Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014

British Journal for Military History

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY ADVISORY BOARDS The Editorial Team gratefully acknowledges the support of the British Journal for Military History’s Editorial Advisory Board the membership of which is as follows: Major-General Mungo Melvin (President, BCMH) Professor Bill Philpott (Secretary-General, BCMH & King’s College London) Dr Tim Gale (Treasurer, BCMH) Andy Grainger (Member BCMH) Dr Andy Simpson (Member BCMH) Professor Charles Esdaile (University of Liverpool) Professor Richard Grayson (Goldsmiths, University of London) Professor Beatrice Heuser (University of Reading) Professor Matthew Hughes (Brunel University) Professor Andrew Roberts (Cornell University) Professor Gary Sheffield (University of Wolverhampton) Professor Sir Hew Strachan (University of Oxford) Dr Huw Bennett (University of Aberystwyth) Dr Huw Davies (JSCSC; King’s College London) Dr Declan O’Reilly (University of East Anglia) Jonathan Ferguson (Royal Armouries) Seb Cox (Air Historical Branch) Bob Evans (Army Historical Branch) Stephen Prince (Naval Historical Branch)

COVER IMAGE: COVER IMAGE: Soldier of the Mounted Infantry on his horse 1899 © IWM (Q 72140)

THE BCMH LOGO: The BCMH logo is based on the combination of Mars & Clio, the Roman God of War and the Greek Muse of History, as a good summation of what we are about. It depicts Mars with his spear whilst Clio stands before him reading from a book – or perhaps this journal – the Secretary General of the BCMH having pointed out that since Mars cannot read someone will have to read it to him.

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY CONTACT US Find us online at: www.bjmh.org.uk Letters and communications to the Editors should be addressed: [email protected] Or Dr Matthew Ford Department of International Relations University of Sussex Brighton, BN1 9SJ * Follow the British Commission for Military History and British Journal for Military History on: Facebook [www.facebook.com/bcmh] Twitter [@marsandclio] Online [www.bjmh.org.uk] British Journal for Military History – ISSN: 2057-0422

BRITISH JOURNAL FOR MILITARY HISTORY

* Volume 1, Issue 1

October 2014

Editor-in-Chief: Dr Matthew Ford Editors:

Dr Nick Terry Dr Catherine Baker

Associate Editors:

Jennifer Daley Aimée Fox-Godden Dr Stuart Mitchell

Published by The British Commission for Military History

CONTENTS NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS EDITORIAL

Articles A ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CENTENARY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

by Gary Sheffield

1

THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT AND PROMOTION IN THE LATE VICTORIAN ARMY

by Ian F. W. Beckett

12

‘SHOOTING POWER’: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOER AND BRITISH RIFLE FIRE, 1899-1914

by Spencer Jones

29

IRELAND’S NEW MEMORY OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR: FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, JUNE 1917

by Richard S. Grayson

48

THE LEGACY OF LIDDELL HART: THE CONTRASTING RESPONSES OF MICHAEL HOWARD AND ANDRÉ BEAUFRE

by Brian Holden Reid

66

DIVIDED LOYALTIES: THE EFFECT THE BOER WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH HAD ON HOW IRISH NATIONALISTS INTERPRETERED THE IRISH SOLDIER SERVING IN THE BRITISH ARMY

by Alan Drumm

81

Reviews MAX HASTINGS, CATASTROPHE: EUROPE GOES TO WAR 1914

Reviewed by Jonathan Boff

97

THOMAS SCOTLAND & STEVEN HEYS (EDS.), WARS, PESTILENCE AND THE SURGEON’S BLADE: THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH MILITARY MEDICINE AND SURGERY DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Reviewed by Jane Bowden-Dan

98

JAMES HOLLAND (ED.), AN ENGLISHMAN AT WAR. THE WARTIME DIARIES OF STANLEY CHRISTOPHERSON, DSO, MC, TD, 1939-1945

Reviewed by Robin Brodhurst

100

ALAN TRITTON, WHEN THE TIGER FOUGHT THE THISTLE. THE TRAGEDY OF COLONEL WILLIAM BAILLIE OF THE MADRAS ARMY

Reviewed by Bruce Collins

103

ANNE APPLEBAUM, IRON CURTAIN: THE CRUSHING OF EASTERN EUROPE

Reviewed by Timothy C. Dowling

104

TIMOTHY S. WOLTERS, INFORMATION AT SEA: SHIPBOARD COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE U.S. NAVY FROM MOBILE BAY TO OKINAWA

Reviewed by Marcus Faulkner

106

THOMAS WALDMAN, WAR, CLAUSEWITZ AND THE TRINITY

Reviewed by Jan Willem Honig

107

PETER KENDALL, THE ROYAL ENGINEERS AT CHATHAM 1750-2012 TIMOTHY CRICK, RAMPARTS OF EMPIRE: THE FORTIFICATIONS OF SIR WILLIAM JERVOIS ROYAL ENGINEER, 1821-1897

Reviewed by Andrew Lambert

109

HALIK KOCHANSKI, THE EAGLE UNBOWED: POLAND AND POLES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Reviewed by Simon Niziol

113

ANTHONY J. NOCELLA II, COLIN SALTER & JUDY K. C. BENTLEY (EDS.), ANIMALS AND WAR: CONFRONTING THE MILITARY-ANIMAL INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Reviewed by Kimberly Brice O’Donnell

115

JIM BEACH, HAIG’S INTELLIGENCE: GHQ AND THE GERMAN ARMY, 19161918

Reviewed by Jack Sheldon

117

JOHN GRODZINSKI, DEFENDER OF CANADA: SIR GEORGE PREVOST AND THE WAR OF 1812

Reviewed by Ian Stafford

118

Submission Guidelines ARTICLE SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

121

STYLE GUIDE

122

BOOK REVIEW SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

123

Notes on contributors PROFESSOR GARY SHEFFIELD is Professor of War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. He is President of the International Guild of Battlefield Guides and a Vice President of the Western Front Association. He has published widely on the First World War and regularly broadcasts on television and radio as well as contributing to numerous journals, magazines and newspapers. Previous books include the acclaimed Forgotten Victory and The Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army, which was shortlisted for the prestigious Duke of Westminster's Medal. PROFESSOR IAN F. W. BECKETT is Professor of Military History at the University of Kent. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he is also Chairman of the Council of the Army Records Society, and Secretary to the Buckinghamshire Military Museum Trust. Previously, he has held chairs in both the UK and the US. Currently, he is attached to BBC South for the AHRC- funded World War One at Home project and is coordinating Great War commemorative activities in Buckinghamshire. He is completing a book on the politics of command in the late Victorian army for the University of Oklahoma Press. DR SPENCER JONES is Senior Lecturer in Armed Forces and War Studies at the University of Wolverhampton. He currently serves at the Regimental Historian for the Royal Regiment of Artillery. His previous publications include From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army 1902-1914 and Stemming the Tide: Officers and Leadership in the British Expeditionary Force 1914. PROFESSOR RICHARD S. GRAYSON is Professor of Twentieth Century History at Goldsmiths, University of London. He is the author of Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died Together in the First World War (2009), and edited At War with the 16th Irish Division: The Staniforth Letters, 1914-18 (2012). He has engaged widely with community groups on First World War remembrance especially the 6th Connaught Rangers Research Project. An associate member of the First World War Centenary Committee in Northern Ireland, he contributed to BBC NI’s Ireland’s Great War, co-edits www.irelandww1.org and chairs the Academic Advisory Group for the Digital Projects run by the Imperial War Museums. PROFESSOR BRIAN HOLDEN REID is Professor of American History and Military Institutions at King’s College London, and since 2010 an Academic Member of College Council. A former Head of the Department of War Studies (2001-7) in 2007 he was awarded the Fellowship of King’s College London (FKC), the highest honour the College can award its alumni and staff, and he is both. His books include J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (1987, 1990), The Origins of the American Civil War (1996), Studies in British Military Thought (1998), Robert E. Lee: Icon for a Nation (2005, 2007) and America’s Civil War: The Operational Battlefield, 1861-1863 (2008).

British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 ALAN DRUMM is a PhD student under the supervision of Dr Mike Cosgrave at University College Cork. His thesis examines the relationship between Irish Nationalism and the British Army between 1880 and 1914 and the impact it had on recruiting. Alan is the author of Kerry and The Royal Munster Fusiliers and has spoken at a number of conferences including the British Commission for Military History’s New Research in Military History Conference 2013, Trinity College Dublin’s Centre for War Studies Seminar Series 2010-11 and the Irish History Students Association’s conference in both 2011 and 2012.

Editorial “The birth of the British Journal for Military History will be as welcome as it is long overdue. The past few decades have seen the appearance of a new generation of military historians. Some have been serving or retired members of the Armed Forces; some academics or aspiring academics; and some - most welcome of all – amateurs who write for the sheer love of it. The continuing demand for their work is evidenced in every major bookshop, where ‘Military History’ shelves often take up as much space as does mere ‘History’. Even those whose primary interest is not military history as such now realise that a knowledge of the subject is necessary if they are to understand the past, to say nothing of the present. Military history is now too important to be left to the military historians. For the past few years military historians have been able to communicate with each another at the annual meetings of the British Commission for Military History and through its publication Mars and Clio. Now the BJMH will make their work available to a far wider readership and should attract an increasing number of contributors. It will be not only British, and not only military historians who will wish it well." Professor Sir Michael Howard

We are very pleased to offer you the inaugural issue of the British Journal for Military History. This journal represents a unique vehicle for distributing high-quality military history to an audience beyond academia. The BJMH is open-access, applies peer review policies to all the articles we receive and is published three times a year. Our first issue showcases some of the journal’s ambitions. Articles consider a number of topics, ranging from the use and abuse of military history, to military promotion, shooting power, memory and war, the evolution of strategy and changing identities. In this edition we not only offer a platform for well-established historians but also for those new and upcoming authors with whom we wish to develop strong ties over the long term. Future issues will focus on counterinsurgency, offer a discussion of women working in military history and have Professors Andrew Roberts and Charles Esdaile debate whether Napoleon was great.

British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 The BJMH has emerged out of the British Commission for Military History. Consequently, it is only right that the first article in this edition is based on a lecture given by Professor Gary Sheffield in memory of Professor Richard Holmes, a former President of the Commission. The Commission itself has been a great source of support to this initiative and the Editors are very pleased to offer their thanks to our fellow members, the General Committee and especially Professor Bill Philpott and Major General Mungo Melvin. If the Commission has provided the support then it is the Editorial Advisory Board that has helped us to develop the sorts of aspirations that frame the journal’s philosophy. The Board includes some of Britain’s leading military historians, academics and scholars. These busy people have generously offered guidance and counsel as the Editors have sought to bring the new journal together from inception to delivery. Their help has been crucial and we are greatly appreciative of their backing. Developing a new journal of course depends on having a great team of editors who are willing to do the work necessary to ensure the smooth production of each edition. In this respect all the Editors ought to be thanked for their endeavours over the past 18 months. The Associate Editors in particular have taken on serious roles and demonstrated their ability to rise to the occasion. Jennifer Daley has been instrumental in getting books reviewed, identifying reviewers and ensuring we have enough material to publish. Aimée Fox-Godden has shaped the look and feel and the layout for the journal. Stuart Mitchell has worked extremely hard to check proofs, copy-edit and act as general fixer. I must also thank Nick Terry and Catherine Baker for stretching our networks and reach and providing an appropriate sounding board for ideas and strategy development. All of the Editors volunteer their time and I hope you will join me in offering our sincere thanks for all their efforts. Along the way a number of other people have helped in the evolution of this project. In particular I would like to thank Dr Philip W Blood, Dr Declan O’Reilly, Ross Mahoney and George Walkley for their early involvement in helping us think through the challenges associated with launching a new journal. Lastly, Dr Simon Coningham very kindly offered his time and the benefit of his experience of working in mainstream publishing. It is only a shame that he passed away earlier this year and was unable to see the final product.

The Editors would like to thank Professor Howard for his generous note of support. Not only do his words encapsulate the philosophy of the journal but we hope they will also inspire you to join us in broadening and shaping the future of our field of interest. Please enjoy this first issue of the BJMH. We welcome your comments and feedback.

DR MATTHEW FORD, EDITOR BJMH

ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY?

A Once in a Century Opportunity? Some Personal Reflections on the Centenary of the First World War GARY SHEFFIELD University of Wolverhampton Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT In this article Gary Sheffield sets out his opinions on the current commemoration plans and media responses to the centenary of the First World War. He argues that the British government and media are letting slip a golden opportunity to challenge popular perceptions of the conflict. This piece builds upon the author’s speech delivered at the Richard Holmes Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the BCMH, King’s College London, and the National Army Museum, Chelsea. It was delivered at King’s College London on 13 March 2014.

This paper, and the lecture it is based on, is dedicated to the late Professor Richard Holmes. Richard was a very talented scholar who nonetheless wore his learning lightly. In print, in lectures and on battlefield tours, and on the television screen, time after time he proved himself to be an outstandingly good public historian. Richard’s death in 2011 deprived him of the opportunity to take a leading role in presenting the history of the First World War over the period of the Centenary to a mass audience. Before beginning my own reflections on the centenary, I would like to say something about Richard’s impact on my career. I arrived as a very junior lecturer at The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1985, to find that the then Dr Richard Holmes was Deputy Head of the War Studies Department. He was kindness personified, taking me under his wing, giving me some very sound advice about the direction of my career, and helping me steer through the politics of the organisation. We stayed in touch after he left Sandhurst and in 1999 we linked up again professionally when I moved to the Joint Services Command and Staff College, and we both taught on the memorable Higher Command and Staff

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 Course staff rides. I learned a very great deal from Richard, not least the importance of public history. I have been very lucky in the senior colleagues who have helped guide my career. Richard was one of the most important influences in my professional life, and I was deeply honoured to be asked to give a lecture in his memory. The subject of my lecture and this paper, my reflections on the centenary of the First World War, is doubly appropriate. First, because Richard Holmes was a masterly communicator of history to a lay audience; he believed academics should speak to ‘real people’ outside the academy. Second, although Richard wrote on a number of historical topics (his PhD was on the French army of the Second Empire, and he published on subjects as diverse as the English Civil War, the American War of Independence, and French counterinsurgency in the 1950s), he had a fascination for the First World War. He once admitted that he was 'haunted’ by the conflict.1 The stands on which Richard led during staff rides to the Somme and Verdun were – even by his very high standards – especially memorable. Although the two things are not the same, in 2014 media interest and, as far as I can judge, public interest in the First World War is at an all-time high. The centenary of the outbreak of the Great War does seem to have caught the public imagination. Undoubtedly, there is a once in a hundred years opportunity for education about 1914-18, and education is a primary objective of the government’s First World War commemoration programme. What follows are a few thoughts on the way we in the UK are commemorating the war, and the state of knowledge and understanding of the First World War outside the academy one hundred years on. My perspective is that of an academic historian of the First World War who has a vocation for public history, and who has, through public lectures and talks to various bodies, appearances on television and radio, the use of social media (primarily Twitter), and high-level engagement with the government, civil service and armed forces, been closely involved with the Centenary commemorations. For a historian of the First World War like myself, the sudden national fixation on 1914 had been both dazzling and frustrating. It is dazzling, because of the sudden huge interest in my subject, and the opportunities that have opened up, not least in heading the University of Wolverhampton's programme of commemoration. Frustrating, because the response of the government and the media to the Centenary leave much to be desired. I have the sense of a golden opportunity for education about what George F. Kennan called the 'seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century', and Britain's role in it, slipping away. 1

Richard Holmes, ‘Foreword’ to Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities (London, Headline, 2001) p.ix

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ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? The last few years has made clear that, despite the efforts of revisionist historians over the last three decades, the 'futility/"lions led by donkeys"' narrative of Britain’s involvement in the conflict is very much with us. The ideas that there were no great issues at stake during the First World War, that a million men died for nothing and, in an accompanying myth, the lives of soldiers were routinely thrown away by criminally incompetent generals has been rebutted over and over again, but display remarkable longevity. One of the earliest and most influential statements came in the writings of David Lloyd George, Britain's prime minister in the second half of the war. His war memoirs, published in the 1930s, are a clear example of the literature of disillusionment, and Lloyd George was assisted in their writing by a disenchanted war veteran turned trenchant critic of the generals, Basil Liddell Hart. However this was a minority view in the 1930s. It began to become the dominant narrative after 1945, when the First World War started to be viewed through the lens of the 'good war', the struggle against Hitler. In the 1950s and 1960s a series of popular books, by the likes of Leon Wolff (In Flanders Fields, 1959 and Alan Clark (The Donkeys, 1961), as well as Joan Littlewood's musical play Oh! What a Lovely War (first produced in 1963, and turned into a film by Richard Attenborough in 1969) firmly established the futility/donkeys narrative in the public mind. Although for the most part worthless as history, they were extremely influential. Until the late 1970s a rather lonely revisionist furrow was being ploughed by John Terraine and his friend and collaborator, Correlli Barnett, and one or two others. From that point onwards new generations of academic historians provided timely reinforcements. In the 1980 and 1990s an informal school of revisionist historians of the British army in the Great War developed, based around the Imperial War Museum, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the British Commission for Military History and a handful of university departments. The founding in 1980 of the Western Front Association, an organisation that brings together scholarly historians and interested lay-people, now with numerous branches and some 6,000 members, was also significant. The overall result has been a series of scholarly works which have moved on the debate significantly. (It is fair to say that some historians remain outside the broad consensus, and even within it there remains plenty of scope for disagreement and debate). However, the impact of such historical revisionism on the public and media has been limited. The 1989 television series Blackadder Goes Forth, a sort of Oh! What a Lovely War for the late twentieth century, was particularly influential in reinforcing stereotypes of stupid generals fighting a pointless war. It is significant that when in January 2014 the Conservative cabinet minister Michael Gove intervened in the debate over the teaching of the First World War, he cited

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 Blackadder.2 The futility/donkeys view underpinned the British government's approach to commemorating the war. The government's advisory panel was light on professional historians but room was found for Sebastian Faulks, author of Birdsong, and Pat Barker, writer of the Regeneration trilogy. Both of these novelists adhere closely to the traditional narrative. When in October 2012 the Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced the programme of official commemorations it was noticeable that it concentrated on British defeats such Gallipoli and the First Day on the Somme but completely ignored the 'Hundred Days' campaign of 1918, when the forces of the British Empire, with their allies, won the greatest series of military victories in British history. The speech showed little knowledge or understanding of the Great War. For instance, Cameron stated that ‘200,000 were killed on one day of the Battle of the Somme’. Assuming he meant 1 July 1916, the true figure was actually nearly 20,000, which is of course shocking enough, but for the UK’s Prime Minister to have a made such a ludicrous mistake in the announcement of the government’s plans for the centenary did not promote confidence that they would be underpinned by a rigorous understanding of the history involved. Similarly Cameron's statement that ‘To us, today, it seems so inexplicable that countries which had many things binding them together could indulge in such a never-ending slaughter, but they did’ suggests that the Prime Minister and his speech writers had a deeply flawed understanding of the nature of the conflict.3 Cameron’s speech brought about a highly critical reaction from some historians, including me. 4 Nonetheless, the government's programme proved too much for some, and initiated a renewed battle for the meaning of the First World War. In May 2013 a letter from a group of actors, musicians, poets and politicians was published in the Guardian, a liberal-left newspaper. It attacked the government's remembrance programme, declaring 'Far from being a "War to end all wars" or a "Victory for democracy" this was a military disaster and a human catastrophe'.5 This promptly became known in some circles as the "Luvvies' Letter".6 Historical research 2

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2532923/Michael-Gove-blasts-Blackadder-myths-FirstWorld-War-spread-television-sit-coms-left-wing-academics.html, 2 January 2014 (accessed 9 October 2014) 3 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-at-imperial-war-museum-on-first-world-warcentenary-plans, 11 October 2012 (accessed 22 November 2013) 4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/britain-at-war/10037507/Historians-complainGovernments-WW1-commemoration-focuses-on-British-defeats.html, 5 May 2013, (accessed 22 November 2013) 5 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/21/remembering-war-to-promote-peace, 21 May 2013 (accessed 22 November 2013) 6 For cultural figures pronouncing on the history of the Great War, see Gary Sheffield. ‘The Centenary of the First World War: An Unpopular View’, in The Historian No.122 (Summer 20114) pp. 2425

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ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? and analysis are highly specialised activities. More than most historical events, the First World War prompts people to go public with views based on emotion, limited knowledge and flawed understanding. In case anyone thinks that opposition to such views as those laid out in the Luvvies' Letter is the preserve of male, middle-aged professors of military history, let me quote at length from the opinion of Dr Jessica Meyer, who is none of these things: My main reason for annoyance lies, I think, in two aspects of the letter. The first is the apparent belief that those engaged professionally with and in the arts (as the majority of the signatories are) have a particular authority to speak about the horror of war… I cannot help feeling that some, such as Michael Morpurgo, are using their status as creators of cultural expression which use the war as subject matter to give themselves authority to pronounce on the ‘truth’ about the war, drawing on the tradition of the First World War canon... The second infuriating aspect of the letter is the dichotomy it sets up between national commemoration and the promotion of international peace and understanding through a focus on its futility and devastation. Such attempts to impose a contemporary political narrative on the commemorations feels like a betrayal of the men who fought… There were certainly plenty of voices calling for international peace both at the start and in the wake of war. Equally there were many who saw the war as a fight for national survival against the threat of Prussian militarism. And there were many who, in fighting for King and Country, were simply fighting to preserve the sanctity of the small part of that nation that they called home. Far more men enlisted in the belief that they were defending democracy, however limited that democracy might seem from a 21st century perspective, than we tend to given them credit for. Many survived the war, just as many did not. Some were disillusioned by their experience; many incorporated it into their life stories and carried on, changed but not destroyed by war. To deny any this is to deny those who gave voice to these sentiments, as a huge number did, the validity of their beliefs and does their memory a huge disservice…7 The government is very aware of the criticisms of the anti-war lobby, and is rather scared of it. In an extreme form it reflects the futility/donkeys narrative dominant in 7

Jessica Meyer, ‘Possibly an angry post’ (blog, http://armsandthemedicalman.wordpress.com/2013/05/22/possibly-an-angry-post/ 22 May 2013, (accessed 22 November 2013). Dr Meyer is a cultural historian. I am grateful for her permission to reproduce part of her blog.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 British society, and politicians do not want to alienate voters. This helps to explain the choice of events that will receive full-scale formal commemoration, as announced by David Cameron in October 2012, discussed above. The historical illiteracy of omitting the Hundred Days is, as Professor Peter Simkins has trenchantly observed, akin to commemorating the Second World War by marking the Fall of Singapore but ignoring D-Day.8 To be fair, the government has changed its mind on this. Under pressure from various quarters, agreement has been reached in principle to commemorate the Battle of Amiens (8 August 1918), arguably the turning point on the Western Front. The government have also been wary about stating why the war was fought. The current debate over the origins of the war is a red herring. There has been widespread media approval of Christopher Clark's 'sleepwalkers' thesis, reinforced in some ways by Margaret MacMillan’s book, that the war was 'a tragedy, not a crime' and blame should not be allocated to individuals or states.9 However the mainstream historical position, based on 50 years of scholarship, is that on the contrary, AustriaHungary and Germany bore the lion's share of the responsibility for the outbreak of war. Anyone solely reliant on the mass media for their information might not realise this. The third volume of John Röhl’s magisterial biography of Kaiser Wilhelm II, which does not hesitate to allocate blame to Germany, provides a powerful counter to the ‘sleepwalkers’ idea.10 The notion of Europe drifting into war fits the current European zeitgeist of failing to face up to uncomfortable truths about the recent past. Not surprisingly, Clark’s book has becomes a best-seller in Germany. However, in my view, the evidence demonstrates Austro-Hungarian and German culpability for the outbreak of the First World War.11 Of course, if no one was to blame for starting the war, the conflict can be seen as futile: except, no matter who was responsible, Germany took full advantage of the outbreak of hostilities. Berlin waged an aggressive war of conquest, carving out a huge empire, imposing brutal rule on occupied peoples and imperilling both the security of Britain and the Empire and the future of liberal democracy on continental Europe. For Britain the war was both a war of national survival and, in 1918, one of 8

www.westernfrontassociation.com/news/newsflash.html?start=65, 24 October 2013, (10 October 2014) 9 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (London, Penguin, 2013 [2012]) p.561; Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace (London, Profile, 2012). For my detailed criticisms of this approach see Gary Sheffield, A Short History of the First World War (London, Oneworld, 2014), Chapter 1. 10 John Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014) 11 For an excellent collection of documents in English translation, see Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Diplomatic and Military Documents (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2013)

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ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? liberation. To take another example of an actor expressing a view on the meaning of the First World War, in 2013 Caroline Quentin spoke about the new production of Oh! What a Lovely War being ‘a heartbreaking piece about the futility of war’.12 One wonders what a war would need to be fought about to qualify as not being futile in Ms Quentin’s book. The Luvvies' Letter and the like flourish in an environment in which the UK government, the successor of the ones that took Britain into the war in August 1914 and led the country through four and a half years of total war, refuses clearly to state that in 1914-18 the vast majority of the British people supported the war, seeing it as a war of national survival. In a democracy, a total war cannot be waged without the consent of the people. Neither will the government broadcast the fact that the weight of historical evidence and opinion points to the British people of a century ago being right in their views. The government makes the argument that it is not its place to place interpretations on historical events. This might have some validity but for the fact that this government (like all others) is very keen to put forward historical interpretations when it suits them. The legacy of Margaret Thatcher, another highly controversial historical issue which resurfaced after her death in 2013, is a case in point. Even more pertinent is the way the fiftieth anniversaries of D-Day and VE Day, which fell in 1994 and 1995, were commemorated. The government of the day had no hesitation in placing a particular interpretation (from the British point of view, a very positive one) on those events. Some individuals, such as Andrew Murrison MP, deserve credit for making public statements supportive of the view that the war was a struggle for national survival. There is a consensus that the centenary years should be about commemoration, not triumphalism. The outbreak of the war in 1914 is absolutely nothing to celebrate. The centenary of 1918 is, however, a different matter. In January 2014 Helen Grant, the Tory minister with responsibility for commemorating the centenary, sent out mixed messages, stating 1918 ‘ was an absolutely vital victory’ but ‘we won’t be celebrating that fact’.13 The successes of the British armed forces and the British nation-in-arms should be celebrated, but not in a triumphalist fashion – I agree with Ms Grant on that much. ‘Celebration’ in the sense of public acknowledgment of a job well done, a great national achievement, would be wholly appropriate. The UK government thought it fitting to celebrate the victory of 1945. It is equally fitting to celebrate that of 1918. Overall, the government, by failing to provide clear and decisive leadership on this 12

Evening Standard, 22 October 2013; http://www.standard.co.uk/news/oh-what-a-lovely-voicecaroline-quentin-starts-training-for-musical-8896715.html, 22 October 2013 (accessed 14 October 2014) 13 http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/458507/ww1-victory-should-not-be-celebrated-with-dancing-in-thestreet-MP-Helen-Grant-says 7 February 2014 (accessed 9 October 2014)

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 issue, is missing a unique opportunity educate the population that the war was fought over major issues, that it was not meaningless, and a million men did not die for nothing. This is nothing short of an abdication of responsibility. To adapt Jessica Meyer’s point, allowing the imposition by default of a contemporary political narrative on the commemorations feels like a betrayal of the men who fought, died, survived, and were victorious. Turning to the media; newspapers, the BBC, and to a lesser extent other broadcasters, have embraced the First World War with a vengeance. It has certainly given various military historians a public platform and what are in historiographical terms old ideas have suddenly become current. Niall Ferguson’s views: that he considers it a catastrophe that Britain did not stay out of the war, and the world would have been better off by a Europe conquered by a ‘benign’ German state, were first put forward in the mid-1990s, but they became front-page news in the Guardian in January 2014.14 Even more surprisingly, The Times gave me half a page to explain why I think his views are profoundly wrong. Views of various sorts have appeared across the press. The Guardian seems particularly keen on publishing pieces that depict the war as futile, although they published an article of mine that argued the opposite. As a life-long Guardian reader, it was an interesting experience being attacked in my daily newspaper of choice as a warmonger, and worse. The wider point is, however, that in spite of Michael Gove’s ill-informed attack in January on ‘left wing historians’ for belittling Britain’s war effort for the most part the centenary commemorations have not been a party political football. Andrew Murrison, a Conservative, and Dan Jarvis, his Labour Shadow, co-operate closely and have both been at pains to avoid politicising the centenary. Neither can historians be neatly divided up by political allegiance. Sir Richard Evans, a leftist who has emerged as a forthright spokesmen for the ‘futility’ view of the war, has found himself occupying common ground with Niall Ferguson and (posthumously) with Alan Clark, both very much of the right, while those who believe it was right for Britain to fight in the war include historians whose politics straddle the spectrum from left to right via apolitical. The response of the BBC to the centenary has been to go into overdrive, with 2,500 hours of programmes plus a major website. The comments that follow are quite critical, so let me preface them by saying that the BBC has produced a great deal of very good, high quality programming and internet material, and I have every reason to believe that there is a lot more to come. This in my view justifies paying the licence fee. But I have some major reservations. For a start, there is too much coverage of the First World War, and it started too early. There is a real possibility that people will simply become bored with the war by the end of 2014, let alone by 14

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/30/britain-first-world-war-biggest-error-niallferguson, 30 January 2014 (accessed 15 October 2014)

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ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? 2018. The flagship BBC TV series: ‘Britain’s Great War’, fronted by Jeremy Paxman, displayed a number of strengths, but also many weaknesses. Appearing at primetime on BBC1, the programme had enormous reach, and as one reviewer wrote that Paxman’s ‘inclusion as presenter says "serious" and it says "knowledgeable"’.15 This can be seen as the BBC marking a great national event and fulfilling its mandate to educate. An alternative view is that the series was rather lightweight. While it certainly did not pander to the ‘futility’ view, and broadly reflects current scholarship, some of the analysis in the programmes was superficial. Overall, 'Britain's Great War' was marred by some poor editorial decisions on inclusion or exclusion of material. The omission of the Battle of Jutland, and the concentration on the first day of the Battle of the Somme to the exclusion of the rest of this four month campaign were perhaps the most egregious examples. Moreover Paxman, who may be looked on as authoritative by a mass audience, is a journalist not a historian, and in a wellpublicised comment at a literary festival revealed that his knowledge of Britain in the First World War has some surprising and rudimentary gaps.16 The series would have had more credibility with a reputable historian presenting the series – and how well Richard Holmes would have fulfilled that role – or failing that, an actor reading a script. Using Paxman as front man is a facet of the BBC’s obsession with celebrity, and this was compounded by the failure to feature a single scholarly historian on screen, although other people (such as another celebrity, the Downton Abbey scriptwriter Julian Fellowes) did appear. The rise of the 'drama-documentary' has been a feature of television over the last few years. This can take the form of dramatisation of events within the context of a conventional 'talking head and film clip' documentary, or a programme that consists solely of a dramatisation. Anyone who acted as a historical adviser to a conventional television documentary will know that the final script is the result of a series of compromises, and will have suffered the frustration of having their advice ignored because factual accuracy does not fit in with what the TV people want to do. Dr Adrian Gregory, of Pembroke College Oxford, has tweeted about his experience on Great Britain's Great War, and it is about par for the course. 17 The trade-off between historical accuracy and the nature of television as a medium of entertainment is particularly acute in the case of 'pure' drama-docs. Bjorn Rose, an ex-Army officer now working as a history teacher, having brought a party of schoolboys to the set to act as extras, found himself very unexpectedly working as a 15

The Independent, 28 January 2014; http://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/tv/reviews/britains-great-war-bbc1-tv-review-memories-from-the-home-front-humanisepaxmans-war-story-9088991.html, 28 January 2014, (accessed 10 October 2014) 16 Daily Mail, 9 October 2013, p.17 17 See @AdrianGregory20’s Twitter timeline.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 historical adviser on the 'Mons' episode of Our World War This BBC series, broadcast in August 2014, sought to repeat the success of Our War, a 'fly-on-the-wall' series of documentaries on the British army in Afghanistan, in which Captain Rose's platoon had featured. He had some success in pointing out obvious errors - he persuaded the art department not to dress the set portraying Nimy bridge in 1914 with Brodie steel helmets, which were not introduced until a year later and only became general issue in 1916 - but otherwise was bemused by the lack of attention to historical detail and willingness to perpetuate blatant inaccuracies and anachronisms. In particular, Rose contested the statement at the end of the programme that the British army had been 'humiliated' at Mons. To put the best possible interpretation on this view, it is highly debatable. Some historians, myself included, would describe it as nonsense. Needless to say, Bjorn Rose lost the argument.18 That Professor David Reynolds' series The Long Shadow was screened is evidence that the BBC is prepared to take risks on giving a heavyweight historian a series which deals with a serious topic in a serious way, albeit on BBC2 rather than BBC1.The series looks at the legacy of the First World War across a range of issues, and is something of a model in conveying deep scholarship in an accessible fashion. It would have served the cause of education much better, and done something to repair the tattered reputation of the BBC as a broadcaster of serious documentaries on mainstream television, if The Long Shadow had been the flagship series for 2014 rather than Britain's Great War. Does any of it - the re-hashing of stale arguments by newspapers, dumbed-down and inaccurate television programmes, and the ambivalent and grudging response of the British government - really matter? I think it does. The Great War Centenary years offer a once-in-a-century opportunity for education, and to move serious debate beyond a narrow circle of historians. The interest and enthusiasm I have witnessed among local history groups, civic societies, in schools, colleges and universities, and the myriad of exhibitions and publications telling the story of the impact of the First World War on local communities has been truly inspiring.19 My hope is that at the end of the centenary period the people of Britain will have a more mature, reflective 18

Information given by Bjorn Rose, 6 October 2014. At the risk of being invidious I have been particularly impressed by the First World War exhibition at the Manx Museum http://www.manxnationalheritage.im/news/new-exhibition-to-mark-100thanniversary-of-the-first-world-war/ and the accompanying book: Matthew Richardson, This Terrible Ordeal: Manx Letters, Diaries and Memories of the Great War (Douglas, Manx National Heritage, 2013), and by Martin Hayes and Emma White (eds.), Great War Britain: West Sussex Remembering 1914-18 (Stroud, The History Press, 2014). I provided a foreword to the latter.

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ONCE IN A CENTURY OPPORTUNITY? and less strident view of the Great War; one less encumbered by myths, half-truths prejudice. We should not allow this opportunity to slip through our hands.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014

The Annual Confidential Report and Promotion in the Late Victorian Army IAN F. W. BECKETT University of Kent Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT The annual confidential report offers insights into both the manner of promotion in the late Victorian Army and the personalities of some of its key figures. This article looks in depth at the form, function and usage of the Annual Confidential Report, arguing that it was a flawed system which hampered the ability of Lord Roberts and Viscount Wolseley to promote the best officers to high command. In October 1902 General Sir Evelyn Wood appeared before the Elgin Commission examining the conduct of the South African War. Wood had been Adjutant General in the War Office from 1897 to 1901. Understandably, one of the principal avenues of enquiry was the quality of military leadership in South Africa. Asked about officer training, Wood placed blame on the annual confidential reports upon which the Selection Board relied for information when considering promotions to higher ranks: ‘The confidential reports up to recently have not been sufficiently drastic and straight; it is only in recent years that the man making the report has understood that his own character is also at stake for fairness and for telling the facts as they really are.’1 To Wood, promotion up to the rank of Major appeared automatic. Thereafter, it was a matter of seniority tempered by rejection only in the very worst cases despite the fact that selection of higher commands by merit alone had been supposedly in force since 1891. Wood suggested that there were three distinct categories of officers that could be identified from confidential reports. There were those whose fitness for advancement was undoubted, and those with such a bad record that their unfitness was readily apparent. The great majority, however, were ‘colourless men’, who had been promoted ‘simply because “there is nothing known against them”’.

1

House of Commons Parliamentary Papers 1904 [Cd. 1790] Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, p. 176, c. 4166, Wood, 29 Oct. 1902.

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THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT The quotation was taken from Wood’s own memorandum on selection written in October 1900.2 The criticism of confidential reports was not new. In October 1888, Sir George Chesney, the Military Member of the Viceroy’s Council, had complained that there was a reluctance to report adversely on subordinates by those ‘who in their desire to make things pleasant, do not put before A.H.Q. & Govt. their real opinions about officers’. According to Chesney, district commanders in India would not commit to paper what they really thought of an individual so that ‘no one wd. infer from them, what has been notorious for years to everyone in the army, except apparently the General O.C. the district, that he is a thoroughly useless officer’. Referring to the case of Lieutenant Colonel Williams of the 16th Bombay Cavalry in March 1889, Chesney similarly claimed that inspecting officers ‘will not do their duty but are too anxious to make things pleasant all round’. The result was that the authorities were aware of an officer’s incompetence but ‘there are no public vouchers to that effect, and they cannot establish a case merely on private opinion but must have something official and definite to go on’.3 Equally, Lieutenant General Sir Donald Stewart, soon to become Commander-inChief in India, wrote in 1880, The curse of our service is that people - I mean most people - won’t say what they think about an officer till it is too late. Then the authorities that ought to know all about the Army then round and say there is nothing on record against so & so as if that were a sufficient recommendation in his favour. Subsequently, Stewart told his successor, General Sir Frederick Roberts, in May 1887 that he did not consider J. F. Cadogan of the 33rd Bengal Infantry capable of commanding a regiment ‘and yet I am not certain there is anything very strong on record against him’.4 Amid the recriminations following the disaster at Maiwand in Afghanistan in July 1880, the Commander-in-Chief at the War Office, George, Duke of Cambridge, criticised the Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, Lieutenant General Henry Warre, for his selection of Lieutenant General James Primrose for the command at Kandahar. Warre tried to deflect criticism by suggesting that he should not have been expected to report on someone of equal rank. Cambridge retorted that a candid view should have been given: ‘In high positions disagreeable things have 2

Ibid., p. 179, c. 4246; National Army Museum (hereafter NAM), Roberts Mss, 7101-23-207, Memorandum by Wood, 15 Oct. 1900; also in The National Archives (hereafter TNA), WO 32/8367. 3 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-232-14, Chesney to Roberts, 1 Oct. 1888, and 12 Mar. 1889. 4 National Library of Wales, Hills-Johnes of Dolaucothi Mss, L13655, Stewart to Hills, 16 May 1880; NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-78, Stewart to Roberts, 5 May 1887.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 to be done at times for the good of the public service.’ Cambridge also suggested that he had advanced Primrose in rank previously in the belief that he was able, and could not have known otherwise unless properly informed through reports.5 Newly appointed Cambridge’s successor as Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley complained to Roberts, now also a field marshal and commanding in Ireland, in September 1895 that the Selection Board was necessarily guided by confidential reports but, in the case of officers of the Indian army, they were of little use: ‘All their geese are swans.’6 Wolseley was invariably prejudiced against the Indian army but there was generally perceived to be a problem. Indeed, when commanding in Ireland between 1890 and 1895, Wolseley had used the same phrase in noting of the confidential reports by his four district commanders, [O]ne must take their opinion of officers in conjunction with what we think of those Generals & how we value or estimate the worth of their opinions. To some amiable men all geese are swans, & I must say this of all of them, that when they find fault & report that any officer is below par, he must be a real fool.7 Shortly before retiring, Wolseley agreed with Wood’s criticisms of reports, suggesting there was a system of ‘promotion by seniority in all ranks, tempered by a somewhat rarely exercised rejection for well recognised incompetency’. While Wolseley felt the Selection Board had been reasonably successful, not enough was known about Majors or seconds in command of battalions.8 Wolseley also once remarked of the Military Secretary, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Whitmore, that ‘I never knew anyone more anxious to do right, but he thinks one man is much the same as the other & hates passing any man over because you have a better man available for the vacancy’. For all their differences on strategic and military matters, Roberts would have concurred heartily, having noted that ‘as rule, I have observed that whether men behave well or ill, they are spoken of in the same terms, and get the same reward’.9 Not surprisingly, Wolseley and Roberts had their own methods of determining military merit. As is well known, both operated their own ‘rings’ of selected officers. 5

NAM, Warre Mss, 8112-54-673, 705, 707, Warre to Whitmore, 5 Dec. 1880, and Cambridge to Warre, 11 Nov. and 31 Dec. 1880. 6 Ibid., Roberts Mss, 7101-23-89, Wolseley to Roberts, 4 Sept. 1895. 7 National Library of Ireland (hereafter NLI), Kilmainham 1313, Note by Wolseley, 30 Dec, 1893. 8 TNA, WO 32/8367, Wolseley to PUS, 15 Oct. 1900. 9 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Alison Mss, Box 1, Wolseley to Alison, 22 Mar. 1885; NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-24-101, Roberts to Dillon, 4 Apl. 1880.

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THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT For Wolseley the Asante campaign in 1873-74 had marked the real beginning of the Wolseley or ‘Ashanti’ ring. As Wolseley wrote in his autobiography, ‘he had long been in the habit of keeping a list of the best and ablest soldiers I knew, and was always on the look-out for those who could safely be entrusted with any special military piece of work’. There is evidence for this ‘list’. On his way out to the Gold Coast, Wolseley gave Captain George Furse ‘a paper bearing a long list of names, asking him at the same time to mark with a cross any name which he considered to be that of a good and efficient officer’. In December 1884 Wolseley told his wife, after an old associate, Sir William Butler, had proved troublesome, he would ‘drop him from my list’.10 Wolseley always claimed that he picked solely on merit and even his critics acknowledged that he had the knack of selecting able men. He had a penchant for courage but also for intellectual reputation, particularly favouring Staff College graduates. There were obvious disadvantages, Wolseley becoming increasingly a prisoner of his early successes, feeling it desirable to keep employing the same individuals lest his rejection of them might reflect on his earlier choice. He also assumed that selected individuals would always be willing to fill specific roles in his military corrective when they themselves were growing in stature and seniority.11 Another drawback, as suggested by Cambridge, was that ‘if the same officers are invariably employed, you have no area for selecting others, and give no others a chance of coming to the front’.12 Roberts was equally careful. One of Wolseley’s protégés, Lieutenant General Henry Brackenbury, was appointed Military Member of the Viceroy’s Council in 1891, throwing him into close proximity to Roberts, who was Commander-in-Chief in India from 1885 to 1893. In May 1894 Brackenbury specifically compared Roberts’s methods to those of Wolseley, suggesting that any officer ‘placed in a great position of authority and responsibility will select as his tools for the work in hand the men whom he has tried, and found never to fail him, and will prefer them to those who he has not tried, or to those who he has tried and not found perfect’. Brackenbury had asked Roberts about the Wolseley ring, to which Roberts had replied that Wolseley was perfectly right: ‘No officer who has the responsibility laid upon him of carrying 10

Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley, The Story of a Soldier’s Life 2 vols. (London: Archibald Constable & Co, 1903), II, p. 201; Sir George Douglas, The Life of Major General Wauchope (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905), pp. 63-64, 74; Hove Reference Library, Wolseley Mss, W/P 10/38, Wolseley to Lady Wolseley, 23-29 Dec. 1884. 11 Adrian Preston (ed.), Sir Garnet Wolseley’s South African Diaries (Natal), 1875 (Cape Town: A. A. Balkema, 1971), pp. 88-89; Ian F. W. Beckett (ed.), Wolseley and Ashanti: The Asante War Journal and Correspondence of Major General Sir Garnet Wolseley, 1873-74 (Stroud: History Press for Army Records Society, 2009), pp. 39-45; idem, ‘Command in the Late Victorian Army’, in Gary Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brasseys, 1997), pp. 37-56. 12 A. R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College (London: Constable, 1927), p. 207.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 out a big job would ever be such a fool as to entrust the details of it to men he did not know he could rely on.’ 13 Roberts himself told Brigadier General Henry Wilkinson in February 1887 that he was guided in his choices by his own knowledge of officers, advice from the HQ staff and higher commanders, the opinion of the army generally, and confidential reports. Even this was not a foolproof method so far as confidential reports were concerned. Thus, in September 1887, having been informed by the Military Secretary that Major Howard Brunker of the Cameronians ‘had been found wanting when in the presence of the enemy in South Africa’, Roberts complained that he could hardly have known this. Brunker had been favourably reported on for the past two years in India, and any previous confidential reports had not been forwarded from the War Office.14 The officer corps of the British and Indian armies was relatively small, but this did not mean that everyone was well known to everyone else, as frequent comments in private correspondence make only too clear. Thus, the confidential report remained significant. General Sir William Lockhart, for example, noted in July 1898 that he considered Lieutenant General George Sanford the best candidate for the Bombay command. It was suggested that Sanford was ‘eccentric’. Lockhart commented, ‘but then I have not seen his confidential report’.15 Clearly, the issue of the annual confidential report is one worth considering in connection with promotion. One of the difficulties in assessing the impact and accuracy of reports is the lack of surviving papers relating to the work of the Military Secretary, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for personnel issues. Just two general letter books have survived, covering the period from 1871 to 1893, and what is characterised as the Commander-in-Chief’s Selection Book, covering the period from 1882 onwards.16 The latter summarises the information utilised for promotions from Colonel to Major General, briefly indicating the general gist of confidential reports only to 1887, at which point the column for ‘Confidential Reports on Colonel’ is used only to record whether a promotion is by selection or seniority. Personnel records as such have not survived with the exception of those of a small selection of leading soldiers, or whose careers were presumably thought of interest. For the Victorian period, there are relatively few but they do include those for Sir Redvers Buller; the Duke of Cambridge; Charles Gordon; Herbert Kitchener; Hector Macdonald; Lord Roberts; the Hon. Reginald Talbot, who commanded the Heavy 13

Royal Artillery Museum, Brackenbury Mss, MD 1085/3, Brackenbury to Buller, 9 May 1894. NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-199-4, Roberts to Wilkinson, 22 Feb. 1887; ibid, 7010-12-100-1, Roberts to Harman, 9 Sept., 1887. 15 British Library (hereafter BL), Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections (hereafter APAC), L/MIL/7/15520, Lockhart to Newmarch, 15 Jul. 1898. 16 NAM, 1998-06-194 and 195, Military Secretary’s Private Letter Books; 1998-06-197, Commander-in-Chief’s Selection Book. 14

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THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT Camel Regiment on the Gordon Relief Expedition; and James Henry Reynolds, who won the VC at Rorke’s Drift.17 A few additional confidential reports have also been preserved for similarly distinguished soldiers including the Duke of Connaught; Lord Methuen; W. H. Mackinnon, who commanded the City Imperial Volunteers in the South African War; and Evelyn Wood.18 Few mention confidential reports in memoirs, the notable exception being Richard Meinertzhagen, who included extracts from his confidential reports from 1900 to 1924. Meinertzhagen suggested that, despite their invariably flattering nature, he had ‘a wonderful aptitude for hiding my faults, and not allowing my little weaknesses to see daylight’.19 Officers were reported on in a number of ways that added to their overall record. There are surviving reports on Indian army officers who attended the Staff College from 1882 onwards.20 Similarly, there are reports on engineering subalterns leaving the School of Military Engineering at Chatham between 1889 and 1892.21 Fortunately, too, all summaries of confidential reports (and a few full reports), primarily for infantry and cavalry officers, have survived for the Irish Command between 1871 and 1894.22 Summary confidential reports have also survived for officers at command and staff levels in the Indian army and the British army in India from 1888 onwards.23 Most leading figures such as Wolseley and Roberts expressed themselves freely on the quality or otherwise of fellow officers in their private correspondence but Roberts also kept copies of some confidential reports made on senior officers on the conclusion of his campaigns in the Afghanistan in 1879, and in South Africa in 1900.24 Consequently, there is sufficient material to make an informed assessment of confidential reports. The form of the annual report changed over time. In 1874 the first page of the report for infantry and cavalry officers required an assessment of the state of an officer’s health; whether fit for service, and with good eyesight; and whether a good horseman. The commanding officer was required to indicate his reasons for 17

TNA, WO 138. Ibid., WO 27/489. 19 Richard Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, 1899-1926 (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1960), pp. 290-96. 20 BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/3424-27. 21 TNA, WO 25/3950. 22 NLI, Kilmainham 1307-1313. 23 BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17038-50. 24 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-148, Reports for 1879, reproduced in part in Brian Robson (ed.), Roberts in India: The Military Papers of Field Marshal Lord Roberts, 1876-93 (Stroud: Alan Sutton for Army Records Society, 1993), pp. 68-69; ibid., 7101-23-188, Reports for 1900, reproduced in full in André Wessels (ed.), Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing for Army Records Society, 2000), pp.126-30. Additional Confidential Reports by Roberts are in TNA, WO 105/25 and 27]. 18

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 considering an officer fit for his current position and for advancement, or reasons for dissatisfaction. The back of the form carried details of date of birth; whether an officer had been a cadet at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst or had attended the Staff College; whether he had attended schools of instruction; whether he had passed for promotion; whether he had command of any languages; and whether he was married or single. The form also required details of whether an officer had been distinguished in the field, such as receiving a mention in despatches or orders and decorations; as well as full details of military service and appointments. The inspecting officer - usually the district commander - would then comment upon the report.25 By 1885, the first page of the report also required details of an officer’s general ability; general professional requirements; capacity for command; self-reliance; readiness and resource; judgement and tact; temper; his practical proficiency in application of drill, reconnaissance, outpost and patrol duties, and horsemanship. The back of the form had not essentially changed although it now also required whether an officer was qualified in signalling, and the name and address of next of kin.26 By 1891, it had changed again. The first page now sought detail on general ability; general professional acquirements; practical proficiency in drill and field movement; professional zeal; smartness in performance of duties; level of horsemanship; and an officer’s capacity for command in terms of judgement, tact, temper, self-reliance, and power of commanding respect. There also had to be an assessment as to whether an officer was equal to, or above, or below the average in his unit; and whether he could exercise proper influence for his rank over officers, NCOs and men. The back of the form now had additional separate sections for what level of promotion an officer had passed; whether he had attended schools of instruction for musketry, military engineering, signalling, cavalry, pioneers, mounted infantry, veterinary work, supply, transport, riding, and gymnastics; and whether he had acted as an adjutant.27 New guidance issued in 1893 required to know additionally where an officer had attended a school of instruction; whether he had been adjutant of a militia or volunteer battalion; and the level at which Persian or Hindustani had been passed.28 The surviving Irish Command report summaries have few for engineer or artillery officers. The front of the form was common to those of infantry and cavalry officers but the back required information on particular professional attainments. The artillery form in 1887 wanted information on an officer’s knowledge of the instructions laid down in the field artillery manual; and his power of applying the 25 26 27

NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Form for Captain William Abberley, 2/8th Foot, 2 Jul. 1874. Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Blank Form, 7 May 1885. NLI, Kilmainham 1312, Report on Major Somerset Kevil-Davies, 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 29

Jul. 1891.

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18

Ibid., Kilmainham 1313, Note by Childers, 20 May 1893.

THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT same in the field, by battery and in brigade, and in relation to other arms. For garrison artillery officers there had to be an assessment of an officer’s general knowledge of the instructions laid down in manuals for garrison and siege artillery; his degree of practical knowledge of the work of heavy garrison ordnance; his knowledge of hydraulics applied to artillery service; and his knowledge of steam and machinery, of electricity, and of drawing. In the case of engineering officers, the 1893 form required information on professional qualifications listed as attendance at the Staff College; and knowledge of field engineering, permanent fortification, construction and estimating, field telegraphy and signalling, electricity, submarine mining, surveying, railways, and ballooning. It also required the knowledge possessed of foreign languages, and of musketry. A solitary report form on a medical officer, also from 1893, was again common to that of others so far as the first page was concerned. On the back, it required to know whether an officer has passed in military law; if he had done so at a training school, in the medical staff corps, or at Aldershot; if he had passed a riding class; and whether he possessed other special acquirements and qualifications as a medical officer.29 In theory at least, the amount of detail required was considerable. Additional reports might be required, especially if an officer appealed against the judgements passed on him. Moreover, the more senior the officer, the more comments were applied up the chain of command. In those reports forwarded to the India Office for onward transmission to the War Office, for example, comments on senior officers in the Bombay and Madras presidencies were made by the governors of those presidencies as well as by the Commander-in-Chief in India. When Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Paul Methuen was about to be appointed Assistant Adjutant General to the Irish Command in 1877, his predecessor, Charles Wynne-Finch, told him that dealing with the confidential reports for seven cavalry regiments, 21 infantry battalions and three companies of engineers, as well as for all the staff, was ‘the “devil”’ in terms of work. The process began each August and continued until the following March.30 Perusal of the Irish reports suggests that Wood was essentially correct: those detailed comments recorded in summary returns tend to relate routinely to the commanding officer and second in command of units but, otherwise, only to those with obvious failings. In both October 1873 and October 1874, for example, all 31 captains and lieutenants of the 6th Dragoons were simply reported as satisfactory.31 To some extent, it depended upon the GOC. Upon assuming the Irish Command in October 1880, General Sir Thomas Steele directed that only unfavourable reports should be recorded. By contrast, when in Ireland, Wolseley insisted that the first 29

Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Report on Lieutenant Colonel Edward Elliott, A Brigade, RHA, 2 Aug. 1887; ibid., 1313, Blank Engineer and Medical Forms, 1893.] 30 Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, Methuen Mss, 1742/6335, Letters on Appointment to Dublin, Wynne-Finch to Methuen, 19 Mar. 1877. 31 NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Reports of 13 Oct. 1873, and 1 Oct. 1874.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 four officers in a unit should be reported on as to their fitness for promotion if it was a two-battalion regiment, or the first six officers in the case of a three-battalion regiment. Forms had to be filled in correctly and fully; periods of half pay should not be counted as employment; the place of birth must be accurately given; there must be a complete address for next of kin; and only the commanding officer and the inspecting officer were permitted to complete the boxes for additional comments.32 Yet, even in Wolseley’s time, every subordinate officer in a regiment could be returned simply as satisfactory, as in the case of all 26 captains and lieutenants in the 1st King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment) in October 1891, and all 24 captains and lieutenants in the 1st Royal Sussex Regiment in July 1893.33 There is also evidence of the reluctance to be specific in comments. In August 1884, Major General Lord Clarina, commanding the Dublin District, indicated that Lieutenant Colonel John Blaksley of the 1st Buffs (East Kent Regiment) was not a success ‘although I am not prepared to give any specific reasons for expressing this opinion, but he is certainly not popular with his officers & is disliked socially according to common report’. The Military Secretary responded by demanding a full report: ‘It is necessary that reasons should be fully given for forming an adverse opinion regarding any officer, but Lord Clarina, although he has formed an unfavourable opinion of Lt. Col. Blaksley, states that he is not prepared to give any reasons for having formed it.’ Clarina replied with details of Blaksley’s want of tact and judgement, defending his own original intention as being a desire to avoid troubling the authorities with unnecessary correspondence, & in the exercise of his important command he has never shrunk from taking on himself as much responsibility as possible, therefore he (Lord C.) some months since settled a misunderstanding which had arisen between Lt. Col. Blaksley & his officers, with regard to a question relating to the Officers Mess; on which occasion he (Lord C.) could not fail to perceive that “he” certainly did not command their esteem, & that “he” had displayed great want of judgement. Cambridge concluded from the evidence Clarina now presented that unless this officer can so far alter his mode of carrying on his duties as to conduce to a more cordial feeling towards him on the part of his subordinates it will become a matter for consideration whether in the interests of the Service and the well being of the Battn. Lt. Col. Blaksley 32

Ibid., Kilmainham 1309, Note by Boyle, 2 Oct. 1880; ibid., 1313, Note by Childers, 20 May

1893.

33

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Ibid., Kilmainham 1312, Report, 22 Oct. 1891; 1313, Report, 20-21 Jul. 1893.

THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT should not be called upon to retire from a position which he does not appear to be sufficiently qualified to fill in a very essential point. Blaksley denied being on poor terms with his officers, and entered a heartfelt plea to be allowed to continue in the army, at which point Clarina indicated that he wished to say no more to damage Blaksley’s prospects. He trusted that the episode would have taught Blaksley the need for requisite tact.34 In the following year, Clarina was again compelled to elucidate further his remarks on Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Oldfield, and Majors John Harkness and John Vincent of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. Not having previously seen Oldfield, Clarina had relied on the report of the battalion’s former commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Macdonald, that Oldfield had ‘completely lost his head on parade’. Similarly, he had relied on Macdonald’s view that Vincent lacked tact and judgement. Clarina excused this on the grounds that, with between 500 and 600 officers in Dublin District, he ‘need scarcely observe that it is manifestly impossible for him to become personally acquainted with the qualifications of every individual officer, therefore he is obliged in a great measure, to rely on the information he obtains from Comg. Offs’. In the case of Vincent, it transpired that Macdonald, in turn, had based his own view on what he had been told of Vincent’s performance as adjutant of the 3rd Northumberland Fusiliers. Meanwhile, Harkness had been promoted to command the 2nd Battalion on the basis of Clarina’s satisfactory reports for 1883 and 1884 yet he now claimed Harkness had little ability. The Duke of Cambridge required to know how these reports could be reconciled, noting that he, is obliged to rely on the reports received from Genl. Officers to assist him in deciding as to the fitness of an officer for promotion, and specially in the selection of a Lieut. Colonel for the responsible position of the command of a Battalion, and H.R.H. is placed in a very difficult position, when, after acting on such a report and appointing an officer to a command, he receives an unfavourable report from the same General Officer. Clarina replied that he felt ‘no difficulty in reconciling the apparent anomaly of his having in three separate reports rendered in three different years expressed opinions regarding an officer at variance with one another’. He had seen Harkness only in the capacity of an acting magistrate in 1883 and 1884, and was not aware of his more general failings until the battalion was concentrated in Dublin in 1885. Rather giving the game away in precisely the way that general criticisms of the annual confidential reports have already been implied, however, Clarina also wrote, 34

Ibid., Kilmainham 1309, Steele to Whitmore, 27 Aug. 1884; Boyle to Clarina, 16 Sept, 1884; Clarina to Boyle, 23 Sept, 1884; Whitmore to Clarina, 26 Sept. 1884; Steele to Whitmore, 9 Oct. 1884; ibid., 1310, Note by Clarina, 28 Oct. 1884.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 No man can possibly more dislike having to make a disparaging remark as to the capacity of an officer than he (Lord C.) does, and he trusts H.R.H. will credit him with the desire to faithfully discharge the somewhat invidious duties which an Inspg. Gen. Officer is required to perform & that his explanation may be considered sufficient.35 Even Wolseley, who was usually more than willing to express his dissatisfaction with officers, could pull his punches on occasion. Thus, in October 1891, Wolseley described Colonel Montgomery Williams, commanding the Regimental District at Birr, as ‘absolutely useless in any Military position’ and ‘absolutely unqualified’ for further promotion. Yet, Wolseley indicated that he would find it difficult to put his exact reasons for these judgements into an official document. Since Williams was due to retire anyway, it would be better merely to say that, in line with previous reports, he had been found wanting in the district’s essential recruiting work through lack of energy and want of ‘go’. Similarly, in August 1892 Wolseley chose not to disclose in full to the officer in question, Lieutenant Colonel William Roberts of the 2nd Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, adverse reports upon him. Wolseley commented that ‘I don’t think one can expect to obtain usefully guiding information from those in command relating to the men under their orders, if their reports are to be shown to those concerned.’ He went on, In these days of selection, it is very easy to tell a Lieut. Colonel that he has not been selected for promotion, because there were others whom it was considered in the interests of the Army & of the State were more fitted for higher positions. One can do this without hurting an officer’s feelings, for you don’t tell him he is useless, but that there are others better than he.36 In much the same way, while suggesting that adverse remarks should normally be communicated to officers, Roberts as Commander-in-Chief in Madras had declined to pass on his full report to Brigadier General George de Berry in January 1883. The latter would not be re-employed and was due to be retired in a matter of months: the full extent of the criticism would only pain an old soldier.37 De Berry, who had first seen action in the Sikh Wars but none since the Mutiny, was duly retired as a Major General in June 1883.

35

Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Note by Clarina, 14 Oct. 1885; Macdonald to Turner, 13 Oct. 1885; Turner to Clarina, 5 Dec, 1885; Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar to Harman, 12 Dec, 1885. 36 Ibid., Kilmainham 1312, Wolseley to Harman, 4 Oct. and 17 Oct. 1891; ibid, Wolseley to Harman, 27 Aug. 1892. 37 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-97, Roberts to Dillon, 31 Jan. 1883.

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THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT On occasions, too, there was a desire to given an officer the benefit of the doubt. In January 1875, Cambridge proposed to remove Colonel Joyce from the 68th Sub District at Galway as a result of the report by General Lord Sandhurst. Sandhurst, however, indicated that ‘it did not occur to me to suggest this officer’s removal. Although I may believe him to be unsuitable for an independent Command’. Joyce’s correspondence had suggested to Sandhurst that he was of ‘flighty intelligence’ and ‘impudent in speech’. Sandhurst recommended proceeding cautiously as he had not disclosed his views to Joyce but the latter had already been called upon to resign and was now demanding to know the cause. Lieutenant General Sir Edward Holdich, commanding the Dublin District, upheld Sandhurst’s view and Joyce was told bluntly he could sell his commission, go on half pay, or retire on full pay as he was over 60.38 In May 1885 there were adverse reports on Captain Charles Mayne of No. 1 Battery, 1st Brigade (Western Division) Royal Artillery at Carlisle Fort, Cork. Mayne had appeared to be drunk on a number of occasions, once while at the theatre in Cork, but was otherwise considered a good officer. Mayne was refused the interview he sought with the Duke of Cambridge and passed over for promotion. But, since the Duke wished to give Mayne the chance to redeem himself, he was given a year’s probation during which he would be reported on monthly.39 In August 1887 General H.S.H. Prince Edward of Saxe Weimar acknowledged that Colonel John Kinchant of the 11th Hussars was wanting in tact, as suggested by Major General the Hon. Charles Thesiger, who commanded the Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh, as well as acting as Inspector General of Cavalry in Ireland. Prince Edward felt Thesiger over ready to take offence. In the event, Kinchant retired in November 1887, being granted the honorary rank of Major General.40 Kinchant’s case raises the issue of where there was disagreement on the quality of an officer and adverse comment, of course, could have its roots in personalities. In terms of the former, for example, there was disagreement over a number of years of the merits of Colonel Thomas Crawley, a British officer serving as Assistant Adjutant General first at Lahore and then Allahabad. In 1891 Major General Sir Hugh Gough, an Indian army officer commanding at Lahore, considered Crawley thoroughly conversant with his duties but the Adjutant General in Bengal, Major General William Galbraith, a British officer, considered Crawley had a ‘buoyant temperament and average ability’. In 1892 the Commander-in-Chief, Roberts, concluded that Crawley was a ‘satisfactory officer without any special qualifications’. By 1893 Major General 38

NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Sandhurst to Horsford, 9 Jan. and 29 Jan. 1875; Fendall to Joyce, 6 Feb.

1875. 39

Ibid., Kilmainham 1310, Steele to Whitmore, 2 and 7 May 1885; Boyle to Young, 12 May 1885; Young to Boyle, 14 May 1885; Boyle to Young, 19 May 1885; Boyle to Young, 27 Jul. 1885. 40 Ibid., Thesiger to Beckett, 29 Aug. 1887; Beckett to Dormer, 18 Oct. 1887; Dormer to Beckett, 19 Oct. 1887; Prince Edward to Harman, 20 Oct. 1887.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 Viscount Frankfort de Montmorency, who had followed Gough in command at Lahore, reported that Crawley was on sick leave and that he would find it difficult to suggest any post or command for which Crawley was fitted. Brigadier General Gerald de Courcy Morton, who was acting Adjutant General in Galbraith’s absence, concurred, describing Crawley as ‘feeble’ although conceding this might be due to ill health. Roberts indicated, ‘I do not think this officer is fitted for further employment on the Staff’. Yet Crawley survived and, transferred to Allahabad, albeit a lesser post, was found excellent in all respects by Brigadier General Horace Evans of the Bengal Staff Corps, commanding there, after two months’ acquaintance in 1894. Back in post as Adjutant General, Galbraith still felt Crawley below average and that, inexperienced as he was in dealing with British officers, Evans was ‘naturally impressed by Colonel Crawley’s knowledge of them, but I cannot concur in his extremely higher estimate’. The Commander-in-Chief in India, now General Sir George White, also felt Crawley had ‘zeal and considerable experience’, but not ‘the gifts that go to make a high commander’. Evans duly reported favourably on Crawley again in 1895 to the evident continuing surprise of Galbraith and White.41 Similarly, there was a clash in 1889 between Major General Henry Davies, commanding the Cork District, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas St Clair of the 2nd Princess Charlotte of Wales’s (Royal Berkshire Regiment). St Clair had reported adversely on Major Justinian Ponsonby, after which Davies had suggested St Clair lacked tact and had a temper. St Clair claimed that Davies’s hostility towards him originated from the time they had served together in Southern District previously, and that any reported discontent within the regiment was due to his arrival from the 1st Battalion with the intention to introduce reforms. A minor disagreement had led Ponsonby to complain directly to Davies but, as Ponsonby had apologised, St Clair had not entered an adverse report on him as when ‘promotion by selection is so much the rule he feels the seriousness of an unfavourable report’. Davies, in turn, took strong exception to any idea that he had been influenced by unsubstantiated reports from within the battalion. The Duke of Cambridge upheld Davies’s report, St Clair having been reported upon for his temper as far back as 1878.42 Two years later, in July 1891, St Clair suggested that Ponsonby had many good qualities and, on the face of it, was qualified for promotion. Yet, at the same time, St Clair was 41

BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17038, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1891; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1892; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1893; L/MIL/7/17039, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1894; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1895. 42 NLI, Kilmainham 1311, Davies Report, 6 Aug. 1889; Note by Davies, 29 Sept. 1889; Prince Edward of Saxe Weimer to Whitmore, 4 Oct. 1889; Beckett to Davies, 19 Oct. 1889.

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THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT compelled to say that he [Ponsonby] is of a hasty disposition, inclined to magnify personal matters and to be contentious. He is exceedingly selfish and vain, and sometimes narrow minded. He has little perseverance at work which entails discomfort and is too fond of leave and of society. He is not good at either drill or field work. Ponsonby’s eyesight was also poor, and St Clair felt that he should not succeed to command of the battalion. Davies did not agree, arguing that he had always found Ponsonby smart and efficient, and had no hesitation in recommending him for the command. For good measure, Ponsonby sent in a medical board report indicating his eyesight was good. Cambridge again found no reason to question Davies’s assessment in the light of St Clair’s own record, concluding that Ponsonby was fitted for promotion.43 As it happened, Davies himself had been admonished by Cambridge in January 1890 for two seemingly contrary reports on the Assistant Adjutant General at Cork, Colonel W. Lewis Ogilvy. The last confidential report in June 1889 had been entirely satisfactory yet Ogilvy was now reported as unfitted for his duties. Cambridge directed Ogilvy either to take more interest in his duties so as to avoid any further condemnation by Davies, or resign.44 A similar personality clash occurred in December 1891 when Lieutenant Colonel James Stewart Mackenzie of the 9th Lancers reported unfavourably on Major Bloomfield Gough following their disagreement over the treatment of a military prisoner in the regiment. Both had distinguished themselves in the Second Afghan War but it was known that they were not friends. Lieutenant General James Keith Fraser, the Inspector General of Cavalry, was unable to offer any view based on personal observation. He was inclined to believe Gough’s side of the story on the basis of Gough’s known gallantry. By contrast, Major General Somerset Wiseman Clarke, commanding the Belfast District, was more ready to back Mackenzie. Given that Fraser was non committal and Wiseman Clarke’s view unfavourable, Gough was warned that he should have chosen his reported words to Mackenzie more carefully, and he must be made aware that further advancement depended on future satisfactory reports.45 One lasting dispute that was played out in the confidential reports was between Roberts and Hugh Gough’s brother, Sir Charles Gough. In December 1879 when the 43

Ibid., Kilmainham 1312, St Clair report, 24 Jul. 1891 with comments by Davis; Harman to Childers, 20 Nov. 1891; Childers to Davis, 23 Jan. 1892. 44 NAM, 1998-06-195, Harman to Davies, 3 Jan. 1890, and Harman to Ogilvy, 3 Jan. 1890. 45 NLI, Kilmainham 1312, Report by Mackenzie, 18 Dec. 1891, with comments but Fraser and Wiseman Clarke; Gough to Childers, 19 Dec. 1891; Mackenzie to Childers, 21 Dec. 1891; Wolseley to Harman, 31 Dec. 1891; Childers to Wiseman Clarke, 1 Feb. 1892.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 then Major General (local Lieutenant General) Sir Frederick Roberts had forced his way into Kabul following the murder of the British envoy there, his force was besieged in the Sherpur cantonment. Commanding a brigade on the lines of communication, the then Brigadier General Charles Gough was ordered to advance from Jagdalak to reinforce Roberts at Sherpur, some 70 miles away and with snow thick on the ground, although the peremptory orders from Roberts actually contradicted those Gough received from his immediate superior, Major General Robert Bright. Roberts believed that Gough had been unnecessarily slow in taking 12 days to get through to him. In fact, there were fierce attacks on those detachments Gough had left to defend Jagdalak and other posts.46 Thereafter Roberts seemingly went out of his way to damage Gough’s reputation despite the latter being praised by the then Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Haines, and awarded the KCB. There were derogatory reflections in Roberts’s correspondence, with Roberts doing his best to ensure Gough would not get the Madras command in 1890, as well as what Gough took to be a damning slight in Roberts’s autobiography, Forty One Years in India, published in 1896. But confidential reports also served Roberts’s purpose. Thus, in 1888, when commanding the Oudh Division, Gough was characterised by Roberts as able and energetic but, ‘Of his power to act with decision when a crisis arrives I have some doubt.’ The 1890 report was the same.47 Whatever the drawbacks in the reporting system, it is clear that those officers who were unsatisfactory were noted. Reports could often be frank, or at least extended only the faintest qualified praise. An example of the former is the October 1880 report on Lieutenant Louis Carden of the Royal Artillery, namely that, ‘This officer appears to have little professional zeal. I have not formed a very high opinion of his capacity as an officer, if he has any he succeeds in disguising it.’ An example of the second is Wolseley’s comment on Lieutenant Colonel Robert Oxley of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders in November 1893: More full of zeal than brains: he seldom leaves the Barracks except on duty & works unremittingly for his men. If attention to business & unnecessary care for his Battn. & for its good name & credit could of themselves make a good C.O., then he ought to be about the best in the Army. But his Battn. is not well taught in the art of fighting. Col Oxley is an old fashioned officer

46

Brian Robson, The Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War, 1878-81 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986), pp. 161-65, 178. 47 NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-100-3, Roberts to Stewart, 5 Apl, 30 Aug. and 29 Oct. 1890, and Roberts to Newmarch, 9 Nov. 1892; ibid., 7101-23-105, Roberts to Gough, 13 Feb. 1897; ibid., Gough Mss, 8304-32, Gough to Roberts, 5 Feb. 1897; Morton to Gough, 16 Mar. 1897; Gough to Harriette Gough, 12 and 28 Dec. 1879; BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17038, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1888 and 15 Mar. 1890.

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THE ANNUAL CONFIDENTIAL REPORT who seems to think drill the end and instead of being merely a means to an end.48 Ultimately, of course, what mattered most, as Wolseley and Roberts invariably stressed, was how an individual performed on the battlefield. Some who had been praised routinely in successive reports fell short of expectations. Sir John McQueen had received glowing reports previously but, having failed to conduct the Black Mountain expedition of 1888 to Roberts’s satisfaction, was now ‘quite the most unsatisfactory commander I have had to deal with and I would never trust him with the conduct of another expedition.’49 Similarly, in 1894, Sir George White found Brigadier General Alex Kinloch at Peshawar ‘altogether a man of considerable mark, which he would probably make greater on service’. A year later, following Kinloch’s indifferent performance on the Chitral Relief Expedition, he had greatly disappointed White and ‘shown none of the dash or enterprise I expected of him’. Redvers Buller suggested privately to White that Kinloch’s chance had come too late after prolonged Indian service and exposure to the sun. He should no longer be considered for the Burma command for ‘it would never do to have a man who proved himself of no use in war, and yet was a great martinet, and very exigent of his Troops, in peace time’.50 In the same way, the formerly favourable opinions of Brigadier General Francis Kempster ended with his perceived failings during the Tirah campaign of 1897 although, perversely, his immediate superior gave him a very favourable report in 1899 on the grounds of the ‘practical knowledge of his profession gained on active service’.51 Others who routinely received favourable and even admiring reports also failed the ultimate test including Major General Sir William Gatacre, defeated at Stormberg in South Africa in December 1899; and Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) Lord Methuen, defeated at Magersfontein in the same ‘Black Week’ in South Africa.52 On the other hand, some men were to fully justify the glowing reports they received, such as the future General Sir Archibald Alison, who was head of the War Office Intelligence Department from 1878 to 1882 and commanded at Aldershot from 1883 48

NLI, Kilmainham 1308, Report on Carden, 9 Oct. 1880; ibid, 1313, Report on Oxley, 11 Nov.

1893.

49

NAM, Roberts Mss, 7101-23-148; ibid., 7101-23-98, Roberts to Dufferin, 4 Nov. 1888. See also ibid., Roberts to Dufferin, 16 Nov. 1888; ibid., 7101-23-100-2, Roberts to Napier, 3 Nov.1 888; ibid., 710123-100-3, Roberts to McQueen, 25 Jul. 1891, and Roberts to Stewart, 18 Aug. 1891. 50 BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17039, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1895, and Covering Note on Kinloch, 4 Sep. 1895; ibid, White Mss, F108/36, Buller to White, 30 May 1895. 51 Ibid., L/MIL/7/17040, Madras Report, 1 Jan. 1898; ibid., L/MIL/7/17041, Madras Reports, 1 Jan 1899. 52 On Gatacre, for example, see BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17038, Bengal reports, 15 Mar. 1888; ibid., L/MIL/7/17039, Bombay reports, 11 May 1896; for Methuen, TNA, WO 27/489.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 to 1888; and General Sir William Lockhart, who died in office as Commander-inChief in India in 1900.53 The annual confidential report, therefore, was one of the tools necessarily utilised to assess officers’ suitability for promotion. They were most certainly noted in the discussions of the progression of Colonels to the rank of Major General between 1882 and 1887, although this did not always make a great deal of difference. In 1885 Colonel Lord John Taylour was set aside from further promotion, Major General William Cameron having reported that Taylour had no capacity for command and ‘I have seldom if ever seen an officer who appears to know less of his work.’ Yet, the Hon. Savage Mostyn duly got his promotion to Major General despite Cameron’s equally damning report that he was ‘a good natured nonentity - to whom it would be dangerous to trust a responsible command’. 54 However, there were many other factors involved in promotion and appointments.55 Evelyn Wood’s criticism of annual confidential reports was largely justified in that inspecting officers did tend to identify only the strongest and the weakest officers. As an officer advanced to command and staff level, his abilities were the more likely to come under scrutiny by his superiors. Even then, however, the unwillingness of some senior officers to make proper use of the annual confidential reports, and of others to draw the right conclusions from them, hampered the efforts of men like Wolseley and Roberts to advance the very best to high command. That was the nature of the problem of promotion in the late Victorian army.

53

NLI, Kilmainham 1307, Report on Alison, 16 Aug. 1876; ibid, 1308, Report on Alison, 21 Aug. 1877; BL, APAC, L/MIL/7/17039, Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1893; ibid., Bengal Reports, 15 Mar. 1895; ibid., L/MIL/7/17040, Bengal Reports, 1 Jan 1898. 54 NAM, 1998-06-197. 55 Ian F. W. Beckett, ‘Kitchener and the Politics of Command’ in Edward Spiers (ed.), Sudan: The Reconquest Reappraised (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 35-53’ idem, ‘Buller and the Politics of Command’, in John Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 41-55; idem, ‘Women and Patronage in the Late Victorian Army’, History 85 (2000), pp. 463-80; idem, ‘Soldiers, the Frontier and the Politics of Command in British India’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 16 (2005), pp. 28092.

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SHOOTING POWER

‘Shooting Power’: A Study of the Effectiveness of Boer and British Rifle Fire, 1899–1914 SPENCER JONES University of Wolverhampton Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT The effectiveness of Boer rifle fire had a significant legacy on the development of British musketry standards. This would prompt improvements in training which would allow the infantry of the BEF to cause disproportionate casualties to their German adversaries in 1914. This paper charts the success of the Boer methods and explains how the British adapted to the increase in infantry rifle fire.

I The growing effectiveness of infantry small arms from the mid-19th century onwards was a recognised influence upon military tactics.1 Although the technical limitations of early generation rifles reduced their overall effect, by the latter part of the century the greatly increased lethality of modern weaponry was becoming apparent.2 In large European armies reliant upon a conscript system that limited the available time for training and largely precluded the creation of marksmen, sheer weight of fire was more important than accuracy. For example, Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 had, in part, been influenced by the tactical advantages conferred by the rapid fire of the Dreyse Needle Gun.3 However, the unique colonial duties of the British Army meant that this emphasis on rapidity was less appropriate. Warfare fought in the proximity of undeveloped imperial frontiers made the movement of supplies a herculean challenge. The army could not afford to be wasteful with its ammunition. In these conditions, rapid 1

For example, see Perry D. Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1994). 2 For criticism of the technical capabilities of rifles, see Earl Hess, The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2008). For recognition of the lethality of modern firepower, see Ian Hamilton, The Fighting of the Future (London, K.Paul Trench & Co., 1885), p. 14. 3 For example, see Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria’s War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.25, footnote 65.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 shooting was discouraged and iron fire discipline was enforced. This approach served the British Army well in a variety of colonial conflicts and, despite a handful of officers who questioned its validity against a similarly armed opponent, close control remained the linchpin of British fire tactics for much of the 19th century.4 The limitations of this tactic would be ruthlessly exposed by the unusual conditions of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899 – 1902). The Boers possessed a unique military culture that had no parallels with any of Britain’s other colonial foes. In Colonel Charles Callwell’s famous treatise on colonial warfare, Small Wars, it was noted that, as a military force, the Boers defied easy classification.5 The Boers lacked a formally constituted army and instead relied upon a voluntary militia system, with volunteers being formed into units known as commandos. 6 Boer citizens responding to the rallying call were expected to bring their own firearm and horse, thus ensuring that the force was both well-armed and highly mobile.7 This combination of firepower and mobility was the defining feature of the Boer military system. The effectiveness of the Boers in combat had been demonstrated in regular conflicts with local Africans, where small numbers of burghers had often been able to triumph over far larger opposition forces.8 Boer firepower would prove to be an important battlefield factor, and the magnitude of the Second Anglo-Boer War ensured the experience left a deep and lasting impression upon the British Army. This article will study British impressions of Boer marksmanship during this major conflict. Although the popular press were quick to attribute success to natural Boer skills, thoughtful military commentators identified a variety of factors that contributed to the effectiveness of Boer rifle fire. This study will examine three key elements that contributed to Boer marksmanship, namely terrain, culture, and equipment, demonstrating how they combined to produce unusually effective rifle fire. The chapter will also consider the British impression of Boer musketry in the aftermath of the war, showing how overall opinion was one of considerable admiration. This admiration would play an important role in the British Army’s musketry reforms in the years 1902–1914, which, in turn, contributed to the 4

Concerns were raised following the poor performance of British soldiers in the First Boer War 1880-1881 but this had little influence on the army as a whole. 5 Charles Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (London, H.M.S.O, 1906), p.31. Callwell felt that the Boers had more in common with a European guerrilla movement than a typical colonial foe. F.H.E. Cunliffe, The History of the Boer War (London, Methuen & Co.1901), Vol.1, pp.4-5 argued that the Boer fighting style was adopted from the autochthonous ‘Hottentots’, albeit with the benefit of modern weapons. 6 For a thorough study of the Boer commando system, see Fransjohan Pretorius, Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899 – 1902 (Cape Town, Human and Rosseau, 1999). 7 Ibid., pp. 80-83. The Afrikaner governments provided rifles to those who did not possess their own. 8 Frederick Maurice, History of the War in South Africa 1899 – 1902 (London, Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 1906), Vol.1, pp.68 – 71; Bill Nasson, The South African War (London, Hodder Arnold, 1999), p.64.

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SHOOTING POWER famous rifle skills of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the opening battles of the First World War. The article will close with a discussion of British rifle fire in the opening of this great conflict, demonstrating certain parallels between the experience of the South African War and the war in Europe. II An immediate problem faced by British troops in the Second Anglo-Boer War was the nature of the terrain and climate. The sheer scale of the geography could be intimidating to inexperienced troops. Sweeping grass veldt in the east and scrub desert in the west stretched for miles, occasionally being broken by huge kopjes and wide rivers. Yet, despite the vastness of the country, effective cover on the veldt was spartan. Boulders, scrub vegetation and anthills offered some concealment for troops, but in many battles the attackers were forced to advance over disturbingly open terrain.9 The incredibly clear atmosphere of the country exacerbated the difficulties posed by the terrain. Troops who were unaccustomed to the conditions faced particular difficulty in estimating ranges correctly, but even veteran troops were known to make serious errors when judging distances.10 This had dangerous implications when advancing to the attack, as it was easy to misinterpret the range to the enemy position. For example, confusion over the exact range to the Boer lines played a role in the destruction of Colonel Long’s battery at the Battle of Colenso on 15 December 1899. On the other hand, the clear atmosphere could offer a great advantage for the defenders, especially if they occupied a kopje, as they could observe advancing foes at remarkable distances. Howard Hillegas, an American journalist attached to the Boer forces, expressed his amazement at the distance at which advancing British forces could be seen, noting that at long range they resembled ‘huge ants more than human beings.’11 Afrikaner riflemen took full advantage of these conditions. Well adapted to the clear atmosphere, the quality of Boer eyesight was a source of much admiration amongst British troops. One officer commented that the average Boer had ‘magnifying eyes’, while General Sir Redvers Buller was said to have stated that ‘if a European and Boer were walking towards each other in an open country, the Boer would see the other 9

For an evocative discussion of the terrain in South Africa, see Count Adalbert Sternberg, My Experiences of the Boer War (London, Longmans, 1901), pp.204-206. 10 “Jack the Sniper” [Charles James O’Mahony] A Peep Over the Barleycorn: In the Firing Line with the P.W.O. 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment, Through the Relief of Ladysmith (Dublin, John Drought, 1911), pp.135 – 136; G. Forbes, ‘Experiences in South Africa with a New Range Finder’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 46/2, (1902), p.1389. 11 Howard Hillegas, The Boers in War (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1900), p.146

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 two miles in advance.’12 Making use of this natural advantage, the Boers often opened fire at ranges of well over a mile.13 This long range rifle fire came as an unpleasant surprise to British troops, who were not trained to fire at ranges above 800 yards.14 Furthermore, pre-war British tactics had assumed that it would be possible for infantry to advance to within approximately half a mile of the enemy’s position before it became necessary to shake out into extended order, and did not anticipate receiving anything but desultory enemy fire beyond 1,500 yards range.15 This was not the case in South Africa, where British formations were often engaged at ranges of 2,000 yards or more.16 Officers recorded their alarm at this tactical development, with one noting: War is not what it was when armies manoeuvred in sight of each other, and when 600 yards was the limit of artillery fire ... That was old-time fighting, and some sport about it too. Now Bill is killed at 2,400 yards, and Bill’s pal hasn’t an idea where the shot was fired. That is modern warfare.17 Such long range fire could be especially problematic for cavalry, who were initially armed with carbines that had a maximum range of 1,200 yards. Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Warren complained that the ‘Boers had only to keep at 2,000 yards from our cavalry in the hills and could shoot them down with impunity’.18 However, even in the clear atmosphere of South Africa, it took an exceptional marksman to hit the target reliably at long range. Observers noted that Boer longdistance fire tended to be erratic unless the range to the target had been established in some fashion. This could take the form of crack shots firing ranging shots and communicating the distance to their comrades. Artillery was also used to establish the range, and so were nearby geographical features.19 Once the range had been established, the fire was considerably more effective. For example, at the Battle of Willow Grange on 22 November 1899, the West Yorkshire Regiment reported: 12

Quoted in Jack, Peep over the Barleycorn, p. 192. The Boers were also capable of holding their fire until close range. See Pretorius, Life on Commando, pp. 139-140. 14 H.R. Mead, ‘Notes on Musketry Training of Troops’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 43/1 (1899), pp. 250-251. 15 War Office, Infantry Drill Book 1896 (London, H.M.S.O., 1896), p.131. 16 The Official Records of the Guards’ Brigade in South Africa (London, J.J. Keliher, 1904), p.18; William Balck, ‘Lessons of the Boer War and Battle Workings of the Three Arms’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 48/2, (1904), pp.1273-1274. 17 ‘Not by a Staff Officer’, ‘Some Remarks on Recent Changes’, United Service Magazine, October 1904, p.47. 18 Report of His Majesty’s Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and Other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa (London, H.M.S.O., 1903), Cmd No.1789 – 1792, Vol.2, Q15850, p.233 (Hereafter referred to as the Elgin Commission). 19 Elgin Commission, vol.1, Q 6860, p. 294. 13

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SHOOTING POWER for about one and a-half hours the Boers kept up an ineffective fire on our position, only one man being hit. The Boers then brought up a VickersMaxim at about 1,800 yards range, and very quickly found our range, and after that their musketry became very effective ... The position under this fire quickly became untenable.20 Long range Boer shooting was particularly dangerous to dense formations. When Lord Roberts took command of British forces in South Africa, his tactical ‘Notes for Guidance’ urged infantry to adopt extended formations between 1,500 and 1,800 yards from Boer positions, effectively doubling the distance set down in the pre-war regulations.21 In practice a number of units chose to abandon close order at even greater distances. For example, Major-General Henry Colvile, commanding Guards’ Brigade, favoured shaking into extended order at 2,500 yards.22 However, despite its capacity to cause losses at huge ranges, Boer long range fire was rarely decisive on its own. Casualties at such range were often more a matter of luck than judgement. For example, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Hunter commented that he believed the effectiveness of long range fire was ‘mythical’ and related that he had regularly patrolled the Ladysmith perimeter in full general’s uniform, secure in the knowledge that none of the besieging Boers would be capable of hitting him!23 The main battlefield function of Boer long range fire was to slow down the pace of the British advance by forcing them to adopt extended formations at great distances from the Boer position. 24 Once under fire, battlefield manoeuvre became considerably more difficult and any element of surprise was lost. A journalist attached to Lord Methuen’s force described this kind of action, writing that the series of attacks during the attempt to relieve Kimberly in November 1899 consisted of ‘no beastly strategy, or tactics, or outlandish tricks of any sort; nothing but an honest, straightforward British march up to a row of waiting rifles.’25 This could be a trying experience for British troops, and it was worsened by the fact that the source of the fire was usually invisible. Part of the reason for this was the use of smokeless 20

Extract from the Digest of Service of the 2nd Battalion The Prince of Wales’s Own (West Yorkshire Regt.) in South Africa (York, Yorkshire Herald Newspaper, 1903), p. 4. The Vickers-Maxim was an autocannon that fired small explosive shells. It was commonly referred to as a ‘pom pom gun’ due to its distinctive sound when firing. 21 National Archives of the UK (NAUK), Kew, London, WO 105/40, Lord Roberts Papers, ‘Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare’, 26 January 1900. 22 Records of Guards’ Brigade, p. 19. 23 Elgin Commission, vol. 2, Q 14587, Q 14588, p. 138. 24 Ibid., vol. 2, Q 19200, p. 397. 25 L.M. Phillips, With Rimington, (London, E. Arnold, 1902), p. 10.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 powder, which will be discussed in detail below, but it was also due in large part to the military culture of the Boers. The commandos were essentially a force of individual riflemen, many of whom wielded their own personal weapons. Although officers were a key part of the commando, there was no drill or training to inculcate obedience to orders or the use of particular formations.26 The Boers had neither the discipline nor the inclination to adopt formal European formations for either attack or defence. Instead, commandos tended to fight as a loose group of skirmishers, with individual burghers choosing their own cover and frequently picking their own targets. 27 The lack of formal organization in the Boer fighting line allowed it to take advantage of available cover and thus blend into the countryside with remarkable skill. Ruminating on his combat experiences, Major-General Geoffrey Barton commented that the Boers were ‘extraordinarily well trained by nature and habit to lie still.’28 The individualistic military culture of the Boers stood in stark contrast to the traditional British approach. Although attitudes differed from unit to unit, much of the British Army favoured close control, volley fire and strict discipline.29 Although these ideas had proved useful in previous colonial wars, they required adaptation to make them effective in South Africa. Henry Colvile commented on his wartime experiences of conservative attitudes in Guards’ Brigade: At first officers and men were very stupid about taking cover. I have seen men halted on a rise in full view of the enemy when a few paces forward or backward would have placed them in shelter, the reason being that to have taken this step would have broken the dressing of the line.30 A combination of British inexperience in taking cover and the relative invisibility of Boer positions magnified the effectiveness of Boer fire. The Boers were able to observe and engage the British forces without revealing themselves; for the British coming under fire from an unknown source was a disturbing experience and often necessitated a delay in the attack until its location could be pinpointed. 31 Furthermore, the British were troubled by the inability to gauge the effect of their 26

Maurice, History of the War, vol.1, p. 86. Balck, ‘Lessons of the War’, pp. 1272 – 1273. 28 Elgin Commission, vol.2, Q 16215, p. 256. 29 For a discussion of this issue, see Edward Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902 (Manchester, University of Manchester Press 1992), pp. 313-315. Reactionary pre-war attitudes were mercilessly lampooned in ‘George D’Ordel’ [Mark Sykes & Edmund Sandars] Tactics and Military Training (London, Bickers and Son, 1904). 30 Elgin Commission, vol. 2, Q 16974, p. 286. 31 Jay Stone and Erwin Schmidl, The Boer War and Military Reforms (Lanham, University Press of America, 1988), p. 80. 27

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SHOOTING POWER own fire against relatively invisible opposition, especially as the evidence of the Boer’s shooting was plain to see. Major-General Neville Lyttleton contrasted previous colonial experience with the new conditions, writing of the Battle of Colenso: Few people have seen two battles in succession in such startling contrast as Omdurman and Colenso. In the first 50,000 fanatics streamed across the open regardless of cover to a certain death, while at Colenso I never saw a Boer all day till the battle was over, and it was our men who were the victims.32 Colonel E.E. Carr echoed similar sentiments, noting that during most fire fights his troops were forced to shoot purely at geographic features to try and suppress enemy fire, whereas the Boer usually had a clear target: They do not fire unless they are pretty certain you are there; I do not say they always see you; although the difficulty is that we cannot see them and they can see us, they can see us for miles; but we seldom see them.33 A private soldier, Charles James O’Mahony, expressed his frustrations with such fighting after the defeat at the Battle of Willow Grange, writing: We were much handicapped for the Boers take cover in a manner never to be equalled ... we sprayed every nook, crevice, donga, spruit etc. on and surrounding the Boer position with lead as if from a watering can, rocks being splintered two miles in the kopjes rear.34 In stark contrast, Izak Meyer, a Boer veteran, described his experience of combat at the Battle of Modder River 28 November 1899 in the following terms: Now I am deadly calm, and with deadly calm I pick my man, pick them one by one. I pick him, my Mauser drops, my left eye closes, I get him in my sights and my Mauser cracks. The Englishman totters, drops his rifle, grabs his chest ... I shoot them down, one after another, one after another.35

32

Neville Lyttleton, Eighty Years: Soldiering, Politics, Games (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1927),

p. 212.

33 34 35

Elgin Commission, vol.2, Q 19200, p. 397. Jack, Peep over the Barleycorn, pp. 74-75. Quoted in Pretorius, Life on Commando, p. 141.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 The ability of the Boers to fight from behind cover was especially useful during extended fire fights at close range.36 In the early stages of the war, some British units attempted to use volleys during fire fights, but it was soon found that the slow, static nature of volley firing proved ineffective against dispersed and concealed enemies.37 By contrast the Boers proved especially adept at ‘snap shooting’, leaning out from behind cover only long enough to acquire a target and fire, and then ducking out of sight once more. J.B. Atkins, a British journalist, witnessed snap shooting at the Battle of Hart’s Hill, 23 February 1900, writing: ‘Boer heads and elbows shot up and down; the defenders were aiming, firing, ducking’.38 Faced with these conditions, the British were forced to adopt a far greater degree of independent firing themselves. 39 Unfortunately, pre-war training had done little to prepare the average soldier for this type of action, and, combined with the difficulties of atmosphere and the relative invisibility of many of the Boer positions, this made fire fights a difficult proposition. Major-General Sir William Gatacre noted the difference in fighting style: [The average British soldier] was rather slow in getting his aim, and he found he was unaccustomed to use his rifle without exposing himself, which at once brought a Mauser bullet in his direction ... The Boer, on the contrary, was particularly good at getting his bead on to the enemy’s hat or mess tin quickly, and in getting covered again before men could aim and fire.40 It was within fire fight range that the majority of British officers felt the Boers had truly demonstrated their marksmanship skills. Major-General J.P. Brabazon argued ‘where they beat us so completely was that when we got onto kopjes at close quarters, say, a few hundred yards, a man could not put a finger up over a rock or ridge without being shot.’ 41 Major-General A.H. Paget related his front line experience at the Battle of Modder River, noting that ‘[i]n these early fights [the Boers’] shooting was very accurate; every bullet had some mark, and there was no wild shooting at all, and when we got to the closer ranges, in places which were fire swept, everybody was hit.’42 E.E. Carr recalled the difficulty of assaulting Boers in strong defensive positions, stating ‘I have seen men rolled over like rabbits and

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Opinions differed as to what exactly constituted ‘close range’ in the Anglo-Boer War. In the aftermath of the war, British regulations codified a range 600 yards or less as ‘decisive’ range for fire fights. See War Office, Combined Training 1905 (London, H.M.S.O. 1905), p. 100. 37 For a graphic description of the difficulties of engaging concealed Boers with volleys, see Jack, Peep over the Barelycorn, pp. 71-72. 38 J.B. Atkins, The Relief of Ladysmith (London, Methuen, 1900), p. 295. 39 Jack, Peep over the Barleycorn, p. 73. 40 Elgin Commission, vol. 2, Q 16772, p. 272. 41 Ibid., vol.1, Q 6859, p. 294. 42 Ibid., vol. 2, Q 16441, p. 259.

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SHOOTING POWER slaughtered, as the Inniskillings Fusiliers were at Pieter’s Hill on the first attempt just before the relief of Ladysmith’.43 In intense fire fights, the skill of individual Boer marksmen could be striking. Colonel Forbes MacBean noted the presence of ‘a certain percentage of men who are uncommonly good shots’ in the average Boer firing line.44 These elite marksmen were capable of causing disproportionate casualties. Henry Colvile noted ‘the Boers had a certain number of picked shots who did great damage’, while A.H. Paget echoed the view, commenting that ‘some of the shooting of the Boers was extraordinary.’45 Even Archibald Hunter acknowledged the presence of crack shots amongst Boer forces, relating that ‘[t]here are certain shots who have earned their living as professional hunters, and from 200 yards to 300 yards [range] they are undoubtedly marvellous shots.’46 The skills of these marksmen were often attributed to frontier life and the popularity of game hunting.47 However, game had been in decline throughout the 1880s and 1890s.48 Furthermore, the growth of urban centres in the Transvaal and Orange Free State during the 1880s and 1890s meant that Boer forces contained a proportion of city-based volunteers who were unlikely to be natural riflemen.49 Nevertheless, rifle culture remained a source of fascination in the Boer republics in the years prior to the war.50 Howard Hillegas felt that rifle shooting was the ‘chief amusement’ in the Transvaal in the 1890s, writing that the ‘demand for rifle ammunition was constant, and firing at marks may almost be said to have taken the place occupied by billiards in Europe.’ 51 Furthermore, beginning in the early 1890s and intensifying in the aftermath of the botched Jameson Raid of 1895, the governments of the Boer republics put renewed emphasis on promoting rifle culture. Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice noted of this policy that ‘[e]very effort, in short, was made to preserve the old skill and interest in rifle-shooting, which it was feared would vanish with the vanishing elands and gemsbok. If the skill had diminished, the interest had not.’52 43

Ibid.,, vol. 2, Q 19198, p. 397. Colonel Carr appears to have confused the attacks at Hart’s Hill (23 February 1900) and Pieter’s Hill (27 February 1900). The Inniskillings Fusiliers suffered severe casualties at Hart’s Hill but were not involved at Pieter’s Hill. I am grateful to Ken Gillings for supplying this information. 44 Elgin Commission, vol. 2, Q 19593, p. 415. 45 Ibid., vol. 2, Q 16440, p. 259; Q 16989, p. 292. 46 Ibid., vol. 2, Q 14585, p. 138. 47 Ibid., vol. 2, Q 21950, p. 564. 48 NAUK, WO 33/154, Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South Africa, p. 49. 49 Hillegas, Boers in War, pp. 19-20. 50 Maurice, History of the War, vol. 1, p. 80. 51 Hillegas, Boers in War, pp. 19-20. 52 Maurice, History of the War, p. 80.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 Nevertheless, not all Boers were gifted marksmen and their shooting could sometimes be wild. However, the fact that the majority of burghers were equipped with modern magazine loading Mauser rifles helped to offset any disadvantages due to lack of individual accuracy. Less talented riflemen could make up for this deficiency through sheer volume of fire. As J.P. Brabazon noted, ‘[i]f you pump lead in a certain direction at a proper distance you must hit somebody.’53 Charles Callwell saw the magazine rifle as the key element of Boer War tactics, noting that, due to its rate of fire, a mere handful of men, lying down under shelter, can bring such a hail of bullets to bear upon ground extending for a considerable distance to their front that hostile troops attempting to cross this will suffer appalling losses in doing so, even if they succeed in the venture.54 Facing such rapid fire could be a harrowing experience for soldiers in the front line. An officer of the 60th Rifles recorded his experience at the Battle of Talana Hill: I don’t suppose I am ever likely to go through a more awful fire than broke out from the Boer line as we dashed forward. The ground in front of me was literally rising in dust from the bullets, and the din echoing between the hill and the wood below and among the rocks from the incessant fire of the Mausers seemed to blend with every other sound into a long drawn-out hideous roar ... the whole ground we had already covered was strewn with bodies.55 The modern rifles of the Boers offered additional advantages beyond rate of fire. The flat trajectory of the weapons made them more accurate and allowed the Boers to create deadly fire swept zones at battles such as Modder River and Magersfontein.56 Indeed, at Magersfontein, the Boers had sited their main position at the base of a kopje, partially as means of taking advantage of the sweeping effect of flat trajectory fire.57 In addition, the Mauser rifle benefited from the use of smokeless powder, meaning that there was no tell-tale puff of smoke to reveal a firer’s location. This was a critical advantage and greatly enhanced the ability of the Boers to fight from behind cover. Charles Callwell considered it the decisive element of Boer marksmanship, arguing: 53

Elgin Commission, vol.1, Q 6860, p. 294. Charles Callwell, The Tactics of Today (Edinburgh, William Blackwood 1903), pp. 31-32. 55 Quoted in Leo Amery, The Times History of the War in South Africa (London, Sampson, Lowe Marston & Company, 1902), vol. 2, p. 164. 56 The Battle of Magersfontein was fought on 11 December 1899. 57 G.R. Duxbury, The Battle of Magersfontein 11th December 1899 (Johannesburg, S.A. National Museum of Military History 1995), p. 2. 54

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SHOOTING POWER The disappearance of black powder has exerted a far more potent influence in moulding tactics into a new shape than the increased power and accuracy or the rapid fire of the modern rifle and gun. Concealment has been so greatly facilitated by this that it has gained a new and commanding importance. It was a standing grievance in South Africa that the Boers could only be heard and not seen.58 There had been some consideration of the effects of modern rifles within the British Army prior to the outbreak of the war, but such discussions had produced few tactical changes. 59 Interestingly, Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence, argued prior to the conflict that the fact that the British were armed with smokeless, flat trajectory rifles would help to offset the dangers posed by natural Boer marksmanship, stating that modern weapons had ‘much diminished the advantage offered by accuracy in judging distances.’60 In fact, the advantages of modern rifles had the effect of greatly magnifying Boer strengths. Long range, flat trajectory rifles allowed the Boers to engage at great distances; the use of smokeless powder vastly enhanced the Boer’s capacity for fighting from behind cover and improved individual accuracy; and the use of magazine loading allowed a far greater rate of fire to be maintained. Expert marksmen could benefit from the range and accuracy of their rifles, while less talented Boers could make up for lack of individual skill with sheer weight of fire. Despite wielding a weapon of similar quality, the British Army enjoyed few advantages by comparison. Lord Methuen offered a bleak assessment of the issue: The shooting of the Regular troops was conducted under exceptional difficulties on account of the clearness of the atmosphere and because the enemy offered no good target, but my opinion gained during my experience of the Tirah and the South African campaigns is that the shooting of our infantry is not worthy of the accuracy and the long range powers possessed by the present rifle.61 The combination of Boer rifle culture and modern magazine rifles lay at the core of many British tactical problems in the Second Anglo-Boer War. Frontal attacks against Boer positions frequently suffered heavy losses, and it took a considerable degree of in-theatre learning before the British Army was able to gain the upper hand on the

58 59 60 61

Callwell, Tactics of Today, p. 7. Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p. 315. NAUK, WO 33/154, Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of South Africa, p. 50. Elgin Commission, Q 14188, p. 121.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 battlefield. 62 The effectiveness of Boer firepower necessitated a profound reconsideration of assault tactics, with a fresh emphasis on dispersed attack formations, prolonged artillery support and flanking movements. III In the aftermath of the conflict, the topic of Boer shooting was much discussed at the Royal Commission on the South African War. Twenty-one witnesses were questioned directly about Boer marksmanship and others spoke on the topic in general terms. Interestingly, several officers cast aspersions on the quality of Boer marksmanship. Colonel A.W. Thorneycroft and Major-General Sir H.M.L. Rundle both considered that Boer shooting had much declined from the First Anglo-Boer War, although both acknowledged that it still remained superior to that of their own soldiers.63 Redvers Buller actually considered that British shooting was superior to that of the Boers.64 Major-General Sir H.J.T. Hildyard thought that the marksmanship of his troops was comparable to that of the Boers, a view echoed by Forbes MacBean and Henry Colvile.65 However, all but one critical witness qualified their statements on the topic.66 For example, Buller only considered British shooting to be superior if the British knew the range to the enemy position, a comparatively rare experience for much of the war. 67 Hildyard acknowledged his view was only an impression and ‘was a very difficult thing to prove’.68 MacBean admitted that he considered Boer fire to be of ‘a fairly high average’ and recognised the presence of dangerous sharpshooters amongst the commandos.69 Colvile attempted to argue that the British shooting was as good as the Boers, but that the hitting was worse, due to the Boers’ ubiquitous use of cover!70 However, the majority of witnesses praised Boer marksmanship, albeit sometimes grudgingly. Major-General Sir Bruce Hamilton directly refuted Henry Colvile’s evidence, arguing that Boer shooting was considerably superior.71 When questioned by the commissioners as to the reason for the divergent views on the quality of Boer shooting, Hamilton responded perceptively: ‘I think British officers are very anxious 62

For discussion of this aspect of the campaign, see Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London, Wedenfeld and Nicolson, 1979) and Stephen M. Miller, Lord Methuen and the British Army: Failure and Redemption in South Africa (London, Frank Cass, 1999). 63 Elgin Commission, vol. 2, Q 12440, p. 19; Q 17879, p. 331. 64 Ibid., Q 14383, p. 212. 65 Ibid., Q 15982, p. 241; Q 16988, p. 292; Q 19593, p .415. 66 The only witness who was unequivocal in his criticism of Boer marksmanship was Colonel Alexander Thorneycroft. 67 Ibid., Q 15483, p. 212. 68 Ibid., Q 15982, p. 241. 69 Ibid., Q 19593, p. 415. 70 Ibid., Q 16988, p. 202. 71 Ibid., Q 17482, p. 314.

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SHOOTING POWER to stick up for the shooting of their men.’72 A.H. Paget had much praise for Boer shooting, noting ‘I am going more not by what I saw when I had a higher command, but what I saw when I was in the fighting line myself ... I was in the fighting line and saw everything that was going on, and certainly the Boer shooting was very good indeed.’73 However, senior officers often had praise for Boer marksmanship; Charles Warren and William Gatacre both considered it to have been superior to that of the British.74 Lord Kitchener saw Boer rifle culture as the key element in Boer success: Our men were not as quick and accurate as their opponents in shooting rapidly, but they had not been trained for this during peace time, and could not, therefore be expected to excel in what the Boers had learned to practice from childhood.75 Lord Roberts was highly critical of British musketry in comparison to that of the Boers, arguing that the average British soldier: was the exact opposite of the Boer, especially in his want of knowledge of the ground and how to utilise it, and in his defective powers of observation. His shooting cannot be described as good ... there was no real marksmanship ... The shooting at short ranges ... was ineffective, and at long ranges the distance was seldom accurately estimated.76 The final report of the Royal Commission concluded that Boer marksmanship had been superior to that of the British, identifying the capacity of the Boers to fight from behind cover, their superior skill in judging distances and ability to hit fleeting targets as critical factors.77 The value of skilful marksmen wielding modern weaponry was clear to many veterans of the conflict. Alexander Thorneycroft considered it an ‘essential point’ from the war, arguing that ‘[w]hen you get to a decisive range, say 300 yards, if your men are first-class shots with good fire sights on their rifles for close shooting, you are at an enormous advantage.’78 Ian Hamilton went even further, arguing that Britain should take inspiration from the Boer military system and adapt it to her own needs:

72 73 74 75 76 77 78

Ibid., Q 17479, p. 314. Ibid., Q 16445, 16446, p. 259. Ibid., Q 15660, p. 224; Q 16772, p. 272. Ibid., vol. 1, Q 173, p. 7. Ibid., vol. 2, Q 10442, p. 440. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 48. Ibid, vol. 2, Q 12435, p. 19.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 I believe that an army composed of individuals each so highly trained as to be able to take full advantage of the terrain, and of his wonderful modern weapon, and each animated with a morale and trained to an efficiency which will make him capable of acting in battle on his own initiative, will break through, scatter, and demolish less efficient opposing forces, even if greatly superior in numbers.79 The British Army underwent considerable tactical reform in the aftermath of the conflict, with a particular focus on improving marksmanship.80 In 1902, Lord Roberts stated that the first object in the training of a soldier was ‘to make him a good shot.’81 To this end, the old system of volley firing was abandoned and was replaced with training that aimed to make each soldier an effective individual rifleman. Between 1902 and 1906 each man was assigned 300 rounds per annum for training. Although this figure fell to 250 rounds per year from 1906 onwards, it was still well in advance of continental armies.82 For example, a German infantryman was assigned between 60 and 100 rounds in their first year and 42 rounds in their second year.83 British musketry training was heavily based on the experience of the Second AngloBoer War. There was a concerted effort to mimic the skills of the Boers, with an emphasis on ‘snap shooting’, firing from behind cover and engaging fleeting targets at unknown distances.84 The culmination of British marksmanship training was the ‘Mad Minute’, in which a soldier was required to fire fifteen aimed rounds at a target at least three hundred yards distant within sixty seconds. This famous exercise was directly inspired by the effectiveness of sudden, intense bursts of fire in South Africa.85 Admiration of the rifle culture of the Boers prompted some authors to urge that attempts be made to inculcate a similar attitude towards guns within the British Empire.86 Although this was impractical for the bulk of British civilian society, there was a marked change towards rifle training within the British Army. Writing in 1904, an anonymous officer noted with satisfaction: ‘[g]reater interest is now shown by 79

Ibid., Q 13941, p. 107. For a fuller discussion of the reforms of this period, see Spencer Jones, From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform in the British Army 1902–1914 (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 2012). 81 Quoted in ‘K.’, ‘Suggestions for the Improvement of the Annual Course of Musketry’, United Service Magazine, June 1904, p. 300. 82 Jones, Boer War to World War, pp.92-93. 83 Frank Bucholz, Joe Robinson & Janet Robinson, The Great War Dawning: Germany and its Army at the Start of World War I (Vienna, Verlag Militaria, 2013), p.204. 84 War Office, Musketry Regulations Part 1, 1909 (London, H.M.S.O. 1909), pp. 258 – 261. 85 Joint Services Command and Staff College Library, Report on a Conference of General Staff Officers at the Staff College, 2-11 January 1906, p. 118. 86 J. Peters, ‘Teach the Boys to Shoot’, United Service Magazine, March 1904, pp. 598 – 601. 80

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SHOOTING POWER everybody, especially by the private soldier, and the keenness displayed by all ranks is as great as could be desired.’87 Particular pride was attached to the completion of the ‘Mad Minute’ exercise, which was generally considered to be the true test of a marksman.88 The award of coveted marksmanship badges and extra pay for soldiers who had reached the required standard further encouraged training and development. Individual training was supplemented by a wide variety of rifle competitions, many of which attracted considerable participation.89 Indeed, by 1913, some of the competitions were attracting so many entrants that they were in danger of becoming unmanageable.90 On the eve of war in 1914 the British Army had established a well-deserved reputation for the quality of its marksmanship. On hearing news of the outbreak of the conflict, Captain Richard Meinertzhagen noted in his diary: ‘Our Expeditionary Force is terribly small, but a mighty weapon, for every soldier can shoot and every man is determined to fight. The Germans will soon find that out. We are not the solders of the South African War.’91 This bullish assessment would be put to the test during the battles that marked the opening of the First World War. IV The conditions of warfare in Europe in 1914 were markedly different from those that the British had faced in South Africa. The most obvious difference was the terrain. Whereas the open country and clear atmosphere of southern Africa had been ideal for long range sniping, the fighting in Europe took place amongst towns, villages, farms and woodland that drastically reduced visible range. The initial British battle of the campaign, Mons (23 August), marked the first time that the army had fought a major engagement in an industrial urban environment.92 Similarly, the intense combat at the Battle of Ypres (19 October – 22 November) took place amidst dense terrain characterised by thick woodland dotted with villages and farmsteads. Even during battles where the terrain was comparatively open, such as Le Cateau (26 August), the rolling fields created dead ground that reduced the ability of the British to engage at long range.

87

‘K.’, ‘Annual Course of Musketry’, p. 300. Richard Van Emden (ed.), Tickled to Death to Go: Memories of a Cavalryman in the First World War (Staplehurt, Spellmount, 1996), p. 24. 89 The Smith-Dorrien Cup and the Evelyn Wood Cup were two particularly popular events. 90 NAUK, WO 279/32, Aldershot Command Papers, Comments on the Training Season 1913, p.11. 91 Richard Meinertzhagen, Army Diary 1899 - 1926 (Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1960) p.80. 92 James Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914, vol.1, (London, Macmillan & Co., 1933) p.72. (Hereafter Official History). 88

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 British pre-war regulations considered rifle fire to be ‘decisive’ within 600 yards, and ‘effective’ between 600 and 1400 yards. 93 At the opening of the war, infantry frequently opened fire at this latter range when the opportunity presented itself. Some officers recorded their disappointment at the lack of casualties this long range shooting caused, but others perceived that, as in the Boer War, its principal value was to delay and disrupt the advance of the enemy rather than kill or wound individuals. For example, Malcolm Hay of the Gordon Highlanders recorded that his company opened fire at a German column at 1200 yards at the Battle of Mons: It was impossible to resist the temptation to open fire with the hope of breaking up the column formation and thus delaying the reinforcement operations….All our shots seemed to have gone too high and none found a billet, but the enemy made no further attempt to leave the wood in close formation.94 Hay also recorded his men engaging Germans at a range of 900 yards at the Battle of Le Cateau, noting ‘the shooting of the battalion was good enough to delay the enemy’s advance’.95 Whilst the openness of the terrain in South Africa had assisted the Boers, in France and Flanders the British took advantage of the opportunities for concealment provided by the plentiful cover. A sergeant of the Lincolnshires recalled his men occupying swiftly constructed slit trenches at Mons, nothing that these were ‘a trick we learned from the Boers, I believe’, adding: We lay in our trenches with not a sound or sign to tell them [the Germans] what was before them. They crept nearer and nearer, and then our officers gave the word. Under the storm of bullets they seemed to stagger like drunken men.96 A German jaeger officer recalled of the British at Le Cateau: ‘They were wily soldiers, tough and tenacious fellows, with iron nerves, even when wounded. They shot well and understood how to use terrain with such skill that it was difficult even for jaeger to detect them.’97 British ability to remain concealed meant that it was possible to hold fire until German troops had reached close range before surprising them with a 93

War Office, Combined Training 1905 (London, H.M.S.O. 1905), p. 100. ‘An Exchanged Officer’, [Malcom Hay] Wounded and a Prisoner of War, (London, Blackwood & Sons, 1916), p.37. 95 Ibid, p.63. 96 Arthur St. John Adcock, In The Firing Line (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1914), p.24. 97 Quoted in Zuber, The Mons Myth: A Reassessment of the Battle (Stroud, History Press, 2010), p.229. 94

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SHOOTING POWER fusillade. Indeed, it was sudden bursts of fire within 600 yards - the ‘decisive’ range – that would prove most effective in 1914. This was especially apparent during the ferocious fighting at the Battle of Ypres, when inexperienced German infantry was exposed to harrowing musketry from concealed British veterans. John Lucy of the Royal Irish Rifles wrote a graphic account: Their [The Germans’] whole attack was aslant…badly directed, and their men not yet extended in lines. What tactics! We let them have it. We blasted and blew them to death. They fell in scores, in hundreds, the marching column wilting away under our rapid fire… Crowds of Germans at close range were plugged easily and rapidly by every one of us. The riflemen shouted as they fired ‘Come on boys. Let ‘em have it,’ and the attack spluttered out, leaving lines and circles of corpses and wounded…98 One German survivor complained: ‘Unthinking, section after section ran into the well-directed fire of experienced troops. Every effort had been put into our training, but it was completely inadequate preparation for such a serious assault on battlehardened, long service colonial soldiers.’99 A German semi-official account of the battle published in 1917 attributed British success to large numbers of machine guns, giving evidence to the famous claim in the Official History that the Germans mistook British rapid rifle fire for that of machine guns.100 As in South Africa, the effectiveness of British rifle fire owed as much to weight and rapidity as it did to individual accuracy. However, the BEF did possess its share of expert shots who, much like the Boer marksmen of the earlier war, could have a disproportionate effect. At the Battle of Mons, the Lincolnshire sergeant recalled that: ‘a few of the crack shots were told off to indulge in independent firing for the benefit of the Germans. That is another trick taught us by Brother Boer, and our Germans did not like it at all.’ The Official History recorded that a single subaltern of the Royal Scots claimed to have ‘hit thirty to forty’ Germans at the Battle of Le Cateau.101 At the same engagement an officer of the Hampshire Regiment related ‘The best marksmen of D Company were able to pick off some of the machine gun crews and occasional officers who marked themselves out by carrying drawn swords.’102 During an attack in early November during the Battle of Ypres, an officer of the German 136th Infantry Regiment recalled:

98

John Lucy, There’s a Devil in the Drum (London, Faber & Faber, 1938), pp.224-225. Jack Sheldon, The Germany Army at Ypres 1914 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2010) p.105. 100 G.C.W. [translator] Ypres 1914: An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff (London, Constable & Company Ltd, 1919) p.11; Edmonds, Official History 1914, pp.462-463. 101 Edmonds, Official History 1914, vol.1, p.184. 102 Nigel Cave & Jack Sheldon, Le Cateau: 26 August 1914 (Barnsley, Pen & Sword, 2008), p.151. 99

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 Schweinberg, joining in, was just about to fire when, a British soldier swung round in a standing position suddenly and shot at him. He immediately felt a burning sensation in his head, but luckily the bullet had only creased him. This accuracy shown by the long service British soldiers with colonial experience who were deployed opposite the company, verged on the miraculous.103 Overall, the British benefited from a similar combination of factors to those which had influenced the Boer marksmen of the earlier war. The British took advantage of the terrain of Europe, which allowed them to remain concealed and achieve surprise when they opened fire; they possessed a culture of marksmanship that emphasised both accuracy and rapidity which had been codified by thorough pre-war training; and they were equipped with reliable weapons, namely the efficient Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle, which allowed British fire tactics to be implemented. Taken as a whole, these factors contributed to highly effective British rifle fire throughout the battles of 1914. The importance of this battlefield asset should not be underestimated. The BEF was a small, relatively fragile instrument, with comparatively light artillery support and a distinct absence of mortars, grenades and other weapons suitable for positional warfare.104 Lacking these assets, the British Army placed much reliance upon the tactical effectiveness of its infantry fire. The confidence was not misplaced and the impressive battlefield performance of the BEF in 1914 owes a great deal to, in the words of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, ‘the shooting power of our infantry’.105 The origins of this ‘shooting power’ lay in the Boer War. The experience of facing Boer firepower left a deep and lasting impression on the British Army. The grudging respect that had developed during the war evolved into admiration in the aftermath of the conflict. As has been demonstrated, the British came to recognise that a variety of factors were responsible for the skills of the average Boer marksman, some of which, such as the clear atmosphere, were unique to the theatre of war. Nevertheless, the value of modern magazine rifles in the hands of skilled marksmen was a lesson that was taken to heart. Universal skills, such as firing from behind cover, snap shooting and rapid target acquisition went on to become the cornerstones of British musketry training in the aftermath of the conflict. Inspired by these changes, the British Army developed its own unique rifle culture during the pre-First World War period, with marksmen being recognised and rewarded for their skills. The effectiveness of BEF rifle fire in 1914 is well attested and played a crucial and arguably decisive role in battlefield victory. 103

Sheldon, German Army at Ypres, p.262. Edmonds, Official History 1914, Vol.1, pp.10-11. 105 Quoted in Ian F.W. Beckett, The Judgement of History: Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Lord French and 1914 (London, Tom Donovan, 1993), p.34. 104

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SHOOTING POWER In 1902 a British officer had judged Boer marksmanship as ‘extraordinary’ and the army as a whole had sought to imitate it. An impression of the success of this process is gained by the fact that a German veteran of 1914 dubbed British shooting as ‘miraculous’. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then the British Army paid a handsome compliment to the marksmanship of Boers.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014

Ireland’s New Memory of the First World War: Forgotten Aspects of the Battle of Messines, June 1917 RICHARD S. GRAYSON Goldsmiths, University of London Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT The narrative of the 16th (Irish) and 36th (Ulster) divisions fighting side-byside at Messines in June 1917 plays a major and valuable role in crosscommunity reconciliation on the island of Ireland. However, there is no sustained historical analysis of precisely who (in terms of geographic origin) was serving in the two divisions by June 1917. This article does that, concluding that around one-third of the men in each division had no Irish connection. This opens up the prospect of nuancing the Messines narrative so that it might play a part in British-Irish reconciliation. Introduction: Messines and memory of the First World War Prior to the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower at Messines in 1998, there had been no all-Ireland First World War memorial which was felt to be owned by all on the island. There is a notionally all-Ireland memorial at Islandbridge in Dublin, but it has not been a major site of focus for Northern Irish, especially unionist, commemoration. Meanwhile, the Cenotaph in London could be claimed as ‘allIreland’, commemorating as it does all the dead of the British military in the First World War (and, as they took place, later wars). Yet while many unionists in Northern Ireland might look to the Cenotaph as a focus of their national remembrance, for nationalists, its place in London is problematic. Consequently, there has been an emphasis on two separate memorials on the Somme each specifically focused on soldiers from one community: the Protestant/unionist 36th (Ulster) Division at Thiepval and the Catholic/nationalist 16th (Irish) Division at Guillemont. Both commemorate overtly divisions which were overtly political and draw on symbolism which struggles to be inclusive. With the opening of the Island of Ireland Peace Tower (a round tower, which is a cultural icon recognised and accepted both north and south of the border), a new

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FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF MESSINES phase of memory was initiated. The significance of Messines was that it was notionally the location of an operation on 7 June 1917 which included, among other divisions, the 16th and 36th Divisions. The location is only ‘notionally’ correct because the memorial is actually about three miles away from where the 16th and 36th divisions saw action. They actually fought in front of the village of Wytschaete, with New Zealanders at Messines itself.1 However, since the operation was officially the ‘Battle of Messines’ it would be hard to quarrel with the Messines site as a memorial to action in the battle, unless official publicity adopted an ‘on this spot, the 16th and 36th…’ approach (which it does not). When the battle took place, it was, at that point, one of the most effective allied attacks of the war, but the Tower is not solely focused on that operation. The memorial also commemorates the 10th (Irish) Division, a non-political formation which was more denominationally mixed than the 16th and 36th as they were first established, and which fought its war in the Gallipoli, Salonika and Palestine campaigns. The Tower can be (and is) held up as a symbol of a shared Irish story across religious and political divides, and it is symbolically Irish in several ways. In the first place, the ‘Round Tower’ design dates back to Ireland as far as the 8th Century. Meanwhile, some of the symbolism is very much all-Ireland, with its height of 32 metres representing the 32 Irish counties, and its four plots of yew trees matching the four provinces. A stone at the memorial site lists all the counties ‘in continuous lettering symbolising that the counties are linked, connected and interdependent'.2 It might be thought that such an all-Ireland tone might be problematic for unionists/loyalists, and issues around that will be discussed later. However, in general it has not been greeted with hostility by unionists/loyalists, and it was a genuinely cross-community creation. As a result, Messines, after the Somme (though, it should be stressed, very far after), is probably the most prominent battle in the popular story of the war across Ireland. The extent to which the origins of the Peace Tower were partly found in changes in historiography, and in a new mood created by the paramilitary ceasefires in Northern Ireland, has been discussed elsewhere. 3 Ultimately, the Tower was initiated by individuals following a visit to Western Front sites in 1996. One was Glen Barr, a leading figure in the Ulster Workers’ Council strike which brought down the Sunningdale power-sharing agreement in Northern Ireland in 1974, who later moved 1

Keith Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.

139-140. 2

http://www.schoolforpeace.com/content/tower-and-park/43 [accessed 26 August 2014]. Richard Doherty, ‘Some thoughts on the Island of Ireland Peace Park’, in Alan Parkinson and Eamon Phoenix (eds), Conflicts in the North of Ireland, 1900-2000 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), pp. 5669; Richard S. Grayson, Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died Together in the First World War (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 177-8.

3

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 from politics to community work. The other leading figure was Paddy Harte, a former Fine Gael government minister in the Republic of Ireland. In a piece on the website of the International School for Peace Studies, Barr reflects on the site of the project:4 Messines was selected because it was at the battle of Messines on 7th June 1917 that the Nationalist 16th Irish Div. and the Unionist 36th Ulster Div. fought and died together for the first time and where the young John Meeke of the 36th Div. risked his life to retrieve the badly wounded Major Willie Redmond of the 16th Div. from the battlefield. Two men from different traditions, both there for different political reasons, sworn enemies in Ireland, brothers in arms on a foreign battlefield fighting a common enemy. Barr’s comments point to the centrality of the 16th and 36th divisions in the story of Messines which led to the Peace Tower’s inauguration. It also points to ideas of reconciliation, in terms of men sharing a common goal in 1917. Meanwhile, there is a sense of anger over this story having been lost (perhaps even consciously hidden), when Barr asks later, ‘Why was I not taught this in my history class at school? Why was it kept from me?’ Finally, there is a sense that in remembering this lost history, the shared story of 1917 can bring about a shared future, in Barr’s reflection that, Tens of thousands of young Unionists and Nationalists lie side by side in cold foreign graves cut down by German bullets which did not discriminate between Protestants or Roman Catholics, but I am convinced, that they can now Rest In Peace in the knowledge that through their joint sacrifice thousands of people from throughout the Island of Ireland who have made the pilgrimage to where they lie have found peace within and between themselves.5 Such views, in particular the idea of using history to build peace, were given state sanction when the Peace Tower was opened in 1998, jointly by the British, Irish and Belgian heads of state. At that opening, the Irish President, Mary McAleese, said: The men of the 36th Ulster Division and the 16th Irish Division died here. They came from every corner of Ireland. Among them were Protestants, Catholics, Unionists and Nationalists, their differences transcended by a common commitment not to flag but to freedom. 4

http://www.schoolforpeace.com/content/glen-barrs-story/63 [accessed 26 August 2014]. Cited in, Richard S. Grayson, ‘The Place of the First World War in Contemporary Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 25, 3 (2010), 325-345 (342].

5

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FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF MESSINES Today we seek to put their memory at the service of another common cause … Meanwhile, the Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, described it as ‘a symbolic moment of reconciliation’, while the BBC coverage set out what would become a familiar narrative: In the battle for the Messines Ridge, Irish Catholics and Protestants from all over Ireland fought side by side against the common German enemy. The clash, in June 1917, was the only time during the war when largely Protestant soldiers from the [3]6th [sic] Ulster Division fought alongside Catholics from the 16th Irish Division, which was drawn from the south.6 The BBC was incorrect to state that Messines was the ‘only time’ the two divisions fought side-by-side during the war. As Keith Jeffery points out, they would do so again at Langemarck;7 a failed operation. However, the BBC’s error points to an idea that was already entering public consciousness and after the Tower’s opening would continue to do so. Following its opening, the Tower has been seen both as a symbol of changes which have already taken place, while also being a site which can be used as part of processes of future reconciliation. There have been two particular ways in which that has happened. In the first place is the International School for Peace Studies on the edge of Messines village which ‘uses the events of The Great War … to engage participants in learning about their shared history, cultural heritage, peace and reconciliation, and the futility of war’.8 Some of its work is focused on groups of young people through its Schools Links Project9 and it also hosts a wide range of community groups. Second, is the Fellowship of Messines Association which aims to reconcile former paramilitaries from republican and loyalist traditions. Formed in 2002, the Association works on an ongoing basis, principally through discussion events. Its work has not been entirely without some loyalist hostility to the allIreland nature of some commemoration of Messines as a quotation from a community organiser in a 2007 report suggests:

6 7 8 9

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/212208.stm [accessed 26 August 2014]. Jeffery, p. 139. http://www.schoolforpeace.com/content/project-summary/33 [accessed 26 August 2014]. http://www.schoolforpeace.com/content/schools-links/56 [accessed 26 August 2014].

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 I have been going back and forward to Messines some six or seven years now. I was one of the original guinea pigs among the excombatants, those who would have faced each other in the conflict here in Northern Ireland… I had assumed that the ‘cross-community’ message was now well and truly accepted. And then just last week I got a shock. I was organising a group of Loyalists to go to Messines, and some of them said, ‘We’ll not be going, because we hear there’s Republicans going too And I said, ‘Why not?’ ‘We’re not walking on that sacred ground with Republicans, not a chance'. ‘But people from both communities, and both parts of Ireland died there; Irish Nationalists from the Irish Volunteers joined the British Army and died over there’. ‘We don’t care, we’re not walking on sacred ground with them’.10 However, such a view appears to be a minority one and both the Fellowship of Messines Association and the International Peace School perform incredibly valuable work. There has been a tendency across the island of Ireland for history to be part of an ‘us versus them’ narrative, where stories of past heroism are used to preserve existing divides. Messines, in contrast, is an example of history being used to reconcile in a way that the vast majority of people would welcome. It rests on one basic historical truth: that on 7 June 1917, two divisions which had been raised for very different purposes on different sides of the Home Rule debate, fought alongside each other. It also draws on the fact that there was contact between the two divisions, most notably in the case of the death of Major William ‘Willie’ Redmond, as discussed below. Nothing that follows here is a challenge to any of this reconciliation work which is, after all, based on historical facts. However, two questions are asked. The first is to what extent those who fought at Messines in the 16th and 36th had an Irish connection? There is no doubt that the 16th and 36th divisions, as the two volunteer divisions raised in Ireland which fought on the Western Front, represented Ireland more than any other division there. However, there is a question as to who was actually serving in the divisions by that stage of the war. Second, does the popular narrative of the two divisions at Messines, focused as it is on their side-by-side service, tell us all that can be told of the symbolism of that battle? In other words, is there a still forgotten dimension to a story which is widely believed now to be wellremembered? It is remarkable that Ireland’s story of Messines has not been subjected to much forensic analysis, despite its importance to Ireland’s new memory of the war. 10

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Cited in, Michael Hall, A Shared Sacrifice for Peace (Belfast: Island Publications, 2007), p. 26.

FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF MESSINES Historians tend to be critical when it comes to contemporary uses of history, yet there has only been one serious attempt to interrogate the new story of Messines.11 In that, Richard Doherty asked, ‘Did the men of the two Irish divisions fight “shoulder to shoulder” in common cause voluntarily? Or is this a case of the organizers [of the Peace Tower] trying to make past events fit a template that suits their modern, laudable, purpose?’12 In answer to his questions, Doherty points out that the men from the 16th and 36th did not share trenches as they were fighting in separate (though adjoining) parts of the front. He also shows that there were Protestants serving in the 16th. Of course, some of those could have been nationalists, but Doherty offers evidence to suggest that some were probably (though not certainly) signatories of the Ulster Covenant against Home Rule in 1912.13 Meanwhile, Doherty rightly argues that there is little evidence of men in either division being aware of which units they were fighting alongside. Despite these problems, Doherty concludes that ‘while the organizers may have tried to make the events of the First World War fit a modern-day template, they have done so with admirable rationale and their efforts deserve to meet with success’.14 Few will depart from that view, but there is more that can be said about who fought at Messines and the significance of that. The structure of the 16th and 36th divisions at Messines The popular image of the 16th and 36th divisions is closely tied to paramilitary antecedents. The 16th is seen as having contained large numbers former members of the Irish National Volunteers, who had joined at the behest of John Redmond, the leader of Irish nationalism, believing that fighting for the British in their time of need would advance the cause of Home Rule. The 36th Division is even more closely associated with the Ulster Volunteer Force, since UVF members enlisted en masse and its battalions were based on the UVF’s geographic formations. However, the 16th and 36th divisions at Messines were not the same divisions which had left Ireland. Far from all their members could even remotely be viewed in any political context for two reasons. First, the divisions’ losses at the Somme meant that they were supplemented by fresh recruits. In many cases these were from Ireland, and included men who had enlisted in 1914-15 but been placed in reserve battalions. However, as we shall see later, many were transferred from non-Irish units and would not have joined those units on the basis of the political convictions attributed to members of the 16th and 36th. Second, the original structure of the 16th Division was transformed 11

Richard Doherty, ‘Some Thoughts on the Island of Ireland Peace Park’ in Alan F. Parkinson and Eamon Phoenix eds., Conflicts in the North of Ireland: 1900-2000 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010), pp. 5669. 12 Ibid., p. 57. 13 Ibid., pp. 59-62 14 Ibid., pp. 66-69.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 through reorganisations. By June 1917, two of its battalions had been disbanded, with a further two merged, and three regular battalions of Irish regiments joining in their place.15 This change in the structure of the 16th Division meant that although the two divisions lined up alongside each other at Messines in June 1917, former members of the UVF and INV were not necessarily close together (see Figure 1). As the battalions took their positions close to the village of Wytschaete, the 36th Division was to the right of the 16th. On the 36th’s left flank (adjoining the 16th) were the battalions of the 109th Brigade. These were three battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers16 plus the 14th Royal Irish Rifles.17 Most Belfast volunteers were in the 107th Brigade, to the right of the 36th Division and not adjoining the 16th Division. Instead, 107th brigade adjoined the 25th Division, which consisted largely of battalions associated with the north of England. Figure 1: the battle order of the 16th and 36th Divisions at Messines, 7th June 191718

19

TH

7th Leinsters 6th RIRegt

2nd RIRegt

1st Munsters

8th Inniskillings

6th Connaughts

48th Brigade (in reserve) 8th Dublins 9th Dublins 2nd Dublins

11th Inniskillings

11th RIRifles

14th RIRifles

108th Brigade

109th Brigade

10th Inniskillings

9th RIRifles 8th RIRifles

9th Inniskillings

12th RI Rifles

107th Brigade

15th RIRifles 10th RIRifles

108th Brigade (in reserve) 9th RIrishFus & 13th RIRifles

DIVISION

7/8th RIrishFus

TH

7th Inniskillings

36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION 109th Brigade 107th Brigade

25

(WESTERN) DIVISION

16TH (IRISH) DIVISION 49th Brigade 47th Brigade

7th RIRifles

Also in reserve: 33rd Infantry Brigade, 11th (Northern) Division

Who Died? As regards the 16th Division, their brigade which adjoined the Ulster Division was the 47th. This brigade was probably the most overtly political as it had been almost 15

The 8th and 9th Royal Munster Fusiliers were disbanded, with the 7th and 8th Royal Irish Fusiliers merged as the 7/8th battalion. In their place came the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers, the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment. These changes began even before the Somme, with the 1st Munsters joining and the 9th Munsters being disbanded in May 1916. 16 The 9th, 10th and 11th originally recruited from the Ulster Volunteer Force in counties Tyrone, Londonderry, Donegal and Fermanagh. 17 Formed from the Young Citizens’ Volunteers, with a large Belfast contingent. 18 The National Archives: WO 158/416, 16th Division, Narrative of Operations from 3.10am 7 June to 4pm 9 June 1917; WO 95/2491, Narrative of Part Taken by 36th (Ulster) Division in the Operations against the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge 7 June 1917.

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FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF MESSINES completely cleared early in the war to allow for an influx of Redmondite volunteers.19 It included Belfast nationalists in the 6th 'Connaught Rangers and 7th Leinsters, plus other nationalists in the 6th Royal Irish Regiment, alongside the regular battalion, the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers. In the initial attack, the soldiers from the two divisions who were closest to each other were the 6th Royal Irish Regiment on the far right on the 16th Division’s front, and the 11th Inniskillings on the far left of the 36th Division’s. Later in the battle, as mopping–up took place, other units of the two divisions were alongside each other (though note that alongside means adjoining not inter-mingled). However, just as the 107th Brigade was alongside English units, so too was the 16th Division’s 49th Brigade next to the 19th (Western) Division, consisting mainly of units from the west country and west midlands, but also some Welsh and north of England battalions. in the first wave, in the most bitter fighting, more battalions of each division would have had no contact with the other division than battalions which did have contact. Only three of the eight 16th Division battalions in action at Messines were directly alongside the Ulster Division at the outset, while the reverse applied to three of the Ulster Division’s ten battalions. For the vast majority, their main contact would either have been within their own division, or with English/Welsh battalions. Who fought in the 16th and 36th divisions at Messines? Having set out the general nature of the battalions, it is necessary to look at their composition in more detail. In the one previous attempt to do this, Doherty focused on religious denomination and has looked in some detail at the 7th and 8th battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,20 using information from Soldiers Died in the Great War (SDGW).21 Certainly the question of denomination is an interesting one, but it is not the only way of telling how far the battalions in the two divisions at Messines represented the popular notion of their composition. It is also possible to consider geographic origin, and to place that in the context of changes since the divisions first went to the front. Meanwhile, the 7th and 8th Inniskillings were only two of the twelve infantry battalions in the 16th, and of course can shed no light on the composition of the 36th. This author has developed a ‘military history from the street’ approach for examining, as far as is possible, all those from a particular area who served.22 Since that focuses on geographic areas rather than on specific army units it is not quite applicable here. 19

Terence Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Divisio (Dublin: Irish Academy Press, 1992), p. 50. 20 Doherty, pp. 61-2. 21 Soldiers Died in the Great War (London: HMSO, 1920), now available on CD-Rom published by the Naval and Military Press. 22 For a full explanation of the methodology see Richard S. Grayson, ‘Military history from the street: new methods for researching First World War service in the British military’, War in History, forthcoming, November 2014.

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 However, some of the sources, methods and principles can be applied to a study of the 16th and 36th divisions at Messines. The fundamental basis of ‘military history from the street’ is that for a soldier to be ‘from’ an area there should be some evidence of an address for the soldier themselves. In the absence of that, next of kin information can be used. The problem with adopting such an approach for a study of a unit is that while contemporary addresses are generally found in the WO 363/364 service/pensions23 records, little more than one-third of the two collections (about 36 percent) survived the bombing of the Arnside Street repository in 1940. The chances of finding a record for a dead soldier are further reduced because such soldiers’ files are only found in the WO 363 service records, and only around onequarter of those survived.24 Consequently, we will never have a complete picture of those who served in the First World War. Furthermore, even those records which survived are not searchable by battalion, and not very reliably even by regiment.25 In the absence of nominal rolls for each battalion26 it is not practical to find all those who served in a specific division at a specific time without a manual search of around 2 million records. Historians do not have decades of research time to put in to the production of one article. However, we do have a clear idea of who died in the 16th and 36th divisions at Messines and the dead can be used as sample.27 They are found initially from two sources: SDGW and the online database of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC). 28 These can be searched by both date and battalion. Commissioned officers were not included in the sample used here partly because in Officers Died in the Great War a battalion is not usually included, but most importantly because officers would commonly not be from a local recruiting area even on the initial formation of a battalion. So, in assessing whether or not a unit was locally 23

Held by the National Archives where they are free to use, but also online as part of a subscription with www.ancestry.co.uk. 24 Grayson, ‘Military history from the street’. 25 In the online transcriptions, regiments are often mis-spelled or completely mistranscribed (for example, ‘Leicester’ for ‘Leinster’. Moreover, there is commonly only one regiment shown in the transcription, even if the soldier served in more than one. Usually, this will be the final regiment served in, but sometimes it will simply be the one which is easiest to read. 26 Only one Irish battalion has a surviving nominal roll: the 14th Royal Irish Rifles, and that does not contain dates of service so it is not possible to be clear who on the roll served at Messines. 27 It should be noted that information (especially in SDGW) is usually more specific for members of infantry battalions than for other units such as the Royal Field Artillery and Army Service Corps. Casualties in such units were likely to be low, especially in a successful operation such as Messines. It was possible to locate some Royal Engineers and members of the Royal Field Artillery, none who served in the 16th or 36th divisions’ ASC units (or smaller formations such as the Army Veterinary Corps) were located as killed at Messines. It is possible that there were none. 28 http://www.cwgc.org/find-war-dead.aspx [accessed 1 September 2014].

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FORGOTTEN ASPECTS OF MESSINES linked, the geographic origins presence of commissioned officers is less relevant than that of other ranks. Therefore, searches were made for other ranks killed in the two divisions on 7 June 1917 and those who died in the week after that (up to and including 14 June, covering the formal dates of the battle). By examining the SDGW and CWGC records, and supplementing the information in them with material from service records29 and medal index cards,30 we can obtain a picture of the origins of those who were killed at Messines, if not others who served. That leads to data being found on 386 individuals from the two divisions who were killed or died of wounds between 7 and 14 June 1917, although 314 of these were on 7 June as the two divisions advanced. Of these, there is some kind of geographic information on all but one soldier. Table 1 below sets out information on place of birth. The most striking point is the proximity of figures for both divisions of Irish and English born recruits. In both cases, around 60 percent of those who died were Irish-born, while around 30 percent were born in England. If we look in further detail at the Ulster Division, of the 130 born in Ireland, 116 (89 percent of the Irish-born and 54 percent of the division) were born in Ulster, with the remaining fourteen spread through the three other Irish provinces though most (nine) born in Leinster. This suggests that by the time of Messines, little more than half of the Ulster Division’s dead came from its recruiting area, while less then two-thirds of the Irish Division originated from its all-Ireland area. It is worth noting that the fifteen from the 36th Division for whom there is no information on place of birth is much higher than the four from the 16th Division. If these were all born in Ireland than it would mean that the Irish-born figure for the 36th is as high as 68 percent. However, this seems unlikely. There is information on place of enlistment for fourteen of the men which places thirteen in England and only one in Ireland (Dublin). Place of residence was found for three, all in England, and the next of kin of a further six were also all in England. Exploring the place of birth of the 16th Division’s Irish-born men reveals less of a focus on one province than for the 36th, which is what one would expect since the Division recruited from nationalists across Ireland. The figures are: Leinster 37, Ulster 31, Munster 23 and Connaught 9 (the percentage being the same in each case as there are a total of 100).

29 30

WO 363 and 364 at the National Archives and on www.ancesttry.co.uk. WO 372 at the National Archives and on www.ancesttry.co.uk.

www.bjmh.org.uk

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British Journal for Military History, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014 Table 1: Country of Birth, 16th & 36th divisions other ranks fatalities 7-14 June 1917 th

16 Division (Total: 172) 36th Division (Total: 214)

Ireland 100 (58%) 130 (61%)

England 57 (33%) 55 (26%)

Scotland 5 (3%) 10 (5%)

Source: SDGW, WO 363, CWGC. * 1 Australia, 3 Channel Islands, 1 Malta

Wales 1 (