Center for Latino Policy Research UC Berkeley Title: Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: How Much Does the Economy Matter? Author: Citrin, Jack, University of California, Berkeley Green, Donald P., Yale University Muste, Christopher, University of California, Berkeley Wong, Cara, University of California, Berkeley Publication Date: 05-01-1995 Series: CLPR Working Papers Permalink: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/68v9378k Keywords: immigration reform, immigrants, Latino, restrictionist, public support, economic impact, labor, policy Abstract: The United States, a self-styled nation of immigrants, is debating its outlook toward newcomers once again. The policies of increased immigration and expanded legal and political rights for immigrants ushered in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Lemay 1987; Shuck and Smith 1985) are under attack. Today, the political landscape is littered with proposals to reduce immigration, seal the border with Mexico, and reduce government expenditures by limiting the access of both legal and illegal immigrants to government services and benefits. As the policy conflict intensifies, politicians and interest groups on both sides of the issues are striving to shape mass opinion with arguments about the value and cost of immigration (Clad 1994; Passell and Fix 1994). This paper thus focuses on the foundations of public support for restrictionist demands. In this context, our principal concern is the precise role of economic motive in determining policy preferences. This analytic question has obvious political relevance. The large-scale influx of people striving to improve their lot necessarily influences the economy of the receiving country. Today, as in the past, advocates of restricting immigration content that newcomers displace native workers in the labor market and create a fiscal drain by costing the government more in services than they pay in taxes. Accordingly, the extent to which opinions about immigration originates in economic concerns should indicate how votes are likely to respond to the heated argument over these claims (Huddle 1993; Passell 1994; Borjas 1990; Simon 1989; Vedder and Galloway 1994). Whatever the economic impacts of immigration, it is also a process that brings ethnic “strangers” into “our” midst. From a theoretical perspective, immigration policy therefore constitutes another excellent case for studying the effects of the interplay between the strategic calculation of personal costs and benefits on the one hand, and commitments to enduring values on the other, on preference formation on policy questions (Citrin and Green 1990; Sears and Funk 1990; Green

eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California and delivers a dynamic research platform to scholars worldwide.

1992; Stoker 1992). After testing hypotheses about economic motivations, we thus briefly consider how a symbolic politics model emphasizing the role of cultural attitudes can be extended to the immigration issue. Copyright Information: All rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. Contact the author or original publisher for any necessary permissions. eScholarship is not the copyright owner for deposited works. Learn more at http://www.escholarship.org/help_copyright.html#reuse

eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California and delivers a dynamic research platform to scholars worldwide.

i R I

+^&CLpp c^

/ Ã ˆ

0

proponents w n c c m i n ~ 'the spccitic indicuiorx ol'cconnn~icthrc,it m d whether this concept should be defined i n objecllvc or wbjectivc and absolute or rclauve tcnns For prcicnt purposes, whether the ihreai 1'. r e d or i n i q i n e d is not a sir.miicant issue

o f e c o n o m i c factors o n public opinion using national data. Third. and most importantiy, the available data m a k e it possible to formulate a broadened set o f conceptualizations o f e c o n o m i c competition and insecurity.

We- e m p l o y a variety o f indicators t o test for the influence o f the individual's; financial

resources. perceived e c o n o m i c prospects, labor market situation, and fiscal c o n c e r n s ,

Resources. A c c o r d i n g to a "rcsources" hypothesis. people w h o lack e c o n o m i c resources o r a r e experiencing financial stress will b e m o r e likely than the well-off to fear the implications o f immigration. Insecure about their o w n futures, the economically disadvantaged should be m o r e likely t o b e hostile toward ( o r to scapegoat) immigrants a n d t o support restrictionist policy proposals.

Pessimism. A "pessimism" hypothesis stresses the influence o f t h e individual's perceptions o f c c o n o m i c c h a n g e . T h e prediction here is that, regardless o f one's current level o f financial resources, the belief that o n e is o n a d o w n w a r d economic trajectory increases the tendency t o v i e w immigration a s resulting in tangible costs t o oneself and enhances restrictionist sentiment,

A s in the analysis o f

"pocketbook" voting, the test o f t l i i h hypothesis entails distinguishing between retrospective j u d g m e n t s and expectations a b o u t the future, and between the individual's assessments o f h i s o w n a s o p p o s e d to the nation's e c o n o m i c prospects (Kiewiet a n d Rivers 1985).

Labor Market Competition. A persistent complaint about immigrants is that they take j o b s a w a y from native w o r k e r s and depress wag.es in selected occupations ( H a w o o d 1983; E s p e n s h a d e and C a l h o u n 1993). According to the "job threat" Iiypo~hesis.a vulnerable labor market situation. a s indexed by factors s u c h a s occupation. unemployment o r anxiety about one's j o b security, is the crucial s o u r c e o f opposition to imrnigrat ion. T h e threat o f economic competition from today's immigrants is presumably greater in the low-skill. low-wage occupations (Borjas and Freeman 1992). In addition. union m e m b e r s r n i @ t be c t p c c t e d

10 b e

Tax Burden.

m o r e sensitive to the potential impact o f immigration o n their w a g e s a n d j o b s . T h e leading argument against today's immigration

is that

it i m p o s e s an

increasingly h e a v y fiscal burden o n states and localities (Passell a n d Fix 1 9 9 4 ) . v h e c o v e r n o r s o f several states h a v e sued the federal government for the costs o f providing services to refugees and illegal immigrants (Brinkley 1994). and it has been suggested that m a s s immigration poses a challenge t o the country's capacity t o sustain the flow o f benefits provided b y the modern welfare state ( S k e w 1993; S c h u c k 1994).

A c c o r d i n g to a "tax burden" hypothesis, then, negative a s s e s s m e n t s of the impact o f

immigration o n the cost o r availability o f g o v e m m c n t benefits will e n g e n d e r support for reducing immigration, T h u s , resentment o r anxicty about the level o f taxes o n e pays and residence in stales with

resentment o r anxiety about the levcl o f taxes o n e pays and residence in states with relatively high taxes o r large concentrations o f immigrants should predict anti-immigration policy preferences. Clearly. the a b o v e propositions presume the existence o f cognitive linkages that connect personal e c o n o m i c experiences to evaluations o f immigration (Fcldman 1982; Weatherford 1983; M u t z 1992). T h e strength o f the relationship between economic motives and negative views o f immigration m a y thus depend o n the mediation o f individual and contextual factors such as the intensity o f e c o n o m i c discontent.. the visibility o f immigrants, o r the fegitimization o f anti-immigrant sentiment by political campaigns. F o r example, w e can consider whcthcr material concerns w e r e a m o r e potent influence o n the opinions o f those w h o regarded the nation's economic problems a s especially pressing.

Similarly,

several observers maintain that blacks are especially threatened by economic a n d political displacement by n e w immigrants (Miles 1992; Schuck 1995). If this is true. then the ethnic competition model would predict that. other things being equal. blacks are more opposed to immigration than whites and that economic anxieties have a stronger influence o n the immigration attitudes o f blacks than o f whites. Recent immigration to the United Stales is heavily concentrated in just a f e w slates (Passell and Fix 1994).

About three-quarters o f iinmisrants entering the United States in the 1980s went to

metropolitan areas in California. Florida. N e w York. Texas, Hlinois. and New Jersey. Olzak (1992) maintains that the presence o f numerous immigrants in a region intensifies economic competition between native residents and newcomers. making the latter group a more potent and visible threat. In other words. a cognitive connection between economic distress and immigration is more readily m a d e when there is a large-' and identifiable alien population. Applying OIzak4s historical analysis t o current public opinion data yields the prediction that restrictionist sentiment will b e more widespread in states o r residential environments with greater concentrations o f immigrants.

By extension. o n e also would

cxpcct the influence o f material concerns on opinion to be greater in such areas than in communities where the immigrant populations are small. Clearly. determining the role o f economic motives is just o n e facet of developing a complete explanation o f attitudes toward immigration. For example, other concerns that have been mentioned a s reasons for opposing immigration environment (Bouvicr 1994).

include anxieties about population growth and protecting the

M o r e fundamentally, "cultural"

factors such a s ethnic solidarity.

conceptions o f national identity. and xenophobia o r racial prejudice (Citrin. Reingold, and G r e e n 1990: Espcnshadc and Calhoun 1993; Glazer 1993; Scars. Citrin. Vidanagc. and Valentine 1994) comprise another major category o f motives that w e shall address in subsequent analyses.

6

Ill. DATA A N D MEASURES T h e public opinion data w e analyze c o m e from the 1992 National Election Study (NES).

A sub-

set o f respondents \vcrc p a n o f t h e three-wave ( 1990- 1991 - 1992) panel embedded in the study's design. and w e utilize their a n s w e r s t o the questions about immigration asked in t h e 1991 Pilot S u r v e y a s well. W e a l s o e m p l o y the county-level data from the 1990 United States C e n s u s to create contextual variables describing t h e social composition o f the respondent's residential environment. O u r dependent variables refer t o policy preferenccs rather than t o broad images o f immigrants a s a group.

To get at the issue at the heart o f the restrictionist agenda, the 1992 N E S S u r v e y asked

respondents w h e t h e r "the n u m b e r o f immigrants from foreign countries w h o a r c permitted to c o m e t o t h e United States t o five should be increased, left the same, o r decreased."

This question w o r d i n g clearly

identifies legal immigrants a s the attitude "object;" it is the item c o m m o n l y used by pollsters t o monitor trends in public opinion about immigration." T a b l e 2 presents the cross-tabulation o f answers to this N E S "Level o f Immigration" item by panel respondents i n 1991 a n d 1992. T h e individual-level continuity coefficient o f .45 is comparable in size to those reported b y Converse and Markus (1979) for specific policy questions in the 1972-74-76

NES panel.

A n d thc 10 per cent increase between 1991 and 1992 in the proportion o f the panel

advocating reduced immigration is consistent with the idea that restrictionist sentiment rises d u r i n g periods o Ceconornic recession. W h i l e current law entitles legal immigrants' access to most g o v e r n i n m i services o n the s a m e basis a s citizens, budgetary stress has stimulated proposals for the imposition o f a requirement.'

residency

To assess public sentiment o n this issue. the 1992 N E S survey asked whether immigrants

should be immediately eligible for "government services such a s Medicaid, food stamps. and welfare" o r have t o wait "a y e a r o r more" for these benefits.

' These data were provided through the InlcrUniversily Cortsoniuni ibr P o l i t i c ~and l Social Rcscarch and thc iirchivi; at CC D A r A . Survey Research Center. University o f Calihrniii, Hcrkelcy. Our an:tJysis 1'. b a e d on the while. hlack, .and IIispanic rcspondcnts KI ihc sample ( n 2425). 4

.

i'he time-wries ~JLI presented i n Tdblc 1 ii drawn Iron1 Giillup and Roper polls. The 1 9 9 1 Piloi Sun'cy w ~ .ihc fin.! lime that the NES had x k c d about inirni&ration. a fact that may mdic.itc the lack el" p o l i l i c d d i c n c e o f Ihib ihme until rcccnily The m^rr,in.al di^iiribuiion o f rcsponheii i n thc I 9 9 2 NCS survey is included i n T'.ible 2. Notablv. b o f h the Clinton administration and Cont;rcssionilI Republicans have floated the idea o f imposing a rcsidcncv requircmcnl l o r inimiZrunt< t o receive bcneiim as a device for obtaining ihc funds t o lin:ulcc wclfiirc rcrorm. Current law requires, no V;LH I bciorc legid t not pointed out to respondenL5 i n fhc 1992 S E S hurv'ev before they were a^kod immip.rnnis can receive n i w i Kovcrnmcnt benefits. This f ~ c wx ~ h qucstion c The 1992 NTS survey also d i d not ask about govcrnmenl scrviccs for illegal immifluni.~, the tarsst ~ t ~ d l i i o m i arcccnlly 's pii-sscd PropoMlion IS7

This survey also probed beliefs about the consequences of immigration.

Respondents were

asked specifically t o assess restrictionist claims that the "growing number o f Hispanics and Asians coming to the United States" would "lake jobs away from people already here" and "cause higher taxes

service^."^

due t o more demands for public

Prior research has conceptualized these estimates o f the tangible costs and benefits of immigration a s subjective indicators o f economic interest (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). T h e present analysis models the respondents' assessments o f "impact" as cognitive links in the hypothesized chain between actual economic circumstances and opinions about immigration policy.

Still, one must be

cautious in interpreting these responses a s valid measures o f the tangible impact o f immigration, o r even of its impact on perceptions.

The wording of the items docs not focus explicitly on the personal as

opposed to the collective consequences of Hispanic and Asian immigration.

In addition. while the

questions call on respondents to make a factual judgment, affective reactions

cued

by the particular

ethnic groups named undoubtedly influence. possible sirongly. the estimates given.7

TABLE 2 S T A B I L I T Y IN O P I N I O N S A B O L - T T H E L E V E L

OF I M M I G R A T I O N

" D o y o u I h i n k t h e n u m b e r o f i m m i g r a n t s f r o m f o r e i n n c o u n i r i c s w h o a r c p c r m i n c d l o c o m c t o t h u L - n i l e d Ssatcs t o l i v c s h o u l d b e i n c r e a s e d ( a l o t o r a l i n k ) , decreased ( a l o t or l i n l c ) . o r l e f t !he same cis i t i s n o w ? " '

Increase

a Lo1

Increase

(n

Keep

( n u 165) ( n - 127)

S m e

Dccreax Total

13)

Soh 2

Increase a Little

Samc

Dccrcuc

Ducrcase T o t a l

a Linlu

a

Lot

23

->

6 0

3

5

43

26

23

I Source 1991 and 1992 National Election Studies The response options i n I W 1 were "increase,' "decrease." or '"keep ihc same the response options were expanded to "increase a hi,"" ~ n c ~ c a hiiclittle," "keep the -same.' "decrease a little," and "decrease a lot."

''

I n 1992.

'

Respondents n c r c asked about each group and each possible impaci '.'cparatcly. The 1991 Pilot survey m k e d only about Hispanics Thi; conlinuily coefficient (1-1-1992) for i h c Take Jobs item was only 29. with a subsuniial shift (1 5 2%) ol'thc distribution toward the position that i t was "cxtrcmely' or "very likely" ht Hispanic immigration n o u l d causc j o b losscs. The continuity cocfncicnt ror the R a i x Taxes iieni, by contra* wiis 42. n i t h n o nei s h i f t i n agpegatc outluok

'

There is also the endemic difliculty oidistin.cuishmp. reawns from rat~on.hl~z.ilionsi n cro-ts-sectioniit da1.1. a problem m q n i l i e d i n this catc because the " i m p . ~ t " questions were M e d after lht "Level ot'lniniifration" iicni

I V DEMOGRAPHIC CORRELATES Table 3 presents the relationships among a number o f standard demographic and political characteristics and public attitudes toward immigration, omitting for the moment consideration o f manifestly economic factors such a s income, occupation, o r employment status. T h e figures in the table refer t o the anti-immigrant responses to the "Level o f In~migration"a n d "Delay Benefits" policy items. Where relevant, w e report the value of tau-beta, a coefficient o f association for variables at the ordinal level o f measurement. Restrictionist sentiment a m o n g the respondents in this 1992 national sample was pervasive and group differences in opinion tended to be small. As noted above, support for reducing the level o f legal immigration w a s the modal point of view. Moreover, fully 80 per cent o f the sample favored a residency requirement o f at least a year before immigrants would be eligible for many government benefits.

On

this question at least, there is very little variation for either "economic" o r "cultural" causes t o explain. A notable feature o f the 1992 NES survey is the degree o f agreement a m o n g white. black and

Hispanic respondents. A number of"observers have argued (Schuck 1994; Miles 1994; Skerry 1995) that economic and political competition between blacks and Hispanics has intensified. particularly in large cities. and that t h i s is likely to result in the rise o f anti-immigrant feelings among blacks. Nevertheless. in the 1992 NES survey, black respondents were slightly less likely than either whites o r Hispanics to advocate reducing the level o f legal immigration and more likely than whites to oppose delaying immigrants' access to government services.' Given that opposition to restriction and defense o f "immigrant rights" has become a virtual litmus test o f ethnic loyalty among Mexican-American activists and political organizations (Gutierrez 199 1 ; Skerry

1993), the fact that Hispanic respondents were not distinctively pro-immigrant

is

surprising." An earlier California survey found that immigration attitudes among Hispanics varied with

-ccneration

and citizenship status (Uhlaner 1991). s o one reason for the current finding may be the

b a c k y o u n d o f the Hispanic respondents in the 1992 N E S sample, Another reason for the lack o f group differences in our data may be the low salience o f immigration policy in the 1992 presidential election.

In the California election o f 1994. by contrast.

"

I t is possible thill this result rcllccis [he ~undcncyo i s o m c bliick rcspondcnls to rc.ject the idc-1 o f c u t l i n ~p.o\'crnnient hcncfib. however that d c a is prcscntccl i n a hurvcy ilcm. rathcr than more positive t'celings about immir.ranis A? a ~ v u p .

'

I t should be noted thai more th.m 80 pcr cent o f Ilisp-inic respindcnLs in lhe 1992 N C S survey were o l M i r x i c a n ori::.in, W i t h rcspcci to ethnic diflcrcnccs in opinions about i ~ n n i i ~ a t i ~tlie i n .rusulis, o l o t h e r Mudici v,iry Anion- recent .'.ludics with findings similar to lhosc rcporiud hcrc arc thc Latino National Polilical ~ u r & y conduelcd in IQS'? (Dc la G m , Dcstpio. I-'C G,;ycia, J. s Immipratton' rcr'crs lo rcsponsc'. ol'hoth "Dccrci~sc Lot" .ind "Dccreçii>J 1.nlle" lo [he ilcni conccrninp the number of immigriinis pcmtttcd 10 cntcr the I ! S While the rc'tponsc catcporte> uerc collapsed for ii n u n i k r o l ~ ~ i i / t i i b l cins ordcr 10 repon the corrclijtcs of opinicinit

iibout imnii~riition.the full distributions wcrc used lo cakulii.1~the tilu-b statistics

..Dcla? 1icncIii-s" j-> iin ilcni which a.sk-s whcthcr irnniif.r*ini^ who cnier this c o u n p should witit 3 year or more for b c n c l i ~ or . whether they should be cli~.iblctmniediatcl~ The pcrccnfa-gc reported is for rcsponscs l o dcla!' bcnc tiL< for .I >ear 7

' I st r.cncraiioti

refers l o rcspondcnu. who %ere forcqn-born, m d 2nd pcncrafion retkni. to wsptindcnts who had at Iedsl o n e parent who was foreign-born. 3rd- pcneralion refers to those respondent-s whose pilienu. were both born in the United S m e s

Imrnicriint context by county refers la ihe perccntafle of foreign-born residcnti in the county where the rcspandent lives. High i r n m i m t i o n slates are C A . IL. MA. NJ.hT. and TX.

Against this background o f factional disagreement, the lack o f strong or consistent relationships between political affiliation and opinions about immigration policy is not unexpected. In the 1992 NES survey, strong Republicans and self-identified conservatives wcrc somewhat more likely t o favor reducing the current level o f immigration and delaying their access to benefits than strong. Democrats

and self-identified liberals.12 however, more nuanced.

Ideological reasoning about the consequences o f immigration was,

For examplc, liberals were a s likely a s conservatives t o say that immigrants

take jobs away from native workers, but less likely t o say that Hispanic and Asian immigration w a s likely t o result in higher taxes.''

More generally, the high level o f restrictionist sentiment among

Democrats in the general public suggests that immigration is another issue on which Democratic party leaders will find it difficult t o formulate a unifying position (Edsall and Edsall 1992).

V . EDUCATION

Confirming the results o f previous studies (Hoskin 1991; Day 1990; Citrin. Reingold and Green 1990). Table 3 reports that negative attitudes toward immigration decrease a s the respondent's level o f formal education rises. For example. 55 per cent o f respondents with just a high school education called for reducing the current level o f legal immigration, compared t o only 3 1 per cent with a post-graduate degree. In addition. the tendency o f formal education to lead t o a more positive view o f immigration was substantially sironger when respondents were posed questions focusing specifically on Hispanics o r Asians rather than on immigrants in general.'" There are several possible interpretations of these links between education and attitudes toward immigration. Because education is an increasingly important asset in a modem economy. it might be argued that education is an indicator o f a protected labor market situation and that people with a high level o f education are more confident about their future prospects. even in an uncertain economy (Hernes and Knudsen 1992).

According t o this reasoning, the educated are less hostile toward immigrants

because they are less economically threatened by them and know i t . An alternative perspective is that education fosters a more tolerant outlook toward "oui-groups." including foreigners and ethnic minorities (McClosky and Brill 1983: Schuman. Bobo, and Stcch 1985). Education instills an acceptance, if not necessarily an appetite, for difference, a s well a s a more sophisticated outlook that shies away from stereotypical thinking.

Moreover, education facilitates the

l7 T h e indicator oS nJcolocicill oricnitition employed is the rcspcndcnt's self-placcmcnt o n the i m i i l i a r NES 7-point sculc. conscrvativcs and "sironf." libcrvls r c l k r t o those l o c a t i n g thcmsclvcs at the extreme p o i n ~ sd o n ^ t h i s continuum.

T h e full set o l ' c r o s - t i l b u l a t ~ o n s i~ riot reported i n order

10 conserve

"Strong,"

space

F o r example. [he tendencv for tho* w i t h more formal education to be niorc siinpuinc about t h e l i k c l v impact v i i l i - s p m i e i r n m i " i i l t i o n o n the l o b prohpccu* o f native w&kcn; i s indicaicd b y the c a r d a t i o n o r - . 2 1 (tau-bctii). S i m i i i ~ ' l y ,the b e t t e r ~ d u c u t c d*crc k'ib l i k e l y t o pcrccivc the .inipat.-t o F A s i a n i r n n i i ~ r i l t i o no n ~ i i xlevels A, n c p I l i v u (iiiu-beta -.20). T h e response opiions !'or the questions conccrnini; h e l i k c l y impact o f l l i h p m i c o r A s i m im~ni'.",r^nls were "not ill a l l likely." "sanic'Ahai likcly." "very likcly, ' and " c w r e m c l y l i k e l y " T h e nej^ative si.cns o l ' U i c tau-bcub reportcd 111 this note r c f l c c t the nurnericttl c o d i n g procedure that gave the "cxircmely l i k c l y " response the higlic-it heore. l4

learning o f dominant norms, which in the United States arguably include tolerance for minorities and a positive image o f t h e role o f immigration in the nation's history. In s u m . t h e r e a r c strong reasons for hypothesizing that differences in cognitive style and cultural outlook rather than in e c o n o m i c vulnerability account f o r the contrasting attitudes toward immigration o f various educational strata. T h i s issue will be addressed below in multivariate analyses that include both education a n d specific measures o f economic circumstances as predictors.

VI. E C O N O M I C F A C T O R S A s a first s t e p in assessing the influence o f economic m o t i v e s o n opinions about immigration issues. T a b l e 4 presents the bivariatc relationships a m o n g various indicators o f respondents' financial resources, perceived e c o n o m i c circumstances, labor market situation, a n d tax burden o n the o n e hand and their a n s w e r s to the Level o f Immigration and Dclay Benefits ilems o n the other. T h i s arrah o f data reveals just a f'ew fragments o f support for the theory' thai e c o n o m i c adversitv. defined in cither objective o r subjective terms. is a poient source o f anti-immigrant sentiment.

For

example. what w e have termed the "resources" hypothesis fails. A s T a b l e 4 ( a ) shows. neither income n o r a n index o f short-run financial strain. a s measured by whether o n e had t o d i p into savings. put o f f needed health care. borrow money, and s o forth. w e r e significantI> related to opinions about restricting the level o f immigration.

Moreover. the least well-off respondents and [ h o s e w h o had experienced

severe fiscal stress were. if a n y ~ h i n t ; , less rather than m o r e likely

10

support d e l a y i n g g o v e m m e n i

benefits for immigranis. ;heir putative rivals for the e n ~ i t l c m e n dollar. i T o test the "pessimism"

hypothesis, Table 4 ( b ) focuses on the role o f the respondent's

retrospective a n d prospective e c o n o m i c judgments. Here. the individual-level results provide o n e piece o f support for the notion that a declining e c o n o m y stimulates anti-immigrant sentiment. Respondents with negative beliefs about the c o u r s e o f the e c o n o m y o v e r the past year. ( a s indexed b y a n s w e r s to questions about whether inflation, unemployment, and the e c o n o m y as a whole w a s better o r worse) w e r e m o r e likely than those with a rosy view to favor reducing the level o f immigration.

Paralleling chi;

results o f studies o f e c o n o m i c voting (Kiewict 1983). however. neither a n unfavorable shift in one's financial situation n o r pessimism about t h c cconomic future w e r e generally associated with a restrictionist outlook o n immigration issues. T h e single exception w a s the tendency o f respondents w h o anticipated a decline in their o w n financial circumstances in the c o m i n g y e a r to be m o r e likely than hose w h o were m o r e optimistic t o favor delaying the access o f immigrants to government benefits.

A s noted above, a leading "economic" hypothesis is that competition in the labor market fosters antiimmigrant sentiment.

In other words, those who face the specter of the loss of jobs, earnings, and

promotions a s a result of the influx o f immigrant workers should be motivated by self-interest to favor restrictionist policies.

The more immediate and clear the threat posed, the stronger should be the

connection between one's labor market position and one's opinions about the proper level o f immigration. Contrary to these expectations, Table 4(c) reports that the unemployed were n o more likely to say that the current level o f immigration should be reduced than respondents with steady jobs.

In

addition, the small minority of respondents who said they worried about losing their jobs in the future were only marginally more likely to advocate restriction than those who fell secure about their employment status. Of course, neither employment status nor anxiety about one's future employment speaks directly to the issue o f whether immigrants werv perceived as a significant threat.

I

TABLE 4

I

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND OPINION ABOUT IMMIGRATION

I TOTAL (n- 2425)

49%

80

I

A. RESOURCES

tau-b

F I N A N C I A L STRAIN1 0 instance ( 3 0 9 ) 1 -1

-Ã

4

5 6 7-8 tau-b

1

(294) (3 13) (290) (297) (267) (206) (2 1 0 )

B. E C O N O M I C PESSIMISM PERSONA1 RETROSPECTIVEMuch Better I (272) 2 (363) 3 (580)

Much Worse tau-b

49% 47 46

4 (427) 5 (359) 6 (391)

'

Financial Strain is a composite index of eight different ncms con-min~, economic sires-..Respondents w r r e asked if lhcy had been unable to buy things tha! lhey needed, i f [hey had put off medical o r denml treatment. if [hey had to borrow money or dip into savings. if [hey were unable to save any money, if they had 10 lake on another job or work longer hours. if' they had fallen behind on rent or house payments, and if lhcy could not afford health insiimncc. Each iifnnnativc answer \vas coded a5 1. s o the Swain index r m g e s from 0 lo 8. Personal Retroiipectivc is iin additive index of two ilems. personal financial siliiiition m d income over positive calegorics wcrc collapsed, aa were [he two most nefiaiive response categoncs.

[hi.;

l^ist !car.

ihc [hrce most

I

TABLE 4 CONTINUED

I

ECONOMIC FACTORS A N D OPINION A B O U T IMMIGRATION

PFRSDMAI.PRO.-.were "cxtrcniely." "very," "sioniewhat." ~ n "no! d ill .all likely mciini that ihc scores on the Job I r i i p x l Index r;ingcd Iron! 8 (Mosl Ne::.illve) lei 2 (1.e:t.s.t Ncgiilivc)

"

Tlie

codinffprocedure

used

newcomers.

17

O n the other hand, thcrc is a slight tendency for respondents w h o mentioned taxes a s the

most important problem facing the nation t o favor restrictionist positions. T h o s e w h o expected federal income taxes to increase "a lot" were m o r e likely than those w h o believed there would be n o increase t o favor reducing the current level o f immigration. Finally, a T a x Impact Index tapping beliefs about the likely consequences o f Hispanic and Asian immigration for future levels o f taxation had statistically significant associations with responses to both the Level o f Immigration (tau-beta= .28) and Delay

Benefits (tau-beta= .09).'" T h e initial examination o f hypotheses about the economic correlates o f public opinion about immigration policy thus suggcsts that one's

circumst.anccs d o not play a significant causal role.

W e employed a variety o f indicators o f economic adversity, threat, and competition in T a b l e 4 and consistenrly found that the poor. the unemployed, those anxious about losing their jobs. and those reporting that thcir financial circumstances had worsened were no m o r e hostile t o immigration that the better-off and c c o n o n i i c a l l ~secure. T h e noteworthy exception to this litany o f negative findings is that blue collar respondents m o r e likely to compete with immigrants for j o b s were m o r e like!? to prefer reducing the current lc\cl o f immigration than people less exposed to such competition in the labor market. O n the other hand. w c d o find that pessimism about about rising taxes w r < ; related to a restrictionist outlook.

aeconomic conditions

and fcars

Given that the surve? questions t a p p i n s

feelings about the eeonom\ were highly general and made no reference to immigrants. w e need to turn

10

multivariate analyses to explore the basis o f these connections and to determini.' whether o r not the relationship;> observed above arc- spurious.

V I I MORE COMPLETE MODELS

In developing m o r e elaborate models to test hypotheses concerning the economic sources o f antiimmigration opinions, o u r strategy is to include several distinct categories o f explanatory variables a s predictors and to introduce them sequentially in successive equations. First, we estimate a model (I) that includes only economic factors and demographic variables a s controls.

W e next incorporate o u r

I ' To clii^itv respondents in l h i s way, we employed ihc 1W0 comparanvc slate dalç w m p t l e d by Lhc Advisory Comrnis'iion on Inicr~.ovcmmentd Relations ( 1 W 2 ) . Slates w e n ; divided into low (lcsi than S I W O per capim). middle (S1400-S2200). and h i ~ h (more t h m $2200) croups Usin8 alternative indicators of lax burden such as the tax per $ 1 0 0 0 o f p c r w n d income or t i n per ~riipiiao f the workinr. populiition docs not iiltcr the results rcportcd in Table 4 ( d )

' The TAXImpiicl Index via.-, conilrucicd in idcniic-il fashion lo ihc Jot) Impaci [r.de\ dci-crikd above, wilh ¥n.'orcr m p i n e from S (ihc moil iikvi> n c p i ~ i v eimpact) lo 2 (lcçi.sh k c l ) )

m e a s u r e s o f party identification and liberalism-conservatism (Model 11).

M o d e l I11 includes the

m e a s u r e s assessing respondents' beliefs about the e c o n o m i c impacts o f Hispanic a n d Asian immigrants. T w o additional equations e x p l o r e the substantive meaning o f these perceptions o f the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f immigration.

Model IV substitutes an index assessing the cultural rather than the c c o n o m i c c o s t s o f

immigration for the J o b Impact and T a x Impact variables. T h e final equation ( M o d e l V) incorporates a m e a s u r e based o n feeling t h e r m o m e t e r r a t i n g s o f Hispanics and Asians to try and distinguish between t h e influence o f affect toward these g r o u p s and m o r e cognitively-based j u d g m e n t s o f t h e c o s t s a n d benefits o f immigration. W e e m p l o y the s a m e set o f specifications for the t w o dependent variables. t h e Lcvel o f Immigration a n d Delay Benefits survey qiiestions. For both dependent variables. m o r e unfavorable a n i t u d e s a r c c o d e d with higher numerical values and cases f o r which "don't k n o w " o r "no answer" w a s the response a r e omitted from the analysis.

O u r estimation procedures a r e based o n probit analysis

techniques and unless otherwise noted all predictors have been recoded with values r a n g i n g from 0 to I . In t h e c a s e o f the Level o f Immigration variable, we u s e a n ordered-probit model ( M c K e l v e y a n d Zavoina 1 9 7 5 ) which is a n extension o f the binary model employed here in the Delay Benefits estimates. T h e coefficients estimated in the ordered-probit model represent the impact o f a one-unit c h a n g e in each predictor o n the m e a n o f the ordinal variable representing preferences f o r restricting immigration. T a b l e 5(a) reports the results for the Level o f Immigration item. with coefficients that a r c statistically significant a t the . 0 5 and . O 1 levels by a one-tailed tcst designated with asterisks.

In these

equations. ethnicit\ and occupational status a r c coded a s d u m m y variables with white; and w h i t e collar respondents treated a s the excluded categories. T h e results o f Model 1 , the "basic" equation including only demographic variables a n d e c o n o m i c factors a s predictors, reveal that the apparent effects in the bivariale analysis o f labor market conlpetition, pessimism about the state o f the economy. and anxiety a b o u t rising taxes o n opinions a b o u t immigration revealed by the bivariate analyses survive the imposition o f controls f o r background characteristics. T h u s , the tendency o f respondents in "high threat" blue collar j o b s to b e m o r e likely than those in w h i t e collar occupations to favor a lower level o f immigration is not a function of'differences in

"' W e rcicr here lo ihc familiar NES instrunieni lhai K-kl rcqxmdenis how warmly on a scale o f 0 1 0 1 0 0 ihcy 1'ccl nboul a paniculw group Given the pohsibiliiy lhnt some rcspondenw systcniatically ~ u d ~ ccvcry d f ~ o u p" Â ¥ b v m l yor "coldly." our n x z i u r c w-iis conslrcclc'd by c-on~putin; lhc ditTurirr~ccbetween an individual's riiiinci. ot'AsiaIls .and I-iispiknics and his or her riitinrs ol'whilcii

their level o f education. B y the same token, Model I indicates that the tendency of blacks to be less opposed to i m m i p t i o n than whites is not a spurious outcome o f group differences in economic circumstanccs or education.

Nor d o differences in economic resources o r outlook account for the

tendency o f pro-immigrant opinions to increase with one's lcvcl o f formal cducation. These results arc gcncrally unaffected by the inclusion of the effects of party identification and ideological orientation in Model 11. Because conservativcs tend to worry morc than d o liberals about the p r o s p c t o f rising taxes, controlling for ideological self-designation lowered the coefficient for the Expect Tax Increase item below a statistically significant level.

On the other hand, Mode! 11's

adjustment for the tendency o f Republicans and conservative respondents in the 1992 NES survey to be more optimistic about the state of the national economy than were their Democratic and liberal counterparts actually strengthened the observed impact of our measure o f economic pessimism (the National Retrospective Indcx) on support for restricting immigration. Model 111 clcarly reveals the strong effects of beliefs about the likely impact o f Hispanic and Asian immigrants on the jobs and taxes of "people already here" on support for restricting future immigration into the United States,

This equation underscores the robustness o f the independent

siatistical effect o f the National Retrospective Index tapping pessimism about the overall state o f the economy on anti-immigrant sentiment. The mediating effects of the J o b Impact and Tax Impact Indices on the association between the High Threat Blue Collar and Level o f Immigration variables also provide some support for the- idea that subjective calculations of self-interest arc a source of restrictionist sentiment (Espcnshadc and Calhoun 1993). Beliefs about the economic impacts of immigration also function as intervening variables that account for thc strong statistical association between respondents' level of formal education and their opinion about reducing immigration shown in Models I and 11. The "economic" explanation o f this result is that the morc favorable attitude toward immigrants of the better-educated is founded on their relative invulnerability to competition from Hispanic and Asian immigrants. A s we have cautioned above, however, i t may be misleading to interpret the meaning o f the survey questions about the impact o f immigration in this utilitarian way. employed in this rcscarch docs not refer expIicitly to the

The wording o f the items

i m p a c ~o f immigration. Moreover.

responses to these items may be significantly colored by broader attitudes toward Hispanics and Asians a s groups o r by a more global ethnocentrism. To the extent that this is the case, the mediating role o f the J o b Impact and Tax Impact Indices in Model I I I may primarily reflect the reluctance o f the bettereducated respondents to attribute negative traits to any minority group.

T h e 1992 N E S survey asked respondents about the likelihood that "the growing n u m b e r s o f Hispanics a n d Asians c o m i n g to the United Status would improve o u r culture with n e w ideas a n d customs?"

W h e n a Cultural Impact Index replaced the J o b Impact and T a x Impact variables in the

predictive equation (Model IV). t h e coefficient for Education remained statistically i n ~ i g n i f i c a n t . ~ T ' he coefficient for the High Threat Blue Collar category o f respondents d o e s achieve statistical significance, bolstering the argument that the J o b Impact and T a x Impact variables e m b o d y an amalgam o f subjective estimates o f tangible costs and benefits and more purely affective evaluations o f specific groups. Mode1 V clearly points to the influence o f these generalized ethnic attitudes.

T h i s equation

contains both o f the economic impact indices and a measure combining the familiar NES feeling thermomeier ratings o f Hispanics a n d Asians a s predictors of rcsponses t o the Level o f Immigration item. "Cooler" feelings toward these minority groups. which m a k e up the majority o f recent immigrants, were strongly related to a prefercnce for restricting immigration. and the inclusion o f this measure o f group affect reduces somewhat the magnitude o f the coefficients for ihe J o b and T a x Impact indices. In this elaborate model, ihere a r c n o demographic variables o r measures o f personal economic resources with statistically significant coefficients. However, negative perceptions o f the trend in the state o f the national e c o n o m y o v e r the past year remain a significant source o f support for curtailing legal immigration into the United States. There are s o m e differences between these results a n d the probit analyses of responses t o the Delay Benefits item which a r c reported in Table 5(b). In Model 1, respondents with lower incomes were m o r e likely to oppose delaying benefits for immigrants, and this "resources" effect remained statistically significant in Models I I and 1 1 1 . ~ ' O n the otlier hand, labor market competition, a s indexed by occupation,

2n

This two-item mc:~suri; WAS w n s i r u c ~ c dby turnnuns rcsp^m~;sl o 1hc queslioii-'. about thc likelihood th.11 increasing I-[ispanic and Asian n~mir.r.ition w o u l d improve "our culturi:" as w x dune with ilic Job and Tu-x Impact indices described .ibovc i n this I.^.sL'. scores range from 2 (positive impact o n culture extremely likcly) to S (pc'iilivc inipuct not a1 t i l l l i k e l y ) and arc then rccodcd to ranee from 0 to 1 Cirircn hnd C'ltrin (1994) have shown [hat this " p o s i t i v ~ "i t w i about cullur.il niipaci and thc questions conecniing the ncs.tilivc labar market .and fiscal IrnpLicLs o i Ilispi-tnic fniiiiir.ration idcritilk a hinglc latent affirctivc oncnt.ition to'isa~dthis n7inorily Vroup. T l ~ cr c s u l b o i Model tV reinforce this conclu*sion. Indeed. thc ep'cct !-or Inconw

WAS

-.i:.nific.int

in

the PI.:]

10 level i n ~ h rnm1 c fully elabor.nud Model

25

V l o r llic lX'l.i>

Uciict'ib i l r n i

influenced opinions about the level of immigration but not responses to this item referring to immigrants' acccss to govcrnrnent benefits. In Models 11-V, party identification rather than liberal-conservatism is a statistically significant predictor, suggesting that the Delay Benefits item engages the pervasive conflict between Democrats and Republicans over social spending.

This issue aside, the results for the two

policy questions are consistent: in the full equation (Model V), pessimism about the national economy, beliefs about the negative consequences o f immigration for jobs and taxes, and relatively "cool" feelings toward Hispanics and Asians are the statistically significant predictors o f support for reducing the level of immigration and delaying benefits for those who arc admitted. VIII. OVERVIEW How d o the results reported in Tables 5(a) and S(b) relate to our spccitic hypotheses concerning the economic bases o f restrictionist sentiment? Our data provide very little support for tlic proposition that

d economic circumsmnccs. whether defincd in objective o r subjective terns. influence opinion

p

formation on immigration issues. Contrary to the "resources" hypothesis. income. short-term financial stress, and self-reported deterioration in one's financial circumstances were unrelated to opinions about the level o f immigration o r the access of immigrants to government

In addition, the pro-immigrant

attitudes of the college educated is better explained by their level o f political and racial tolerance rather than their insulation from material anxieties. The labor market competition hypothesis receives only weak support from our data. We do find that workers with the most to fear from job competition with new immigrants were more likely to adopt resirictionisi opinions. On the other hand. employment status, anxiety about losing one's job. and union membership were unrelated to the desire to reduce immigration into the United States or to a preference for delaying immigrants' access to benefits.

The consistent relationship between negative retrospective perceptions of the state of the national economy and restrictionist policy preferences supports the "pessimism" hypothesis. But it is importan1 to note that this seeming object of concern is not one's own situation; respondents' anxieties about the tmjcctoy of h e i r

22

financial situation were unrclatcd to attitudes about immigration.

W e remind thc reader o f i h e slight diflkrcnce in ihc role o f income air :J predictor in Lhc case o f t h c Delay Qcncfilii item I n iinoiher iin*il?,sii' not reported here. we found no relationship between whether or not one wa-s receiving benefits tram ihe governmcnl and rcbponscs to ihe question about dcliiyinp the acccss o l i m r n i g r m u 10 cnliilemcni programs

Beliefs about the negative consequences of immigration for jobs and taxes were strong predictors of restrictionisi sentiment in our data. While this outcome seems consistent with the labor market competition and tax burden hypotheses, responses to the impact items can not treated unambiguously as calculations of the personal costs and benefits stemming from immigration. In sum, economic motives apparently play a limited role in shaping opinions about immigration in the general public as a whole. Nevertheless, there may exist subgroups among whom anxieties about one's material well-being are a more potent source of opposition to immigration. Table 6 addresses this issue by comparing the relationships between various economic factors and the Level of Immigration and Delay Benefits items across groups of respondents categorized by race. level of concern about economic problems, and immigration levels in one's state of residence. T h e results point to a strong similarity in opinion formation on immigration issues across these diverse groups.

A lack of financial resources is no more significant in influencing attitudes about

immigration among blacks than among

Pessimism about the national economy is not more

sirongly related to restr~ctionist sentiment among those who named economic issues as the most important problem facing the country in 1992. Negative beliefs about the impact of Hispanic and Asian immigration on taxes had approximately the same relationship to opinion about the lcvel of immigration in the slates with high and low concentrations of immigrants respectively. In short. while [he salience o f the immigration issue may vary depending on one's locale. ethnicity or position in the labor market, the nature of the values, attitudes and information shaping preferences on national policies seem quite uniform throughou~the public. X l . CONCLUSION

T h e purpose of this paper is to explore the underpinnings of public opinion on issues raised by the current national debate on immigration reform.

Since advocates of restriction generally rest their

case on claims about the negative economic and fiscal consequences of immigration, our principal focus was to determine the strength of economic motives in shaping the policy preferences of ordinary citizens. For this reason, o u r empirical analysis was designed a s a systematic test o f the hypothesis that, at the individual level, unfavorable economic circumstances increase hostility to immigration, rather than to assess competing explanations and develop a comprehensive model of preference formation in this domain.

?Y The su-ongcr relationship hcrwcen rcuospcclivc assessments of one's Financial i-ilualion and fhc Lcvcl 01' I m m i g r ' i i o n ncm amone blacks disappciirs when Lhc M o d e l I cqualiun i s estiniaicd scpi~raiclyfor cdch raciikl proup

T h e d o m i n a n t r e s u l t o f o u r a n a l y s i s w a s t h e virtual a b s e n c e o f s t r o n g , statistically s i g n i f i c a n t relationships between indicators o f personal economic well-being and opinions about immigration. W h i l e s o m e o f o u r i n d i c a t o r s a d m i t t e d l y a r e c r u d e , their d i v e r s i t y a n d t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f n e g a t i v e f i n d i n g s s u p p o r t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n i n g t h e l i m i t e d i m p a c t o f e c o n o m i c selfinterest, d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f p e r s o n a l m a t e r i a l g a i n s a n d losses. o n preference f o r m a t i o n o n p u b l i c p o l i c y i s s u e s (Citrin a n d G r e e n 1990; Sears a n d F u n k 1990). O n e reason for [he limited role o f economic motives m a y b e that people d o not attribute responsibility for their plight t o immigrants. Scholars o n opposite sides o f the debate about the economic c o n s e q u e n c c s o f i m m i g r a t i o n g e n e r a l l y a g r e e that t h e s h o r t - r u n effects. w h e t h e r b c n c f i c i a l o r h a r m f u l ,

arc n e i t h e r l a r g e n o r p e r v a s i v e .

T h i s m a y h e l p e x p l a i n o u r s o m e w h a t unexpected f i n d i n g t h a t

respondents living in states a n d counties with greater concentrations o f recent immigrants w e r e n o m o r e likely t h a n t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s in t h e rest o f t h e c o u n t r y t o e x p r e s s restrictionist o p i n i o n s . T h e e c o n o m i c t h r e a t p o s e d b y i m m i g r a n t s m a y o n l y b e felt in s p e c i f i c l o c a l e s a n d j o b c a t e g o r i e s t h a t a r c n o t a d e q u a t e l y sampled in a national survey. Y e t w e d i d find that a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s b e t w e e n a n t i - i m m i g r a n t a t t i t u d e s a n d p e s s i m i s m a b o u t t h e c u r r e n t s t a t e o f t h e national c c o n o m y . B e l i e f s that i m m i g r a t i o n w o u l d h a v e h a r m f u l e f f e c t s o n employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d t a x e s w e r e a l s o a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s u p p o r t f o r r e s t r i c t i o n . W h i l e people seem t o respond t o national economic problems m o r e than t o personal e c o n o m i c problems. these findiiigs a r c s u b j e c t t o a m b i g u o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f r o m i h c p e r s p e c t i v e o f a self-interest m o d e l o f o p i n i o n f o r m a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e m i g h t a r g u e t h a t p e o p l e o f t e n a r e u n a b l e to sea t h e p e r s o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f remote policies and events a n d therefore use information about the state o f the nation a s evidence o f their o w n p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ( L a n e 1986). In a w o r l d o f uncertainties, w h a t h a s h a p p e n e d t o o t h e r s m a y a f f e c t t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s t h a t t h e s e l f will b e s i m i l a r l y a f f e c t e d . H e n c e . i f an i n f l u x o f i m m i g r a n t s t h r e a t e n s t o r a i s e t a x e s in California, it m a y m e a n t h a t o n e ' s o w n t a x e s w i l l a l s o go u p . Still, it is not o b v i o u s w h y d i s c o n t e n t a b o u t t h e s t a l e o f t h e n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y s h o u l d b e d i r e c t e d a t immigrants.

O n e e x p l a n a t i o n is t h e p s y c h o d y n a m i c t h e o r y o f s c a p e g o a t i n g , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t

cconornic adversity acts a s a trigger f o r the displacement o f anxiety and anger o n t o minority groups. R a t i o n a l f e a r o f e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n in t h e future p r o v i d e s a n o t h e r interpretation. A t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y is t h a t p e o p l e ' s s o c i o t r o p i c i m p u l s e s s t o p a t t h e nation's borders. T h a t is, w h e n t i m e s a r e b a d a n d t h e r e is l e s s t o g o a r o u n d . p e o p l e resist a d d i n g t h o s e w h o a r e not full-fledged m e m b e r s o f t h e political c o m m u n i t y to t h e list o f c l a i m a n t s f o r j o b s o r g o v e r n m e n t a l a s s i s t a n c e . T h u s , o n e i m p o r t a n t a r e a f o r future research is t o identify the cognitivc processes that m a y underlie the fusion o f e c o n o m i c uncertainty and ethnic tensions, including opposition t o immigrants.

O u r data confirm the important influences o f long-standing predispositions such a s ideology and group identifications o n opinion formation in immigration policy.

Preferences

o n specific issues

regarding immigrants in general are conditioned by emotional responses to Asians and Hispanics, the groups comprising the majority o f current migrants. Future research should explore whether the public would be m o r e receptive toward immigrants if they m o r e closely resembled the native population in appearance a n d culture (Hoskin 1991 ; Citrin, Reingold, a n d Green 1990). It also is important t o disentangle the meanings o f beliefs about the impact o f immigrants o n economic a n d social life. O u r data revealed that believing that immigration would raise taxes and cause unemployment significantly boosted restrictionist sentiment. But w e cannot tell whether these responses represented utilitarian calculations based o n personal experience o r factual knowledge, casual reactions t o c u e s in the national news, o r expressions of cultural affinity o r bias. Nor, given the available data, were w e able to construct a model incorporating the possible effects o f beliefs about the impact o f immigration on crime. education, urban congestion, o r other problems. Whatever their conceptual status, beliefs about the economic consequences o f immigration have political ramifications when they serve a s legitimating arguments for restrictionist policies in a culture that discourages nativist o r xenophobic appeals.

In the same vein, the significant role o f economic

factors in immigration politics m a y be t o mobilize the restricted segment o f the electorate \vho arc directl! affected rather than to influence the opinions o f the entire public. Those for w h o m the personal implications o f immigration are minimal m a y subsequently use news reports about the economic effects o n others to frame their o w n thinking about the issue. O u r data revealed n o relationship between the number of immigrants in a slate o r counts and the opinions o f its residents on immigration issues.

Clearly. though. the salience of these issues and.

consequently. the likelihood that they stimulate political action should vary with the presence o f immigrants and the nature o f their local impacts. Just a s protests against school busing occur when plans for forced integration arc implemented and attract the participation o f affected parents, it s e e m s obvious that legislation a n d other actions directed at immigrants would be proposed where immigrants are numerous, not scarce.

Proposition

187, the initiative aimed at eliminating benefits for illegal

immigrants, w a s advanced in California, and now is being considered in Florida, Texas, and Arizona, but not in South Dakota o r Oregon. T h e 1992 N E S d a t a were collected during a period o f recession a n d pervasive public pessimism about the state o f the economy. Since then. national economic conditions have greatly improved, but the 1994 General Social Survey conducted in mid-year by the National Opinion Research Center indicates

that the proportion o f the public favoring a lower level o f immigration increased from 4 9 to 6 5 per cent.

This paradoxical result underscores the influence of non-cconomic determinants of public opinion and suggests that the behavior of political elites and activists and increased media coverage not only has raised public consciousness o f immigration issues, but has also framed the debate in terms that engage cultural identities and fundamental values as much as individual economic interests.

APPENDIX A C O D I N G O F PREDICTOR V A R I A B L E S IN P R O B I T A N A L Y S E S All predictor variables, except where noted, were coded t o range from 0 to I .

R k m w x W c Vadabks

Age: actual a g e in years recoded with 0 = 17 years, 1 - 91 years (maximum). Education: n u m b e r o f years completed, recoded with 0 = 1 year, 1 ¥=\7years. 0 = least cd.. 1 - most cd., in number of yrs. Sex: 0 = male, I , female. Hispanic: d u m m y variable, 0 - non-Hispanic, 1 = Hispanic. Black.: d u m m y variable, 0 non-Black. I = Black. Immigrant Status: 0 3rd generation o r more, 1- 1 st o r 2nd ~ n c r a t T o nimmigrant. Percent Foreiqn Born in County: percentage o f county residents born oinside U.S. in 1990 Census. ranges from 0 to 100. ¥=

~ ~F ~ C ~ OiK S c Occupation: all variables listed a r c d u m m y variables, with White Collar occupations comprising the excluded category. Union Member: 0 n o n - n ~ c m b c r .1 =- Self o r Family nwniber belongs t o labor union. Income: recoded from 24-ca~egories,with 0 = low i n c o n ~ e .1 - - high income. Personal Retrospective Evaluations: recoded from iwo-item index. 0 = positive evaluation, 1 = negative (see footnote 2. Table 4b). National Retrospective Evaluations: recodcd from three-item index. 0 - positive evaluation. 1 = negative (see footnote 3 , Table 4b). Expect Income T a x Increase: recorded from 3-category variable. with 0 - Don't cxpect increase, I = expect increase.

Pnliticalni-i-w. Party Identification: receded from 7-point variable. with 0 - strong Democrat. 1 - :strong Republican. Ideological identificarion: recoded from 7-point scale. with 0 = extreme liberal. I - extreme conservative.

JnlpacLoLLr~unigr~ J o b Impact Index: s u m m e d index, o f t w o Hispanic and Asian Job Impact items, with impact, I = high negative impact. T a x Impact Index: s u m m e d index of t w o Hispanic and Asian T a x Impact items. with impact. I high negative impact. Culture Impact Index: s u m m e d index o f t w o Hispanic and Asian Culture items, with 0 impact, 1 = n o likely impact.

0

=

n o likely

0

=

n o likely

=

high positive

1-G N e r m e d Hispanic and Asian Fouling Thermometers; responses on 100-poini Hispanic a n d Asian feeling thermometers were norrned by subtracting respondent's score on White Fueling Thermometer. T h e s e t w o normed thermometers were then s u m m e d and recoded s o that 0 = intense liking o f Hispanics a n d Asians, a n d 1 = intense dislike.

REFERENCES Borjas. Gcorgc J. 1990. Basic Books.

&n&i

or S S ,m .' The Impact -

.

011

n

0

1111

: LJ-S. F

~ m w NY: .

.

Borjas, George J. and Richard B. Frccman. 1992. and t h* ~W ak Force., F.con& the United St-d Source A r e a Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bcmvier. Leon F. 1994. H o w Francisco: Sicrra Club Books.

.

~c

-

nt. San

Y Brinkley, Joel. 1994. "At Immigration, Disarray and Dcfeat." Hcw ,

Septcrnbw 1 1 , 1994.

Citrin. Jack and Donald Philip Green. 1990. "The Self-interest Motive in American Public Opinion." in Samuel Long. cd. Ry.s-tf.a& in M i c r w c i i . v ol . 3. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Citrin, Jack. Beth Reingold, and Donald Philip Grecn. 1990. "American Identity and the Politics of . . Ethnic Change.'' Jg.lmaI of PCIIIIIC~ 52; 1124-54. Clad, James C. 1994. "Slowing the Wave." E-n

Policy 95: 139- 150.

Converse. Philip E. and Gregory B. Markus. 1979. "Plus ca Change ..." -can Rcvicw 73: 32-49,

Political Scicrid;

Day, C. L. 1990. "Elhnocentrisin. Econon~icCompetition, and Attitudes toward US Immigration Policy.'" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. Chicago, IL, April 5-7. DeFrcitas, Grcgory. 1991. b u u y at WQ-.~&Y Press.

in

1 J . S .I,&or Forcc. XY: Oxford Ur~iversity

De la Garza, Rodolfo O . , et al. 1 9 9 2 M o V o i c>.~ s. .M c s t c n R~i c a d f i b - & u &m&ed&, Boulder: Wcstvicw Prcss. Doyle, Michael. 1994, "Feinstcin Gets Toughcr on Immigration." k

a

Edsall. Thomas Byrne and Mary D. Edsail. 1992, Chain Reaction: -act on ~ ~ i p o l;.i w . u, MY:~ Norton. ~ ~

xWcs

n

~Junc. 16. 1994,

..

of RAW.

Espenshade. Thomas J. and Charles A. Calhoun. 1993. "An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocurncnted Irnrnijgation." d- Policv Rcvicw 12: 189-224,

...

Feldman, Stanley. 1982. "Econoniic Self Intcrcst and Political Behavior,'' -. 26: 446-66.

..

Journiil of P011t1cd

Field Institute. "Voting in the 1994 General Election." San Francisco. January 1995, 5 ,

..

. .

Fonw. P. 1964. Ill-and P r a c h e s o f thp A r n w ~ d c - r a m o f Labor 1900- 1909. N c w York: International Publishers. Glazer. Nathan 1993. "The Closing Door: Is Restrictionism Unthinkable?" Npw R Grccn, Donald Philip. 1992. T h e Price Elasticity o f M a s s Prcferences.'' &view 86: 128-48.

d 209: 15- 19.

..

Grccn, Donald Philip a n d Jack Citrin. 1994. "Mcasuremcnt Error and the Structure o f Attitudes: Arc Positivc and Ncgative J u d p c n t s Opposites?" M a n Jo&f Pol- . . 38: 128-48. Gum, T c d R o b e r ~ .1970. W h v b Rebd. Princcton: Princcton University Prcss. Gutierrez, David G . 1991. "Sin Fronteras?: Chicanos, Mexican Americans, a n d t h e Ernergcnce o f t h e . .. . Contemporary Mcsican Immisration Debate. 1968- 1978," bd o f w !0: 5-3 7. Harwood, Edwin. 1983. "Alienation: American Attitudes Toward Immigration." b b l i c O p a 6: 4951. Herncs. Gudmund a n d Knud Knudsen. 1992. "Xomcgians' Attitudes Toward X e w Immigrants," S o c i o l o r i ~ ~35: a 123-39.

Huddle. Donald. 1993. "The Costs o f Immigration." Washington, D.C.: Carrying Capacity Network. Hutchinson. Edward Prince. 198I . M t i v c &ton, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

of Arn&-on

.

,

Pol ic\.- 1 7 ~ 81965, -

Immigration and Naturalization Services. 1993. INS Fact Book: Summary o f Recent Immigration Data. Washington. D.C.: U.S. Department o f Justice. Jacobs, Lawrence. 1993.. Kcy. V . 0 . I96 I , m l i c 0

Ithaca: Cornell LJnivcrsity Press.

.

*

0

. N Y : Knopf.

Kicwiet, D, Rodcrick, 1983, W.Chicago: University of Chicago Prcss. Kiewict. D. Roderick a n d Douglas Rivers. 1985. "The Economic Basis of Reagan's Appcal." in John E. . . . . C h u b b and Paul E. Pctcrson, cds. Thr New Directions in American Politics. Washington. D.C.: T h e Brookings Institution.

Lane, Robert E. 1986. "What a r c People Trying to d o with their Schemata? T h e Question o f Purpose." in cds. Hilkdalc, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Richard R. Lau and David 0. S~EUS. Associates, Inc.

~~~~~

-

- of 1, LeMay, Michael C . 1987. F r o m Oncn Door to Dutch Door: An Wi>ih S ~ G ~NCW Q York: . Praegcr.

o n Po&

NY: John Wiley & Sons., lnc.

LcVine. Robcrt A. and Donald T . Campbell. 1972. m o w n - .

- of Tokanct McClosky, H e r b e n a n d Alida Brill. 1983. Lib&NY: Russcll Sagc Foundation.

1,

-

W-LRt-lit.\

*

.,.

Ahnu

McKclvcy, R.D. and W . Zavoina. 1975. "A Statisiical Model for the Analysis o f Ordinal Level Dcpendcnt Variablesf" o f M a h x m d c a l Soci~JQgy4: 10-3-20. Mcisenhcimer. Joseph R,. 11. 1992. "How D o Immigrants Fare JLah-wReview 1 1 5: 3- 19.

111

the U . S . Labor Market?"

Miles. Jack. 1992. "Blacks vs. Browns." ItiJi^. Monthdy k& 270(4): 4 1-59. Morganthau, Tom. "America: Slill a Melting Pot?" p e w s w e & Mullcr. Thomas. 1993. w

7

-

-

d the

ican

August 9, 1993, 16-23.

m.NY: N e w York University Press.

Mu&, Diana C . 1992. " ~ V a s sMedia and thc Depoliticization o f Personal Experience." olfdtkal Science 36: 483-508. c ~ C Olzak. Susan, 1992. ~ ~ t . m j of- Ethnic Press.

~

~

J O L I ~

QandJ C Jo r n . Stanford: Stanford University

Page, Benjamin I . a n d Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. "Effects o f Public Opinion on Policy." -m. E&l&-al S c i e n c m * 77; 175-90. Passell. Jeffrey S . 1994. "How M u c h D o Immigrants Really Cost?" Clarcmont. C A : T o m a s Rivera Ccntcr. PasscII, Jeffrey S. and Michael Fix. 1994. "Myths About Imznigrants." Pompcr. Gerald M., et al. 1993. T h e F k c t i o n of Chatham House Publishers.

Policy 95: 15 1 - 1 6 0 .

. Rc .?orts. m ma . Chatham.

NJ:

Rule. James B. 1988. Theoritx ~ L C i v j 1V i o l e n c ~ Berkeley: . University o f California Press. Runciman. W.G. 1966. w t i v e D fivcvticth-Ctantttw

.

.

and Sorial Justicc : A S t d y

a

a

~

d

m d Berkeley: University o f California Press.

a

-

to 5 Social 1 n c w

Schuck. Peter H. 1994. "The Evolving Civil Rights Movement: Old Civil Rights and N e w Immigration." Cumin 359: 13-20. Schuck, Pctcr H. and Rogcrs M. Smith. 1985. tuN e w Haven: Yale University R e s s .

in &

Cons-

Schuman, Howard, L a w e n c e B o b , and Charlotte Stceh. 1985. .Cambridge: Harvard Univcrsity Prcss. Scars, David 0. and Carolyn L. Funk. 1990. "Self-interest in Amcricans' Political Opinions." in Janc J , Self--. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mansbridgc, cd. &~QIXI Scars, David 0.. Jack Citrin, S h a r m a i m Vidanagc, and Nicholas Valentine. 1994. "What Ordinary Americans Think About Multiculturalism." Papcr prcscnted at the annual meeting o f the American Political Science Association, N e w York City. NY. September 1-3. Simon, Julian L. 1989. Jhc F.co&c

. -snC o

Cambridgc, MA: Basil Blackw~cll.

Skcrry, Pcwr. 1995. "Thc Black Alienation; African Amcricans vs. Immigrants.'' p e w

R -

2 12: 19-

20.

.

1993, m c ~ i c a n .sTIIL . Arnbiv alb-

'

'

-.NY:

Frec Press.

..

Stoker. Laura. 1992. "Interests and Ethics in Politics." Ammican Poltt~calScicncc Rc\,icut 86: 369-80, Tichenor. Daniel. 1994. "Regulating the American Political Community: Immigration Conflict and Policy Activism in U.S. History, 1870-1990." Paper presented at the annual meeting o f the American Political Science Association, New York City. NY, September 1-3. Uhlaner, Caroic J. 1991. "Perceived Discrimination and Prejudice and the Coalition Prospects o f Blacks. Latinos, and Asian Americans." in Byraii 0. Jackson and Michael B. Preston, eds. .. . tc P o I ~ t ~ In c s C a 1 1 f o h Berkeley, CA: I G S Press. Vcddcr. Richard K.and Lowell E. Galloway. 1994. "Immigration and Unemployment: N e w Evidence." Arlington, VA: T h e Alexis d c Tocqueville Institution. Wcathedord, M . Stephcn. 1983. "Economic Voting and the .Symbolic Politics' Argument." .. 011t1caI S-vicw 77: 158-74.