China s growing presence in the Caribbean

Collection* of Internet articles (2007-2011) on: China’s growing presence in the Caribbean Contents China’s presence in Dominica By: Sir Ronald Sande...
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Collection* of Internet articles (2007-2011) on:

China’s growing presence in the Caribbean Contents China’s presence in Dominica By: Sir Ronald Sanders, April 28, 2011

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Why is China spending billions in the Caribbean? By: Ezra Fieser, GlobalPost, April 22, 2011

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With Aid and Migrants, China Expands Its Presence in a South American Nation By Simon Tomero, New York Times, April 10, 2011

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Guyana, China engage in multiple agreements, from health care to training The Guyana Press, March 31, 2011

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The Growing Economic Presence of China in the Caribbean (Weblink) By: Richard L. Bernal, January 2011

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China moves to deepen ties By: Louis B. Homer, Trinidad Express, January 23, 2011

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The Dragon in the Caribbean: China-CARICOM Economic Relations (Abstract) By: Richard L. Bernal, 2010

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China Statement to Caribbean Development Bank BOG-40 By: Mr. Du Jinfu, May 2010

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Jamaica, China sign US$500m investment pact Jamaica Gleaner, February 5, 2010

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China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother By: Daniel Erikson, The Jamestown Foundation, December 16, 2009

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China’s influence growing in Latin America and the Caribbean By Dr. Odeen Ishmael, July 1, 2009

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China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean By: Sebastian Castaneda, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs

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China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (Weblink) By: Government of the People’s Republic of China, November 5, 2008

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Settling the China Question: A Caribbean Challenge By: Sir Ronald Sanders, May 5, 2008

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China pledges more support to Caribbean region From: Xinhua, September 9, 2007

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* This collection is limited to: (1) recent articles (2007-2011), (2) in the English language, (3) concerning mainly the CARICOM subregion.

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China's presence in Dominica By: Sir Ronald Sanders, April 28, 2011 http://www.caribbean360.com/index.php/opinion/389630.html#axzz1L32altQl http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A--China%27s-presence-in-Dominica-6189.html

The Caribbean island of Dominica is fast becoming a living example of the way that China has strengthened its influence by moving into countries that the United States and other Western nations have neglected. According to a white paper on China's foreign aid issued by China’s State Council on April 21, by the end of 2009 China had aided 161 countries and more than 30 international and regional organizations, including 123 developing countries. Of them, 30 are in Asia, 51 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 in Oceania and 12 in Eastern Europe. Asia and Africa, home to the largest poor population, have got about 80% of China's foreign aid. While the US has been preoccupied with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the so-called ‘war on terror’, paying little attention to its immediate neighbourhood, the Chinese have established a presence throughout the Caribbean that, in large part, is regarded as beneficial to the people. In Dominica’s case, in 2004 the government there broke long-held diplomatic relations with Taiwan to recognize the People’s Republic of China and sign-on to a policy of ‘one China’ – the code for agreeing with the Chinese government that there is only "One China" and Taiwan is an inalienable part of it. On the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Chinese promised to undertake infrastructural development projects totalling over US$100 million – all of it grants. Four projects were specifically identified: a sports stadium; a new grammar school; the rehabilitation of the major road connecting the capital, Roseau, to the second major town, Portsmouth; and the rehabilitation of the island’s major medical facility, the Princess Margaret Hospital. The Chinese have, so far, fulfilled their undertakings on three of these projects. The stadium is built and in use, two phases of the school are complete, and work has started on the Roseau-Portsmouth road including the construction of miles of wall along the sea to help contain coastal erosion. Only the hospital project is pending and no one doubts that the Chinese will fulfil that commitment. It should be pointed out that European Union (EU) is also helping with the rehabilitation and widening of the road from Dominica’s Melville Hall Airport to Roseau. A significant difference in the EU and Chinese road projects is that the EU is employing Dominican workers while the Chinese use Chinese labour exclusively. While it might have been felt that the local population might have favoured the EU project, employing local labour, over the Chinese project that employs only Chinese, this is seemingly not the case. Albeit a small number of people, asked about the Chinese not employing local labour, responded by saying that they were more interested in the projects, particularly the road, sea wall and hospital than they were in the jobs. They added that they were getting the projects for free. Of course the latter observation is not entirely true. In return for their economic assistance, the Chinese government secures a “one-China policy” from the Dominican government in international organisations. This support is replicated from all the other small, Caribbean countries to which China provides similar help. The isolation of Taiwan and its non-recognition as a state continues to be an 2

important element of China’s foreign policy. But, it may well be that, in the not too distant future, the Chinese government will insist on support for other – and new – aspects of both its domestic and foreign policy. In fairness, it should be noted that in a White Paper on Foreign Aid, the Chinese government has listed as one of its Eight Principles for economic aid and technical assistance to other countries that “the Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual”. China has been declaring that position since 1964. Another consequence of relations with China is a gradual influx of Chinese into the local population. It is striking that far more retail shops in Roseau are now operated by Chinese than used to be the case. However, while this competition may trouble local retailers, people in the street point to less expensive products sold by the Chinese that they find affordable. And, in any event, while the number of Chinese retailers – and food outlets – is growing, the overall Chinese population is not yet large enough to create an outcry. If China is welcome in Dominica and other small Caribbean countries, it is because China has filled a void left by the United States and other Western nations. Over the last decade, US assistance to the Caribbean region has dwindled except in the area of interest to the US – security including drug trafficking. Little attention has been paid to the interests of the region for infrastructural development, improving education and health facilities, and laying the foundations for investment that could produce employment and technical know-how. Canada provided US$1.82 million from 2008 to 2009 for projects, but its development agency, CIDA, notes that “there are no long term bilateral projects planned in this country”. The EU collectively stands out, among Western countries, as maintaining assistance to Dominica. That assistance goes beyond resurfacing the airport road to include a range of infrastructural projects, including improvement of the Melville Hall Airport. EU money also provides budgetary support to the Dominica government. But, while EU support has undoubtedly contributed to Dominica’s welfare, the island’s loss of its preferential banana market in the EU significantly hurt its economy and put hundreds of small farmers out of business. The difference between the EU and China, is that the EU does not tie its aid to support for EU foreign policy – an advantage, perhaps, in dealing with a collective of 27 nations whose policies are not directed by the interests of any one nation. For all this, Dominica’s physical infrastructure - roads and bridges – has made great strides, and it is helping the country’s economy. Poverty fell from 39 per cent in 2003 to 28.8 per cent in 2009, and absolute poverty declined from 10 per cent in 2003 to 3.1 per cent in 2009. However, the International Monetary Fund has observed that more than 30 per cent of the labour force has emigrated, and per capita GDP of about US$4,931 is low. Nonetheless, Dominica is an unspoiled and naturally beautiful country with all the potential of becoming the world’s leading Eco-tourism destination. It is to that potential that this column will turn next week. Sir Ronald Sanders is a business executive and former Caribbean diplomat who publishes widely on small states in the global community. Reponses to: www.sirronaldsanders.com

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Why is China spending billions in the Caribbean? By: Ezra Fieser, GlobalPost (Boston, MA, USA), April 22, 2011 http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/110325/china-caribbean-investment-tourism

The Caribbean lacks commodities, it's not a major producer of raw materials and it has relatively little buying power. Yet China is investing billions there. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic — After the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2005, it received a token of appreciation from the mainland Chinese government: a $55 million cricket stadium. It was part of $132 million China doled out to Caribbean countries in aid and soft loans in the years leading up to the 2007 Cricket World Cup. At the time, the investment was seen as a not-so-subtle reward to countries that had broken off formal relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing. Ever since, China has made that sum look like pittance. The Beijing government and private Chinese corporations are spending billions in the Caribbean, building major tourism projects, financing roads and ports and buying companies — all of which are helping open new markets for Chinese products. The onslaught has cash-strapped Caribbean governments simultaneously praising China as a welcome benefactor and questioning what the country wants in exchange. “Nearly every island in the Caribbean, from the smallest on up, currently has a substantial investment from China,” said David Jessop, managing director of the Caribbean Council, a Londonbased consultancy that works with Caribbean governments. “It seems that what nobody knows is what is motivating China.” The total investment is difficult to quantify. China’s Ministry of Commerce reported that foreign direct investment in Caribbean countries by Chinese firms totaled nearly $7 billion in 2009, a more than 300 percent increase from the 2004 foreign direct investment of $1.7 billion. Those figures are somewhat misleading because of Chinese use of Caribbean tax havens — such as the Cayman Islands, which received $5.3 billion in Chinese foreign direct investment in 2009. That aside, Caribbean islands have clearly been the recipients of investment by both Chinese firms and the government of the People’s Republic of China, which is financing some of the Caribbean's most notable, and largest, projects. The boldest broke ground last month: The Chinese government's Export-Import Bank is putting $2.4 billion toward the construction of a 3,800-room resort in the Bahamas that will boast the largest casino in the Caribbean. Roughly 5,000 Chinese workers will be brought in to construct the Baha Mar resort on Cable Beach. Others projects recently agreed to or completed by Chinese firms or the government include: • •

A 2011 commitment by Beijing to build a $600 million deep-sea harbor, highway and port in Suriname that will link the country to its natural resource rich southern neighbor, Brazil. A $462 million cash infusion in a stalled beachfront resort, known as Punta Perla, on the Dominican Republic's east coast. Dominican Minister of Tourism Francisco Javier García Fernandez said he hoped the agreement would bring more investment from China to the Caribbean’s most visited country.

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The construction and operation of a $1 billion container port in Freeport, the Bahamas, just 60 miles from Florida, by Hong Kong-based conglomerate Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. A $17 million cricket stadium and $122 million in economic assistance from the Chinese government to Dominica, a country of less than 73,000 people and less than one-fifth the size of Rhode Island. A $100 million purchase of a majority stake in Omai Bauxite Mining from the government of Guyana by Chinese mining company Bosai Minerals Group. Bauxite is a sedimentary rock from which aluminum is extracted. The construction of Trinidad & Tobago's prime minister's official residence and the National Academy for the Performing Arts by the Shanghai Construction Co.

The number and magnitude of investments has left some mystified. At a recent dinner between Caribbean leaders and a Chinese delegation, Jamaican officials asked, “‘What does China want from us?’” a person who was at the meeting told GlobalPost. “That’s the big question that everyone has about this: Why?” Caribbean governments have welcomed the investment — particularly the development aid — partially because other sources have dried up. For example, aid from the United States to members of CARICOM — a bloc of 15 Caribbean states and five associate Caribbean countries — has been falling since the 1980s, said Richard Bernal, former Jamaican ambassador to the U.S. and current director for the Caribbean at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington. “What you are seeing in the Caribbean from China was mainly economic aid at first and now it’s starting to diversify into other areas, like tourism," he said. Bernal believes China's motivation for targeting the Caribbean is diplomatic. “There are few countries around the world that have maintained ties with Taiwan, and 12 of them are in Central America or the Caribbean,” he said. Of the 23 countries to keep formal diplomatic ties with Taipei, six are in the Caribbean: Belize, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent. China’s ambassador to Barbados, Wei Qiang, told GlobalPost that China has no interest in competing with other world powers in the Caribbean. Rather, it sees the islands as fellow developing countries and potential partners. “The Caribbean countries form an important part of the developing countries world, so to speak. One pillar of China’s foreign policy is to increase the unity with fellow developing countries. In that sense, the Caribbean is a fundamental part of that strategy,” he said. But it appears China has received little in return. Unlike other regions that China has targeted, like Africa and South America, the Caribbean largely lacks the commodities the rising superpower craves. The Caribbean is not a major producer of raw materials or food. Tourism is almost universally the economic driver. And with relatively little buying power — the total population of the 39 islands is about 40 million, about 3 percent of China’s population — the Caribbean will not be a major importer of China’s goods. Take Grenada. Among the Spice Island’s largest exports are nutmeg, cloves, ginger and cinnamon, hardly the basis of the Chinese economic expansion. Its population is under 110,000. China has 655 cities of at least 100,000 people, according to a 2010 report by Deloitte. 5

Yet, the island has seen an influx of Chinese money since the building of the cricket stadium in 2007. “The Chinese government and private companies are stepping in finance projects, big projects, that were stalled due to the recession,” said Richard Simon, press secretary to Prime Minister Tillman Thomas. Simon could not name the projects because the sides are still negotiating terms. “We believe that the relationship with the People’s Republic of China can only grow. China will be the main country to deal with going forward,” he said. Aside from those major investments, Simon said Chinese business owners are opening convenience stores and restaurants. “On the streets, you’re seeing a presence that you didn’t see just a few years ago.” The warming relationship has benefited Chinese companies, Ambassador Qiang said, but “these are small markets and small countries and we don’t have huge amounts of trade in terms of volume. From the point of view of diversification of our foreign trade partners, we think all these markets are worth working on as far as we can.” Residents of the islands seem to have a different take. Tomas Lora, who drives a cab in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, said a few months ago the company he drives for upgraded its vehicles to a fleet that looks and rides like a Toyota. “It’s not, it’s a Chinese car,” he said. “You wouldn’t know the difference because it looks like a Corolla. But they say it costs about half as much as a Toyota.” “You’re seeing Chinese products everywhere in the last few years,” he said. “It’s all ‘Made in China.’” Also on GlobalPost: China considers building rival to Panama Canal Colombia and China are in talks about building a so-called “dry canal.” The project would consist of about 250 miles of railroad linking Colombia’s Pacific coast to a new Atlantic port that would be built near the city of Cartagena. February 22, 2011, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/china/110221/panama-canal-trade-china

With Aid and Migrants, China Expands Its Presence in a South American Nation By Simon Tomero, New York Times, April 10, 2011 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/world/americas/11suriname.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 Ranu Abhelakh contributed reporting. A version of this article appeared in print on April 11, 2011, on page A4 of the New York edition

Paramaribo, Suriname — The Foreign Ministry’s elegant new headquarters here is a gift from the Chinese government. Chinese signs on hundreds of businesses, from casinos to grocery shops and furniture stores, beckon the residents of this capital. Chinese work crews are paving roads cutting through the jungle. Anchored by a surge in immigration to this country since the 1990s, and smoothed with gifts of aid and low-interest loans, China has quietly but surely established a foothold in Suriname, a tiny corner of South America that is often an afterthought even for its neighbors.

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While the economic aid has certainly been welcome in Suriname, formerly known as Dutch Guiana, the growing political and demographic profile of the Chinese here has created concerns, ranging from xenophobic calls from some political leaders here to investigate what they call a “Chinese invasion” to more tempered efforts to decipher what effect China’s rising influence will have on a country that is already distant linguistically and culturally from the rest of South America. “What’s next, Chinese Guiana?” asked John Gimlette, a Briton whose book, “Wild Coast,” about the forgotten corner of the world on South America’s northeastern shoulder — Guyana, French Guiana and Suriname — was published this year. China, which has built an embassy compound here that dwarfs the aging United States Embassy, insists that it has no plans to make Suriname into a de facto colony. Instead, China portrays its growing clout here as a reflection of solidarity with another developing nation. Still, Chinese officials acknowledge that Suriname, which is about the size of Florida but with a much smaller population, about 500,000, is rich in potential. “Suriname is a lucky country, such small population, so much land,” said Yuan Nansheng, the Chinese ambassador to Suriname, in an interview. China, which enjoyed warm ties with previous Surinamese leaders, has also nurtured a close relationship with President Desi Bouterse, a controversial figure who until his election by Parliament last year was a fugitive from Interpol because of a 1999 cocaine trafficking conviction in the Netherlands. Mr. Yuan said that he met with Mr. Bouterse at least once a month, about the same pace of meetings he had with Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, where he served as ambassador before coming to Suriname. Mr. Yuan said China had no problem with the questions surrounding Mr. Bouterse’s past, even as the president also remains on trial for the killing of 15 top opponents in the 1980s, when he installed a military government here after taking part in a coup. “Of course, we would like to invite Mr. Bouterse to China,” Mr. Yuan said. Meanwhile, though precise figures are hard to obtain, China is also thought to have emerged as the top provider of aid to Suriname after the Netherlands conveniently ended important aid disbursements here around the time of Mr. Bouterse’s election last year. Aside from the new Foreign Ministry building, designed and built by Chinese companies, China’s aid to Suriname includes military assistance, construction of low-income housing, a plan to derive renewable energy from rice husks, help for shrimp farming and an upgrade of the state television network. China’s expanded presence can easily be glimpsed just by driving out of Paramaribo into the countryside. Chinese laborers from one company, China Dalian International, which is upgrading Suriname’s roads, toil under the hot sun. They live in roadside camps carved out of surrounding forest. In parts of Suriname, concerns over whether some Chinese laborers illegally stay past the end of their visas has led to debate over whether Chinese companies should be allowed to bring their own workers to the country, possibly depriving some Surinamese of jobs.

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In one example, a Chinese palm oil project in the eastern province of Marowijne prompted calls by Ronnie Brunswijk, a leader of Suriname’s Maroons, who are descended from escaped slaves, for Chinese employment in the area to be limited to management positions. More broadly, the arrival over the past two decades of thousands of new Chinese immigrants is generating debate over the influx’s effect. Some here see positive results. “They invest in every corner of the country,” said Noel Hassankhan, a restaurant owner, referring to Chinese food stores. “They offer an assortment of products, cheap prices, and stay open until late in the evening.” Estimates vary over the numbers of Chinese now in Suriname, but China’s embassy puts the figure at about 40,000, or nearly 10 percent of the population, including legal and illegal migrants. Others, citing scandals over illegally obtained residence permits, say the numbers could be higher. As in other parts of the world that have recently attracted Chinese immigrants, notably in Africa, many of the new arrivals are traders or small-business owners. In parts of Paramaribo and towns in the interior, Chinese food stores can now be found on nearly every block. These immigrants face numerous challenges. Many opt to bypass Dutch, the official language, communicating with customers and employees in Sranan Tongo, a Creole language that makes heavy use of English. Chinese shop owners and their families are also exposed to violent crime, including robbery and murder. “We need the steel bars to protect us,” said Lin Yubo, 25, the Chinese owner of a general store in Atjoni, a village in the interior. He and his wife, who arrived in Suriname five years ago, live in their store behind a metal barricade. “This is life in the bush,” he said. Suriname’s growing Chinese community supports two daily newspapers and a new television station with 15 employees that broadcasts each day in Mandarin. “Suriname is a gateway to both South America and the Caribbean, so its Chinese population has grown fast,” said Thomson Cheung, 57, the station’s director, who came to Suriname in the 1970s. Chinese emigration to Suriname is nothing new. The first Chinese contract laborers arrived in the mid-19th century, and many Chinese in later generations intermarried with mixed-race Creoles. But the recent influx of thousands more has been more notable, in part, because many of the new arrivals are visibly involved in commerce, standing in contrast to Brazilians, Suriname’s other fastgrowing immigrant group, who work largely at remote gold mines in the interior. Some immigration specialists, citing estimates for Chinese immigration elsewhere in South America, say concerns over China’s influence here is overblown. Canadian and American companies, for instance, remain important players in Suriname’s mining industry. In absolute terms, they point out, more Chinese have moved to neighboring countries like Brazil and Venezuela. But Suriname’s size means that the influx is impossible to ignore. “Suriname is basically a village with a seat in the United Nations,” said Paul Tjon Sie Fat, a Surinamese scholar in the Netherlands who has written widely on China’s influence in Suriname. “Any small change in the ethnic or class balance is immediately noticed.”

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Guyana, China engage in multiple agreements, from health care to training The Guyana Press, March 31, 2011 http://www.guyanapress.com/archives/6009

Guyana’s bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China were further strengthened yesterday with the signing of agreements to boost priority projects in the areas of transportation, health care, training and culture. The inking of the agreements by Foreign Affairs Minister Carolyn RodriguesBirkett, Finance Minister Dr. Ashni Singh, and China’s Assistant Commerce Minister Li Rongcan was part of the Eleventh Session for the Guyana/China Joint Commission on Economic Trade and Technical Cooperation. Minister Rodrigues-Birkett, addressing the delegation, pointed out that through a joint commission, the two countries have been able to concretise measures to promote programmes of functional cooperation. This year marks the 27th Anniversary of the Guyana/China Joint Commission. While noting that the consistent substantial contribution from China towards Guyana’s national development remains a tangible one, Minister Rodrigues-Birkett stated that it also demonstrates south/south cooperation and the country’s unwavering commitment to supporting small developing states.

The Growing Economic Presence of China in the Caribbean By: Richard L. Bernal, January 2011

Paper presented at the IMF/UWI Conference on “The Caribbean Challenges after the Global Crisis”, Barbados, January 27-28, 2011. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/carib/pdf/bernal2.pdf

China moves to deepen ties By: Louis B. Homer, Trinidad Express, January 23, 2011 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/___China_moves_to_deepen_ties-114464534.html

Deepening of bilateral trade between China and Trinidad and Tobago is high on the list of activities between the two countries, said Yong You Ming, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China. He said between January and September last year China exported US$360 million to Trinidad, while Trinidad exported over US$100 million. A large portion of the trade between the two countries came from the sale of asphalt and related products. He said in addition to trade, China has developed a programme in the field of culture to develop some of the talents in Trinidad and Tobago. "I would like to mention marshal arts in particular where a group of talented performers went to China and acquitted themselves creditably". The Ambassador said China's foreign policy includes the promotion of culture as well as developing friendly ties to bring about peace and stability. He said: "Just recently US President Obama, in a speech welcoming China's President, said the US welcomes China's rise as a strong, prosperous and successful member of the International community."

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He said China continues to play a pivotal role in world technology which includes the manufacture of the world's fastest trains as well as super computers. He added, based on continued mutual respect and mutual benefits, China's direction in world affairs is set to bring about peace and progress among all nations. The Ambassador's remarks were made yesterday as he attended the Chinese New Year festival organised by the Chung Shan Association in Port of Spain. President of the Association, Joseph Tai Chew, in his address said the recent visit of members from Chung Shan helped to deepen and widen relations with Chinese community in countries outside of China. Next year a contingent of Chungshanese are expected to meet in San Francisco for the biannual convention of Chungshanese. On February 3, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar is expected to host a dinner to commemorate China's New Year festival.

The Dragon in the Caribbean: China-CARICOM Economic Relations By: Richard L. Bernal In: The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 99: 408, 2010, pp. 281-302 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a922732054~frm=titlelink

Abstract In recent years the People's Republic of China has expanded its economic relations with CARICOM. This is evident in the increase in trade and development assistance. The objective of this article is to explain the expanded and intensified economic presence of China in the CARICOM region. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to identify the motives for China's conduct in the region and the factors that account for the receptivity of CARICOM to economic relations with China. Although the focus is primarily on the economic relationship between China and the CARICOM countries, this aspect of China's involvement in the region cannot be separated from the political dimension. China's motives for a growing presence in the region are both economic and political and have to be examined in the wider context of China's overall foreign policy, its shifting world view, its superpower status and the geo-politics of the current global conjuncture. Similarly, CARICOM's conduct has to be located in the wider context of its overall foreign policy. The first section outlines the history and current status of China-CARICOM relations. This is followed by an exposition of the extent and increase in economic interaction between China and CARICOM. The third section provides an examination of China's motives for the conduct of its foreign policy in the CARICOM countries. These motives are partly influenced by economics and partly by politics and hence have to be understood in the global geo-political context. A fourth section is devoted to explaining CARICOM's receptivity to increased economic relations with China. The final section provides a brief outlook for China-CARICOM economic relations.

China Statement to Caribbean Development Bank BOG-40 By: Mr. Du Jinfu, the Temporary Governor for the People’s Republic of China th Statement at the 40 Annual Board of Governors Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank, Nassau, The Bahamas, May 19-20, 2010 http://www.caribank.org/titanweb/cdb/webcms.nsf/AllDoc/E7DD68FE9C79A1EB04257729004EFDBA?OpenDo cument

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Mr. Chairman, Mr. President, Fellow Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to attend the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). Please allow me to thank the Government of the Bahamas for organising the CDB Annual Meeting, so that we can gather in the beautiful city of Nassau and enjoy the hospitality of the Bahamian people. Our gratitude also goes to the Management of CDB for the excellent programme. This year marks the fortieth anniversary of the founding of CDB. On behalf of the Chinese Government, I would like to congratulate CDB on the achievements made in all these years. Severe earthquakes hit Haiti this January, inflicting heavy casualties and property losses. Taking this opportunity, I would like to convey condolences and sympathies to the people of Haiti on behalf of the Chinese people. After the earthquake, the Chinese Government acted promptly in providing humanitarian aid to Haiti. Up until now, China has delivered USD15 million worth of financial assistance and emergency supplies to Haiti. We appreciate CDB’s timely and active participation in the quake relief in Haiti. In 2009, the international financial crisis impacted the Caribbean in many ways. Export, tourism and remittances have dwindled to various extents. As an important multilateral development bank in this region, CDB has taken a series of short-term and long-term measures tailored to the development needs of the Caribbean, playing a positive role in mitigating the impacts of the crisis and helping its regional countries weather their worst time. CDB still faces various challenges. China supports CDB’s effort to play a more important role in advancing regional development. Currently, we are very glad that the Board of Directors of CDB has reached an agreement on a General Capital Increase of 150%. Sufficient lending capacity and adequate capital are very important for CDB to play a better role. We hope that CDB could further enhance its capacity and accomplish the goals outlined in the Bank's 2010-2014 Strategic Plan. Ladies and Gentlemen, as always, China values the friendly cooperation with the Caribbean, respects the development pattern that the Caribbean countries have chosen based on regional and domestic realities, and supports the concerted pursuit of development and regional integration in the Caribbean. Recent years have seen frequent exchange of high-level visits, expansion of economic and trade cooperation and closer multilateral cooperation between China and the Caribbean countries. Though affected by the financial crisis, China-Caribbean trade reached USD5.5 billion, and foreign direct investment from China to the Region posted USD8.6 billion in 2009. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises have also taken an active part in economic activities and investment projects, making contributions to development of the Region. We also hope to further enhance cooperation with CDB, strengthen economic and trade ties through this platform, and share the fruits and experiences of China’s development with the Caribbean countries. Last but not least, I am glad to let you know that the World Expo 2010 was opened in Shanghai on May 1, 2010. The Caribbean Pavilion, with its unique beauty, has become a tourist attraction in the Expo. I sincerely invite you all to visit the Shanghai World Expo, and share the joy of the Chinese people. Thank you!

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Jamaica, China sign US$500m investment pact Jamaica Gleaner, February 5, 2010 http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20100205/business/business4.html

The governments of Jamaica and China have signed agreements valued at more than US$500 million (J$4.5 billion) for road, housing and other projects, including the construction of a Chinese Garden at the Hope Botanic Gardens. Prime Minister Bruce Golding this week led a delegation to China, now Asia's dominant economic power-house -- eclipsing Japan -- in search of capital. An official meeting between Golding and China's Premier Wen Jiabao preceded the signing of the agreements Wednesday at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, a release from the Jamaican delegation said, by Jamaica's Foreign Minister Dr Ken Baugh, and the vice-minister from China's Ministry of Commerce, Fu Ziying, and the chairman and president of the EXIM Bank of China, Li Ruogu. No timetable was given for deployment of the funds, nor the nature of the financing, but the new capital will be poured into the construction of 'affordable' housing, road repair and rehabilitation, shoreline protection, and rehabilitation of the Palisadoes strip that leads to the Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston. Golding told the Chinese business community that his aim is to establish a new phase of relations between Jamaica and China with the intention of marketing Jamaica as a preferred investment destination, the statement said. The delegation also did hard sells on several initiatives, including prospects for coffee farming in the Blue Mountains, and the distribution and warehousing hub to be developed at Caymanas Estate on the edge of Kingston -- targeted at far-flung countries in Asia as a transit point for trade with South America and elsewhere in this hemisphere. Golding was due to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Vice-president Xi Jinping, before departure. The group, which includes Industry Minister Karl Samuda, returns to Jamaica Saturday.

China in the Caribbean: The New Big Brother By: Daniel Erikson, The Jamestown Foundation, December 16, 2009 http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35848&tx_ttnews%5Bba ckPid%5D=25&cHash=83aaa0f966

When Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) Wu Banggou arrived in the Bahamas in early September 2009 on the second leg of his Americas tour, it quickly became clear that he was not on vacation. As China’s top legislator and the highest-ranking member of the Chinese government to ever visit the Bahamas, Chairman Wu's entourage included 150 Chinese officials and business leaders. The delegation signed a series of critical economic deals, including an agreement for mutual protection of Chinese and Bahamian investors, a multi-million dollar loan to help build a highway to Nassau’s international airport, and additional support for a major cricket stadium under construction (Caribbean Net News, September 10).The visit was hailed as a major diplomatic event by the Caribbean press, while Chinese media emphasized that the two sides were ready to intensify exchanges and that the Bahamas “would unswervingly stick to the ‘One 12

China’ policy” (Xinhua News Service, September 5). In 2008, bilateral trade between the two countries had surged to $386 million, more than double the year before, and sustained growth was expected in 2009 despite the onslaught of the global financial crisis (CaribbeanPressReleases.com, September 5). Chairman Wu was greeted warmly by Bahamian Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham, who had overseen the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the Bahamas in 1997, during a previous term in office. Indeed, as this rising Asian power becomes more deeply engaged with the tiny micro-states of the Caribbean, China is positioning itself to be an increasingly influential actor in a distant part of the world traditionally attached to its principal rival, the United States. At first glance, China and the Caribbean would appear to have few interests in common. China, with a population of over 1.3 billion, has undertaken an impressive economic expansion that has earned it renewed recognition as a global power. The sovereign states of the English-speaking Caribbean consist of small, micro-states with sluggish levels of economic growth. This region of 12 countries includes the island nations of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago—as well as Belize, which is located on the Atlantic Coast of the Central American isthmus, and Guyana, which is located east of Venezuela along the northern coast of South America. The global financial crisis that began in the United States in late 2008 has devastated the Caribbean economies, and muddied the prospects for the region's future growth. While China has been both a primary driver and beneficiary of world economic growth, the Caribbean has, for the most part, been a reactor to it. It is this difference that makes China an alluring, yet potentially dangerous economic partner. Trade and Strategic Issues Trade between China and the Caribbean has expanded dramatically in recent years. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade between China and the Caribbean Community (also known as CARICOM, this 15-member regional grouping includes all the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean plus poverty-stricken Haiti, the former Dutch colony of Suriname, and the tiny British territory of Montserrat) grew by a factor of 100 between 1990 and 2008, from a paltry $20 million to over $2 billion [1]. Antigua and Barbuda is China’s top trading partner in CARICOM, with trade worth about $600 million reported in 2008. Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Dominica round out China’s top five CARICOM trading partners. For these nations, trade with China is surely a boon, but because China has little demand for their products or services, trade is heavily one-sided. In 2008, 93 percent of CARICOM-China trade came in the form of Chinese exports to the region. Only Dominica approached a balance of trade, exporting over $60 million in goods to China in that year. In the last ten years, Chinese exports have consistently made up more than 70 percent of total trade (IMF Trade Statistics Directory). This imbalance is cause for concern but is more indicative of the severe economic imbalance that plagues the Sino-Caribbean relationship. Chinese-state affiliated companies have also made significant investments in Caribbean infrastructure, especially Hutchison Whampoa Limited, the Hong Kong-based conglomerate whose chairman, Li Ka-shing, is known to have strong links to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Active with port concessions on both ends of the Panama Canal, Hutchison Whampoa established a fully operational $2.6 billion port facility in Freeport, Bahamas in 2001 (Washington Times, November 20, 2001). This past fall, unconfirmed rumors swirled through the Caribbean that the company is in the process of purchasing the Grand Bahama Port Authority (The Freeport News, October 5). Beginning with the first China-CARICOM Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, which took place in Jamaica in February 2005, China has convened periodic meetings with Caribbean counterparts to advance its economic interests. China is also playing a robust role in the regional multilateral banks as a member of the Caribbean Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, which it joined in 2008 with a contribution of $350 billion (Inter-Press Service, May 27, 2009). 13

China’s overall strategy for the Caribbean has been driven by a desire to ensure the security of Chinese offshore financial holdings, woo countries with infrastructure projects and investment deals to ensure support for China in multilateral organizations, and promote the crucial “One China” policy to isolate Taiwan on the world stage. The Taiwan Issue: Caribbean Minnows and Asian Sharks Now that China has become a major actor on the world stage, it is demanding the diplomatic recognition that for years had been bestowed on the Republic of China (ROC), commonly referred to as Taiwan. The “One China” policy makes diplomatic recognition of China versus Taiwan a zero sum game, which means that Beijing will not maintain relations with any state that recognizes Taipei. Only 23 nations maintain official relations with Taiwan and Latin America and the Caribbean account for half of these, making the Commonwealth Caribbean a competitive arena in which both Beijing and Taipei have a strong interest. China, in competition with Taiwan, offers economic support to the Caribbean through trade, aid and investment, which returns the favor—for the most part—by maintaining the “One China” policy. Taiwan’s alliances with the Commonwealth Caribbean have been whittled down by Beijing's increasingly skillful diplomacy in recent years. The Bahamas defected in 1997, and the island nation of Dominica severed ties with Taipei in 2004. Not long after that, Grenada—still grappling with the legacy of the communist takeover that prompted U.S. military intervention in 1983—turned its back on its staunch anti-communism rooted in the Cold War era to open its arms to China in 2005. Four countries—Belize, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—recognize Taipei over Beijing, but the support of these Caribbean nations often comes down to dollars and cents. In 2008, 91.5 percent of China’s trade with CARICOM was with countries that recognize Beijing. Only 8.5 percent of China’s trade was with countries that recognize Taipei despite the fact that more than half of the people in CARICOM live in Haiti, a state allied with Taiwan [2]. In the case of St. Lucia, the competition between China and Taiwan veered into the theater of the absurd as the debate became heavily polarized along political lines leading up to the 1997 election of Dr. Kenny Anthony as prime minister. As a result, recognition of China became a domestic issue with Anthony’s party, the St. Lucia Labor Party, supporting Beijing while Sir John Compton, leader of the United Workers Party (UWP), favored Taipei. These internal divisions are often rooted in ideological differences but enhanced by the “dollar diplomacy” practiced by both China and Taiwan in the Caribbean. When Anthony was elected prime minister in 1997, he switched allegiance from Taiwan to China within the first four months of his administration. During his administration St. Lucia was the recipient of much Chinese aid, especially in preparation for the Cricket World Cup, hosted by the West Indies in 2007. Four key Chinese aid projects, including the construction of a national stadium and a psychiatric hospital were used to woo the tiny nation out of Taiwan’s dwindling fold. Nonetheless the extent to which China’s “internal affair” with Taiwan was a domestic issue in St. Lucia became clear when the island’s most recent electoral results provoked a change in recognition of the “One China” policy. The general election of December 11, 2006 saw a return to power of two-time Prime Minister Compton, and St. Lucia’s position on the Taiwan question was once again in play. With a population of almost 170,000 and an estimated GDP of $1.8 billion, the tiny nation emerged as a key fighting ground in the geopolitical battles for diplomatic recognition between China and Taiwan. On April 30 2007, St. Lucia formally recognized Taiwan and within a few days China withdrew its diplomatic corps (New York Times, May 2, 2007). In reality, St. Lucia’s switch does not represent a turning of the tides back to Taiwan but instead merely re-emphasizes the fact that recognition of China or Taiwan in the Caribbean is not an ideological issue, but instead one fueled largely by economic opportunism.

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Moreover, St. Lucia’s flip-flop represents an exception, as most other English-speaking Caribbean states have moved decisively toward recognizing Beijing. Meanwhile, gaining confidence from its ever-expanding economic prowess, China is learning quickly to play the dollar diplomacy game. The PRC has an advantage over Taipei in this endeavor to the extent that its foreign ministry operates unconstrained by the scrutiny of either a legislature or independent media, and its willingness to dig into its deep pockets have already paid some dividends. Dominica’s Primer Minister Roosevelt Skerrit switched recognition in 2004 after receiving a pledge of $112 million over a six-year period from Beijing. Though in 2003 Grenadian Prime Minister Keith Mitchell said that maintaining relations with Taiwan is “practical,” by 2005 he had changed his tune, signing a joint communiqué in support of the “One China” policy. In exchange, Beijing promised financial assistance to rebuild and expand Grenada’s national stadium for the 2007 Cricket World Cup; construction of 2,000 housing units; new hospital facilities; agricultural support; a $6 million grant to complete projects previously financed by Taiwan; and an additional $1 million scholarship fund [3]. Furthermore, Caribbean governments are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower without a colonial or “imperialist” history in the hemisphere, China is in many ways a more politically attractive partner than either the United States or Europe for some local politicians confronted with increasingly anti-American constituencies. China, in this view, offers a more benevolent version of the “Big Brother” role typically played by Western powers. Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that the Caribbean’s embrace of China—to the extent that this has actually occurred—is potentially linked to their perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. China and the Caribbean: A Delicate Embrace More than 8,000 miles separate Beijing from most Caribbean capitols, but given the historical, economic and political differences between China and the Caribbean, distance has not diminished the eastern economic powerhouse’s interest in forging ties with these tiny Caribbean islands. Nonetheless, China’s engagement with the Caribbean has intensified significantly in recent years and small Caribbean states can no longer ignore the dragon in their midst. Today, virtually every Caribbean nation—including those that do not formally recognize China—has extensive political and economic contacts with the nascent economic powerhouse in East Asia. This marks a dramatic change from the days when Caribbean nations lacked significant economic or diplomatic relations with China. Recently, a surge in trade between China and the Caribbean, increased diplomatic recognition of China in the region, and a flurry of official visits have signaled a significant strengthening of Sino-Caribbean ties. While the reasons for this are complex, the relationship between China and the Caribbean hinges on two critical components: China’s economic might, and its focus on diplomatically isolating Taiwan. Economic cooperation is the underlying basis for Caribbean interest in strengthening ties to China. As an economic powerhouse that is well equipped to deal with the effects of increasing globalization, China stands opposite the vulnerable Caribbean and can offer the attention of a superpower to a region looking to take part in the globalized economy. The desire to strip Taiwan of its remaining allies, as a step toward reincorporating it under the domain of mainland China, has given the Caribbean a level of political salience in Beijing that it would otherwise lack. Yet, the true shape of China’s relations with the Caribbean will be determined by broader global forces and the dexterity with which Chinese policymakers and their Caribbean counterparts are able to forge mutually advantageous ties. It is clear that China is mapping out a long-term vision for engaging with the Caribbean, but it is too early to tell whether this vulnerable region will sink or swim as a result. Notes 1. Direction of Trade Statistics – International Monetary Fund, July 2009. Exports of a country to the world by partner and Imports (c.i.f.) of a country from the world by partner, www.imfstatistics.org (accessed July 2009).

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2. Direction of Trade Statistics of International Monetary Fund and author’s estimates. 3. Daniel P. Erikson and Janice Chen,” China, Taiwan and the Battle for Latin America,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Summer 2007.

China’s influence growing in Latin America and the Caribbean By Dr. Odeen Ishmael, July 1, 2009 http://www.sharenews.com/opinion/2009/07/01/china%E2%80%99s-influence-growing-latin-americacaribbean

The visit by Brazil's President, Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, to China in May 2009 reflected the Asian nation's expanding economic and political influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). One year ago, the Brazilian government announced that China would surpass the United States as its major business partner. The results of da Silva's visit verified this after the two nations signed 13 agreements, including a $10 billion loan from the China Development Bank to Brazil's state oil company, Petrobras. Petrobras also concluded a deal with a subsidiary of China's oil refiner, Sinopec, for the export of crude oil. And a major commercial agreement will see the beginning of huge poultry exports to China. Brazil's two-way trade with China, one of the few economies still growing despite the global crisis, reached US$3.2 billion in April, surpassing the $2.8 billion trade total with the U.S. So far this year, Brazilian exports to China grew 65 per cent over the same period in 2008, rising from $3.4 billion to $5.6 billion. At the beginning of November 2008, China's priority to LAC was highlighted in a policy paper issued by the country's foreign ministry. And, later that month, to emphasize that priority, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Costa Rica, Cuba and Peru to highlight his country's growing power and influence in the region. This was a follow-up to his Latin American tour in 2004, which resulted in expanded investments, trade and diplomatic and military exchanges. China's policy paper on LAC states that the Chinese government views its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean from a strategic plane and seeks to develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development with countries in the region. It goes on to explain the importance of the bilateral co-operation in trade, investment, finances, agriculture, infrastructure, resources and energy, tourism, customs, quality inspection, culture and education. Some political observers feel that the diplomatic outreach in LAC is also aimed at urging the 11 nations in the region that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan to shift their recognition to China. Costa Rica in 2007 severed connections with Taiwan, and so did Grenada and Dominica. It is obvious, too, that the establishment of leftist governments in many countries in LAC has aided in strengthening bilateral diplomatic relations. But the embrace of China also comes from LAC as part of its broader inter-regional diplomacy which has seen expanded relations with Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East, while maintaining its traditional connections with the United States. China's links with LAC centres on trade and are propelled by an ever-increasing demand for natural resources. Trade shot up from $12.6 billion in 2000 to $102.6 billion in 2007, and was expected to reach $150 billion last year. In 2008, China's top 10 trade partners in the region were Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia, Costa Rica and Cuba. Significantly, China is now the third largest trade partner of the region. 16

The country's main exports are computers, telecommunications equipment, clothing, shoes, electronics, motorcycles and cars, while most imports are agricultural goods and raw materials such as crude oil, iron ore, copper, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, aluminium and nickel. The Asian giant is also investing heavily in the region. Its investments reached $1.89 billion in 2007, much related to infrastructure building, extraction of national resources, manufacturing assembly, telecommunications and textiles. In addition, it has science and technology agreements with 13 regional states and these have led to more than 100 research projects in agro-, bio- and information technology. These agreements have resulted in an earth-resources satellite project with Brazil, with three satellites launched to date; and another with Venezuela which saw the $400-million Simon Bolivar communications satellite launched in October 2008. Energy concerns play an especially important role in China's Latin-American diplomacy. In addition to the energy agreement with Brazil, Beijing is also exploring energy deals with Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Argentina. With regard to Venezuela, China is expected to invest billions of dollars in a heavy oil development project in the Orinoco belt. As a result of this co-operation, Venezuela has begun to receive oil drilling platforms and oil tankers it ordered from China. Currently, Venezuela is the seventh largest source of Beijing's external oil supplies. But the Chinese government is also showing attention to the smaller economies of the region. For instance, tiny Dominica, which cut relations with Taiwan, has been offered US$122 million in assistance over a period of six years. At other multilateral levels, China has held numerous discussions with the Rio Group and has established a dialogue mechanism with MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (Caricom). In the military sphere, China offers training courses for military officers in its staff academies and sells helicopters, artillery, anti-air and anti-ship missiles and light assault weapons to some Latin American and Caribbean countries, while purchasing anti-tank, anti-air missiles and avionics from Brazil. Significantly, in September 2004, China sent a "special police" peacekeeping contingent to Haiti - an ally of Taiwan - marking Beijing's first deployment of forces ever in the Western Hemisphere. Despite the expansion in political, economic and diplomatic ties between China and LAC, some negative aspects of economic activities, in particular, have persisted when viewed from the LAC perspective. Some trade analysts say that Chinese goods are dumped without duties into many markets, with Mexico and Argentina particularly hard hit by China's flood of low-end manufacture exports. This, they add, has resulted in the rise of anti-China sentiments. Further, the view has been constantly maintained that China's involvement in the region could pose a future threat to U.S. influence. And, while many political and business leaders in Latin American and Caribbean countries welcome new Chinese investments, others are concerned that their domestic industries and their U.S. export markets will be overwhelmed by cheap Chinese imports. It is hoped that with the advancement of closer diplomatic and business relations between China and LAC, solutions to such problems will become matters of priority. Dr. Odeen Ishmael is Guyana's ambassador to Venezuela, however, the views expressed are solely his. 17

China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean By Sebastian Castaneda, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs http://www.coha.org/china%E2%80%99s-policy-paper-on-latin-america-and-the-caribbean

On November 5, 2008, the Chinese government released a policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, as it had previously done so for Europe in 2003 and for Africa in 2006. Although it may not come as a huge surprise that Latin America is the most recent region for which China has formally spelled out its foreign policy position, the region has been historically perceived as being under the United States’ sphere of influence. Perhaps the importance of the Chinese policy paper lies in the timing of its release. The release of the paper deliberately coincided with the unfolding of the current financial crisis; this congruence of events has allowed China to expand its influence in this somewhat neglected region without attracting any lasting venom from the U.S. China’s policy paper formally evidences the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean as part of China’s growth plan for its long-term strategic interests. Most of all, this includes access to raw materials as well as a plethora of natural resources, the infiltration of new foreign markets, the reduction of diplomatic support for the Republic of Taiwan, and the strengthening of Beijing political standing on the global stage through strong alliances cemented with the developing world.

China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean November 5, 2008

The Chinese government launched its first ever policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean region. The full text of the policy paper is available at: • http://english.gov.cn/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm • http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-11/06/content_7179488.htm • http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t521025.htm

Settling the China Question: A Caribbean Challenge By: Sir Ronald Sanders, May 5, 2008 http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2008/05/printable/080502_sanders0505.shtml

In a week which saw the World Health Organisation (WHO) reject Taiwan’s application for membership, and a senior representative of Taiwan hold closed-doors discussion with top officials of the government of China, I was asked on a Caribbean-wide television programme what advice I would give, if asked, to Caribbean governments that maintain diplomatic ties to Taiwan. These are the governments of Belize, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Kitts-Nevis and Haiti. My answer was unequivocal. They should begin negotiations with the government of the People’s Republic of China on an aid and investment agreement that gives them as much help as they now get from Taiwan, if not more. Once that agreement is tied-up, they should move on, like the nine other countries of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), to pursue a “One China” policy. It is a policy that is followed by the vast majority of countries in the world. 18

It is in the interest of the entire group of 14 independent countries, which along with the British colony, Montserrat, make up CARICOM to settle a long-term and predictable aid, trade and investment agreement with China along the lines of the Lome and Cotonou treaties that they had with the European Union (EU). But, CARICOM will not be able, collectively, to negotiate such a treaty with China while five of its members remain tied to Taiwan. One China policy If the point needed re-emphasising, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Li Jinzhang, recently sent a strong warning that the Chinese government will not compromise its One China policy. And, the indications could not be clearer that China and Taiwan are moving inexorably toward a means of living together despite the sabre rattling from Beijing and the loud protestations of the previous Taiwanese government. The newly elected President of Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou, who takes office on May 20, favours better business ties with China, including more direct air links, more Chinese tourists and normalized trade ties. China is already the biggest market for Taiwanese investment. Ma has abandoned plans by the previous Taiwanese administration to hold a referendum on Taiwan trying to join the United Nations as a sovereign state, and he has opened exploratory talks with Chinese government officials. These talks are unlikely to settle arrangements between the two parties anytime soon, but by a process of attrition, they will move toward a solution that is in their interests. When they do, those who have held on to the coat tails of Taiwan may find themselves casualties. For the time being, even under President-elect Ma, Taiwan will try to maintain diplomatic support for itself from the few remaining countries that still do so. So, there will undoubtedly be reaffirmations of Taiwan’s sovereign status, and its commitment to providing assistance to its supporters in what has come to be called “dollar diplomacy”. Eventually, however, there are some realities that have to be faced by Caribbean countries collectively: • China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council with a power of veto. • China is now the fourth largest economy in the world and growing. • China now has close to US$1.4 trillion in foreign reserves; it has money to spend. • In 2007, China earmarked RMB 4 billion (about US$1.5 billion) to Chinese companies to invest in the Caribbean. • China also announced in 2007 that the government itself would invest US$553 million in the Caribbean over the three year period 2007-2010. • China’s middle class is growing and will soon be larger than the middle class of the United States; within the next few years, Chinese will make up a significant number of world-wide tourists. • China’s trade with the Caribbean as a whole, including Cuba, jumped from US$450 million in 1991 to US$980 million by 2001. The Caribbean connection China has an interest in access to raw materials in the Caribbean. In this connection, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana are of far more strategic interest to China than the smaller territories that make up the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, a sub-group of CARICOM.

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It is gas and asphalt in Trinidad; bauxite in Jamaica; timber, bauxite and minerals in Guyana that are China’s big attractions. As has been pointed out by Gregory Chin of York University, it is not that China cannot get these commodities elsewhere, but the additional resources that the Caribbean supplies gives the Chinese government comfort, as well as the ability to negotiate prices. In the Bahamas, Chinese companies have taken advantage of the proximity to the US to establish manufacturing and assembling of products for the US market. Increasingly, the Bahamas’ port services include ship repairs and storage. The relationship works for both countries. The challenge of the OECS for China is the continued flirtation by some of them with Taiwan. But, China can afford to wait; it has nothing to lose. At the bottom line, China’s investment and aid gives Caribbean countries room to manoeuvre, in a limited international economic space. So far, China’s aid and investment does not come with political conditions. Therefore, it gives Caribbean governments the ability to pursue infrastructural and other developments for which they would get little or no help from international financial institutions and some traditional donor countries. A Caricom one-China policy But, the relations between China and CARICOM countries have been structured at an individual level. In the course of working these relations, individual Caribbean countries have negotiated very little; they have been recipients of what the Chinese have offered. And, while the Chinese have been relatively benign and helpful, the Caribbean should not count on this remaining so. This is why all of the countries of CARICOM should join together in negotiating a long term aid and investment treaty with China, that provides direct benefits to individual countries at levels no less than they now enjoy (including those who now have relations with Taiwan) and sets an agreed framework for the wider China-CARICOM relationship. Part of the agreement should be adherence to labour laws in the Caribbean, and skills and technology transfer. To do so, all of CARICOM needs a One China Policy.

China pledges more support to Caribbean region From: Xinhua, September 9, 2007 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-09/09/content_6091669.htm

Xiamen ― China plans to offer 4 billion yuan (US$530 million) in low-interest loans to Chinese firms in three years to encourage more investment in Caribbean regions. China will help Caribbean countries to train 2,000 government officials and various technical professionals during the period, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi said at the ongoing 2nd China-

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Caribbean trade and economic cooperation forum held in Xiamen, a coastal city in east China's Fujian Province. She pledged that China will broaden technical exchanges and deepen cooperation in agriculture and fishery, and implement tourism agreements to encourage more Chinese citizens to visit Caribbean countries. "China is ready to deepen the economic and trade cooperation with Caribbean countries as it attaches great importance to their friendship and cooperation," she stressed. Efforts will also be made to improve trade conditions and promote trade balance, as economic relation is of great significance to bilateral friendship and cooperation, according to the vice premier. Wu said relationship between China and the Caribbean countries has been further strengthened, particularly over the past five years, when the trade volume increased at an annual average rate of 32.7 percent. Enhancing cooperation is a natural requirement of economic development of both sides, who are devoted to improving national economies and people's living standards amid challenges brought about by globalization, according to Li Changjiang, chairman of the forum, held on the sidelines of the 11th China International Fair for Investment and Trade. China and Caribbean countries, both developing nations, can learn from each other through cooperation, said Lolita Applewhaite, deputy secretary general of Caribbean Community. "We hope to attract more investment from China, whose economy is growing rapidly, which will be a win-win choice," she said. "We are particularly interested in learning China's experiences in tourism, industry and technology development," said Harold Lovell, minister of tourism with Antigua and Barbuda, a Caribbean island covering 441.6 square kilometers. Development of bilateral economic and trade relations also provides momentum to Chinese firms. The Shenzhen-based Huawei Technology Co., Ltd.,which launched marketing programs in Caribbean regions as of 1999, has provided equipment and services worth over US$100 million, said Fan Houhua, president of Huawei's Latin-American business. Trade turnover reached US$4.4 billion in 2006 and is expected to hit US$5 billion this year. Both sides have registered US$2.23 billion in trade turnover in the first half of this year, up 22 percent as against the same period of last year, according to official statistics. More than 260 officials, delegates of investment organizations and enterprises from 13 Caribbean countries participated in the forum.

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