dollars in aid for Afghanistan’s development. The growing influence of India is considered a threat by Pakistan which fears geographic encirclement. Pakistan and India have also supported antagonistic groups in Afghanistan (during the Taliban regime

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India supported the anti-Taliban resistance while Pakistan was supporting the Taliban), leading to concerns that both countries were fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan. 107 Iran Iranian involvement in Afghanistan is far less “obvious” than that of Pakistan. Iran seems to aim to strengthen its position in Afghanistan by contributing to the reconstruction process, becoming one of the most important donor countries in Afghanistan.

While Iranian weapons were found in the

possession of insurgent fighters, security officials believed that non-governmental, criminal or terrorist networks were behind it (instead of the official Iranian government) 108. Also, most of the more complex improvised explosive devises are believed to stem from non-governmental Iranian sources. There are, however, tensions between Afghanistan and Iran regarding Afghan refugees and illegal immigrants in Iran. Also the use of the water from shared rivers is a source of conflict between the two countries.

Pakistan Pakistan is very closely linked to the conflicts in Afghanistan. Beside the official conflict between the two countries regarding the border, (Afghanistan does not totally recognize the validity of the current “Durrand-Line” based on an “imposed” contract with the British Empire), the commando bases for all major anti-governmental elements appear to be on Pakistani soil. A key organization in this regard is the Pakistani military secret service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), which was not only involved in the distribution of funds to Afghan resistance groups during the Soviet occupation, but also allegedly supported the Taliban movement. The ISI, especially its political wing and its Afghan bureau, is believed to act somewhat autonomously from the Pakistan government. Some of the key figures in the Afghan bureau have been assigned to posts for more than 10 years and developed close relations to the Taliban and other Islamist groups and there seemed to be cases in which ISI staff started to identify with Islamists causes. 109 It is believed that at least some ISI staff members maintained a 107

For further information about the Indian-Afghan relationship see: CDR / Jayshree Bajoria: “India – Afghanistan Relations”; October 23, 2008; Online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html

108

The main counter-argument given is that it would be very risky for mainly Shiite Iran to support a predominantly Sunni resistance force. 109

“When Musharraf decided to change policies after 9/11, he had to bring ISI under control. While he enjoyed support from many senior generals in the Pakistan army, down in the ranks of ISI, he had to deal with an organization that had been so close to the Taliban and was, in many cases, sympathetic to Al Qaeda that he couldn't be sure of its loyalty. […] Within the Afghan bureau of ISI, some of the key figures have been assigned to this work for 10 or more years. The reason is that they have the relationships with key Pashtun and Afghan militants that are essential to Pakistan's statecraft in Afghanistan. So a lot of these colonel-level, major-level, captain-level ISI officers working on the Afghan frontier have been left in place for long periods of time. They have developed close relationships with their clients. They seem, in some cases, to have come to identify with their clients' causes. […] There was a great deal of disagreement within the Pakistan army and the ISI about Musharraf’s descision to wage war against the Taliban“ – see PBS FRONTLINE “Interview Steve Coll”; July 20, 2006; Online: http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html

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certain amount of contact with Taliban forces even after former President Musharraf announced that Pakistan would join the War on Terror. However, the new Pakistani government recently (November 2008) announced that the political wing of the ISI would be disbanded, making it even more unclear what role the ISI and its members will play in the future. Russia With Afghanistan geographically situated in Central Asia, Russia has been a part of Afghan history. In the 18th century, the Russians and the British struggled over influence in Afghanistan in the course of “The Great Game” – both the northern and eastern borders of Afghanistan were formed in this era. The Soviet Union provided military and development assistance to Afghanistan in the 1950’s and also supported the rise of the communist movement there. From 1979 to 1989 Afghanistan was under Soviet occupation until the latter retreated as result of ongoing resistance funded by the US, China and Saudi Arabia. Russia became sensitive to Islamic extremism earlier then the US due to the fact that it considered Islamists’ calls for the liberation of Central Asia’s Muslims – and thus (former) parts of the Soviet Union – as a threat to its control and stability in the region. With the rise of the Taliban, Russia started supporting a coalition of some of the very same commanders that it fought against a few years earlier: the Northern Alliance. With the US-led invasion of Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and the ongoing efforts of the US and other NATO countries to quell insurgency and terrorist groups in that country since then, Russia is in a peculiar situation. Clifford J. Levy wrote in the New York Times in February 2009: “It often seems that Russia cannot decide whether it hopes that America’s current venture in Afghanistan succeeds, collapses or just ends up in a lengthy slog that might be cause for furtive grins in the backrooms of the Kremlin. […]Dmitri O. Rogozin, Russia’s outspoken ambassador to NATO […] reiterated this month that Russia was deeply worried about the spread of Islamic extremism. But he also did not shy from expressing a little satisfaction that the mighty Americans were faring not much better than the Soviets. “They have repeated all our mistakes, and they have made a mountain of their own,” he said.” 110 In January 2009, Karzai openly stated that there would be “other countries” if the US would not support them militarily. Two months before he had quietly sent a request to Moscow and received a quick answer from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev who assured friendship and offered cooperation on defense. 111

110

Clifford J. Levy: “Poker-Faced, Russia Flaunts Its Afghan Card”; New York Times; February 21, 2009; Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/weekinreview/22levy.html 111

Jean MacKenzie: “Karzai’s Great Gamble”; Institute for War and Peace Reporting; February 13, 2009; Online: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=350066&apc_state=henh

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Saudi Arabia Declared the lead nation of the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia supported the jihad against the Soviet occupation. Saudi Arabia is also believed to have provided some support to the Taliban who – contrary to Al Qaeda – do not question its leading role. Saudi Arabia also hosted talks between Afghan government officials and (former/moderate) Taliban in Mecca in September 2008. Some experts assume that Saudi Arabia’s interests in these negotiations are primarily to reduce conflicts among Sunnis which could otherwise lead to greater influence for mainly Shiite Iran in the Muslim world. The United States of America In the 1940’s Afghanistan and the US had a brief era of cooperation when the US began construction of dams in Helmand province. However relations cooled when the Soviet Union significantly increased involvement in Afghanistan less than a decade later in the late 1950’s. While Soviet development programs took place mainly in the north, the US funded projects in the south. The US projects included the road between Kabul and Kandahar and an extraordinarily large airport in the latter city. This created speculation that the Americans wanted to use this airport militarily in case of an escalation of the Cold War.

112

However, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the US

focused on covert support for the Afghan anticommunist resistance, aimed at making the Soviets’ stay in Afghanistan as costly as possible. Cooperating mainly with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia this covert action played a significant role in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. After that, the US again significantly reduced its involvement in Afghanistan, stopping military aid in 1992 and the USAID program two years later. In the early 1990’s, the American Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) competed with an Argentinean firm over the construction of oil and gas pipelines through Afghanistan from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and received backing from US government officials.113 While Afghanistan was not very high on the US agenda by that time, a number of government officials at first believed that the Taliban could “create a new base for peace”. 114 However, the US did not recognize the Taliban government and openly criticized their human rights violations after 1997. Islamist terrorist attacks on US/American targets, including the first bomb attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the US Embassy bombings in 1998, increased US attention on the region again, leading to cruise missile strikes on camps in Afghanistan in 1998. The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, resulted in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban regime. In its quest to defeat the Taliban, the US also allied with former mujahedin 112

Schetter 2004, p. 84f

113

Unocal’s plan conformed to US policy to cut off Iran from Central Asian energy reserves. Unocal got support from the National Security Council of the White House as well as from the US ambassadors to Turkmenistan and Pakistan. Unocal also managed to get Zalmay Khalilzad, the later US Ambassador to Afghanistan, to join its advisory board. (see Coll 2004, p. 306-315; 338-339) Unocal withdrew from the project in 1998 after a series of difficulties.

114

See Coll 2004, p. 299f

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commanders. The strong military focus of the US created new challenges. As Barnett R. Rubin put it, “Rearming the warlords empowered leaders the Afghan people had rejected; enabling the Northern Alliance to seize Kabul put those Pakistan most distrusted in charge of the security forces. And the White House’s opposition to `nation building´ led to major delays in Afghanistan’s reconstruction.” 115 Today, the US is the biggest donor of development aid in Afghanistan, although these contributions are small compared to the $ 100 million that the US military spends there every day. 116

b) EXAMPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS DEPLOYED IN AFGHANISTAN ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) ISAF is a UN-authorized multinational force that was first established in 2001 upon the invitation of the Afghan Interim Administration. Since August 2004 it has been led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) making it NATO’s first and largest ground operation outside Europe. Initially only responsible for the security of Kabul, ISAF began to take over regional command of the 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 117 from US-led coalition forces in 2004. Currently, more than 50,000 ISAF troops from 41 nations are stationed in Afghanistan. 118 The current (February 2009) commander is General David D. McKiernan, who is described as a political thinker and who stated in public that the conflict in Afghanistan can not be solved by military means alone. The following map shows the different regional commands and the locations of the PRTs as of December 1, 2008. 119

115

Barnett R. Rubin: “Saving Afghanistan” in: Foreign Affairs; http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2007/March/Rubin%2003-01-07.pdf

January/February

2007;

Online:

116

See Alexandra Cooper et al.: “The US War in Afghanistan: A Primer for US Peace Activists“; Peacework magazine; ssue 391 December 2008 - January 2009; Online: http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/us-war-afghanistan-primer-us-peace-activists

117

PRTs are small bases with military and civilian staff that are intended to provide both security and facilitate reconstruction at the provincial level. During a visit from members of the UN Security Council in November 2008, President Karzai complained that the PRTs established a parallel government in Afghanistan. According to the September 2008 report of the UN Secretary General, ISAF has initiated a review of the PRT concept “with the goal of preparing a transition to civilian and Afghan leadership as soon as possible. Coordination of the PRT policies will henceforth be led by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, created by President Karzai in 2007”. 118

Source: NATO Topics: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); Online: http://www.nato.int/issues/isaf/index.html

119

Source: ISAF Maps & Logos; Online: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.jpg (The link appears to be updated regularly to include the most current version of the map) A bigger version of this map can be found in the annex

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Figure 10 : ISAF RC and PRT Locations

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) forces As of July 2008, only about 60% of the US troops stationed in Afghanistan were deployed as part of ISAF. The other 40% of US troops were operating under direct US command within Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). 120 In October 2008, the US Ministry of Defense stated that approximately 20,000 US troops would have been deployed as part of the OEF in Afghanistan. 121 The OEF in Afghanistan consists out of two different commands: The first one is the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), which is charged with the strategic training, advising and mentoring of ANA and ANP, in part through Embedded Training Teams. The second – and significantly larger one – is the Combined Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101) 122 which is deployed mainly in the East and the South of Afghanistan along the Pakistani border as counter-terrorism combat 120

See: JoAnne O’Bryant and Michael Waterhouse: „CRS Report to Congress - U.S. Forces in Afghanistan“ from 15 July 2008; Online: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108070.pdf 121

See: US Ministry of Defense News Release: “Defense Department Activates U.S. Forces-Afghanistan” from 6 October 2008; Online: http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12267 122

The last number (101) is based on the number of the division that is in control of the CJTF (currently 101st Airborne Division, which took over from the 82nd Airborne Division in April 2008). However, the previous name CJTF 82 appears to have established itself, as a lasting synonym for OEF in Afghanistan, as even the official website of CJTF 101 ( http://www.cjtf101.com/ ) displays the CJTF 82 logo.

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mission. Special forces mainly from the US but also other countries make up a significant part of this task force. 123 Since 6 October 2008, the (US) commander of ISAF, David D. McKiernan, is also heading the new command and control headquarter for all US troops in Afghanistan, USFOR-A. 124 With the chains of command of ISAF and OEF nevertheless remaining separate and distinct, the objective of the establishment of this headquarter was a better coordination between US troops deployed within ISAF and those deployed within OEF. International Private Security Firms A series of international private security firms including DynCorp and Blackwater are also active in Afghanistan. DynCorp is officially tasked with training of policemen and is in part also responsible for the security of President Karzai 125 and other prominent members of government. Blackwater’s role in Afghanistan appears to be less transparent and there are various rumors circulating about its activities. What seems to be certain is that the company was providing, for example, protection for the Kabul CIA station in 2002 and flights for the US Air Force through its aviation division (starting 2004.) 126 Only weeks after Blackwater’s expulsion from Iraq, the US State Department decided to review Blackwater’s services in Afghanistan (beginning March 2009.) 127

UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) UNAMA is in charge of fulfilling the UN’s obligations as originally outlined in the Bonn agreement. It is a political mission directed and supported by the United Nations Department of 123

“A key element of the OEF deployment are Special Operations Forces, which form part of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). The US has recently announced that as part of its new “surge” of forces, it will deploy up to 20 additional Special Forces teams to Afghanistan. CJSOTF-A is largely comprised of US personnel from all three services (Army, Navy and Air Force) such as US Army Special Forces and US Navy SEALS. However, a number of other countries have also deployed their Special Operations Forces to CJSOTF-A. These forces, which are deployed throughout Afghanistan, are engaged in a wide array of operations, including ‘direct action,’ various forms of unconventional warfare, espionage, reconnaissance, and so-called psy-ops (psychological operations)” see: Amnesty International: “Getting away with murder? The impunity of international forces in Afghanistan”; ASA 11/001/2009, 26 February 2009; Online: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA11/001/2009/en 124

See: US Ministry of Defense News Release: “Defense Department Activates U.S. Forces-Afghanistan” from 6 October 2008; Online: http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12267 125

According to an interview of February 2008 conducted by the German news website sueddeutsche.de with Mr. Jeremy Scahill who investigated activities of Blackwater and DynCorp; Online: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/968/432718/text/

126

See Jeremy Scahill “Blackwater – The Rise of the world’s most powerful mercenary army”; Nation Books; New York; 2007, p. 43-45; 239. During the interviews for this assessment two interviewees claimed that Blackwater was active in a so-called “counter-narcotics operations” that included targeted assassinations of presumed insurgent leaders and other “black opts” in Afghanistan. It was not possible to follow up this topic and thus it is unclear if and to what extent this was actually true. 127

See: Sara A. Carter: "Blackwater under review in Afghanistan“; Washington Post; February 3, 2009; Online: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/03/blackwater-under-review-in-afghanistan/

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Peacekeeping Operations. As an ‘integrated’ Mission, UNAMA has two main areas of operation, development and humanitarian issues, and political affairs.

According to UN Security Council

Resolution 1806 (2008) 128, the mission has the following mandate: (a) to promote more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government and the adherence to the principles of aid effectiveness enumerated in the Afghanistan Compact; (b) to Strengthen cooperation with the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (c) to provide political outreach through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country; (d) to provide good offices in support of Afghan-led reconciliation programmes; (e) to support efforts to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption; (f) to play a central coordinating role to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid; (g) to monitor the human rights situation of civilians and coordinate human rights protection; (h) to support the electoral process through the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan; and (i) to support regional cooperation in working for a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan. UNAMA officers are also active in conflict resolution / providing good offices, acting as a facilitator / mediator in cases which are considered politically significant or which affect larger areas / number of people. UNAMA is also active in raising the issue of civilian casualties. It had 17 field offices in 2007 and a significant increase in staff is planned for 2009.

2. NATIONAL ACTORS a) GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS President Hamid Karzai (The Afghan constitution – similar to the one of the US – grants large authorities to the Afghan president, while parliament and especially provincial governmental institutions have significantly less influence in decision making.) President Hamid Karzai is Pashtun and a member of the Popalzai clan of the Durrani tribe. He was elected as the first interim president in 2002 and then in 2004 re-elected as president of Afghanistan. There have been numerous assassination attempts on him in the past years. Karzai is sometimes called only the mayor of Kabul – or the president of “Kabulistan” – since the influence of the central government outside Kabul is criticized as not very strong. Others consider him a puppet of the US and his previous employment with the US firm UNOCAL (who tried to build an oil

128

For full text of the resolution see: “UN Security Council Resolution 1806 (2006) Adopted by the Security Council at its 5857th meeting, on 20 March 2008” Online: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Security%20Council%20Resolutions/sc-180620-march-english.pdf

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and gas pipeline through Afghanistan in the 1990’s) fuels rumors about a hidden US agenda. 129 Karzai is frequently criticized by the international community for not doing enough against corruption in the government. Furthermore, there are rumors and allegations that his brother Ahmed Wali Karzai 130 would be a leading figure in drug trafficking and that Karzai uses his position to prevent prosecution of his family members. Karzai regularly speaks up against civilian casualties of international air strikes but his position seems to be further weakened among the population who see him as unable to stop them. Recently, he became a strong advocate for talks with the Taliban and their leader Mullah Omar which did not stop him from expelling two UN staff members for allegedly negotiating with Taliban leaders in Helmand in December 2007. Karzai argued that any talks would have to be carried out with the involvement of official representatives of the Afghan government. ANA (Afghan National Army) The ANA is an all-volunteer force established in 2003. They are tasked with: (a) securing the borders and deterring external threats, (b) defeating terrorist forces, (c) disbanding, reintegrating or imprisoning illegal armed groups, and (d) managing internal security threats and emergencies in cooperation with the Afghan National Police. According to the latest report of the UN Secretary General (from 23 September 2008) the ANA number more than 62,000. In the beginning, the ANA was to be capped at an end-strength of 70,000 service members; however the recruitment ceiling was raised in the following years to the current 122,000 by 2012. Some interviewees mentioned that warlords/commanders were effective at “smuggling” their own loyal militias into the army. In cases where this was true, a conflict of interest could arise if these ANA soldiers ever had to conduct operations against the interests of their “former” leaders. ANP (Afghan National Police) Compared to the ANA, the reform and rebuilding of the Afghan National Police is considered less successful. Reports vary about the actual number of police deployed in Afghanistan and the September 2008 report of the UN Secretary General simply states that only “70% of the 82,000 strong force is estimated to be present for duty.” Police forces have a relatively bad reputation in Afghanistan as many policemen are allegedly involved in petty corruption – which some argue is mainly because of the low official salary of around 100 USD per month. There have also been reported cases in which newly

129

Further information about the alleged gas energy background can be found in a (slightly polemic) article written by Eric S. Margolis: “Afghanistan and Iraq are all about energy” in Gulf Times, June 23, 2008; online: http://www.gulftimes.com/site/topics/printArticle.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=225828&version=1&template_id=46&parent_id=26 130

There were also rumors that Ahmed Wali Karzai was a whistleblower regarding the alleged negotiations between two UN staff members and local Taliban key leaders in Musa Qala/Helmand in 2007. According to these rumors, Ahmed Wali Karzai would have lost two or more important suppliers of opium/heroin if these key leaders had changed sides – thus he had used his family connections to President Hamid Karzai to get the two UN staff members expelled.

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trained policemen deserted their posts and stole equipment or allied with insurgent groups and criminals. As a result, there have been numerous robberies at road blocks in which the perpetrators wore official police uniforms. The building up of an effective and uncorrupt police force has been hindered by the fact that in the past many senior leaders in the Ministry of Interior had links to drug trafficking and other criminal networks. The sale of “lucrative” positions in border areas or near drug trafficking routes also contributes to a negative image of the police. In mid October 2008 Karzai appointed a new Minister of Interior, Hanif Atmar, who in contrast to his predecessor, 131 has a reputation of being uncorrupt. Time will tell what effect this will have on the quality of the ministry and the police force.132 NDS (National Directorate of Security) The NDS is Afghanistan’s secret service agency headed by Amrullah Saleh133, who was already an intelligence aide in the time of the Northern Alliance under Ahmad Shah Massood during the 1990’s. Financed mainly by Germany, the UK and the US, its current main tasks are to provide intelligence support to the Afghan government and to ISAF for the fight against anti-government elements (see below.) Estimations of how many staff are employed in the NDS vary from 15,000 to 30,000. International human rights organizations and the Red Cross have accused the NDS of human rights violations in the treatment of prisoners and suspects.

131

Despite severe criticism of his qualifications as minister, Karzai offered the previous Minister of Interior, Zarar Ahmad Moqbel, the post of Ministry of Refugees. Moqbel rejected this. Nevertheless, it was an example of how – for political reasons – unqualified people in key positions are not completely removed but merely “relocated” to posts of similar rank in other areas or regions. 132

Shortly after the announcement, a series of incidents (assassination of three expatriates, abductions) happened in Kabul which were at first believed to be the result of criminal gangs “flexing their muscles” to come to terms with the new minister. While in the end the first cases apparently were not directly related to the shift, security officers were advised to be more cautious for following two months.

133

Amrullah Saleh was described by one interviewee as being uncorrupt with a sharp mind, making him a dangerous man for many Afghan officials involved in organized crime.

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B) THE “ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS” (AGES)

Figure 11 : “The Afghan Insurgent Front”

This map shows the bases of support of the three major insurgent groups according to research of Seth G. Jones in 2008 and their believed political bases [added by the author of this study]. Additional bases of support for each group are likely to exist in Kabul and in other parts of the country, e.g. for HIG in Hekmatyar’s home district in Kunduz. Also, activities of the insurgent groups are not limited to the areas of these bases of support. (Source of map [without the markings for the political bases]: RAND Counterinsurgency Study – Volume 4, 2008; p. 39; Reprinted with courtesy of the RAND cooperation)

The Taliban While the term “Taliban” is often used synonymously for the whole array of anti-governmental elements, in a stricter sense, it is a Sunni-Islamist, predominately Pashtun movement under the official leadership of Mullah Mohmmad Omar 134, who legitimizes his role by claiming to be chosen by Allah. The stated objective of the Taliban is to create an Islamic society by changing the current structures and giving power to religious institutions and leaders. Thus, they oppose the idea of a strong and 134

Mullah Mohammad Omar carried the title Amir al Mu’minin (“Commander of the Faithful”) which is a title used by a number of Muslim rulers in the past. He also claims to talk with Allah in his dreams (which has meant that Mullah Omar sometimes withdraws from commitments after receiving another “vision” while sleeping)

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modern state. Because the Taliban ideology also includes imagined values of conservative Pashtun rural society they find supporters among marginalized tribes in the south of Afghanistan and the Pashtun areas in Pakistan. Unlike Al-Qaeda, the Taliban seem to be only interested in Afghanistan and Pakistan. One interviewed UN official stated that several attempts by Al-Qaeda to broaden their interests to the situation of Muslims in other parts of the world have failed. Furthermore, as Taliban blame Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden for the US-led invasion which led to their loss of power, the relationship between these two is believed to be quite tense. The Taliban movement re-organized its activities noticeably in 2004, yet it is assumed that its members are far less coordinated or hierarchically structured than they were pre-2002. The movement can be described as rather unstructured with different units competing or even fighting against each other for local influence and personal interests.135 Thus, even if Mullah Omar himself negotiated a peace agreement (and actually stuck to it) it is highly unlikely that all Taliban groups would adhere to it. Only a small percentage of Taliban fighters (10%) are believed to be motivated by political or religious beliefs. The remaining 90% are considered to have joined the movement for personal or economic reasons, including lack of job opportunities, dissatisfaction with predatory officials in the current Afghan government and revenge / vendettas for perceived injustice or “murders” committed by representatives of the Afghan government or international military forces.136 Thus the motivation of many Taliban fighters would not be removed by a peace agreement alone. The key political persons of the Taliban movement are believed to be mainly in Quetta, Pakistan.

Haqqani Tribal Network The Haqqani tribal network is led by Jalaluddin Haqqani 137 and his three sons. Haqqani’s aspirations to rule are far more limited than those of Hekmatyar or Mullah Omar. He appears to only strive to become the caliph of his home area in southeast Afghanistan within an Islamic Emirate (which

135

There can be two or more Taliban leaders in the same region who each claim to be the official representative / leader for the region assigned by Mullah Omar. This may be due to frequent changes of mind by Mullah Omar and also bad communication within the movement along with local power conflicts. 136

"At present, support for the insurgency often reflects dissatisfaction among tribal groups that have been marginalized or dispossessed in local power struggle. ´The story of almost every front in the insurgency [...] starts with a commander who had tried to reintegrate peacefully but was driven underground´ by the new government and its supporters that moved in after 2001, backed by US forces“ see: Astri Suhrke et al: “Conciliatory Approaches to the Insurgency in Afghanistan: An Overview”; PRIO / CMI; 2009; Online: http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/ACF283.pdf 137

During the Soviet occupation, Jalaluddin Haqqani was one of the favored mujahedin commanders receiving millions of dollars from the West and the Saudis. Although not belonging to the Taliban core group, Haqqani was a minister during the Taliban regime. After 9/11 the US and Pakistan unsuccessfully tried to convince Haqqani to change sides, but he simply returned to the Afghan frontier.

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could be under Taliban control). There are different opinions about whether the network is completely part of the Taliban movement or just allied to them. In any case the links are strong, with Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, believed to be a leading commander of (pro-)Taliban militias in Waziristan, part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan.138 The Haqqani Network appears to have close links to Al Qaeda 139 from which it gets/got support for executing complex insurgency operations. It is also believed to have received support, at least in the past, from the Pakistani ISI. The network is assumed to be behind many of the “spectacular” insurgency incidents of 2008 including the attack on the Serena Hotel in January, the one on the Indian Embassy in July and the assassination of three female international aid workers and the local driver of IRC in August 2008. Haqqani is also believed to have introduced the tactic of suicide bombers to Afghanistan. Jalaluddin Haqqani recently rejected negotiations with the Afghan government. His base is believed to be around Miran Shah in Northern Waziristan, Pakistan.

HIG (Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar) Among all the political-military parties of Afghanistan, HIG is considered to be the one with the most developed political structure which also includes at least semi-open discussion among members about the strategic approach of the party. This Islamic cadre party led by dropouts from Kabul University is influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the Taliban, Gulbudin Hekmatyar wants to maintain the structure of a modern state in Afghanistan with himself as the national leader or president. Hizb-e-Islami along with Gulbudin Hekmatyar was the main recipient of US and Saudi Arabian funding and military aid administered through the Pakistani ISI during the time of Soviet occupation. The US stopped any support to Gulbudin Hekmatyar as he publicly spoke out against the US invasion of Afghanistan and officially designated him as a “global terrorist” in 2003 – the party Hizb-e Islami itself however, was not put on the US list of terrorist groups. Hekmatyar did not participate in the Bonn Conference in 2001 and later on officially rejected the accord stating that it was merely US-imposed. In recent years he has openly stated his alliance with the Taliban in the fight against international forces and the current Afghan government.

138

See Ismael Khan: “Forces, militants http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/23/top2.htm

heading

for

139

truce“;

Dawn;

June

22,

2006;

Online:

Steve Coll: “Jalaluddin Haqqani has very long and intimate roots and a long history with bin Laden personally. When Al Qaeda was formed along the Afghan-Pakistan border in the summer of 1988, its first camps were in Haqqani's territory. The first infrastructure of Al Qaeda was essentially supervised by Haqqani. Haqqani himself raised money repeatedly in Saudi Arabia and had rich contacts with Arab fighters coming to the region. He was their Afghan patron in many ways.” (see: PBS FRONTLINE : “Interview Steve Coll”; July 20, 2006; Online: http://pbs.gen.in/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/interviews/coll.html )

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Also, in recent years a number of (former) Hizb-e-Islami members have joined the official Afghan government stating that they would not follow Gulbuddin Hekmatyar anymore. During the interviews, there were different opinions regarding whether this is actually true or whether some contact and thus potential for a later reunion still remains. HIG is believed to have its political base near Peshawar, Pakistan.

Al Qaeda Al Qaeda is an international Sunni Islamist network founded in Pakistan 1988 during the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Its prominent head is Osama bin Laden, although the idea of a “mastermind” behind all of Al Qaeda’s attacks is misleading. There appear to be many “headquarters” and the network does not seem to have a well-established hierarchy or structure linking the different cells around the world – with the consequence that the cells operate more or less independently. While it seems to give special value to Afghanistan due to its history, unlike the other AGEs Al Qaeda’s objectives are not limited to one country or region. The network strives for a global “liberation” of all Muslims from Western influence and their unification in a single caliphate 140. The network is active in different countries (e.g. Chechnya, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan) providing training, funds as well as ideological and logistical support to local Islamic groups. The increase of foreign (antigovernmental) fighters in Afghanistan is also attributed to Al Qaeda’s involvement. Today, the Al Qaeda cell that is active in the region is believed to have its safe havens in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan, near the Afghan border.

Foreign resistance fighters After the Soviet invasion, Arab and other non-Afghan volunteers joined the jihad to fight the presence of non-Muslim military forces in Afghanistan. These fighters came from countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt or Israel/Palestine, but also Indonesia and Malaysia. Initially the “US government looked favorably on the Arab recruitment drives”. 141 The relationship between Afghans and their non-Afghan comrades-in-arms was not without tension. They came from a different

140

Al Qaeda also opposes Saudi Arabia’s claim of leadership

141

The CIA – seeing them as additional, committed anti-Soviet fighters – “examined ways to increase their participation”. Coll 2004, p. 146, 155

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culture, spoke different languages and followed a different interpretation of Islam. 142 Interestingly, in the 1980s, suicide attacks were only advocated by these foreign resistance fighters whereas the Afghans denounced them. 143 1n 1986, Osama bin Laden opened his first training camp for Arab volunteers in the Afghan province of Paktia and by 1989, the CIA estimated that there were “about 4,000 Arab volunteers in Afghanistan, mainly organized under Sayyaf’s [Islamist Mujahedin leader having strong support from Saudi Arabia; today leader of the political party Dawat-e Islami] leadership.” 144 Besides Arabs, there are individuals from the Caucasus and Central Asia (Chechens, Tajik, Uzbek…) fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan today. Also, “several waves of Arabs settled in Waziristan during the mujahedin wars against the Soviets and, more recently, after the U.S. and Northern Alliance overthrow of the Taliban regime.” 145

c) DRUGLORDS, COMMANDERS AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL POWER BROKERS Following their own interests, local power brokers are profiting from the current situation of numerous conflicts and lack of rule of law / state. There are numerous drug and war lords / commanders 146 in Afghanistan who maintain their own private armies or illegal armed groups as a source of power. It is assumed by a number of experts that at least a couple of these commanders have been quite skillful in smuggling their followers into the Afghan security forces (ANA, ANP) where they get additional training, equipment and salary while their loyalty remains with these commanders. 147 Nevertheless, these local power brokers are on constant look-out for opportunities to get access to 142

“Early on, some Afghan fighters clashed with Arab jihadists over the issue of decorated graves. Most Afghan mujahedin buried their dead in rough dirt and stone graves marked by green flags and modest adornments, following Sufi-influenced traditions. Echoing the methods of the Saudi Ikhwan near Jedda more than half a century earlier, the Wahhabis swept through and tore down these markers, proclaiming that they encouraged the worship of false idols. In at least a few cases the Afghans attacked and killed these Arab graveyard raiders. Bearden [CIA chief in Islamabad 1986-1989] recalled the thrust of the very early reports arriving from Afghan commanders in the field: `They say we are dumb, and we don’t know the Koran, and they are more trouble than they are ever going to be worth” (Coll 2004, 152f ) 143

“The Afghans [trained by ISI] uniformly denounced suicide attack proposals as against their religion. It was only the Arab volunteers […] who later advocated suicide attacks. Afghan jihadists, tightly woven into family, clan, and regional social networks, never embraced suicide attacks in significant numbers.” (see Coll 2004, p. 134) 144

Coll 2004, p. 201

145

See: Jones, Seth G.: “RAND Counterinsurgency Study Volume 4 : Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”; RAND National Defense Research Institute; 2008; p. 43; Online: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.pdf 146

“Warlord” and “commander” are terms used for local power brokers who acquired power and social status through the ability to create and maintain private militias over the past decades, not seldom with the support of foreign military aid and/or illicit trade. Besides this common characteristic there are also significant differences between different “warlords”, e.g. whether they are trying to transform their powerbase by acquiring official posts or whether they work against government. The term was criticized by members of the United National Front who claimed that it was used as propaganda against them.

147

One interviewee told a story from Lashkargah in which, during an anti-insurgent campaign, policemen of one post who were loyal to a local drug lord let the insurgents escape. The drug lord wanted to keep ISAF forces in his region busy so that they wouldn’t have time to interfere with his drug harvest.

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resources through which they can support their followers (and thus their own claim of leadership). Some of them have succeeded in obtaining official posts in government (e.g. as provincial governors) and are thus officially working for the Afghan government. Trust in them is limited, however, and Karzai has regularly tried to rotate these provincial governors between different provinces to limit their ability to establish a strong power base in one area. While this worked in some cases, some governors such as Mohammad Atta in Mazar-e Sharif / Balkh have succeeded in maintaining their post over a longer time and reduced the influence of their rivals. There are also believed to be strong links between drug lords and some governmental officials 148 – a case showed that about nine tons of opium were found in the basement of the governor of Helmand in 2005, leading to his dismissal yet not to any legal prosecution. Trying to get the most out of the situation, some commanders are believed to follow a “see-sawstrategy” in which they try to profit out of the conflict between Taliban / AGE and international forces, using one side against the other. On one side they receive funds from international forces for information or even equipment to fight against the Taliban while on the other side they come to agreements with local Taliban forces enabling the latter to spread out in their areas. (If skillfully applied this is then used by the commanders to show the international forces how urgently they need their support to fight against this Taliban threat). There are rumors of various “accidents” happening to such warlords / commanders when either side becomes fed up with their intrigues. Local power brokers are also a common source of security incidents for which “the Taliban” are usually blamed. Interviewees working on security matters in Afghanistan believed that a number of “insurgency attacks” are, for example, commissioned by drug lords who want to keep national and international security forces busy so that they have less time (or interest) for poppy eradication. Also, an increase in security incidents is often noted when one local power broker is removed or about to be removed from his official post (e.g. chief of police or governor), “underlining” the point that this person better stay or return to the post - or else!

d) THE P OLITICAL-MILITARY P ARTIES AND F ACTIONS The most important internal counterforce to the democratization of Afghanistan stems from a group of religious leaders who head a number of influential political-military parties “tanzims”. The power base of these “jihadi leaders” and their tanzims was established and extended after 1978 with their key roles in the anticommunist resistance. A limited number of Sunni resistance parties 148

For the restructuring of the Afghan drug economy and its links to Afghan government officals see: Mark Shaw: “Drug Trafficking and the development of organized crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan”; Online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1164651372704/UNDC_Ch7.pdf

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through the Pakistani ISI received weapons, financial and other support equivalent to several billion US dollars, funded mainly by the US and Saudi Arabia. With this military support the tanzims were able to build up and maintain large militias. Because these armed groups have been accused of committing many human rights atrocities on the Afghan population after the withdrawal of the Soviets, the Afghans are skeptical towards these political parties and their leaders. Some Afghans believe that they only instrumentalized Islam for their personal gain – a critique that for the sake of one’s own safety better not be voiced too openly. 149 Of these Sunni parties, the following still play a leading role in today’s Afghanistan:

 Tanzim-e Dawat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (“Afghanistan’s Islamic Mission Organization” – formerly called Ittehad-e Islami), led by Abdulraab Rasul Sayyaf,  Jamiat-e-Islami (“Islamic Society”), led by the former Afghan president Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani,  Mahaz-e

Melli-ye

Islami-ye

Afghanistan

(“National

Islamic

Front

of

Afghanistan”) led by Pir Sayyad Ahmad Gailani. Of these, Mahaz-e Melli is politically the most active. Having had links with Karzai already in the times of the Soviet occupation, this tanzim built up a pro-Karzai coalition amongst the Pastuns which included Afghan Mellat (“Afghan Social Democratic Party”) 150 led by the former Minister of Finance Anwar al-Haq Ahadi and the legalized domestic wing of Hezb-e Islami 151, led by Mohammad Khalid Farooqi, as well as radical Islamists from Dawat-e Islami. However, as Ahadi as well as (legalized)

149

In 2003 the Afghan newspaper Aftab published an article titled “Holy Facism” in which the Jihadi leaders were attacked for misusing Islam as an instrument of power. “In consequence, its editor was sentenced to eight years in prison, but was forced into hiding and, ultimately, to flee the country.” (see: Thomas Ruttig: “Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan’s Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006)”; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Afghanistan Office; p 23; Online: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-544-2-30.pdf ) 150

Mahaz-e Melli already had a link with Afghan Mellat during the time of the Soviet occupation when the latter was only allowed to operate in Pakistan under the umbrella of the former. This link is also testified to through marriage - Ahady is the son-in-law of Pir Gailani . – Thomas Ruttig: “Islamists, Leftists – and a void in the center. Afghanistan’s Political Parties and where they come from.” While Afghan Mellat is named “social democratic”, interviewees stated that Ahady himself would advocate a liberalism that “would scare American liberals” 151

Previous members of Hezb-e-Islami joined the government of Karzai about 2-3 years ago and received a number of deputy ministers’ posts (e.g. Agriculture, Finance and Public Health). Although they publicly stated that they would not follow Hekmatyar anymore, a number of interviewees were skeptical and assumed that at least some of them were still be in close contact with their former leader.

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Hezb-e Islami members announced their intentions to compete in the 2009 presidential elections, one can assume that this coalition is not as strong as it seems. 152

Figure 12 : Political Alliances in summer 2008

Pro-Karzai Coalition

Afghan Melat

Pir Sayyad Gilani

Married to daughter of Pir Gilani

Ahadi Finance Minister

Mahaz-e Melli

Pro-Karzai Coalition

Pro-Karzai Coalition

Membership of some Hizb-e Islami commanders

President

1st VicePresident

Hezb-e Wadat Mardum

Hizb-e Islami

Khalid Farooqi

Hamid Karzai Zia Massoud

(legalized)

Gulbudin Hekmatayar

Opposition

Haji Mohammad

Yunus Qanuni

Mohaqeq

Speaker of Parliament

United National Front

Abdulraab Rasul

Dawat-e Islami

Mustafa Zahir

Sayyaf

King’s grandson Abdul Rashid

Burhanuddin

Rabbani

Dostum

Junbesh

Jamiat-e Islami

© C. Vigier

LEGEND: Opposition

Membership

Current Relation unclear

Alliance

Individual / Leader

Issue / Kind of relationship

Conflict / Antagonism

Leadership / Chairman

Political Party / Coalition

The graph above – as is case with most graphs of this kind – can only show a “momentary picture” of the dynamic constellations and alliances among a number of political groups in 2008. Furthermore, it needs to be stressed that the parties are not as homogenous as it might look, with members of political parties building their own alliances or changing sides when they see fit. Another Sunni tanzim that was among the Peshawar Seven supported by ISI, is Prof. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi’s party, the Jabha-ye Melli-ye Nejat-e Afghanistan (“Afghanistan National Liberation Front”). Interviewees described it to have little effect as a party largely remaining a “one-man show.”

152

For information and theories about the Presidential Election and its candidates see: Ahmad Majidyar: “Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections“; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; January 29, 2009; Online: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.29289/pub_detail.asp

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On the Shiite side, the largest party (Hezb-e Wahdat) split into two during the Taliban era leaving two influential parties today:

 Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami (“Islamic Unity Party”) led by Karim Khalili and  Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan (“Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan”) led by Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq. The Junbesh-e Melli Islami-ye Afghanistan (“National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan”) has a special status: Initially a pro-government militia during Soviet occupation, in 1992 its leader General Abdul Rashid Dostum defected to the other side. He then allied with the Northern Alliance in 1996 and after the fall of the Taliban had different relationships with government and opposition camps. 153 While Dostum is largely still considered as “the big man” behind Junbesh, the party is witnessing political reform attempts. With Dostum currently staying in (unofficial) exile in Turkey 154, Sayed Noorullah has become acting head of Junbesh party. The successor parties of the communist “People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan” do not play a significant role in today’s politics as the left of today is more divided than ever, with at least 15 registered parties competing for this clientele. 155 In 2006/07 the United National Front (Jabha-e Mottahid-e Melli) was formed as a coalition of various parties many of which already belonged to the Northern Alliance. It is headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-e Islami). Further prominent members are Rashid Dostum (Junbesh), Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq (Hezb-e Wahdat Mardum), Mustafa Zahir (grandson of former king Mohammad Zahir Shah), ex-defense minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim, parliamentary speaker Yunus Qanuni and Vice President Ahmad Zia Massoud. The United National Front claims to have the support of 40% of the parliament and has presented itself in opposition to Karzai, although Abdulraab Rasul Sayyaf (Dawat-e

153

In Uzbek / Dari “dost” means friend, “dost-um” can be translated into “my friend” (some translate it also as “everybody’s friend”). One interviewee stated that “Dostum” was actually a nickname given based on the General’s reputation of changing sides, having eventually been the friend of everybody at least once. Dostum is blamed for one of the biggest human rights atrocities in Afghanistan after 9/11, including the death of about 2000 Taliban fighters that had surrendered to him in Kunduz. For more details see Newsweek August 2002 “The Death Convoy of Afghanistan” online: http://www.newsweek.com/id/65473/page/1

154

Officially, it has always been denied that Dostum would be actually “in exile” in Turkey, arguing that he would only visit the country or be there because of medical treatment, yet at least part of his staying there is very likely political. In February 2008, Dostum’s men abducted his former ally Akbar Bai and brought him to Dostum’s house. After police surrounded his house Akbar Bai was freed and hospitalized. The Afghan General Attorney intended to prosecute Dostum for this incident, but due to political reasons, Dostum up till today has never been actually trialed. However, he was suspended from his governmental post as Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. Ongoing political pressure and rumors about Karzai promising Dostum to drop charges if he leaves the country, likely contributed to Dostum’s leaving to Turkey end of 2008. 155

See Thomas Ruttig: “Islamists, Leftists – and a Void in the Center. Afghanistan’s Political Parties and where they come from (1902-2006)”; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Afghanistan Office; p 29f; Online: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_9674-544-2-30.pdf

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Islami), who is considered as loyal to Karzai, is also a member of the United National Front. The front is believed to be far less “united” than it officially states. e) “THE CLERGY” – RELIGIOUS ACTORS Religious heads have influence over many political-military parties. Religious leaders and key persons play a significant role in Afghan life due to the reputation they enjoy among the population. Virtually, any leader needs religious backing, so if a person has no extensive religious education or cannot claim to be a descendant of the prophet himself, he needs the support of an influential mullah or maulawi to be able to “compete.” Thus, while there is not a formally institutionalized Sunni clergy, a number of politicized religious scholars play a leading role in the political system and society. In Afghan culture, mullahs are often asked to be counsels in local conflicts that demand religious arbitration. Last but not least, a majority of the judges in Afghanistan have an education in Sharia law only. Shura-e-yi Ulama (“Council of Religious Scholars”): Each province has its own shura or council in which the religious leaders (maulawis, mullahs) are represented. The supreme national Shura-yi Ulama includes two members of each of these provincial shuras and is currently led by Abdulhadi Shinwari. This shura meets with President Karzai once a month. Local mullahs vary greatly in level of influence and education/qualification. Although many can barely read or write, their education is above average in comparison with the illiterate majority. As a consequence, mullahs often take the position of teachers in rural areas where educated teachers from outside are less willing to work.

f) ACTORS ON LOCAL AND FAMILY LEVEL Shuras / Jirgas Shuras/Jirgas are councils which discuss issues of the community and which are involved in conflict management using arbitration and social pressure. While “shura” and “jirga” are often used synonymously, a jirga is a traditional Pashtun tribal council whose consensual decisions are strictly binding. Shuras on the other hand are embedded in Islamic tradition and were originally advisors to the leader who was not bound to take the advice. Traditional shuras/jirgas usually did not include women (who are officially represented by newer yet rather powerless women’s shuras.) Although shuras were founded as general councils, in the recent years they often include a certain percentage of women. As members from different ethnic or political groups often have their own shuras, there can be different shuras in one community. While many people trust jirgas/shuras with the resolution / management of

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their conflicts, there are a variety of cases in which the arbitration of these traditional institutions led to decisions that violate human rights principles. 156

Community Development Councils (CDCs) CDCs are the newest structures in Afghanistan, having been created in the course of the National Solidarity Program after 2002. They are supposed to be representative decision making bodies at the community level whose members have been elected in fair and open elections. Yet, this is not the case in all regions, as local commanders and power brokers in many areas succeeded in influencing the composition of the CDCs to their benefit and undermined the representative character of the CDC. Over 18,500 CDCs have been elected since October 2007 and they offer a broad structure and access point for large development projects. They are also active in conflict resolution, especially regarding conflicts that arise through development projects. To further strengthen their role, organizations like UN-Habitat and Agha Khan Foundation have included trainings in conflict resolution for CDC’s within capacity building programs.

Elders Elders often play a leading role in dealing with internal conflicts within their own families. They are generally respected and the younger generations are bound to their decisions. Elders also act as envoys or representatives in negotiations with other families, such as when a family member is involved in a car accident or crime.

Mirabs Mirabs are traditional “water managers” who supervise the distribution of irrigation water among different fields along a canal. They are thus key figures in water conflicts, although their role has decreased over the past decades.

Khan “Khan” is an honorary title used for respected (mostly older) leaders of a community – and those who claim to be so. 157 The importance and influence of the khans has diminished significantly during the years of war. Traditionally, a khan has good rhetorical skills and proven courage. With his wisdom 156

The most famous cases of baad or badal are when young women of the family of a male perpetrator are given to the family of the victim as compensation for a crime. Although these women are officially married to a male member of the other family, they often face a life comparable to a slave with daily harassment and abuse in many cases. This “tradition of conflict settlement” is common mainly in Pashtun areas with baad / badal being part of the Pashtun honor code Pashtunwali. 157

Adding “-Khan” to a name is also a form of paying respect while addressing an Afghan man (e.g. Abdullah-Khan). The female equivalent is “-jon” or “-jan” (e.g. Leila-jon).

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and intellect he is also a mediator / arbitrator in local conflicts – with some Afghans saying that this is the most important characteristic of a khan. A khan should also provide access to external resources for his followers and he may easily lose them if another khan can provide more. The influx of large amounts of international funds has led to dynamic changes within these structures as development projects have become a resource over which different khans compete.

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III. ROOT CAUSES AND E SCALATING FACTORS Chapter Summary Afghanistan’s long history of complex intertwined conflicts also reflects a magnitude of different root causes and escalating factors. From a general perspective, it is both virtually impossible and of little effect to make a clear distinction between original root causes and escalating factors. On the political level, Afghanistan struggles from the effects of bad governance resulting from a kaleidoscope of factors such as lack of qualified staff and a widespread predatory approach to governance that considers an official post primarily as an opportunity to enrich oneself and distribute resources only to one’s followers instead of serving the public good. These lead to endemic corruption and wide-spread impunity of power players and their followers. With the use of military power as a major way to claim and hold political power, there also appears to be a rather militarized perception of “peacebuilding” among many key persons in Afghan government that could be dramatically expressed as, “Go there, bomb any opposition to the ground and then afterwards simply build up a nicer village.” Also, political key players have been instrumentalizing ethnicity, religion and regionalism to mobilize their followers. On the social level, there is a high illiteracy rate and a lack of vocational training.. There are archaic honor codes that can lead to blood feuds, an explosive population growth and a re-active approach to conflict resolution limited to compensation for damages without addressing underlying root causes and a highly traumatized population after decades of war. Economically and environmentally, Afghanistan faces a growing scarcity of natural resources such as water, arable land, pastures and wood, in combination with the fact that 80% of population depends on agriculture. Droughts and other effects of global warming further exacerbate this. There is high unemployment making people more receptive to offers of payment from criminal / opposition groups. Insurgency as well as corruption in government is significantly supported through revenue from the drug economy in Afghanistan. Security-related factors that contribute to existing conditions are a high proliferation of small arms and the presence of hundreds of illegal armed groups organized as criminal gangs (or) under the command of warlords who use private militias to claim and maintain political power. National security forces, especially the police, are weak and in many cases negatively affected by corruption, loyalty to local power players as well as unqualified and ill-equipped staff. There is a lack of security for the local population, with insurgency and criminal groups threatening civilians and / or offering “protection” in exchange for financial or logistical support.

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Afghanistan’s borders in large part were artificially formed, dividing ethnic territories and creating a multi-ethnic country. The country has faced numerous attempts at invasion or external control and has become the arena for conflicts between foreign powers that try to influence the situation in Afghanistan to their benefit. Insurgency groups operating in Afghanistan receive external support or at least benefit from “safe havens” outside Afghanistan’s borders. The international presence in Afghanistan has had escalating effects on conflict due to perceived injustice in the distribution of development aid, the alienation of the Afghan population caused by civilian casualties from international air strikes based on faulty information and behavior of international soldiers considered as culturally inappropriate (such as night raids).

The conflicts described above are based on and affected by a series of circumstances, causes and factors. With the long history of conflict and the multitude of intertwined conflicts, it is difficult to clearly distinguish which factors directly relate to which conflict – or whether something is a root cause or an escalating factor. However, to provide some categorization, the following root causes and escalating factors are sorted according to type/area of effect, resulting in the categories: political, economical/environmental, social, security-related or international. The latter category is then again divided into roots and escalating factors that are related to actors abroad and those related to the international presence within Afghanistan. 1. POLITICAL One of the main challenges in building up a trusted and professional government in Afghanistan, is the predatory approach to governance of a significant number of governmental officials and power players who appear to see posts in “local governance as a resource to enrich individuals and their solidarity groups rather than a position to provide a service.” 158 This contributes to bad governance which a number of interviewees regarded as a larger problem in Afghanistan than the insurgency. Thus, statehood itself can be regarded as a driver of conflict. 159

158

Eckart Schiewek: “Efforts to Curb Political Violence in Afghanistan: Counter Insurgency and National Reconciliation”; p. 157; in: Cheema, Pervaiz et al (Eds.) “Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia”; Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Asia Printers; Islamabad; 2006 159

As CPAU wrote in a conflict assessment summary: “By rebuilding the state the international community and international military forces are also in the process of rebuilding a key driver of conflict in Afghanistan: the Afghan state. [It] has its own agency in the current rebuilding process which is still dominated by a number of factions who have a stake in conflict and the Afghan state continues to be a primary driver of instability in some areas which is associated with criminality, corruption and predatory activity.” See: CPAU: “Working on Conflict - A summary of an assessment for ActionAid Afghanistan” Online: http://www.cpau.org.af/docs/Working%20on%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan%20-%20Summary.pdf

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The high level of corruption 160 within the government, police and judiciary combined with the reputation of the Taliban as being less corrupt, also alienates the people from the government. 161 For years, it was an open secret that official positions which granted access to resources from drugs or international funds often were bought for a certain price. 162 On the latest Corruption Perception Index of the INGO Transparency International listing 180 countries, Afghanistan is among the 5 worst nations. 163 The policy of integrating warlords by putting them in official posts in government cuts both ways. It was praised, especially in the beginning, as a way to reduce resistance and the risk of uprisings by these warlords. However, many of these warlords did not have the competencies required for the post and had committed human rights atrocities in the past. The inclusion of warlords in a “democratic government” sent mixed signals to the population. In the case of the Ministry of Interior, these warlords brought with them a number of followers who (also) had links to criminal activities. Putting them into strategic positions within the ministry jeopardized the building up of a strong police force.164 Warlords and commanders with a history of human rights violations are not only present in ministries or official posts, they also have seats in the parliament. According to Human Rights Watch about 60% of members of the Afghan parliament are believed to be (war) criminals.165 A consequence of this high percentage of warlords in influential posts is a lack of political will to deal with the past and even a boycott of transitional justice as part of reconciliation. In 2006/2007 the 160

For a recent article on corruption in Afghanistan see: Dexter Filkins: “Afghan corruption: Everything for sale” Herald Tribune, January 2, 2008: Online: http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/02/asia/corrupt.php?page=1 161

One interviewee working at an NGO told the story that they had been trying for over a year to register the office car. The officials in the ministry in charge said that since the car was for an international organization, they could easily afford to pay 20,000 Afghani (about 400 USD) extra in bribes. Since it is against the policy of that organization to support corruption, the car remains unregistered. 162

Rumors are that 150,000 USD is paid for the lucrative post of Chief of Police in a province involved in drug production or trafficking, including ongoing monthly payments to Kabul. Also, Barnett R. Rubin wrote that “Police Chief posts in poppy-growing districts are sold to the highest bidder: as much as $ 100,000 is paid for a six-month appointment to a position with a monthly salary of $ 60” (see: Barnett R. Rubin: “Saving Afghanistan” in: Foreign Affairs; January/February 2007; Online: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2007/March/Rubin%2003-01-07.pdf )

163

Transparency International: Corruption Perception http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table

Index

2008

–

online:

164

There was a case in Kabul of security guards pursuing a car allegedly involved in a kidnapping attempt. Eventually the car drove straight into the compound of the Ministry of Interior. In another reported case, the female head physician of the German Medical Center in Kabul received a call directly from the Office of the Afghan President saying the wife of President Karzai was very sick and asking the physician to come immediately and that a car was already sent to pick her up. When the woman left the center there were indeed men and a car waiting, one of them with a picture of her. The physician, however, got irritated by the shabby appearance of the men and decided against entering the car. As it turned out, it was a kidnapping attempt and the President’s wife was not sick. However, the call was reportedly indeed made from within the Office of the President. 165

See Declan Walsh: “Warlords and Women take seat in Afghan parliament”; The Guardian, December 19, 2005 Online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/dec/19/afghanistan.declanwalsh

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Afghan parliament passed a law calling for full amnesty for all human rights violations committed during the civil war. While this law was for a long time not officially signed by the Afghan president, one interviewee stated that it nevertheless unofficially has come into effect. There have been numerous cases where influential commanders did not face trial even for criminal acts conducted in recent years. 166

Most of the interviewees for this study stated that the biggest challenge for Afghanistan will be the

increasing politics of ethnic mobilization and radicalization. Decisions in parliament were often made not because of the actual content of the different options but because of ethnic linkages to the persons involved

– Tajik parliamentarians would only vote for Tadjik proposals or candidates,

Pashtuns would stick to Pashtun ones, Hazaras would support only options from their kind and so on. Seven years after the Bonn agreement, the people’s disappointment in the official government is growing. One interviewee stated that in 2007, after a district which had been under Taliban rule for a couple of weeks was re-conquered by pro-governmental forces, a local staff member of a human rights agency went to the villagers and asked for their opinions. The answer was that the people did not care anymore whether they were ruled by Taliban or by the official government as they would both be equally bad and both would abuse their positions. In many cases, unqualified officials are not dismissed but merely “rotated” to other official posts out of political considerations.167 One objective of such rotations is to reduce the power of a governor in a region - or simply a reaction to growing unrest or political pressure. Thus, for example if the people of a province (or the international community) strongly and continuously protest against a governor because of his incompetence, cruelty or corruption, this person is often simply moved to govern another province. There is also a rather dominating militarized understanding of “conflict resolution” and “peacebuilding” among government officials. As one interviewee put it, “the common understanding in the government for building peace now seems to be: If there is opposition anywhere, use military force to bomb everything to the ground, kill every potential insurgent and then afterwards simply make

166

For example, although 9 tons of opium was found in his basement, and there was severe international pressure, the former governor of Helmand, Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, was forced out of office but never faced trial. Instead, “Sher Mohammad’s “punishment” was to be elevated to the senate or upper house of parliament in Kabul, while his younger brother, Amir Mohammad Akhundzada, was left in Helmand as deputy governor.” (See: IWPR: “Helmand Ex-Governor Joins Karzai Blame Game”; 26 Feb 2008; Online: http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=l=EN&p=arr&s=f&o=342923 ) In September 2008, there was an outcry in the international community when Karzai apparently planned to reinstate Sher Muhammad Akhundzada as governor in Helmand and argued that it would be beneficial for the security in that province (see Dean Nelson: “Hamid Karzai blaims Britain for Taliban resurgence”; Times Online; September 7, 2008; Online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4692252.ece 167

Some interviewees stated that Karzai followed a policy in which the different parties are in a certain balance in order to prevent one party from gaining to much power. Another possible, although less strategic, reason behind such rotations could be because some power brokers reportedly possess strong relationships with people in high places, preventing them from being sacked for good.

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some reconstruction and development projects to build everything up again.” 168 The dangers inherent in this concept are multifold; killing is seen as a legitimate way of “peacebuilding”, the ownership and responsibility for solving conflict is outsourced to the military, strengthening the importance of military might as a basis for political power, diplomatic and other non-violent approaches are reduced and the line between military intervention and development aid is blurred. The dependence of the Afghan government on international assistance due to low government revenue is also a factor that can accentuate conflicts. Today, international assistance makes up 90% of all public expenditures in the country. 169 As this international assistance comes with certain expectations on the part of the donor countries, the Afghan government is in a way vulnerable to accusations from anti-governmental forces that it is “driven” by Western countries, which makes propaganda against foreigners an even more useful tactic. It also leads to the perception that the Afghan government is under the instruction of the international community 170 which has unfavorable effects for the assumption of responsibility for and the ownership of the process. As history shows, Afghanistan has very little democratic experience at the national level. Changes in national rule were not the result of elections but often of violent coups. Thus, military might rather than the votes of the population played an important role for claiming and maintaining power. National heads often followed a governing style which left a good amount of autonomy to the regional rulers in how they govern their respective areas, yet at the same time national expenses and especially the maintenance of regional or national armed groups was largely financed through pillage or semivoluntary tributes from the local population.171 There has never been a functioning central government that was totally accepted in every part of the country and that was able to exert exhaustive control.

168

This concept is similar to and probably also in part influenced by a superficial understanding of the political-military strategy of “Clear, Hold, Build” (CHB) which the US first applied in Iraq in 2005 / 06. However, the CHB strategy does, at least in theory, include the addressing of “root causes of the insurgency”, stressing the need for civil-military cooperation to do so. “The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN [=counterinsurgency] operations. […]. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.”. See: Department of the Army: “FM3-24: Counterinsurgency”; December 2006; p. 2-1 Online: http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf 169

See: Waldman, Matt: “Falling short – Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan”; ACBAR Advocacy Series; March 2008; Online: http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf 170

One member of the Afghan government stated in an interview: “I would like to see the moment where Afghan policy papers are written originally in Dari or Pashto and are then translated into English, French, German or any other international language – currently it’s vice versa” 171

As one interviewee put it, for centuries, the local population of an area had basically two options when an armed group of a regional or national leader approached: risk being looted or provide "voluntarily“ goods from their own stock.

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2. SOCIAL Afghan society is characterized by strong community and group structures. Identity as well as social security is largely subject to membership in one’s family, clan, tribe or ethnic group. The men of a family are expected to care for their relatives in need. As a consequence, a high level of nepotism can be found on all levels in Afghanistan: For example, NGOs are often dominated by one family or ethnic group as the people in charge prefer to hire based on relationship rather than merit. Due to social pressure from the family, this is done even in cases where a person knows that his or her relative is incompetent for the job. Personal standing and career are also considered the result of good relationships rather than merit.172 Regarding unequal distribution of resources, one interviewee used the term of “gatekeeper” referring to Afghans sitting in positions which allowed them to influence other people’s access to resources or information. For example, a person in charge of collecting applications for jobs or funding may “filter” these applications in favor of his or her own group, disregarding the others. Related to this, the interests of an individual are second to the family interests and family honor is highly valued and defended. 173 This honor code includes blood feuds which can last for decades, resulting in people being harmed or killed for something that a relative allegedly did several years ago. Also, a conflict that may have started between two individuals from different families has the potential to escalate and draw in dozens or even hundreds of other family, clan or tribe members. 174 Afghanistan never had a broad school system and education was usually limited to boys. Furthermore, numerous members of the educated elite left the country and many of the few schools that existed were destroyed or shut down during the civil war and the Taliban regime. The consequence is a very low literacy rate among the people in Afghanistan with a significant difference between the sexes (about 45% male vs. 15% female). There is also a lack of vocational training structures, and people very much depend on either agricultural or unskilled work opportunities. Though the problem is not unknown in other parts of the world, there is a significant development gap between urban and rural areas in Afghanistan. Pictures from Kabul’s city life in the 1960’s and 172

International interviewees who were working in offices of INGOs told of cases in which local staff where either promoted or had their contracts extended. They described for them awkward situations when national staff then came to them and thanked them, sometimes bringing small gifts, saying that they would not have thought that they would like them so much. These interviewees said that they had some difficulty explaining to these staff members and other colleagues that the promotion or extension of the contract was the result of their good work and qualifications and had nothing to do with how much they liked them as a person. 173

For example, pregnant unmarried women “do not exist” in Afghanistan. If an unmarried daughter got pregnant, it would mean great shame for the family. Afghan families usually do almost anything to eliminate the slightest risk of such an event (e.g. women are not allowed to meet with unrelated men – or sometimes are not even allowed to leave the house in the first place). In the rare cases when it does happen the usual result is secret abortion and death of the newborn – in some cases of the daughter as well. There are no official numbers about such cases as the highest priority is to “save face” and thus not to tell anybody. 174

There is an Arab proverb often quoted in Afghanistan: “"I against my brother. My brother and I against my cousin. My cousin, my brother, and I against the world."

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1970’s resemble those in other metropolises showing concrete buildings, paved streets and pedestrians in modern clothing, while the vast majority of the population, who are in rural areas, has lived a life with very poor infrastructure as well as poor educational and health systems. Afghanistan also lacks a strong civil society. What are today referred to as civil society organizations in Afghanistan are a relatively new phenomenon. International interviewees who worked in Afghanistan right after the fall of Taliban stated that there were hardly any NGOs there with which to work and in some cases business firms were officially labeled as NGOs in order to be local partners for development projects. A consequence of the high influx of foreign aid was the enormous growth of often family-run Afghan organizations competing for development aid funds as “NGOs”. Dependent almost exclusively on international donor funds, the end of a funded project very often means the (temporary) end of the organization’s engagement in the respective issue – or even of the whole organization. Rather than “real” non-profit civil society organizations striving to bring social change, from their ideology, many of these ”NGOs” are better described as small “donor-driven” 175 consultant firms trying to provide income for family members. The high religious conservatism combined with local customs can also be regarded as a root cause. For example, there is high social pressure to marry which involves increasingly expensive wedding feasts and bride prices. This often leads to families indebting themselves for years or being more willing to participate in illegal activities simply to gain sufficient money. There is a certain tendency for the population to ignore one’s own responsibility and blame outsiders for the existence of current problems. 176 One example is the claim that the economy is so bad only because outsiders have destroyed the factories and are not willing to invest in the country. While this may contain a certain amount of truth, it totally neglects any Afghan responsibility for the situation. This blame game includes the risk that Afghan-caused problems (e.g. corruption by Afghan officials scaring away investors) are not tackled, missing the opportunity to improve the situation. The return of more than 5 million refugees since 2002 (making it the largest refugee repatriation in the last 30 years) significantly added to an increase in population and increased tensions over natural 175

Effectively, Afghan “NGOs” often tend to present themselves as ideal implementation partners for the fulfillment of international donors’ agendas. One interviewee working as the country head of an international donor organization explained about his first meeting with an Afghan “NGO” in Kabul: He said that he was initially very much impressed by the professional presentation of the organization. However, he was quickly disenchanted when he asked in which fields the organization would want to work in the future. The manager simply answered: “Whatever you would like us to work in!” 176

In one case, a bridge was being built over a river to connect a village to nearby markets. In order to do this, some of the houses needed to be demolished. The funding came from a German development bank. The village wanted the bridge and the Afghan Government supported its construction knowing that it would benefit their reputation and likelihood of being re-elected. In a meeting with the owners of the homes that needed to be demolished, however, the participating government official – in order to minimize critique of his own person – instead of presenting the situation as a common development project that would benefit the whole village, stated that the Germans insisted on this bridge and thus the destruction of these houses. There was, however, little doubt that this official would later on want to take all the credit for the construction of the bridge.

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resources, especially if these belonged to refugees’ families before they left Afghanistan and were claimed by other people during their absence. The lack of natural resources and job opportunities is accentuated by a comparatively huge population growth estimated at 3.9 %. An increasing amount of people have to live with a decreasing amount of natural resources and job opportunities. Another escalating factor is the perception that having many children is a blessing. Children are regarded as an additional work force and provision for old age with potential for bringing additional connections to other families through marriage. The early marriage of women (57% are younger than 16) also contributes to a high number of children per women (6-7 children on average.) Regarding conflicts on the family level, some interviewees argued that the cultural way of bringing up children may also lead to future conflicts in the family. Since it is the custom for a woman to leave the house of her family and move to the house of her husband, her time in the family is limited.177 Thus, many families are less willing to “invest” in their female children, including in their education. Instead, it would be the boys who receive everything. Some interviewees mentioned that many mothers would treat their sons significantly better than their daughters, trying to win their affection and through this improve their own influence in the family. As a consequence, young men get used to the circumstances that there is always somebody to do the chores, clean up after them or do other work. 178 It also lays the foundation for a man’s conflict of interest when his wife and his mother engage in a power struggle with each other at home. A number of interviewees, both Afghan and international noted that the uncritical belief in given information in disregard of its actual degree of truth among many Afghans could also be a root cause or escalating factor. Comments by other people are often not checked or questioned but quickly accepted as “the truth.” 179 This leads to high vulnerability to manipulation and agitation and widespread

177

According to one interviewee there is a Pashtun saying that a daughter is merely a guest in the house of her father and another one stating that it would be a shame for the father if his daughter got her first menstrual period in his house and thus was unmarried. 178

One interviewee who led vocational training courses stated that it was very, very difficult to teach young Afghan men the basics of keeping order or taking care of their equipment as they simply had hardly ever done it before. Another international interviewee who has lived together with young Afghan men in a house stated that these young men were unable to keep a household and literally needed a woman to clean up after them. 179

There was a story in Kabul of somebody starting a rumor that a woman had misbehaved so much that Allah turned her into a donkey and she was standing at a big mosque. Many people rushed to the mosque, wanting to see the transformed woman. When they got there, somebody told them: "There is nothing like this here! You can see it only in the cinema!“ So the crowed went to the big cinema and again was told that the donkey was not there as such divine things could only take place at the mosque. Some people in the crowd got angry and said: "But they told us, the woman that was transformed into a donkey would be here! Why don’t you let us see her?!?“

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rumors about, for example, atrocities committed by international forces180 or “betrayal” of international countries who would make deals with the Taliban for their own profit. The high level of traumatization among the population in Afghanistan also contributes to the escalation of conflicts and violent behavior due to the effects/symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 181 Last but not least, there is a primarily re-active approach to conflict resolution that excludes addressing underlying root causes. Growing conflicts and existing tensions tend to be ignored until they lead to the outbreak of violence. Once this violence has occurred, key persons of involved families and the community come together to find a way for “repairing” the damage and to create the perceived “peace” that existed right before the violent escalation. The eventual “solution” of the conflict seldom includes elements that tackle the underlying causes which led to the violence. 182 3. ECONOMIC / ENVI RONMENTAL Afghanistan suffers from a significant and increasing lack of natural resources such as arable land (only 12% of the land can be used for agriculture), water and forest areas. The lack of natural resources is further increased by desertification and ongoing erosion, reduction of glaciers and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources such as deforestation. 183 Seven years of drought have further worsened the situation, leading to the drying up of wells. 184 The majority of the population depends on agriculture, making it vulnerable to natural disasters like droughts and other effects of global warming. 180

Probably the most outrageous rumor that was mentioned was that US soldiers in Iraq deliberately kill innocent civilians in large numbers to get organs to sell on the black market. The person telling it stated that she got frightened when she heard that US soldiers would now be moved to Afghanistan. The fact that she was a member of the educated elite in Afghanistan makes it clear that rumors are spreading throughout the population regardless of educational level.

181

People suffering from PTSD can show symptoms of increased arousal like anger or hyper-vigilance. One Afghan interviewee, who witnessed the execution of several people by the Taliban, stated that he now becomes angry very quickly, losing control of himself, and because of that he has difficulties in social relations. Another international interviewee stated that he had noticed several times sudden twitches on the faces of Afghan people when they came under stress (e.g. due to a car accident) For him it was a clear sign to “back off” immediately and get out of reach. 182

For example, if one farmer gets angry at another about the distribution of water between their two fields and hits that one with a stone, injuring him severely, the person or group that mediates in the conflict would first look for a way to compensate for the injury. In a second step, it may even be that both farmers are then told how they should distribute the water. However, it rarely happens that in the process of the mediation, the underlying root cause of water scarcity ise tackled – for example by agreeing on joint improvements to the irrigation system or a change of crops to less water-needy alternatives. 183

Between 1990 and 2005, Afghanistan lost about a third (33.8%) of its forest cover or around 442,000 hectares. (see online: http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/2000/Afghanistan.htm ) This deforestation also leads to an increased risk for erosion and floods. 184

“Persistent droughts and the availability of donor financing have provided a stimulus to groundwater depletion by means of deep tubewells and in the process, resulted in a lowering of water tables. For example, the springs around Kabul that lie within their zone of influence have dried up. This is a serious and possibly catastrophic development for Afghanistan if it is not correctly managed.” For further details about the see: ADB / Azimi, Ali :“ Environment Assessment for ADB’s Program in Afghanistan“ Feb’ 2007; http://www.adb.org/Documents/Assessments/Country-Environmental/AFG/Environment-Assessment.pdf

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Despite the currently booming sectors of construction and communication, Afghanistan has a very poor licit economy with hardly any industrial production of goods. While it gained some revenue from the export of cotton and dry fruits before the war, other countries have improved quality and efficiency in production over the last three decades. As a consequence, the Afghanistan of today seems unable to compete on the world market in these fields. An additional obstacle to export is the fact that Afghanistan does not have direct access to the sea, leading to significantly higher transportation costs. 185 There is also a high level of poverty in Afghanistan with at least 50% of the population living below the poverty line of 2 USD per day. 186 The high unemployment rate also leads to a vast amount of people who can be rather easily manipulated by agitators or who can be recruited for illegal activities by insurgents. The drug economy provides financial resources for insurgent groups as well as other illegal armed groups like warlord militias. It also fuels corruption and patronage systems in which government officials are involved. In addition, it continues to motivate spoilers, who consider a strong government as a threat to their business, even though close links remain between the drug economy and government officials and influential key persons.187 4. SECURI TY RELATED With the country’s history of 30 years of warfare there is a high proliferation of small arms in Afghanistan. 188 The disarmament program initiated after the fall of the Taliban has been unable to achieve its set objectives in the set time frame, and has faced several problems, including weak law

185

One interviewee working as a consultant for a clothing manufacturer stated that Afghan tailors could compete in price and quality of their products as such, but transportation costs for getting the wares out of the country would shift the scale in favor of other countries. 186

The numbers on poverty vary significantly, and include claims that up to 70% of the people live on less than a dollar a day. The latter estimation is based on a BBC article that at least in the translation from RAWA contradicts itself by stating 20 out of 26 million ( 76%) live below the poverty line, though only 30-40% of the population live in poverty: (see “Afghanistan: 20 Million People Under the Line of Poverty”; online: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2008/10/17/afghanistan-20-million-people-underpoverty-line.html ) 187

“What cannot be doubted, however, is that, given the volume of resources involved, many [political players] retain an interest in illegal activities and still receive resources from these activities in exchange for the ´political protection´ that they provide. […] Despite the separation between the political ´upperworld´ and the criminal ´underworld´, it must be emphasized that it remains impossible to operate in the latter without support from the former” see: Shaw, Mark: “Drug Trafficking and the development of organized crime in Post-Taliban Afghanistan”; p. 198 Online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1164651372704/UNDC_Ch7.pdf 188

It is estimated that in 1992 there were more personal weapons in Afghanistan than in India and Pakistan combined (Coll 2004,

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enforcement and the lack of political will.189 Warlords maintain control over militias relying on them to gain and maintain personal political influence and leverage. These illegal armed groups appear to be at least tolerated by decision makers, especially if these militias can be used for fighting (other) armed opposition forces.190 Besides the existence of hundreds of illegal armed groups 191 it is common for at least one gun to be present in a family’s home, sometimes more than one.192 The presence of these arms means that violent conflicts can quickly cost somebody’s life. Afghanistan has a long history of war crimes which have never been addressed due to a culture of impunity benefiting most people who committed them. 193 Human rights violations committed by rulers of Afghanistan in the past are also not dealt with but rather omitted in stories about the person, especially if he has become a worshipped “hero of the land” like Ahmad Shah Massood.194 Another challenge Afghanistan faces is the low quality of the national civilian police force due to a series of factors. There was an absence of a national civilian police force in the time between the

189

As Antonio Giustozzi put it, the process ended up as “a façade process of disarmament. […] Behind this process, non-state armed groups of various types would be allowed to continue to exist and sometimes prosper, as long as they were willing to pay at least lip service to the bureaucratic process and abstained from actively working against the government in charge. This satisfied international actors, who were not willing to risk destabilizing large portions of Afghanistan. […]Finally, it satisfied key Afghan players, all of whom were to various degrees linked to militias in different regions of the country and reliant on them to maintain and expand political influence and leverage.” (see: Giustozzi, Antonio: “Bureaucratic facade and political realities of disarmament and demobilization in Afghanistan”; published in: Conflict, Security & Development, Volume 8, Issue 2 June 2008 , pages 169 – 192) 190

For example, according to news reports, when Karzai planned to reinstate Sher Muhammad Akhundzada as governor in Helmand (despite apparent clear proof of his connection to the drug economy) he argued that his illegal militias would assist in ousting the Taliban from the province (see Dean Nelson: “Hamid Karzai blaims Britain for Taliban resurgence”; Times Online; September 7, 2008; Online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4692252.ece 191

The Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Program was extended for three years in 2007 stating that it was impossible under the current conditions to meet the goals. Also, insurgents and criminal gangs would re-arm themselves. (see: IRIN: “Afghanistan : Disarmament Program extended”; 31 October 2007; Online: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75084 192

A colleague visited the house of another Afghan colleague, and in one room she saw three AK47 (Kalashnikovs) leaning against the wall. Her colleague said that only two of them would belong to him – the other to his wife. - It is also a favorite sport to hunt for birds and one can frequently see young men with hunting rifles in the streets.

193

For a report on war crimes committed in the early 1990s see the Human Rights Watch report “Blood Stained Hands – Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity” from July 2005; Online: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/07/06/blood-stained-hands-0 (This report was widely regarded as the trigger for Afghan parliament to pass its amnesty law – allegedly because a couple of parliament members felt threaten by the report and the idea that somebody might press charges against their involvement in human rights atrocities) 194

Ahmad Shah Massood was the military leader of the Northern Alliance until his assassination on September 9, 2001. Less than 30-years of age, he achieved a legendary status by fending off six attacks of Soviet troops between 1980 and 1982, each time significantly outnumbered in his last battle the ratio was 7:1. He is still celebrated by his followers as the “National Hero of Afghanistan”, with a whole foundation being active in keeping his reputation in this regard – omitting the fact that his forces were also responsible of severe human rights violations committed against predominately Hazara population in Kabul in the early 1990s.

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Soviet invasion and the fall of the Taliban.195 As a consequence, only a limited number of professionally trained police were available after 2001. Over the past decades, the profession of a policeman has had a rather low social reputation in Afghan society. 196 Extremely low literacy rates, corruption, numerous cases of drug abuse and lack of discipline among today’s police force contribute to this low reputation. In addition to the lack of security provided by Afghan police, in some areas insurgents and criminal gangs offer “protection” to the local population in exchange for support or recognition. Some interviewees stated that there have been cases where people preferred to be under the protection of such groups rather than having to pay government officials to do the job. The severe difficulties in controlling cross-border movement of insurgents and criminal groups especially between Pakistan and Afghanistan are largely based on the condition of having a long border (2,430 km) which runs through vast areas of barely accessible terrain. In addition, the official border police are virtually nonexistent due to very small numbers of staff and corruption, as well as lack of qualifications and equipment.

5. INTERNATIONAL a) CAUSES AND ESCALATING FACTORS RELATED TO SOURCES / EFFECTS FROM ABROAD Afghanistan has a history of invasions from foreign forces which have all resulted in the retreat of these invaders because of fierce Afghan resistance. This legacy of having to defend oneself against international aggressors benefits agitators and recruiters from the insurgency in mobilizing people against international forces in the country. Afghanistan has a long history of serving as a battlefield for proxy wars, involving interference by foreign countries such as the British Empire/UK, USSR/Russia, Iran, Pakistan, the USA and Saudi Arabia. While Afghan men played the main role in fighting in these wars, international support provided a majority of the required funds and equipment and thus contributed to the prolonging and / or the escalation of the conflicts.

195

While Afghanistan had such a police force (based on the European policing model) in the 1960s and 1970s, the police became militarized in the course of internal power struggles during the Soviet regime. The following civil war also hampered the reestablishment of a police force and during Taliban regime only the “Vice and Virtue police” existed. (See Murray, Tonita: “PoliceBuilding in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Civil Security Reform” in: “International Peacekeeping”, 14:1, February 2007; Online: http://www.saint-claire.org/resources/Police%20Building%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf ) 196

One interviewee mentioned an example at the Kabul airport where police officers were standing at the security check with the metal detector. A member of parliament or government went through this metal detector and the alarm went off. The policeman noticed it, but first hesitated stopping the man who just went on. Asked about his behavior the policeman stated “How can I as a simple policeman dare to stop such a person, whose social rank is so much higher than mine?”

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Afghanistan’s current borders are the result of its assigned role as a buffer state between Russia and British India. Both the northern and the southeastern borders cut through regions of different ethnic groups (e.g. Tajik, Uzbek and Pashtun). The result is a multi-ethnic country in which people tend to identify themselves along ethnic rather than national lines, even though a strong Afghan nationalism can also be witnessed.. 197 Insurgent groups receive external financial support from private persons and “charities” in the Arab states, local drug lords, foreign intelligence and parts of the local population in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Baluchistan. Many have “safe havens” across the Pakistan border in areas beyond the control of Pakistan’s government. Also, given the increasing instability in Pakistan, there is the growing risk that unilateral attacks on these safe havens could have severe consequences for the stability of the region. B)

CAUSES AND ESCALATING FACTORS RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL ACTORS OR THE

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN

AFGHANISTAN

According to some interviewees there is growing dissatisfaction about where international development funds are spent. On the one had, there are voices saying that more development projects should take place “in the South” where the security situation is worst. On the other hand there are also numerous areas in the North and especially Central Afghanistan which have a comparatively excellent security situation, yet whose population feels excluded from development aid or the “peace dividend”. As one interviewee stated, people there are starting to think that there may be “a need for a few explosions” in order to get noticed and thus attract development funds. Air strikes and night raids conducted by international forces as well as Guantanamo-like detentions of suspects in international army bases such as Bagram have further escalated the tensions between Afghan population and international forces. Some interviewees noted that there is also a growing dissatisfaction towards the presence of foreigners in Afghanistan and their alleged ruthless and “unIslamic” behavior. The establishment of civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) by international forces and the concept of combining military with civil approaches have been widely criticized for working outside of Afghan governmental structures, and even for creating a de-facto parallel government structure. Because local government structures in Afghanistan are weak, PRTs in many areas risk taking over responsibilities of the local Afghan government and thus further undermine its

197

For example, there was a huge nation-wide euphoria when taekwondo athlete Rohullah Nikpai won the first-ever Olympic medal for Afghanistan in 2008.

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authority. 198 As Matt Waldman puts it: “by diverting resources which otherwise could have been devoted to civilian development activities, PRTs have in many cases undermined the emergence of effective institutions of national and international government, and other civil development processes.” 199 Similar to that, at least in the past, two-thirds of foreign assistance bypassed the Afghan government, leaving it in the role of a rather inactive bystander. One other factor that may, at least on a small scale, have an indirect negative effect is the large amount of stress for international staff in Afghanistan caused by restricted movement and leisure possibilities, security warnings and even direct exposure to dangerous situations, distance from family and friends as well as other difficulties in daily (work) life. Without sufficient stress management and possibilities for stress relief, there is the risk of negative psychological effects on the individual that also affect behavior. Consequences can be loss of temper, frustration, resignation or distorted perception which may lead to making wrong decisions, worsening the cooperation with Afghan counterparts and escalating the situation.200

198

For example, if PRTs deliver services to the population like humanitarian aid without involving governmental structures, they risk giving a signal to the population that the official government does not care about them or is incapable of doing anything. While in some cases this may not be very far away from reality, “just doing it by oneself” also does little to increase the awareness and capacity of the government to fulfill their responsibilities. 199

See Waldman, Matt: “Falling short – Aid effectiveness in Afghanistan”; ACBAR Advocacy Series; March 2008; p. 3; Online: http://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf 200

Examples for this could be an armed soldier losing control in a challenging situation leading to the death of an innocent which in turn may lead to riots and other escalations of violence. It could also be a development worker angrily accusing an Afghan counterpart of being corrupt, making the person lose face and risking the end of cooperation or even personal retaliation.

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IV. L OCAL STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE I NITIATIVES Chapter Summary With large parts of the population considering official jurisdiction as ineffective and corrupt, traditional forms of conflict resolution including shuras (local councils), mullahs or other respected members of a community are by far the most accepted and popular for settling conflicts on the local level. The approach is usually one based on arbitration, often combined with building up social pressure in order to ensure that the involved parties adhere to the solution. To be selected or accepted as an arbitrator, professional knowledge in conflict resolution techniques is secondary to social status based on personal reputation, age, influence in the community and lineage.

The downside of

traditional conflict resolution is that it commonly does not address the root causes of conflicts. It is mostly reactive to already escalated conflicts and applies customary law, which may include severe human rights violations as the “solution” to a conflict (e.g. the practice of “baad” in which young women are given to other families for retribution for a crime committed by another family member) On the governmental level, there seems to be little actual support and political will for national peace and reconciliation initiatives. One of the main reasons is the high number of former mujahedin commanders in high places who likely jeopardize any process which might lead to accusations of human rights atrocities. One of the biggest blows against the national Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice was the amnesty law passed by the Afghan Parliament in the beginning of 1997. The Peace Jirga between Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2007, in which about 700 representatives from both countries met, also was widely criticized for not inviting representatives from Taliban forces. Saudi Arabia succeeded in September 2008 in facilitating the first preliminary talks in Mecca between members of the Afghan government and “reconciled” Taliban leaders, yet further talks appear to be thwarted by the Taliban’s proclaimed demand that all international forces should be withdrawn from Afghanistan as a precondition for any negotiation. Although lacking coordination, there is an array of peacebuilding projects being conducted on the community level by local NGOs and a few international organizations working particularly on this topic. These projects include, for example, trainings in conflict resolution techniques, local events, the establishment of peace councils and other structures for conflict resolution and reconciliation. However, with very few opportunities available in Afghanistan to receive long-term funding, many of these projects are limited in duration to a few weeks or months with unclear prospects of when – or if – new funding will be available.

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1. TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION In Afghanistan, using traditional conflict resolution structures is by far the most popular way to deal with conflicts on the local level as long as they do not involve serious crimes such as murder. 201 These structures involve mullahs, elders or community shuras (community or tribal councils). The guidelines these institution use for dealing with conflicts are based on different sets of values: “Local Shuras believe it is difficult to resolve conflicts solely by applying only one law, even Sharia. Rather, the conflict resolution mechanism is a mix of practices accepted by all members. The conflict resolution formula used in many communities is a combination of Sharia, ´maraka´ customary law (urf) and / or Pashtunwali, in areas where it is practiced.” 202 Conflicts are settled in a kind of mixture between consensus and arbitration. In most cases, the involved parties explain their points of view, the elders or shura members discuss the case and reach a consensus which is then passed on to the conflicting parties as a judgment. While this judgment is usually not officially binding, social pressure is often built up and put on the parties to make them adhere to the decision. Likewise, shuras also argue that the only alternative to their solution would be to go to court – where both parties are likely to have to pay significant sums for fees and bribes. Unable or unwilling to do so, the judgment of the shura often remains the best option disputants may have. Courts and police are widely considered as highly corrupt, 203 a perception grounded in various cases where the party who was willing – or able – to pay more got the favorable result.

When an

official judiciary document is needed, parties tend first go to a shura to reach an agreement and then later on go to court in order to formalize the agreement. 2. KINDS OF LEGI TIMIZATION OF A LO CAL MEDIATOR/ ARB ITRATOR In Afghanistan, the social status of the person acting as a mediator or arbitrator is far more important than (usually his) actual qualifications or skill in conflict resolution. Thus, people who can claim to be descendants of the Prophet (carrying the title eshan or sayed) or from the first caliph (khoja) are commonly addressed for mediating/arbitrating a conflict because their word has far more value than that of people without such a line of descent.

201

For detailed information about different approaches to conflict resolution, including surveys about the acceptance of traditional forms in comparison to governmental forms (official courts) see: Center for Policy and Human Development / UNDP: “Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 – Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule and Law and the Search for Justice”; 2007; Online: http://www.cphd.af/nhdr/nhdr07/download/pdfs/eng/nhdr07_complete.pdf 202

See: CPAU / Nawabi, Kanishka / Wardak, Mirwais / Zaman, Idrees: “Religious Civil Society: The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan – Case Studies from Wardak and Kunduz”; July 2007; p. 43; Online: http://www.cpau.org.af/Research/Docs_our_publications/Religious%20Civil%20Society%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf 203

Also, addressing the police for help can lead to sexual harassment. There have been numerous stories of women going to the police to complain about a crime and instead of filing her complaint, the policemen responded that she would have to have sexual intercourse with them if she wanted assistance in the case.

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Another source of legitimization could be profound religious knowledge. Especially in earlier times, the heads of Sufi orders (pir) also were respected mediators/arbitrators due to their religious knowledge, and due to the vast nationwide social networks through which they had access to personal and material resources. Within a given social structure or group it is usually the task of the person higher in the hierarchy to settle disputes. Just as a father may intervene in a quarrel among his sons, the elders of a family are in charge of dealing with conflicts within the family or acting as negotiators in disputes between family members and other groups. On the political level, persons in key positions such as provincial governor are also sometimes asked to act as an arbitrator in local disputes – even if the dispute is between husband and wife. 3. DRAWBACKS OF TRADITIONAL CONF LICT RESOLUTION STRUCTURES While these traditional structures have far better acceptance in the community than the formal judiciary, they also have a series of drawbacks. To begin with, such structures are usually only reactive, i.e. the conflict has already escalated before they become active. Also, members of these traditional structures often lack awareness of root causes of a conflict leading to only the act of “violence” being arbitrated while the underlying causes are not tackled. 204 As Matt Waldman puts it: “Shuras […] usually adopt an authoritarian approach. Thus, although shuras are the preferred method of dispute resolution, they sometimes act in a way that either fails to resolve disputes fairly, or neglects their underlying causes, which could lay the seeds for future disputes or violence.” 205 In addition, when dealing with the conflict, customary law may be applied and this can include severe human rights violations especially against women. 206 These laws are also often applied simply because this is how it has been done before – and not so much because it is the best solution for the particular case.207 Also, as a conflict analysis written by the Afghan NGO CPAU states, traditional structures like councils of elders “often reflect a narrow traditional view of authority, which many

204

One example of this is the classic conflict over arranged marriages and bride prices. Elders and Shuras meet regularly to discuss how individual cases can – or should – be solved. There is no approach to tackle what generates these conflicts so similar disputes are likely to continue in the future. 205

See: Waldman, Matt: “Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan – The Case for a National Strategy” Oxfam Research Report; February 2008; p. 14; Online: http://www.oxfam.org/files/community_peacebuilding_in_afghanistan_report_feb08.pdf

206

The most infamous example of a customary law is “baad” in which a woman of the family of the perpetrator is given to the family of the victim as compensation for a crime. This way of settling conflicts is particularly common in Pashtun areas. When a perceived “crime” like alleged adultery is dealt with through traditional structures, the verdict can also lead to stoning of the (usual female) misbehaver. 207

In witnessing how mullahs and shura members acted in role-plays during conflict resolution trainings offered by a local Afghan NGO, it appeared that many had severe difficulties in actually listening to the stories of the conflicting parties. Instead, they often interrupted the story by quoting religious verses or general sayings announcing the verdict before having heard all sides.

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young people and returning refugees are reluctant to submit to.” 208 Last but not least, the membership of traditional shuras is often based on a certain level of wealth, influence or power, thus effectively excluding women, youths or the poorest members of the community. In recent years, “new” shuras have been founded in the course of different development programs which include these groups, for example the women’s shuras. However they often lack influence or are more dependent on international support. 4. PEACE INI TIATIVES AND EXAMPLES OF PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES a) INITIATIVES ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL Official initiatives from the government in Afghanistan aimed at reconciliation and peacebuilding appear to be rare. While there have been official strategy papers and programs for peacebuilding in Afghanistan on the national level, there have been significant delays in the implementation of these plans. For example, the major action plan in this regard, the “Peace, Reconciliation and Justice – Action Plan of the Government of the Islamic Republic in Afghanistan” 209, was drafted in 2005 containing a three year plan through the end of 2008. Although the action plan clearly ruled out the possibility of an amnesty for war crimes, the Afghan parliament passed an amnesty law in spring 2007. Many interviewees stated that there was a lack of political will among key persons to actually realize such transitional justice and reconciliation programs. The explanation given was that a significant number of members of parliament and government profit from the current situation (e.g. as drug lords who can maximize their profits from illicit drug trade as long as the fighting continues to distract attention) or that simply too many people in key positions would be threatened by punishment if transitional justice actually took place. Other initiatives like the “Peace Jirga” between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the summer of 2007, where 700 delegates from both countries met, was criticized for not inviting delegates from the Taliban and other opposition groups. The 40 delegates from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, where pro-Taliban forces have been active, pulled out of the peace jirga. 210 On the international level, Saudi Arabia facilitated preliminary talks between members of the Afghan government and (former) Taliban delegates in Mecca in September 2008. However, formal and official talks with the Taliban seem to be blocked by their demand that all foreign troops should first leave the country.

208

CPAU / FES: “Conflict Analysis Afghanistan – Update May http://www.cpau.org.af/Research/Docs_our_publications/Conflict_Analysis-Afghanistan-Final.pdf

2005”;

p.

4

Online:

209

For an English translation of the Action plan see online: http://www.unama-afg.org/news/Afghan%20Government/06dec10government-action-plan-eng.pdf 210

See: Ashfaq Yusufzai: “Kabul Peace Jirga Falls Short”; August 14, 2007; Online: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38884

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It should also be noted here that UNAMA, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, to some extent is active as well, according to its mandate, in trying to mediate between conflicting parties and especially to de-escalate political conflicts on the local and national levels. b) EXAMPLES OF PEACEBUILDING P ROGRAMS BY LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The following list of organizations and their activities in peacebuilding211 is only representative and does not claim to be in any way complete. Due to lack of coordination between organizations working in peacebuilding it was difficult to find out who was actually doing what in this field. Also, most of the following information is based only on statements of the organization about their activities – it was not verified through other sources. It should be noted that the vast majority of the peacebuilding projects of NGOs are reliant on funding from international donors, which – due to realities in the field – in almost all cases leads to projects that only last for a couple of weeks or months and are then stopped or “put into hibernation” until new funds can be acquired after a lengthy process of proposal writing and approval. This carries the risk that qualified staff, whose salaries depend on project funds and who will not be paid once the project ends, move to new jobs with other national or international organizations before the new funding comes through. The consequence can be a high turnover of staff, aggravated by competition over qualified staff especially among international organizations in which there seems to be hardly any limit regarding salary offers. 212 Local organizations ACSF (Afghan Civil Society Forum) has provided trainings in conflict management, peace education and Do-No-Harm in 14 provinces. According to their sources 2,800 students and religious leaders as well as 1,200 government officials were trained in these courses or workshops. In the future, ACSF wants to continue the program with a bigger focus on inter-ethnic conflicts. ACSONP (Afghan Civil Society Organizations Network for Peace) is a network of different Afghan NGOs who expressed interest in working for peace. Since 2006 it is the main organization body

211

Peacebuilding activities are hereby defined as community-based projects aimed at resolving existing conflicts, increasing conflict-solving skills and capacities among communities or key persons, fostering mutual understanding and reconciliation or other activities which are directly aimed at building peace. This definition does not include general development activities (although some interviewees stated that any development project would be peacebuilding), activities in the security sector like training of security forces, DDR or de-mining as well as programs related to official state building / strengthening of government and rule of law. 212

As a result there are truly “fantastic” expectations among especially young (comparatively) qualified Afghan staff about how much their work would be worth, resulting in demands for a daily (!) rate equivalent to two or three times the monthly salary of a teacher – often without them being able to deliver results of a quality that would significantly exceed the level of that of an average intern in a first world country.

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for the National Peace Day in Afghanistan, even though cooperation with international organizations like UNAMA varies depending on the current chair organization (currently Mediothek) AIHRC (Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission) is a semi-governmental organization that advocates for human rights as a vital part of peace and security. In cooperation with a consultant of the German Development Service (DED), AIHRC founded a Peace Building Unit in 2007. Together with the American University in Kabul they also conducted a conference on conflict resolution in Herat in November 2007. CCA (Cooperation Center for Afghanistan) is offering counseling and mediation services in family conflicts. With the assistance of a DED consultant, staff of CCA’s office in Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh province) has been trained as professional mediators for such cases. CPAU (Cooperation for Peace and Unity) has established “peace” shuras in 1-2 districts of Badakhshan, Ghanzni, Kabul, Kunduz and Wardak provinces. These shuras are supposed to work for peace building in their districts. CPAU together with SDO (see below) developed a peace curriculum for classes 1-12, which unfortunately, was rejected by the Ministry of Education (which included another one in the national curriculum). In response, CPAU trained about 50 teachers and sent them to schools in Ghazni, Kabul, Kunduz and Wardak to stay. While there, they would wait until a teacher would not come to class (which is not uncommon in Afghanistan) and then “hop in” to teach peace education. In the future, CPAU plans to expand its project into other provinces and increase work in conflict monitoring. ECW (Educational and Training Center for Poor Women and Girls of Afghanistan) has established its own peacebuilding department within its regional office in Kunduz province (North Afghanistan) in 2005. Together with Mediothek (see below) they created the first “Peace Caravan” in Kunduz and conducted trainings for journalists, teachers and provincial councils. ECW conducted two major projects that involved in-depth training of more than 1,100 people (mullahs and other male and female shura members) in conflict analysis, conflict resolution and peace building. The 2-3 week training took place in nearly all districts of Kunduz, Baghlan and Takhar province in the North-East of Afghanistan. In 2008, ECW also founded the Youth Peace Network in which more than 20 youths between 16 and 24 were trained and encouraged to become active peace builders in their communities. Mediothek is an Afghan-German organization with offices in Kabul, Kunduz and Jalallabad. With a smaller peace journalism component, Mediothek’s peacebuilding work also includes the “Peace Caravan Project” in which people from different provinces are brought together for mutual understanding and dialogue at an event that includes discussions, arts, and sport activities. Mediothek also publishes special magazine issues informing the public about the process and the meeting results. .

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PTS (Programme Tahkime Sulh – National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission) was established through a presidential decree in May 2005. Headed by Prof. Mojadeddi (president of Afghanistan in 1992) it has offices in 12 provinces (Kabul, Kandarhar, Façade, Paktia, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, Zabul, Helmand, Uruzgan and Farah). The main areas of work include a reconciliation program with former Taliban,

213

through which, according to PTS, around

7,000 Taliban were engaged in the peace process. PTS also led investigations into prisoners’ cases in Bagram, Poli-Charki and Guatanamo. It also conducted seminars to educate people (also Taliban) about the “real” Islam and distributed 200,000 – 300,000 pamphlets about peace messages from the Holy Q’uran. SDO (Sanayee Development Organization) has been working with five religious schools (madrassas) in Kabul and Bagrami district and trained 125 teachers and 500 students in peace education. Together with CPAU it also developed a peace curriculum for classed 1-12, which was not accepted by the Ministry of Education for introduction into the national curriculum. SDO also established a modern mediation committee in Badghis involving 25 mediators working at the community level. SDO also stated that they have a community peace building program working on conflict resolution in Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh), Faryab and Herat provinces. TLO (The Liaison Office) 214 stated that they are in the process of developing a data bank registering all types of conflicts at the community level for further analysis and peace building efforts. TLO also helped to build up the Commission of Conflict Mediation (CCM) which offers out-of-court arbitration in Southeast Afghanistan for resolving conflicts between local communities. They work in Khost, Paktika, Paktia and Helmand. They want to focus more on inter-ethnic conflicts in the future.

International organizations Agha Khan Foundation is one of the organizations implementing the National Solidarity Program (NSP). Similar to UNHABITAT, it has developed trainings in conflict resolution for the CDC (Community Development Councils), which were founded in course of the NSP program.

213

To reintegrate former Taliban, PTS would first have a talk with the Talib(an) who wanted to be reintegrated and collect information about the person. After approval by the PTS, the former Taliban would receive an official letter of pardon and officials in his home area would be informed not to prosecute him. There would be, however, a time of monitoring to check whether the person continued insurgent activities. Some participants in the PTS program, however, could not return to their home areas due to the risk of revenge by families of their victims. The program was funded by the US and UK until January 2008 when both stopped funding. While PTS argued that this was because the UK wanted to negotiate with the Taliban directly and the US simply “lost interest, ” the main critique was that the program was ineffective and did not include real reconciliation between the exTaliban and the communities where they live. 214

TLO originallly stood for “Tribal Liasion Office”. However, it changed its name in summer 2008 due to political pressure from the official Afghan government.

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ARD Inc.: As part of the Local Government and Community Development program, funded by USAID, in North Afghanistan (DAI is implementing the program in the South), ARD has established a conflict mitigation unit. One of the projects was a pilot conference in one province where local key people (mullahs, elders, governmental officials) came together for four days. The conference included a short introduction to conflict analysis techniques and then provided space for the key people to identify and prioritize conflicts on the local level, as well as finding solutions for them. DED (German Development Service) runs a civil peace service program in Afghanistan through which about a dozen peace and conflict consultants are deployed to work within Afghan organizations for a duration of usually 2 years. This service is free for the partner organizations as DED provides an allowance and living costs for the consultants. DED also has a small fund for peace building activities to which Afghan organizations can apply. DED’s current partner organizations are AIHRC, CCA, ECW, HRA – Horizon Rehabilitation of Afghanistan; Mediothek, RTA – Radio Television Afghanistan and SDO. FES (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) has a minor peacebuilding program including offering trainings / workshops in conflict transformation and dialogue. Part of the trainings is conducted by international trainers who come to Kabul for the short-term. Also, the members of FES’ Young Leaders’ Forum consisting of about two dozen Afghan Youths (and alumni from previous years) also occasionally conduct trainings in negotiation and peace building in the provinces. NCA (Norwegian Church Aid) has cooperated with SDO in Faryab, providing funding for conflict resolution trainings. They are interested in continuing funding for peacebuilding projects, especially in that area. NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) has specialized in land conflicts as part of its returnee program in Afghanistan. The organization also provides information to refugees/returnees about where they can obtain services and about conditions in the area to which they would like to return. There also is a legal assistance program which primarily tackles land conflicts/cases and conflicts regarding families (e.g. inheritance). NRC has offices in Kabul, Jallalabad, Kunduz, Puli-Khumri (Baghlan), Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh province), Maymana (Faryab province), Bamyan and Herat. There is also an office in Peshawar, Pakistan. While a number of interviewees considered NRC as a leading organization in the resolution of land conflicts, the organization itself refrains from using the term “peace” as often as other organizations in describing their programs. According to the interviewed representative, NRC instead refers to terms like “helping people” or “stability”.

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Oxfam International has conducted some research on peace and conflict in Afghanistan. In February 2008 the document “Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan”215 by Matt Waldman was published presenting results of surveys in 8 provinces. In the future, they are planning to organize a nationwide conference to talk about a national strategy for peacebuilding. UNHABITAT has been the leading organization implementing the National Solidarity Program. Within this, UN-Habitat has also developed a peacebuilding module in which it trained members of the Community Development Councils (CDCs) in conflict transformation. UNIFEM has different units dealing with conflicts and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. The two largest projects are “The Oral History of Afghan Women” (aiming at keeping a record of the history of Afghan women since the late 1970s) and “Supporting Women’s Engagement in Peacebuilding and Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict”. UNIFEM is working mainly on the policy level, with local implementing partners conducting projects on the community level. At the time of the interview UNIFEM was (re-)assessing in which regions it would focus its work.

215

For the report “Community Peacebuilding in Afghanistan - The Case for a National Strategy”, see online: http://www.oxfam.org/files/community_peacebuilding_in_afghanistan_report_feb08.pdf

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V. T HE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT AND THE INSECURITY ON THE LOCAL POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS Chapter Summary Since the summer of 2005 the security situation has significantly deteriorated with 40-50 percent of the country inaccessible to civilian aid programs. This development has contributed to a “militarization of development aid” in which the military is also using development projects as a means of “winning the hearts and minds” of the population and thus “force protection.” A consequence of that appears to be increasing attacks by insurgent forces on NGOs considered as “soft target” allies of international governments and their military forces in Afghanistan. Afghan civilian become victims not only of attacks from insurgent groups but also from military operations of progovernment forces that are based on faulty information, which in 2008 led to more than 2000 civilian casualties – the highest number since 2002. Among these, 552 civilians were killed in air strikes by international forces. Both NGOs and the Afghan population are also subject to an increase in crime including robbery and abductions / kidnapping.

1. THE SECURI TY SITUATION IN GENERAL Since the parliamentarian elections of 2005 the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated enormously. While suicide attacks were a rare event before 2005, their numbers have increased significantly over the last three years. The amount of security incidents including bomb attacks and clashes between pro- and anti-government forces has also increased.

Figure 13 : Attacks from insurgents 2006-2008 (ANSO)

AOG = Armed Opposition Groups (Source: "The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) Quarterly Data Report, 4 2008", p. 10; reprinted with courtesy of The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO))

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The number of counted incidents varies from organization to organization based on data collection as well as categorization of attacks. However, all surveys show the general trend regarding the increase in number of security incidents.

Figure 14 : Security Incidents 2003 – 2008 (UNDSS)

Number of Security Incidents per month (January 2003 – June 2008) There is a clear pattern that the number of incidents is lower in the winter months while the peak is in summer. (The sharp increase in September 2005 included events in course of the parliamentary elections) Source: UNDOC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008 / UNDSS

The increase in attacks also resulted in a change in the geography of accessible areas for I(N)GOs. In September 2008, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security rated about 90 out of 400 districts as areas of extreme risk. Forty to fifty percent of the country is considered inaccessible to United Nations aid activities. Officials from the Afghan government stated that at least 12 districts are completely beyond its control.216 Below is a map that depicts the security risk level in different parts of Afghanistan in the winter of 2008/2009. The percentage of high and extreme risk areas has increased significantly over the last four years. 217 While some international organizations continue to work in the high risk areas, a growing number of NGOs have reduced work in areas where they see too many dangers for international as well as local staff, or where proper monitoring is not possible anymore. The insecurity has also led to a growing “militarization of aid” in which international governmental organizations choose to closely cooperate with international security forces to conduct development projects in more dangerous regions. Also, international security forces themselves – in order “to win the hearts and minds” of the people – increasingly see development projects and other “civilian” support (such as providing health care or humanitarian aid to selected target groups or key persons) as a way of 216

Report of UN Secretary General on Afghanistan, September 23, 2008

217

For a simple copies of security maps of Afghanistan from 2005 and 2007 see article from Nick Meo “Leaked aid maps show extensions of no-go zones”; December 5, 2007; Times Online; online: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3000067.ece

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“force protection.” The big critique of the latter phenomenon is that soldiers lack knowledge and experience in development issues and can easily cause unintended negative impacts due to a lack of conflict sensitivity or insufficient information about the target groups. 218

Figure 15 : Security Situation in Afghanistan in winter 2008/2009

a) RISING NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN DEATHS DUE TO THE INSURGENCY CONFLICT As a result of the deteriorated security situation, according to UNAMA Human Rights Unit, 2,118 civilians died in 2008, a 40% increase compared to the 1,543 civilian deaths recorded in 2007. Of these deaths, 55% were attributed to anti-government elements (AGEs) and 39% to pro-government forces.

218

A number of interviewees gave examples of such negative impacts. One was about a commander of an international forces camp/PRT who wanted to support the local economy by giving lucrative logistics contracts to local businesses instead of foreign firms. To select adequate partners, he asked an Afghan colleague, an officer from the Afghan National Army, to take care of the issue. The Afghan military commander distributed the contracts exclusively among members of his own family and ethnic group, also a minority in the region. When the news spread that the international forces were favoring this one group and excluding others, the idea backfired and caused a very disgruntled mood among the population, leading also to some of the excluded groups joining Taliban forces.

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The remaining 6% could not be attributed clearly to either side “since, for example, some civilians died as a result of cross-fire or were killed by unexploded ordinance”. 219 The majority of the civilian deaths caused by AGEs were largely the result of suicide and improvised explosive devise attacks (63%). There have also been incidents targeting individual civilians directly who were accused of supporting the Afghan government, international organizations or the military. UNAMA also recorded 271 assassinations by insurgents, and UNDSS counted 343 based on a slightly wider definition of AGE’s assassinations. UNAMA and the Afghan Independent Human Rights commission have also noticed a significant increase in cases of threats, intimidation and harassment of civilians by insurgents. Victims of these actions have included teachers, doctors, tribal elders, construction workers and civilian government employees. 220 As one interviewed UN official stated, AGEs would deliberately target members of different groups without an obvious pattern. With people not knowing who could be the next target, this strategy maximizes fear of Taliban attacks. b) CIVILIAN DEATHS AS RESULT OF INTERNATIONAL AIR STRIKES Regarding civilian deaths caused by pro-government forces, air strikes conducted by international military forces 221 have yielded the greatest death toll. UNAMA’s Human Rights Unit counted 552 civilian deaths in 2008. 222 The highest death toll among civilians caused by an attack of pro-governmental forces since 2001 resulted from the US air strike on the village Azizabad in Shindand district of Herat province on August 21, 2008.. According to reports of the UN and different human rights organizations, it led to the death of 92 civilians, including 62 children and 15 women. The US military first denied any civilian

219

See: UNAMA, Human Rights Unit: “Afghanistan: Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2008”; January http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_human%20rights/2009/UNAMA_09february2009; Online: Annual%20Report_PoC%202008_FINAL_11Feb09.pdf 220

UNAMA Annual Report on Protections of Civilians in Armed conflict, January 2009, as well as: Report of UN Secretary General on Afghanistan, September 23, 2008 221

On December 23, 2008, the Afghan Independent Human Rights commission published a report including detailed information about cases of air strikes and house raids that led to increasing anger among the population. See: “ From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspective on Operations of Pro-Government Forces in Afghanistan”; Online: http://www.aihrc.org.af/2008_Dec/PDF_Pro_G/Eng_Pro_G.pdf – Another report about Civilian casualties was published in September 2008 by Human Rights Watch: “Troops in Contact – Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan“ Online: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/09/08/troops-contact-0 ; more recently, also UNAMA Human Rights Unit published their report “Afghanistan – Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, 2008”; Online: http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UNDocs/_human%20rights/2009/UNAMA_09february-Annual%20Report_PoC%202008_FINAL_11Feb09.pdf 222

UNAMA Human Rights Unit “Afghanistan – Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, 2008”; Online: http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_human%20rights/2009/UNAMA_09februaryAnnual%20Report_PoC%202008_FINAL_11Feb09.pdf

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casualties and claimed that the air strike primarily hit insurgents.223 However, as villagers stated that there had been no Taliban in the area at the time, it appears to be more likely that the US military acted on false information. President Karzai and others even assumed that this information was given to US forces deliberately in order to misuse their military power in a local conflict between Afghans. 224 There have been numerous cases in which US forces especially were allegedly manipulated by Afghan power brokers to launch air strikes against personal opponents. 225

Figure 16 : Reported Civilian Casualties in Armed Conflict (2007 – 2008)

The chart is based on information collected by the UNAMA Human Rights Unit. While the chart indicates an increase in attacks during the summer months, some exceptionally lethal attacks happened in February (67 civilian casualties caused by a suicide attack in Kandahar) and July (attack on the Indian Embassy causing the deaths of 55 civilians). Also included in the chart are casualties caused by military actions from pro-government military forces such as an air strike in Nangarhar in which 46 civilians were killed (July) and an military operation in Herat leading to the deaths of 92 civilians (August). (Source: UNAMA Human Rights Unit: “Afghanistan – Annual Report on Protections of Civilians in Armed conflict, 2008”, January 2009)

223

The US military first denied that there were any civilian casualties. An internal US military report later stated that 55 people died, including 22 anti-government fighters and 33 civilians. The conclusion of the report was that the armed attack was "an act of self-defense, necessary and appropriate," based on the information available at the time to the officer in charge. People from the village, however, stated that no Taliban were in the area at the time of attack. – Source: Hans-Jürgen Schlamp: “Air Force Report Confirms Rising Civilian Toll” in Spiegel International, November 13, 2008 – Online: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,590234,00.html 224

For a report on the Shindand air strike see Carlotta Gall: “Evidence Points to Civilian Toll in Afghan Raid” in NY Times, September 7, 2008. Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?partner=rssnyt 225

One interviewee told of a case a few years ago where a local power broker managed to convince the US forces in his region that he was the person in charge of a certain village. He went to the village and tried to claim power by arguing. The village elders opposed his leadership and decided to go to Kabul to complain. The power broker contacted the US forces stating that he had urgent information about a convoy of bearded Taliban moving toward Kabul. The convoy was indeed attacked by an US air strike without checking who was the “real target”. In other stories, power brokers allegedly blackmailed villages stating that they would make US forces attack the village if the villagers would not obey their rule.

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Whether the stories about deceitful information are true or not, the effect that civilian casualties have on the reputation of the international military and on the Karzai government is devastating and plays into the hand of terrorist and AGE groups. 226 Another issue that has a negative effect on public opinion is the night raids of Afghan houses by international soldiers. Because the personal home is regarded as an untouchable sanctuary, intrusions by foreigners and alleged mistreatment of women and elderly people are considered a severe act of disrespect for local culture and values. 227

c) NON-POLITICAL CRIMES IN AFGHANISTAN “The steady decline in law and order – particularly murders and kidnappings – has accelerated this year [2008]. In the prosperous western trading hub of Façade, rising crime has led investors to pull out of the area. Some 150 of the province’s 250 factories have closed, according to the Union of Façade, a traders association.[…] About 60 businessmen are kidnapped per year, mostly by organized criminal syndicates that demand huge ransoms, according to the Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce. With many businesses wary of entering such an environment, private investment in the country dropped almost by half from 2006 to 2007, estimates the Afghan Investment Support Agency, based in Kabul.” 228 Beside the insurgency-related attacks, abductions have become a major security threat to all people in Afghanistan with significant effects on the population and economy. The widespread perception that police officers are directly involved in the crime business further worsens the situation and plays into the hands of Taliban groups which like to present themselves as righteous saviors from government corruption. The increased risk of abduction has left a mark on the behavior of Afghan people, especially among those who can be counted as wealthier. With about half of the population living below the poverty line (estimations in this regard run as high as 70%), the perception of being “wealthier” even applies to Afghan staff working for an international organization receiving monthly salaries of about 500 USD or

226

This is true especially because the concept of revenge and retaliation is deeply embedded in Afghan culture – for example in the Pashtun honor code Pashtunwali (see online: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtunwali ). If a Pashtun man assumes that the wrongdoing or killing has been done intentionally, he is required by cultural norms to take revenge in equal proportion, i.e. kill the perpetrator or aligned persons – which may lead him to join insurgent groups fighting pro-government forces. 227

For further information about cases of night raids, also see the AIHRC report “From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspective on Operations of Pro-Government Forces in Afghanistan”; Online: http://www.aihrc.org.af/2008_Dec/PDF_Pro_G/Eng_Pro_G.pdf 228

Mark Sappenfield: “Rise in crime, kidnapping, top Afghans' worries” in The Christian Science Monitor, issue of November 25, 2008; online: http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1125/p05s01-wosc.html

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more. Also, saving to get married can attract criminal intentions. 229 As a result, many local staff members hide the fact that they work for international organizations from neighbors or even their own family members – fearing the greed of common criminals capable of abduction or robbery far more than insurgent groups. Also, some Afghan people have stopped depositing savings into bank accounts.

2. IMPACT OF THE SECURITY SITUATIO N ON I( N)GOS In addition to an upsurge of attacks on security forces and government institutions, the number of attacks on international development organizations has also increased significantly. According to the situation report of the UN Secretary General published on September 23, 2008 230 “more than 120 attacks have been targeted at humanitarian and development programs [to date] in 2008, as a result of which 30 humanitarian aid workers have died and 92 have been abducted.”

Figure 17 Categorization of insurgents’ attacks on NGOs, 2008

(Source: "The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) Quarterly Data Report, 4 2008", p. 4; reprinted with courtesy of The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO))

229

Beside the local culture of a bride price which, contrary to Islam, goes to the family and not to the bride, leading to the fact that many daughters are sold to the highest bidder, getting married is very costly in Afghanistan. The groom’s family is expected to arrange at least two major feasts for the engagement and the marriage and hundreds of family members of the bride and groom are invited. There are large wedding halls with lavish decorations. The costs for a marriage can easily exceed 10,000 USD with virtually no limit. One interviewee told a story about a family whose house was robbed by criminals. When one of the robbers was about to take the henna which a daughter was keeping for her wedding ceremony, the family pleaded to at least leave these items so the daughter could get married. The robber replied: “Why do you think I was forced to become a robber? I, too, want to get married. I need money to pay for the wedding and I need the henna as well for my own marriage.”

230

See online: http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_repots-SG/2008/08sep23-SG-report-SC-situation-in-afghanistan.pdf

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In its last quarterly report, the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) counted more than 170 security incidents throughout 2008, an increase of 20% compared to 2007. ANSO attributed this to the “notably expanded conflict, up >50% from 2007, which caught more NGOs in its wake as it spread”. The report also states that “with a few exceptions, NGO’s were generally attacked for being perceived as intrinsic to the military and political objectives of the International Military Forces (IMF) and related foreign Governments.” ANSO reported fewer cases of (purely) criminal attacks against NGOs (equivalent to 35% of the attacks compared to 61% in 2007,) However, ANSO also noted ongoing criminal involvement in attacks from armed opposition groups, so the line between crime and political attacks has become less clear in many areas of the country.231

Figure 18 : Categorization of criminal attacks against NGOs, 2008

(Source: "The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) Quarterly Data Report, 4 2008", p. 5; reprinted with courtesy of The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO))

a) EXAMPLES OF EVENTS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS There were certain “milestones” or special events during the last three years which affected the international community and led to changes in the security regulations. One event was the riots in Kabul on May 29, 2006, after a US military convoy crashed into a queue of civilian cars, killing at least one taxi driver. Given the American troops’ reputation among Afghan for their ruthless driving, and people’s frustration over joblessness, the pace of reconstruction and the presumed presence of agitators, within minutes groups of angry protestors began marching through Kabul, attacking vehicles and the offices of internationals. Among others, the main office of Care International and a Chinese brothel were burnt down, several stores looted and burning barricades erected on the streets. After about 6 hours the situation calmed down and on the next day it almost 231

See: "The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO)Quarterly Data Report, 4 2008"

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seemed as if nothing had happened. As a result of this event, many INGOs have removed from the street any official signs indicating the location of their offices or guest houses. Another event was the attack on the five-star Serena Hotel in Kabul on January 14, 2008 by at least four anti-government fighters, three of them wearing police uniforms. The attack took place during the visit of a Norwegian delegation led by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and resulted in the death of six people, four of them internationals. It was believed to have been executed by members of the Haqqani Network with logistical support from Al Qaeda. The Serena attack came as a shock even to the international community because the hotel was frequented by international aid workers and diplomats as a place for recreation as it has exercise and spa facilities. Rumor had it that these places were the main target of the attackers. It was thus seen as the first attack on the non-military international community and led to an increased fortification of hotels and restaurants which specialize in international guests. 232 The attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, in which 54 civilians died also had a significant effect on the international community. In the attack, which was later attributed (again) to the Haqqani Network, this time with involvement of the Pakistani ISI, a car filled with explosives ran into the gates of the Indian embassy, resulting in the highest death toll of an insurgent attack in Kabul since 2001. It took place in an allegedly secure area of Kabul and rumors quickly spread that the car must have passed through a number of police check points to get there. The incident was also seen as a clear sign of a proxy war between India and Pakistan on Afghan soil. As a consequence of the attack, an increasing number of roads in Kabul on which international embassies and governmental institutions are situated are now blocked to normal traffic. The ambush on aid workers of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Logar province 50 km south of Kabul on August 12, 2008 233 led to the deaths of four civilians, including three international female staff members. The aid workers were on their way back to Kabul, driving in two clearly marked International Rescue Committee vehicles. While it was not the first time national and international staff members of an international aid agency had been killed, the incident was perceived by many as a clear fulfillment of the Taliban threat to also attack “soft targets” like international development workers. Previous killings had been followed by discussions and rumors about whether the incident had a personal component (i.e. that the perpetrators wanted to hit/kill this person in particular, regardless of his/her status as international aid worker) or whether the victim “misbehaved” in any way, e.g. provoking robbers by grabbing for a gun, and thus the killing could be interpreted as having an element of self-defense. The IRC incident was different. Also, the close regional proximity to 232

The “standard” expatriates’ restaurant now possesses, beside armed guards, a security lock/floodgate where the guest has to pass at least two gates along with security personnel who search bags and sometimes male guests. 233

For IRC’s statement on the incident see: http://www.theirc.org/news/four-irc-staff-killed-afghanistan0813.html

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Kabul was startling as it indicated that “the Taliban” was already at Kabul’s doorstep. The incident led to a series of articles in the news showing the increasing death toll for development workers in Afghanistan, and led to a further review of security regulations and areas of operation for many International NGOs (INGOs.) b) REACTIONS OF I(N)GOS TO THE DETERIORATED SECURITY SITUATION Security regulations for staff of international organizations have changed drastically since 2005. While staff members in 2005 sometimes spent their weekends traveling to the country side, restrictions on movement in 2008 prevented staff of some organizations from setting foot outside in their free time. This led to bizarre situations where, for example, instead of simply walking in and out of the gates, one international staff member had to arrange for an office car to go from their home to the office next door which was less than 20 meters away. Movement and transportation regulations have probably seen the biggest change due to the security situation. Many International Governmental Organizations and International NGOs [I(N)GOs] now have a policy that staff members should fly to distant project areas rather than take a car. If there is no alternative to going by road, usually a two-car policy is applied, stating that staff members must travel with at least two cars that stay in contact via VHF or other distance communication systems. Depending on availability within the organization, armored vehicles are also used for increased risk areas, including within Kabul city borders.234 The main concern here is not a direct attack by antigovernment elements on an I(N)GO vehicle, but the vehicle being affected as a “bystander” in an attack on a primary target such as an international military convoy driving along the same road, e.g. being hit by pieces of shrapnel from the bomb or destroyed vehicle parts. Consequently, there is a general rule of keeping a long distance on the road from potential primary targets (military or governmental convoys). 235 Beside an increased use of armored vehicles, many I(N)GOs now prefer low-profile movement with any “treacherous” markings (like the name and logo of the organization or the big CODAN antenna

234

The Kabul roads for which some I(N)GOs now prescribe an armored vehicle due to increased risk of bombing attacks are, for example, the road to the airport as well as Jallalabad Road leading to ISAF Camp Warehouse. 235

For example, if a military convoy is near, drivers of I(N)GOs have been instructed to slow the car down or even stop on the side of the road until the convoy has passed. Since the military forces themselves also request a minimum distance from their vehicles to minimize the risk of a suicide car bomber approaching the convoy, this policy also reduces the risk of being shot at in an “act of self-defense”. There have been a number of cases where international soldiers fired warning shots on Afghan vehicles or even shot dead the driver when the vehicles came to close to the convoy. There also have been a few cases where warning shots were fired on clearly marked vehicles of I(N)GOs.

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typical of only international cars) removed from their vehicles.236 Given that primary targets of insurgents, such as soldiers from international military forces and staff of security firms, frequently use unmarked white cars similar to those of I(N)GOs, some organizations have also repainted their cars in another color or have switched to use the exact type of cars as the Afghan population.237 Regarding communication about a planned trip, many I(N)GOs that have security officers or risk managers, require staff to inform them one day before the actual travel. One interviewee also stated that she stopped telling many people (especially local staff) where she was intending to go to in advance. She would now rather say that she is “leaving for a trip” instead of naming the exact destination or time/way of travel. Also, some organizations require staff to inform their radio room during travel when they have passed certain points in order to keep track of where the vehicle / staff is positioned and thus start a search from there in case the staff do not arrive at their destination. Most I(N)GOs also have the policy that international staff are no longer allowed to drive by themselves but have to use the service of an Afghan driver. This is not only because of the deteriorated security but because car accidents, especially if they lead to human casualties, can lead to far larger complications and demands for blood money if the driver is a foreigner. 238 Related to accidents, international staff members are also advised to immediately inform their headquarters about the incident and “flee” from the scene at once if the victim of an accident they were involved in is likely to die. Otherwise they may risk being attacked or even killed on the spot by an angry mob of family members or bystanders. 239 As mentioned before, as the result of the Kabul riots in 2006, most (I)NGOs have removed all signs and posts from the street showing the presence of an office. While in many cases, these signs 236

This issue is disputed among security exports in the international community. On the one hand, being less visible may attract less attention and thus reduce the risk that one will “stand out” and be easily identified by political insurgents or criminals looking for a wealthy victim. Alternatively, soldiers of international forces or security firms drive in big unmarked cars and so removing the NGO’s name could result in a mistaken attack by insurgents who would not be against the work of NGO itself. 237

The most popular or widespread car in Afghanistan is the Toyota Corolla. More than half of the cars on Afghanistan streets are of this type, including virtually all white and yellow taxi cabs. Security warnings issued in 2006 and 2007 stating that one should look out for a white Toyota Corolla thus became a “running gag” among the international community, since this was as exclusive in Afghanistan as the warning regarding a “bearded man with black hair”. There were just too many of them…

238

In an extreme case where one international staff member of an IGO was involved in a car accident leading to the death of an Afghan man, the foreigner was arrested and kept in jail for several days. The family of the deceased issued death threats and intensive negotiations with various family members were required to come to agreement on the amount of the “blood money”. Eventually the IGO had to pay several thousand USDs to the family of the deceased. With the blood money issue settled, the official trial could start. The judge grabbed the opportunity to have inflammatory speeches against the ruthless driving and behavior of internationals in Afghanistan and the trial itself went on for several weeks. Once the trial was over and the staff member released, the headquarters of the IGO pulled him out of the country, fearing ongoing demands and threats from the family of the deceased. 239

If an Afghan person causes an accident and someone dies, the reaction is similar: The driver flees from the scene and hides, while elders of his family – sometimes accompanied by a local mullah – start to negotiate with the family of the victim about the blood money. The driver does not reappear until an agreement has been found and the case is officially settled.

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can still be found lying around somewhere in the compound, it is quite unlikely that any NGO will put them up again outside anytime soon. 240 With more and more districts considered high and extreme risk241 areas, the regions in which (I)NGOs are still working have become quite limited, due to security as both local and international staff can get robbed or worse when traveling into certain districts. Although most organizations have stricter regulations for international than national staff – with national staff being sent to areas which are already off-limits to foreigners – an interviewee from an IGO working also in the South stated that the deteriorated security situation led to fewer national staff being willing to go to certain districts. A number of interviewees from organizations working in areas with deteriorated security stated that they are trying to conclude ongoing projects but have decided against commencing new ones for the moment. Some of them stated that due to the high likelihood of corruption it would be futile to conduct projects without an ability to conduct proper monitoring. If I(N)GOs do continue to work in volatile areas, they often employ armed guards. One interviewee whose organization was working in Uruzgan stated that they are required to travel with armored vehicles and almost a dozen guards when they want go to the field. Similarly, almost all offices of I(N)GOs and an increasing number of official guest houses are now protected by armed guards. As the deteriorated security situation and the resulting restrictions imply an increased amount of stress and pressure on staff members, an increasing number of international (N)GOs offer “R&R” (special conditions aiming for regular “rest and recreation” outside Afghanistan) regulations for their international staff. These regulations usually include additional vacation days, sometimes along with subsidized travel to locations abroad (e.g. home country or nearby secure capitals like Dubai). They vary from organization to organization (from two or three times a year and on up to seven extra vacation days every six weeks). Long-term consultants who are paid by day often do not have specific R&R regulations in their contracts but are instead given the opportunity of an increased number of unpaid leave days.

240

Thus, finding the office of an organization for the first time is usually a mixture of asking for the exact address beforehand and asking guards or police in the respective street about the exact entrance.

241

According the September 2008 report of the UN Secretary General, about a quarter (“approximately 90 out of almost 400”) of all districts in Afghanistan are assessed as areas of extreme risk.

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VI. UPCOMING CHALLENGES Chapter Summary A series of likely developments in the coming months and years have the potential to worsen the situation in Afghanistan. In the short term, the likely increase in security incidents triggered by the deployment of additional international forces, as well as related to the upcoming presidential and parliamentarian elections, will pose a challenge in the near future. In the medium and long term, ongoing bad governance, increasing anger about the behavior and presence of foreigners in the country, population growth in combination with scarce resources and effects of global warming build potential for escalation of conflicts. Last but not least, the international community faces the risk of becoming morally trapped in Afghanistan if measures aimed at short term reduction of the insurgency increase the risk of an outbreak of a new civil war after the international presence is reduced.

The following possible future developments are likely to have a negative impact on the conflict situation within Afghanistan and thus can be seen as upcoming challenges. Early intervention and addressing the underlying problems may at least reduce these unfavorable consequences. The challenges are divided into two categories: Short-term challenges are those which will most likely come into effect in the next few months. Medium and long term challenges are those which are slowly building up, although sudden escalations are possible in some areas and so they may be seen already in the short term. a) SHORT-TERM CHALLENGES The deployment of additional international soldiers – especially the up to 30,000 US troops that were announced in the beginning of February 2009 – will lead to, at least in the short term, a significant increase of security incidents. It is also likely to fuel support for jihadists who already claim that international forces are occupying the country. The significant increase of troops bears the risk that attention may shift to an even greater extent to military action rather than civilian development. Calls to use military force to combat insurgents may be louder than those to address underlying root causes. Also, it may lead to an increase of civilian deaths which – apart from the human tragedy – will lead to further alienation of the population from the international presence and an increase in the insurgents’ ranks as surviving family members want to take revenge for their loss. It remains to be seen if the increase of troops will lead to an increase (through funding for security services or direct military operations) or decrease (through shifting these tasks to the enforcement agencies) in support for warlord structures, although an increase appears more likely in an attempt to “turn the wheel around” and strike back the Taliban militarily.

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The coming elections (presidential elections scheduled for 2009 and parliamentary elections for 2010) will also most likely lead to an increase of violence in the form of intimidation of government officials and supporting IGOs, and political assassination, as well as general security incidents to demonstrate the bad security situation and thus the necessity of postponing the elections. If resistance groups do manage to stop people from voting in parts of the country, even if elections can take place in other areas, the results based on these votes and thus the legitimacy of the elected candidates could be challenged. Last but not least, the election process may lead to an intensification of the political-military party conflicts, especially if political parties rally around individual presidential candidates and would then not accept if “their” candidate does not win the elections, potentially fearing that the “other” , winning candidate would exclude their members from official power positions and resources. b) MIDDLE AND LONG TERM If the severe weaknesses and failures of the official Afghan government such as the endemic corruption, inactivity and incompetence of staff and internal power struggles are not thoroughly addressed, the government might continue to loose support among the population. This will set a very low standard in comparison to insurgent groups who could easily present themselves as the “better alternative” on a regional level. The world-wide economic crisis is likely to have an effect on the total amount of international assistance that will be provided to developing countries, including Afghanistan. Although commitments like the Millennium Development Goals, in which donor countries promised to increase the funds for development aid, may slightly reduce this effect regarding governmental aid, international NGOs dependent on private funding are expected to decrease budgets for development work in the coming years. This may lead to an indirect strengthening of insurgent groups who consider development projects under the official government as a threat to their own support among the population. The combination of population growth, increasing scarcity of natural resources and negative impacts of deforestation and erosion is highly likely to lead to an increase of conflicts over natural resources (especially water) in the middle and long term. These conflicts are expected to then be instrumentalized by political players to fuel ethnic or regional tensions in order to mobilize followers. With its high dependence on agriculture and also the stronger impact natural disasters like floods have on the country’s environment, Afghanistan is particularly vulnerable to the effects of global warming, bringing additional hardship in the years to come. These effects will also worsen the above mentioned increasing scarcity of resources, especially water. The inability of Afghanistan’s economy and level of government income to finance a large army and police force (military experts assume that Afghan security forces need to be twice the size if not

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three times as big to actually have the potential to control the current insurgent threat) combined with the growing unwillingness of some ISAF nations to send and “sacrifice” their own soldiers is likely, sooner or later, to lead to the situation that international assistance would be reduced and Afghanistan would have to handle the security situation with less external support. Currently, the estimated costs for Afghan military and police forces alone (about $ 3.5 billion) are already about five times higher than the total government revenue of Afghanistan in 2007 (around $ 670 million). 242 Experts say that the number of Afghan national security forces would need to be at least doubled to have a significant impact, making it highly unrealistic that Afghan government revenue will be sufficient to finance such a large amount of security forces by itself any time soon. With limited capacity to combat or control insurgency and tensions, the only possibility of reducing the risk of more bloodshed is to reduce the overall amount of conflict potentials. Thus a change of strategy is needed to tackle the root causes and core problems on the local, national and international levels. This would include the strengthening of local structures for conflict transformation, the reduction / blocking of resources for illegal armed groups and the involvement of all regional stakeholders in the peace process, especially Pakistan, India, Iran and Russia. Otherwise, the international community risks to become “morally trapped” in Afghanistan due to the prevailing risk of a new outbreak of civil war (leading to Afghanistan becoming again a failed state, and destabilization of the region as well as vast human rights atrocities among the civilian population) without the bulwark of international military presence which would be target of ongoing attacks from insurgents. Currently, it seems that the approach to tackling the above dilemma by the US and ISAF is a shift toward empowering militias – a tactic that already proved to be problematic during the Soviet occupation. The approach has a high risk of creating/supporting warlord structures and conflicts between political parties. With the risk that these warlords would fall back into civil war and human rights atrocities as soon as the international presence is reduced, the problem of the international community being “trapped” in Afghanistan without an exit strategy remains or may even increase. In addition, this approach seems to lack a strategy for how these militias could eventually be demobilized and reintegrated into society Civilian casualties caused by US air strikes, and behavior of internationals considered disrespectful to local culture (especially night raids of international soldiers), are likely to lead to an increase in 242

“Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.“ See: Rubin, Barnett R. / Rashid, Ahmed : “From Great Game to Grand Bargain – Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan”; from Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008; http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20081001faessay87603/barnett-r-rubin-ahmed-rashid/from-great-game-to-grandOnline: bargain.html

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anger towards internationals, which may be further inflamed by conservatives and insurgents. This undermines good relationships between Afghans and foreigners and supports the legitimacy of the Taliban as keepers of virtue. It also bears the risk that development and reconstruction concepts could be declared “un-Islamic” – similar to the concept of empowerment of women being attributed to Communism during the Soviet occupation.

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CONCLUSIONS At this point it is difficult to assess how the situation in Afghanistan and the region will develop in 2009 and beyond. It has been only a short time since the new US president Barak Obama has officially commenced his work. The presidential elections for Afghanistan are scheduled for August 2009, although the deteriorating security situation raises doubts as to whether elections can take place in all parts of the country. Given Russia’s offer to Afghanistan for cooperation on defense, the relationship between Pakistan and India, and Pakistan’s own challenges in dealing with Islamic extremists and insurgents in the North-West Frontier Provinces, there are many elements currently in motion. The long list of conflicts, root causes and escalating factors in Afghanistan show the complexity of the situation. While considering negotiations with “the Taliban” may be a significant step toward reducing the current amount of violence, other conflict potentials need to be addressed in the process as well. There will not be “one solution” that will solve everything, everywhere. The very same approach can lead to rather good results in one area and to catastrophe in another. Fortunately, there are many different ways to improve the situation a little and avoid relying on any one approach which may not be applicable or “ripe” at the moment (i.e., because a certain conflicting party is not willing to negotiate at the current time). The challenge is, however, to coordinate these different possibilities, so that people working in different areas are aware of what is going on elsewhere and ideally what experiences others have had in similar situations. As tempting as the thought may be, peace can never be “imported”. Afghan ownership of the process is crucial. Yet the challenge remains, that a number of influential Afghan and international actors have incentives to maintain the current conflict situation rather than to see its resolution. These actors, however, are neither the majority nor are they homogenous. Allies for peacebuilding and conflict transformation can be found at each level, in each area and in each group. It may take some looking, some capacity building, some coordination and some time to find them– but they are there.

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ANNEX 1. THE IMPACT OF THE RELATIONSHIPS IRAN - SAUDI ARABIA – US ON AFGHANISTAN The following text was written by Andreas Wilde (MA in Iranian Studies). It was translated by the author of this assessment and reprinted here with Andreas Wilde’s permission.

As for the complex political Situation in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that all nations in the region, and particularly Afghanistan’s neighbors, have been involved in the conflict in one way or another. Among the regional powers Iran and Saudi-Arabia attempted to gain influence by supporting one or several conflicting parties in Afghanistan. In contrast to Pakistan the Iranian (and to an even greater extent the Saudi Arabian) influence in Afghanistan remained relatively limited. Riyadh and Teheran had their respective protégées who were supposed to provide the political means to influence ongoing events in Afghanistan, yet neither was able to effectively apply control in the Hindu Kush. For a long time, both countries were accused of leading a proxy war in Afghanistan. In this regard there is no doubt that Iran and Saudi Arabia can look back on a not untroubled relationship in the past. Prior to the revolution in Iran in 1978/78, the relations between Teheran and Riyadh were already a little tense. Before this revolution, Iran’s government was regarded as an ally of Washington and part of the strategic “Northern Tier” – a kind of bulwark against Soviet influence. 243 For years, Iran had been courted by Washington and it had been built up as regional “hegemon” in the Persian Gulf, a position the country assumed on Washington’s political map according to the Nixon Doctrine. This state of affairs changed after the Islamic Revolution. During the 1980s Washington backed Saudi Arabia as well as Iraq which had been at war with Iran since 1980. The political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are mainly related to religion and ideology. Tensions have increased since a part of the Shiite clergy assumed power [in Iran] after the revolution and also legitimated this power by religious and ideological means. Saudi Arabia is religiously dominated by the Wahabiya, an extreme puritan and fundamentalist branch of Islam which stems from a religious renewal movement emerging on the Arabian peninsular during the 18th and 19th century. Its followers condemn not only Shiites and Islamic mystics, but also any Sunni non-Wahabi school of thought, and consider them as non-Muslim. The revolution in Iran now brought such religious Shiite 243

See Reissner, Johannes (2008): Irans Selbstverständnis als Regionalmacht. Machtstreben im Namen antikolonialer Modernität, 8.

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authorities to power, leading to a situation where the new government of Iran was in fundamental political and religious-ideological contradiction with Saudi Arabia. Beside that, both nations were competitors due to their respective claims to supremacy in the Gulf region. This rivalry was first of all of a political and economic nature – with a religious-ideological dimension added after the Iranian revolution. It is a fact that Saudi Arabia has increased its influence on the Islamic world since the 1960s mainly based on its wealth in oil and the resulting influx of funds. This influence especially affected the cultural and social fields of numerous Arab states where the Islamization processes of the respective societies were supported by Riyadh. After the Iranian Revolution, the Saudis had reason to be concerned about their political and economic influence in the Middle East. They faced an antagonist who was religious-ideologically motivated and displayed a sense of mission, based on a will to extend its influence especially on the Shiite population in the region. In fact, Iranian policy makers took up the quest to have an influence on the Near East and looked for allies by selectively exporting the model of the Iranian revolution. In the beginning Iran was able to engage in Afghanistan to a far lesser extent than one might assume. Teheran was hindered in this regard by the long war against Iraq (1980-1988) which is now referred to as “the First Gulf War.” The support of Shiite resistance groups was kept at a minimum in order not to irritate Moscow. Nevertheless, Iran could not afford to leave Afghanistan entirely to Pakistani and American influence. In general, Iranian engagement from then on was motivated by these concerns and by anxiety about the growing influence of the US and its allies. Iran was pursuing three objectives in Afghanistan: 1. Limiting the influence of the axis of Washington-Riyadh-Islamabad and possibly strengthening Wahabi significance in the Afghan resistance; 2. Enhancing the position of the Afghan Shiites in the future distribution of power; 3. Installing a government with pro-Iranian attitudes in Kabul. The Afghan resistance was mainly carried out by Sunni (or to be more exact Sunni Pashtun) groups with close relations to Pakistan. Islamabad provided for the distribution of weapons and ammunition to the Afghan Mujahedin and offered safe havens. Saudi Arabia in alignment with other Arabic Gulf states was in charge of financing the resistance parties, 244 and provided particular support to the Ittihad-i Islami [led by Prof. Abdulraab Rasul Sayyaf]. With this financial backing from Saudi Arabia, the comparably small Ittihad-i Islami became a wealthy and influential group within the resistance.245

244

Rubin, Barnett (2002): The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Sec. Edition, 196-197. 245

Rubin, Barnett (2002): 220-221.

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Iran, on the other hand, favored the Shiite factions which later united with other Shiite groups into the Hizb-i Wahdat. These were supported in context of the exporting the model of the Iranian revolution. The revolutionary activity in the [predominantly Shiite] regions of central Afghanistan populated by Hazaras can be considered as a second example after Lebanon of the successful export of the Iranian model. One can only speculate over Saudi objectives in Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s as the Wahabiya had not had and still does not have a strong standing among the Afghan population. It is likely that by supporting the Ittihad-i Islami Riyadh wanted to strengthen its foothold within the Afghan resistance. The Saudi-Iranian tensions and competing claims for regional supremacy had a devastating impact in the 1990s. The antagonism led to tensions which dictated the continuation of the civil war for years to come. The secondary literature assumes a proxy war took place between Riyadh and Teheran, conducted via their allies in western Kabul where the biggest war damages occurred.246 However, this may be jumping to conclusions, since the foreign supporters found their Afghan allies to be unreliable: Hizb-i Wahdat forged an alliance with Pakistan’s favored Hizb-i Islami led by Hekmatyar, and, after the takeover of the Taliban, Ittehad-i Islami and Wahdat found themselves in the Northern Alliance. The fast pace and fluidity of alliances in Afghanistan reflect the fact that although Afghan parties needed their external patrons and financiers, they acted independently and according to their own interests at the time. However, an assumption that Iranian or Saudi influence was marginal would be equally premature. The Saudi-Iranian as well as the Iranian-Pakistan rivalry can be seen as a kind of trigger for the Afghan powder keg – and this is true despite that fact that neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran was able to bring to bear as much influence as Pakistan. Thus, the war in Afghanistan continued even after Saudi-Iranian relations relaxed during the government of the reform-oriented Iranian president Khatami (1996-2004). In the time of the Taliban, Saudi Arabia’s position became more ambiguous. Obviously, Riyadh’s strategy shifted in favor of the Taliban and to the detriment of its traditional protégé the Ittihad-i Islami. Paradoxically, the latter joined the Northern Alliance together with the proIranian Wahdat party, while Saudi Arabia started supporting the Taliban whose regime it officially recognized in 1997.

247

How the government in Riyadh bridged the gap between its former ally and

support for the Taliban is difficult to assess. Iran’s engagement in Afghanistan was always dominated by its enmity to the USA and political as well as ideological competition with Washington’s allies at the regional level. In addition, it claimed advocacy for the affairs of the Afghan Shiites vis-à-vis their Sunni counterparts. As mentioned before, 246

Ibid. 258, 264. 272-274; Schetter, Conrad (2003): Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan, 488. See also Harenberg Länderlexikon ’94/95, “Afghanistan“, 26. 247

Regarding the Saudi Arabian influence and the Wahabi mission in Afghanistan during the time of the Soviet occupation and the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia see Rashid, Ahmed (2000): Taliban. Afghanistans Gotteskrieger und der Dschihad, 224227, 316-329.

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Riyadh was always perceived as part of the axis of USA-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan. From the Iranian point of view, Saudi Arabia is an influential country, a “heavyweight” and a competitor. Yet, this rivalry and the so called “proxy war” of both nations has never been decisive for war or peace in Afghanistan – they have only added a dimension to the conflict. In the meantime, Iran has advanced to become one of the biggest and most important donor countries for Afghanistan, exerting significant influence in the border town of Herat in regard to the economy and the improvement of the infrastructure. American accusations that Iran was supporting the Taliban with weapons turned out to be untenable.248 Iran itself increasingly feels militarily encircled by the USA (US troops are based in the Gulf region, in Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan). The Karzai government has promised Iran that Afghanistan will not become a launching pad for American troops to organize a military campaign against Iran. This consideration is gaining increasing significance against the backdrop of President Ahmadinejad’s announcements regarding Israel, Iran’s hotly debated nuclear program, and Washington’s threats to consider military options including air strikes. The question remains to what extent Karzai can keep this promise in the worst case of an actual US military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. Because it is still dependent on the presence of western troops, the Afghan government’s room to maneuver is limited. The Iranians, who perceive Afghanistan as a kind of bridgehead towards central Asia, are aware of this. At the moment, the Iranian-Afghan relationship appears to be rather relaxed. However the future relationship is dependent on the pace of President Obama and his plans to settle the nuclear conflict with Teheran. In May 2007 Afghanistan witnessed the consequences of Iran’s actions: Iranian efforts toward an immediately return of Afghan refugees triggered a political earthquake in Afghanistan, after which the Afghan Parliament withdrew its confidence from two ministers in Karzai’s government. Akbar Akbar, the minister for refugee issues had to resign; the Foreign Minister Spanta was kept in office by Karzai against a [disputed] resolution of the parliament. Whether this action by Iran was a pinprick to destabilize Afghanistan politically remains open to question. It does show, however, that Iranian actions are not without effects on Afghanistan. References: Harenberg Länderlexikon ’94/95: “Afghanistan”. (Dortmund: Harenberg Lexikon Verlag), 2527. Rashid,

Ahmed

(2000):

Taliban.

Afghanistans

Gotteskrieger

(München:Drömer)

248

Wilde, Andreas (2006):“Irans neue Politik in Afghanistan”, in Inamo 48 (4), 20-21.

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und

der

Dschihad.

CONFLICT ASSESSMENT AFGHANISTAN

Reissner, Johannes (2008): Irans Selbstverstädnis als Regionalmacht. Machtstreben im Namen antikolonialer Modernität. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. Berlin. Rubin, Barnett (2002): The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Sec. Edition. (New Haven/London: Yale University Press). Schetter, Conrad (2003): Ethnizität und ethnische Konflikte in Afghanistan. (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag). Wilde, Andreas (2006):“Irans neue Politik in Afghanistan”, in Inamo 48 (4), 20-21.

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2. ISAF MAP (DECEMBER 1, 2008) Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afganistan_prt_rc.jpg

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