OCTOBER 2013

Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes Benchmarking arbitration and mediation regimes for commercial disputes related to foreign direct investment SOPHIE POUGET

A product of the FDI Regulations database Global Indicators and Analysis Department Financial and Private Sector Development The World Bank Group

Overview and main results An effective commercial arbitration regime matters for foreign investors. Commercial contracts are increasingly complex and often require reliable, flexible dispute resolution mechanisms. Commercial arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms give the parties the autonomy they need to create systems tailored to their disputes. In addition, foreign investors view arbitration as a way to mitigate risks by providing legal certainty on enforcement rights, due process, and access to justice. The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes indicators assess the legal and institutional framework for commercial arbitration, mediation and conciliation regimes in 100 economies. They assess the ease of initiating, conducting, and resolving commercial disputes, and the existence of judicial assistance for recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards. Results include:

s All surveyed economies recognize arbitration as a tool for resolving commercial disputes. s Only nine economies have not acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. s High Income OECD and Eastern Europe and Central Asia are the regions that reformed their laws on alternative dispute resolution the most between 2011 and 2012. s Only seven economies do not have a consolidated law on commercial arbitration and Iraq is the sole economy with legislative provisions only on procedural aspects of commercial arbitration.

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s Jordan, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea only have mediation institutions, while Angola and Brunei Darussalam do not have any private institutions dedicated to alternative dispute resolution. s Thirty-nine economies host private institutions which offer fast-track arbitration services, i.e., time-bound arbitration for faster and less expensive resolution of the dispute, and 17 host institutions which offer online arbitration services, allowing online arbitration proceedings to save time and expense. s Globally, arbitration proceedings take 326 days on average, while recognition and enforcement proceedings of foreign arbitral awards take 557 days on average. The fastest economies are Kosovo and the Kyrgyz Republic for arbitration proceedings, and Singapore and the Slovak Republic for recognition/enforcement proceedings. The Arbitration and Mediating Disputes indicators are significantly correlated with perception data on the importance of alternative dispute resolution, as well as other measures such as total foreign direct investment inflows and inflows per capita, the Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts data, the World Bank Group’s Governance Indicators, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Indicators, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s World Investment and Political Risk data. The paper concludes by identifying several opportunities for improvement, such as greater flexibility for domestic arbitration regimes, faster arbitration proceedings, and better domestic court capabilities.

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Acknowledgments Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes (AMD) is part of the FDI Regulations database of the Global Indicators and Analysis Department (GIA) of the World Bank Group (WBG). The lead author, Sophie Pouget, is a Private Sector Development Specialist working in GIA. The author is grateful for valuable peer review comments received from Thomas J. Mahaffey and Hoda Atia Moustafa in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), World Bank Group (WBG); Fady Zeidan and Patricia O. Sulser in the Legal Department of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), WBG; Pierre Guislain, Christine Qiang and colleagues in the Investment Climate Department of the IFC, WBG; Heike Gramckow in the Legal Department of the World Bank; and Meg Kinnear, Secretary-General of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), WBG. Additional valuable comments were received on earlier drafts of the paper from Carolin Geginat, Hulya Hulku, Melissa Johns, Augusto LopezClaros, Tanya Primiani and Federica Saliola from GIA. The author is also grateful for contributions to the analysis made by Mohammad Amin, John Anderson, Christian de la Medina de Soto and Martin Schmidt from GIA, and by former colleague Marc Reifsnyder de Chassey. Two groups of people provided pro-bono contributions without which this report and the AMD indicators could not have been developed. The first is the group of lawyers, law professors, representatives of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) institutions and government regulators in each of the 100 economies covered by the report which responded to the AMD questionnaire. Their input on ADR in their economy was the fundamental source of data for the analysis. Grateful acknowledgement of these contributors is made in the Contributors section at the end of this report. Additional details about the contributors across all topics of the FDI Regulation database are provided at http://iab.worldbank.org/ Local-Partners/2012. Particular acknowledgement is made of the contribution of John W. Ffooks & Co, which responded to surveys in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The second is the expert consultative group formed to provide technical input to the development of the AMD topic. This group of global experts in alternative dispute resolution provided input on the focus of the AMD questionnaire and on the methodology to develop the AMD indicators. Members of the expert consultative group include: Frédéric Bachand, Professor, McGill University, Canada Mohamed Badissy, Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Department of Commerce, USA Markham Ball, Professor, Temple University Law School, USA Yas Banifatemi, Partner, Shearman & Sterling LLP, France Chiann Bao, Secretary-General, Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, Hong Kong SAR, China João Bosco Lee, Partner, Lee Taube Gabardo, Brazil Karel Daele, Partner, Mishcon de Reya, United Kingdom Jason Fry, Partner, Clifford Chance, France Emmanuel Jolivet, General Counsel, ICC, France Anna Joubin-Bret, Partner, Joubin-Bret Law Firm, France Salem Nassar, Professor, São Paulo Law School, Brazil Mohamed Abdel Raouf, Director, Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, Egypt Eduardo Silva Romero, Partner, Dechert LLP, France Thomas So, Partner, Mayer Brown JSM, Hong Kong SAR, China Hannah Tümpel, Manager, ICC Dispute Resolution Services, France Don Wallace, Professor Emeritus and Chairman of the International Law Institute, Georgetown Law, USA Jason Yackee, Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School, USA Katia Yannaca-Small, Counsel, Shearman & Sterling LLP, USA

The content of this report was previously published as: Pouget, Sophie. 2013. “Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes: Benchmarking Arbitration and Mediation Regimes for Commercial Disputes Related to Foreign Direct Investment.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 6632.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

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1. Introduction

FIGURE 1: Perception of the legal ADR framework as an obstacle to FDI, by region 3.0 2.7

In Indonesia, it takes more than two years to enforce a foreign arbitral award on average. The proceedings will be held before the Central Jakarta District Court, which is not a specialized court. In addition, the foreign investor must comply with several obligations and provide a substantial number of original documents, specifically, a letter from his diplomatic representation stating that his country has a bilateral relationship with Indonesia and is bound by a convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In contrast, in the neighboring Philippines, the process would take only nine months. The time frame of the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court is strictly defined and the documentation requested is less burdensome, as the investor must provide only a copy of the arbitration agreement and the appointment of the arbitral tribunal, along with a certified translation, if necessary. The difference between the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Indonesia and the Philippines is critical for a foreign investor who is looking for economies which can offer business opportunities, but also legal certainty and time efficiency, in case of the need to enforce an arbitral award. It is also critical because, more generally, foreign investors often take into consideration whether the economy they choose to invest in is supportive of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). ADR consists of specific procedures for settling disputes outside of court litigation. It includes commercial arbitration, mediation and conciliation.1 The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes (AMD) study has collected data and, to a limited extent, views, of lawyers, law professors, representatives of ADR institutions and government regulators in each of the 100 surveyed economies. It has been able to identify the regions where the legal framework on ADR is perceived as a moderate to severe obstacle to foreign direct investment (FDI). Figure 1 shows that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SAR), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) are the regions in which the legal framework on ADR is perceived as a moderate to minor obstacle to FDI. In comparison, this perception decreases in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and is very low in high-income OECD economies (OECD). The AMD indicators measure ADR regimes relevant for FDI across 100 economies across seven regions, providing comparable and actionable information about this regulatory space (Annex 1). They serve as a critical tool in order to track the evolution of ADR regimes worldwide and capture the new reforms and best practices. They measure the ease with which foreign investors can submit a

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2.5

2.3 1.9

2.0 1.5

2.8

2.4

2.0

1.3

1.0 0.5 0.0

OECD

LAC

EAP

ECA

SAR

SSA

MENA

Note: The AMD Perception score measures the average perception of contributors, based on a scale from 1 to 5, of the extent to which their legal framework on ADR is an obstacle to FDI. The highest scores indicate the regions where the obstacle is perceived as bigger. Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

dispute arising out of the commercial relationship they have with a local party and how easy it is for the appointed arbitral tribunal to conduct the proceedings. They also look at whether foreign investors can enforce a foreign arbitral award with the support of domestic courts.

2. Context and importance of an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution system for foreign investors ADR provides tailored dispute resolution mechanisms that are particularly useful tools for complex commercial transactions, such as foreign direct investments. Commercial arbitration enables the parties to create systems tailored to their dispute and to guarantee the necessary confidentiality to protect their commercial secrets and their reputation. It also allows them to select arbitrators who are experienced professionals with a particular expertise relevant to the dispute. Hence, ADR is now widely recognized as the preferred dispute resolution mechanism for many investors and entrepreneurs (McLaughlin 1979). Even if no systematic evidence has been found regarding the impact of ADR on FDI (Governance and Social Development Resource Centre 2013), authors recognize that economies should improve their ADR regimes and allow for flexible and faster dispute settlement in order to attract FDI. Studies find that more than two-thirds of multinational corporations prefer commercial arbitration over traditional litigation, either alone or in combination with other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

to resolve cross-border disputes (PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University 2006). Commercial arbitration is considered to provide a neutral forum for the settlement of disputes related to FDI, which can often be sensitive and, hence, limits the risks associated with FDI (Schwartz 2009). Even if domestic courts could be considered as treating foreign companies fairly, domestic firms often have an advantage over foreign investors, as they are more familiar with local court procedures and can use their own lawyers and language (PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University 2006). Moreover, a robust ADR framework, including laws and private institutions that provide ADR services, contributes indirectly to the rule of law. Because ADR is particularly attractive for foreign investors, it is usually an incentive for greater accessibility to the legal system, online and in English, thus attracting the international business community. It also contributes to the training of judges and lawyers, as many of them serve as arbitrators and mediators and their obligations often include obtaining a certification and placing emphasis on ethics, impartiality, and independence. Arbitration is becoming recognized as a “growth industry” (Zaiwalla 2013) and benefits the reputation of an economy in the international arena. For instance, Singapore is now a recognized hub for arbitration, and is often chosen by foreign investors as a place where they can have their disputes settled. Two factors explain this achievement: Singapore has consistently amended its legislation on international arbitration and is now able to offer dynamic and reliable arbitration services (Box 1). Hence, policy reforms that remove barriers for investors to settle their disputes are crucial. For instance, practitioners such as the Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) Court of Arbitration recognize the need to have a faster way to settle disputes and to enforce arbitral awards to attract FDI (Bangkok Post 2012). Some stated that “if you are to bring in more FDI you need fast-track arbitration,” that is, time-bound arbitration where arbitrators have to observe specific time limits (Zaiwalla 2013). Others have also indicated the need to guarantee that foreign investors can freely appoint their lawyers. The Chair of the Commission on arbitration for the ICC in Thailand suggested that “granting short-term work permits or business visas for foreign lawyers” could be an option (Bangkok Post 2012). There is, thus, a need to assess ADR and to provide comprehensive and substantive information on why and how ADR regimes can be reformed. In an interdependent and interconnected world, where FDI inflows are vital to economic growth, economies need to have an attractive investment climate. This means that economies should be able to answer the growing and more complex needs of the business community. This supposes, in particular, that economies should offer up-to-date, stable and predictable ADR regimes in order to better attract FDI. This is precisely what

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

BOX 1: Singapore, a hub for arbitration In Singapore, international arbitration is regulated by the International Arbitration Act of 1994, which is frequently amended (see the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2012, No. 12 of 2012) in order to become more user-friendly and for Singapore to gain prominence as a seat for international arbitration (Wallace and Rosen 2012). Among others, the legal reforms include a wider definition of an arbitration agreement, clarify the courts’ power to award simple or compound interests, and provide more support for emergency arbitrators and interim orders (Choo 2012). A number of these amendments were aimed at aligning the legislation with UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. In the last ten years, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre has become a hub for arbitration. In 2010 and 2011, according to a survey from the ICC, Singapore has ranked 5th in the list of preferred seats of arbitration out of 98 cities, following Paris, London, Geneva and Zurich (ICC, 2012). Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

the AMD indicators attempt to do by identifying and measuring good practices, and developing a preliminary quantitative analysis of the data, showing that the AMD indicators are significantly correlated with several outcomes of specific interest for FDI.

3. Design of the Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes indicators The AMD research includes three sets of indicators, as explained below, providing comprehensive information and analysis on ADR in the surveyed economies. These indicators look exclusively at commercial arbitration—originating from the agreement of the parties2— and do not cover investment arbitration.3 They look at all types of commercial arbitration involving all kinds of parties, whether private, state, or state entities involved in commercial relationships with private parties. The AMD research also examines a variety of arbitration cases, whether administered by private arbitration institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) or ad hoc arbitrations.4 The first set of indicators, AMD 1, measures the strength of ADR laws and institutions, covering and including: 1. The domestic laws and regulations on ADR (Box 2), their accessibility, and whether or not they are considered to follow the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Laws on International Commercial Arbitration and on International Commercial Conciliation5 that states have the possibility to incorporate in their domestic legislation; it also covers the New York Convention on the

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Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention).

The third set of indicators, AMD 3, deals with judicial assistance in recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards:

2. Data on ADR private institutions, whether they exist in the surveyed economies and follow specific rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976, revised in 2010.

1. All steps of the recognition and enforcement process are measured, whether or not there are specialized courts and to what extent these courts review the arbitral award.

3. Reporting on the specific ADR services available, such as fast-track or online arbitration.

2. Through a standard case study (Box 3), the length of the usual recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign arbitral awards is established.

BOX 2: Key laws measured by the AMD indicators

s National ADR laws (including civil code provisions) on commercial arbitration, mediation and conciliation

s National civil codes, civil procedure codes/rules, regulations

It is important to note that the data were gathered and reviewed from late 2011 through mid-2012. Subsequent reforms to alternative dispute resolution regimes are not captured by the AMD indicators.

s Ratification of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

The second set of indicators, AMD 2, looks at the ease of process, before and after initiating arbitration proceedings: 1. Before initiating arbitration proceedings, it measures whether or not an arbitration agreement can be easily concluded, and whether or not the economy surveyed allows for a distinction between domestic and international arbitration; 2. It also looks at possible restrictions that parties may face when appointing their arbitrators and counsels, and when conducting the arbitral process, for instance, freedom to choose the language of the proceedings or the arbitrating institution. In addition, it measures the ease of process once arbitration proceedings are initiated, and through a standard case study (Box 3), the usual length of arbitration proceedings; 3. It captures judicial assistance during arbitration proceedings: whether domestic courts refer parties to arbitration when they have a valid arbitration agreement, and whether there are other measures they could offer in support of arbitration proceedings.

BOX 3: The AMD case studies on the length of proceedings The AMD indicators rely on two case studies:

s Case study on the length of arbitration proceedings: contributors are asked to give an estimate where a hypothetical party is in breach of a supply agreement and the other party seeks to recover US$100,000 through arbitration, without asking for assistance from the domestic courts.

s Case study on the length of judicial proceedings related to foreign arbitral awards: contributors are asked to give an estimate of a hypothetical foreign arbitral award rendered in the amount of US$100,000, to be recognized and enforced in the surveyed economy. Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

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4. AMD Results AMD results on the strength of ADR laws and institutions6 Arbitration laws, statutes or provisions Because of its numerous advantages, commercial arbitration is important to the investment climate of an economy. For this reason, it should be more widely recognized and made comprehensively accessible, in order to facilitate access to information for foreign investors. Thus, it is critical to make all the substantial and procedural provisions regulating commercial arbitration incorporated available in one single source of information, either a law incorporated in a code or a specific statute. All the economies surveyed recognize arbitration is, in one way or another, a mechanism for dispute resolution. The AMD indicators show that 93 percent of the economies surveyed have a specific commercial arbitration statute or a chapter in a civil code setting out provisions governing arbitration in their economy. The remaining seven economies have some provisions scattered throughout civil codes or other laws, but which do not provide sufficient regulation of arbitration. These economies are: Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Montenegro. Iraq is the economy which has the most limited framework for commercial arbitration, in that it has no consolidated law or provisions.

Online access of arbitration laws To facilitate access to information, arbitration laws should be available online. As technology continues to develop, ease and speed of access to information is becoming paramount for foreign investors and the investment climate of these economies in general. About 93 percent of the economies surveyed were able to provide websites where these laws could be found. However,

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

many of these sites were not official government sources, but rather websites of private law firms. Among the economies where arbitration laws are not accessible (Box 4), five are located in SubSaharan Africa (SSA): Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and Sierra Leone. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), only Cyprus and Yemen do not have arbitration laws accessible online.

BOX 4: Percentage of countries where ADR laws are not accessible online, by region

Sub Saharan Africa Eastern Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa OECD East Asia and the Pacific South Asia Latin America and the Caribbean

71.5% 14.25% 14.25% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

Arbitration laws following the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration The fact that the law on commercial arbitration follows the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is a good indication of the degree of an economy’s support for arbitration. The UNCITRAL Model Law aims to harmonize the discrepancies that can exist in domestic laws, regarding various aspects of the arbitration process, notably how arbitrators are selected and appointed, or how the arbitral tribunal can conduct arbitral proceedings. Economies that follow the UNCITRAL Model law reduce the uncertainties that the parties can face while choosing commercial arbitration instead of traditional litigation of their dispute. The main guiding principles on which the UNCITRAL Model Law is based are the following: party autonomy, freedom to agree on the conduct of arbitration proceedings, competence of arbitral tribunals to decide on their own jurisdiction, judicial support to arbitration coupled with restraint from undue interference. Seventeen economies which do not rely on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, according to our contributors, are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Iraq, Italy, Montenegro, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone and the United States. However, since some of these economies have sophisticated regimes and pro-arbitration domestic courts, such as France, they do not follow the UNCITRAL Model Law but are still based on the same guiding principles mentioned above.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Given the extent of cross-border transactions in today’s world, as well as the numerous locations for holding assets, recognition of a foreign arbitral award can be a very important stage in the arbitration process. In that respect, the AMD indicators look at the New York Convention, a powerful instrument for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.7 The New York Convention is critical to a good legal framework on commercial arbitration, as it requires national courts to recognize foreign arbitral awards, i.e., to grant them the same validity as a judgment. As a result, it also means that domestic courts must enforce foreign arbitral awards in the case where a debtor refuses to abide by its terms. Nine economies have still not acceded to the New York Convention.8 The latest surveyed economy to accede to the New York Convention was Rwanda in 2008; and the Democratic Republic of Congo is about to be the most recent party to the Convention.

Mediation and conciliation laws Mediation and conciliation services are not widely used. Indeed, 54 percent of the economies surveyed do not have a consolidated law encompassing substantially all aspects of commercial mediation or conciliation. Out of the 46 percent of economies that do have a consolidated law, only half are considered by our contributors to follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation. However, 64 percent of the economies surveyed do have laws that provide for court referral of cases to mediation or conciliation in commercial disputes where court proceedings have been initiated. Some of these laws can be restrictive and narrow down the type of cases that may be submitted to mediation or conciliation services under certain conditions. For example, in Colombia, conciliation is a prerequisite before litigation in commercial, family, and administrative law cases. During commercial trials, there is a special preliminary hearing for the purpose of conciliation, in which the judge acts as a conciliator. In addition, according to the 2010–2011 statistics provided by the Colombian Ministry of Justice Website, some 50 percent of the cases referred to conciliation are settled, highlighting the importance of such practices.

Arbitration and mediation institutions The vast majority of the surveyed economies have arbitration institutions. These arbitration institutions are crucial, as very often the parties decide that their arbitration case should be administered by an institution which will provide both the necessary support and control of the arbitral tribunal.

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Only five economies do not have arbitration institutions administering arbitration cases: Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Jordan, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea. However, four of these economies have mediation institutions. Only Angola and Brunei Darussalam have neither an arbitration nor a mediation institution. In 86 economies, these institutions operate under their own rules. Only a limited number of institutions—in Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Egypt, Malaysia, Mozambique, Singapore, Senegal, and Zambia—follow the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which make a comprehensive set of regulations related to arbitration proceedings available to parties who wish to use them.9 Arbitration institutions are encouraged to offer a roster of arbitrators or mediators, provided that the parties can remain free to choose arbitrators or mediators which are not on the roster. This is particularly useful for foreign investors, who are not familiar with the host economy, and who have to appoint an arbitrator from that economy, either because it is required by the law, or for practical reasons, such as the necessity to appoint an arbitrator familiar with some local industrial, technical, or environmental aspects of the dispute. Eighty-seven economies have ADR institutions which provide for a roster of arbitrators or mediators. However, 20 of these arbitration institutions have rosters where fewer than 10 percent of the arbitrators are women, and 20 arbitration institutions have rosters where fewer than 10 percent of the arbitrators are foreign nationals. Only a limited number of economies possess ADR institutions which offer attractive services for foreign investors, such as fasttrack or online arbitration. Indeed, 39 economies host an arbitration institution which offers fast-track arbitration services, enabling the parties to opt for time-bound arbitration proceedings—in practice, usually six months renewable once—which the arbitrators must duly respect. Only 17 economies have ADR institutions which offer online arbitration services, allowing the parties to carry out the arbitration proceedings online, including the initial filing of the request for arbitration, the appointment of the arbitrator(s), oral hearings if needed, and the rendering of the arbitral award. For example, some arbitration centers have created specific rules for fast-track arbitration, such as the Bangladesh International Arbitration Center, which finalized and adopted its Rules of Procedure in April 2012 (Annex 3). Last but not least, only four economies (Bangladesh, Burundi, Uganda, and Zambia) have arbitration institutions that do not have an official website.

AMD results on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings Entering into an arbitration agreement Before initiating arbitration proceedings, the parties must first consent, through an arbitration agreement, to submit their dispute to arbitration instead of taking it to domestic courts. This arbitration agreement, which serves as the basis of the parties’ consent to arbitration, must follow certain formal requirements. The parties can conclude the arbitration agreement in writing, by email or fax, by a reference in another document, an exchange of statements of claim and defense in the course of the proceedings, by oral agreement, or by their conduct. In this respect, some economies are more restrictive than others when it comes to particular methods of concluding an arbitration agreement (Figure 2). In only four economies are parties unable to conclude an arbitration agreement by email: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Haiti and Mali. In addition, only 18 economies allow parties to enter into an arbitration agreement by conduct (i.e., recognizing the arbitration through the behavior of the parties); in only nine economies can the parties conclude the agreement orally. Arbitration agreements must also deal with disputes which can be submitted to arbitration, that is, disputes considered arbitrable according to the domestic laws of the economy. The most frequent commercial disputes are generally considered arbitrable and only a few economies have specific restrictions. For instance, finance and banking activities are not arbitrable in only three economies; patent law or other intellectual property disputes are not considered arbitrable in six economies and intra-corporate disputes are not arbitrable in nine economies. However, disputes involving rights over immoveable property are not arbitrable in twenty economies (Annex 4).

FIGURE 2: Accepted methods of concluding an arbitration agreement, in %

By incorporation by reference

100%

By writing

100% 94%

By email or fax By an exchange of statements of claim and defense

90% 18%

By conduct 9%

By oral agreement 0

20

40

60

80

100

Percent

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

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THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

The ease of process before initiating arbitration proceedings In terms of commercial arbitration, economies can be categorized into two groups: a) those which recognize two types (domestic and international) and b) those with no distinction.

FIGURE 3: Percentage of economies which make a distinction between international and domestic arbitration, in %

The distinction between international and domestic arbitration is key, as it shows to what extent an economy is willing to offer foreign parties a regime which is flexible and answers their specific needs during the course of the arbitration proceedings. The AMD indicators show that 58 economies distinguish between domestic and international arbitration, in their laws or in case law (Figure 3).

Distinction by law 42%

55%

Distinction by case-law No distinction

For these economies, the AMD indicators compare the two regimes and show that laws on international arbitration offer more flexibility to the parties than laws on domestic arbitration (Figures 4 and 5). As shown in these figures, economies recognizing international arbitration have few restrictions on how international arbitration proceedings are conducted; for example, the nationality of the appointed arbitrators, the language of the proceedings, and the seat of the proceedings. However, economies, such as Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and Vietnam have restrictions regarding the language of domestic arbitration proceedings. Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka also place restrictions on the seat of domestic arbitration proceedings. Of these 58 economies, only 28 rely on an economic definition of international arbitration, according to which the arbitration is considered international if international trade interests are at stake (Figure 6). This broad definition allows the parties involved in a commercial relationship with an international component to benefit from the laws on international arbitration.

3%

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

Of these 58 economies, some specific criteria, such as whether the place of registration of a party is abroad or not, or whether substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is performed outside of the economy, could be enough to make the arbitration qualify as international. Hence, 52 economies recognize an arbitration dispute as international if one of the parties is registered in a foreign economy. However, only 14 economies consider a commercial arbitration to be international if one of the parties is a company with foreign ownership (Figure 6).

Length of arbitration proceedings While it is important for foreign investors to rely on a comprehensive legal framework on commercial arbitration allowing them to tailor their

FIGURE 4: Restrictions on the appointment of arbitrators and foreign counsels

FIGURE 5: Restrictions on the rules of procedure of the arbitration

100

100 International arbitration

Domestic arbitration

80

80

60

60

40

36%

40 17%

20 2%

7%

On the nationality of the arbitrators

14%

31%

28%

26%

0

Domestic arbitration

International arbitration

12%

20

4% 0% On the language spoken by the arbitrators

On the legal qualifications of the arbitrators

On the appointment of foreign counsels

Note: These restrictions have been measured across economies which distinguish between international and domestic arbitration and provide for two distinct legal regimes. Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

0

On the choice of an arbitration institution

17%

12%

12% 5%

16%

21%

5%

On the location On the languague of the arbitration of the arbitration hearings proceedings

On the seat On the number of of arbitration appointed arbitrators

Note: These restrictions have been measured across economies which distinguish between international and domestic arbitration and provide for two distinct legal regimes. Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

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AMD results on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

FIGURE 6: Factors by which arbitration is recognized as international, in %

Specialized judicial assistance Place of registration of a party outside the economy

Since commercial arbitration is based on consent, when an arbitral award is rendered, the parties usually voluntarily comply with the decision and no further action is necessary. However, if the debtor refuses to pay, the winning party may bring enforcement proceedings in the local courts.

86%

Seat of arbitration located outside the economy

74%

Substantial part of the contract performed outside the economy

74%

Subject-matter of the dispute connected to a place outside the economy

The AMD indicators look at foreign arbitral awards only, in order to measure whether economies comply with the New York Convention, as foreign investors rely on it often when they need to enforce an arbitral award. Foreign arbitral awards are those which are rendered in arbitration proceedings conducted outside of an economy and, when applicable, awards rendered within an economy which are not considered as domestic according to national laws.

71%

Agreement between the parties that the subject matter of the dispute relates to more than one economy

69%

Company headquarters located outside the economy

64%

Headquarters of the arbitration institution located outside the economy

36%

22%

Foreign ownership of a party 0

20

40

60

80

100

Note: These restrictions have been measured across economies which distinguish between international and domestic arbitration and provide for two distinct legal regimes. Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

disputes according to their needs, it is also important to assure them that arbitration proceedings will be conducted in a timely manner. In 2012, based on one of the case studies mentioned in Box 3, it takes an average of 326 days to conduct arbitration proceedings. Arbitration proceedings can also take longer, as in Brazil (560 days), India (569 days), Croatia (679 days), and Iraq (910 days). As shown in Box 5, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) is the region where arbitration proceedings are the fastest and SubSaharan Africa the region where they take the longest, although there is very limited data available for SSA.

BOX 5: Average length of arbitration proceedings by region Eastern Europe and Central Asia East Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean High-Income OECD Middle East and North Africa South Asia Sub Saharan Africa Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

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36 weeks 41 weeks 41 weeks 48 weeks 58 weeks 63 weeks 65 weeks

In a case where the debtor refuses to comply with the foreign arbitral award, the foreign investor must request judicial enforcement of the award. In such an event, economies which have courts with specific jurisdiction over the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are more familiar with arbitration and provide greater security to foreign investors. Only 23 economies have specialized courts with specific jurisdiction to recognize and enforce arbitral awards. In addition, 78 economies allow for an appeal. Some of these appeal courts are judicial, but they can also be administrative or constitutional courts (see Annex 5 for some examples).

Length of recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign arbitral awards As mentioned above, foreign investors take into consideration the length of the proceedings that they would potentially have to conduct in a particular economy. In 2012, based on one of the case studies mentioned in Box 3, it takes an average of 557 days or 80 weeks to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards in the surveyed economies. As shown in Box 6, recognition and enforcement proceedings are the fastest in the East Asia and the Pacific region, whereas they take longest in South Asia; once again, there is very limited data available for SAR. The length of recognition and enforcement proceedings is affected by different factors, such as the number of steps required to execute the foreign arbitral award in the economy. In 71 economies, parties are required to apply for recognition of a foreign arbitral award prior to its enforcement before the competent court. The recognition phase is the conversion of the arbitral award into a court judgment. However, some economies, such as Belarus, Georgia, and the Philippines allow for this phase to be conducted simultaneously with the enforcement phase.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

BOX 6: Average length of recognition/enforcement proceedings by region, in weeks East Asia and the Pacific

39 weeks

High-Income OECD

43 weeks

Sub-Saharan Africa

65 weeks

Middle East and North Africa

68 weeks

Eastern Europe and Central Asia

75 weeks

Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia

90 weeks 386 weeks

Finally, some legal provisions can facilitate recognition and enforcement proceedings. An example is the possibility of conducting ex parte proceedings: e.g., if the losing party refuses to attend the hearings, the domestic courts may still be able to make a decision. As shown in Figure 7, only 23 percent of economies do not provide for the possibility for a party to conduct ex parte proceedings.

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

5. Trends for ADR in 2011 and 2012 Contributing to the longer procedure are the many requirements imposed to prove the consent to arbitration and the validity of the arbitration proceedings. For instance, in Albania, the requesting party must provide the competent court with confirmation from the arbitral tribunal that the arbitral award is final, if necessary with a notarized translation (as mentioned by our contributors). In India, the entire contract would have to be produced and, if in a foreign language, translated, in the event that the arbitration agreement is a provision within the original contract between the parties. However, some requirements serve as a guarantee of greater legal certainty and are therefore necessary. The type of evidence usually required by courts, in support of a request to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award include the production by the requested party of a certified copy of the original foreign arbitral award (93 economies), and a certified copy of the arbitration agreement (94 economies). Only six economies: Burundi, Haiti, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Zambia do not require any of these.

FIGURE 7: Percentage of economies recognizing ex parte proceedings, in %

In 2011 and 2012, 59 percent of OECD economies and 43 percent of ECA economies have amended, adopted, or are about to adopt new laws/provisions on international commercial arbitration, mediation, or conciliation. On the other hand, only 11 percent of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and 12.5 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) economies have reformed their laws in that time period. Figure 8 shows, in dark blue, the 31 economies which have revised their ADR regime in 2011 or 2012.10 These economies are: Albania; Australia; Austria; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Colombia; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Czech Republic; France; Germany; Hong Kong SAR, China; Ireland; Kazakhstan; Mexico; Moldova; Nepal; the Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Russian Fed.; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Turkey; Ukraine; United States and Vietnam. Among them, three economies, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep. and Saudi Arabia, have adopted a pro-arbitration approach through new laws on commercial arbitration in 2012: 1. In Colombia, the new National and International Arbitration Statute (Law 1563/2012), enacted on July 12, 2012, appears to be based on the UNCITRAL Model law and governs both domestic and international arbitration.11 2. Saudi Arabia enacted a new law on arbitration (the 2012 Law) which came into force on July 8, 2012.

23%

Ex parte proceedings No ex parte proceedings

3. Finally, Congo, Dem. Rep., signed the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa in 2012 and joined the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA, Annex 2). As a result, all OHADA Uniform Acts are part of the Congolese legal framework, including the Uniform Act on Arbitration of 1999.

77%

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

As shown in Figure 9, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a significant increase in the number of arbitration, mediation, and conciliation institutions. SSA economies colored in dark blue have created new arbitration institutions in 2011 or 2012. These economies are: Cameroon, Congo, Dem. Rep., Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, and

11

FIGURE 8: Economies which have revised their ADR laws in 2011–2012

Economies which have revised their ADR legal framework in 2011 or 2012 IBRD40362 SEPTEMBER 2013 This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Other surveyed economies Economies not covered by AMD

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

FIGURE 9: Sub-Saharan African economies which have created ADR institutions in 2011–2012 IBRD40363 SEPTEMBER 2013 This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Economies which have created new ADR institutions in 2011 or 2012 Other surveyed economies Economies not covered by AMD

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

12

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

Rwanda. Gray is for SSA economies which have not created new arbitration institutions over the past two years.

1. AMD indicators on the strength of laws and institutions (AMD 1)

In 2011 and 2012, the following private ADR institutions were created or launched in these economies:

2. AMD indicators on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings (AMD 2)

1. Cameroon: the Permanent Centre for Arbitration and Mediation (Centre Permanent d’Arbitrage et de Médiation), launched in April 2012 by the African Centre for Law and Development; 2. Congo, Dem. Rep.: as a new member State of OHADA, Congo has now access to the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration of OHADA; 3. Kenya: the Nairobi Centre for Arbitration Act was approved by the President of Kenya in January 2013 and is expected to become the second largest arbitration institution in the East Africa Community, along with the Kigali International Arbitration Center; 4. Mauritius: the LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre, established in 2011 and fully operational since October 2012, with the support of the London Court of International Arbitration, the Mauritius International Arbitration Centre and the government of Mauritius; 5. Nigeria: the Lagos Court of Arbitration launched in November 2012, with the support of the Lagos State government; 6. Rwanda: the Kigali International Arbitration Centre, launched in May 2012, on the initiative of the Private Sector Federation in partnership with the government of Rwanda.

3. AMD indicators on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (AMD 3). In the following analysis, the AMD sub-indicators 1, 2 and 3 have been most of the time averaged across the surveyed economies to measure potential correlations of the overall quality of alternative dispute resolution regimes with other economic variables. These variables, considered as relevant for the investment climate, are the following: 1. AMD indicators on the perception of contributors of the quality of the legal framework on ADR of their economy (AMD Perception) 2. Total FDI inflows 3. FDI inflows per capita 4. Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts data 5. World Bank Group’s World Governance Indicators 6. World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Indicators 7. MIGA’s World Investment and Political Risk.

AMD correlations with AMD Perception indicators One of the first interesting correlations found was between the average of AMD 1, 2 and 3 and the AMD perception indicators (Figure 10).

6. Correlation analysis of AMD indicators The results presented thus far have been primarily descriptive in nature. This section presents preliminary quantitative analysis of the data, demonstrating that the AMD indicators at the economy level are significantly correlated with outcome indicators of interest. It should be stressed that these correlations do not imply causality, and more rigorous econometric analysis will be necessary to better understand the relation between the AMD data and these and other economic variables. Nonetheless, these correlations provide a useful starting point by showing that the indicators are significantly associated with measures of economic performance. The AMD data that was used for the quantitative analysis below relies on the results of three AMD sub-indicators, which are scored on a scale from 0 to 1, with higher values corresponding to better outcomes:

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

The AMD perception score indicates the extent to which contributors perceived that the quality of the legal framework on ADR in their economy could be an obstacle to foreign direct investment. Their perception of the legal framework on ADR is reported as: 1 = no obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle, 3 = moderate, 4 = heavy, 5 = severe. This outcome variable shows a strong negative correlation with the average of the three input variables. As shown in Figure 10, the perceived obstacle of the ADR regime decreases in economies with higher-quality arbitration frameworks and practices as measured by the AMD indicators. A strong negative correlation was also identified between AMD 1 and the AMD perception indicators.

AMD correlations with total FDI inflows and FDI inflows per capita This second set of correlations finds that economies that score better on the AMD indicators tend to receive more FDI inflows.

13

A strong and positive correlation was found between the average of AMD 1, 2 and 3 and actual FDI inflows (millions), as shown in Figure 11. Similar and somewhat stronger results are obtained when the average of the three input variables are correlated with a five-year average of FDI inflows per capita (Figure 12). These correlations clearly indicate that there is a relationship between ADR regimes and FDI. However, as noted above, the correlations do not imply causation. For example, the high correlation between AMD indicators and FDI inflows per capita may be partially capturing the effects of a higher stage of development (as reflected in a higher income per capita) on the overall quality of a country’s legal framework.

AFG

5

Strong positive correlations have also been identified between AMD 1 and these two output variables.

AMD correlations with Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts The AMD research shows that economies where the time to enforce a contract in court is shorter are economies where the time to enforce an arbitral award is also shorter (Figure 13).

FIGURE 11: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and total FDI inflows 250000

FIGURE 10: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and AMD Perception

More robust quantitative research will be needed to better understand the relationship between alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and global FDI flows.

MDA

PNG

IRQ

SLE

SAU ETH BIH BDI

2

GTMECU

BFA MOZ VNM ARM BGD INDPHL KAZ CIV RUSGEO JOR AGO THA TUR BOL COL MUS KGZ CRI AZE BRA TZA NPL EGYITA ZMBDOM BLR KEN TUN RWA ROM BGR GRC SENKos CMR SVK NGA CHL CZE SRB POL MARMYS MEXZAF PER MLIHND NIC GHA JPN VEN AUT AUS KOR ESP MKD HRV FRA BRN IRL CYP USA SGPLKA NZL UGA CAN NLD

1

TWN

.4

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CRI

ALB IDNTCD KHM UKR PAK MNE ARG

.6 .7 .8 Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

GBR DEU

RUS AUSFRA

CAN INDESP MEX IDN CHL NLD SAU TUR IRL POL AUT COL KAZ MYS NGA VNM ARG THA PER CYP UKR ZAF VEN KOR BLR NZL GHA SRB ROM DZA MAR DOM SVK CRI MOZ ZMB BGR TCD GRC CRI CIV AZE JOR PAK PHL BRN TUN BGD TZA ALB HND GEO NIC MDG KHM BOL UGA KGZ ECU MNE ARM BIH MKD CMR CZE KEN LKA HRV SEN MUS MDA HTI MLI RWA NPL AFG SLE BDI BFA PNGGTM EGY YEM JPN TWNETH AGO ITA

GBR HKG DEU

.9

IRQ

.4

Note: The Pearson correlation is very strong (-0.499) and significant at the 1% level.

.5

.6 .7 .8 Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

.9

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.202 and significant at the 5% level. This correlation becomes stronger after controlling for outlier economies after controlling for outlier (the United States). Source: UNCTADstat for FDI data.

10000

FIGURE 12: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and FDI inflows per capita over a five-year average HKG

FIGURE 13: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts

8000

BGD COL

HRV MNE

0

NLD CANAUT

ESP CHL FRA KAZ BGR USA CIV CYP NZL SVK POL CRI JOR RUS ROM ITA ALB MYS GEO MUS PER BLR BRA ARM SRB DOM MEX COL MKD GRC BIH ARG TUN KOR THA HND ZAF ZMB MDA NIC TCD VNM JPN EGY GHA KGZ MAR DZA BOL KHMTUR NGA MDG VEN IDN MOZ ECU CRI IND SEN LKA UGA TZA MLI PAK CZE PHL YEM CMR SLE HTI BFA RWA KEN PNGGTM BGD AFG ETH NPL BDITWNUKR AZE AGO

IRQ

.4

AUS

BRN

.5

.6 .7 .8 Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

GBR

DB Enforcement (# days) 100 200 300

2000

IRL

IND EGY MUS

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.225 and significant at the 5% level. The correlation exists, even if a little bit weaker, after controlling for outliers (Hong Kong SAR, China; and Singapore). Source: UNCTADstat for FDI data.

SAU

TUN PHL

BRA

JOR BIHALB HND ESP MEX CHL UKRCYP IDNHRV PER KHM CAN VNM BOL POL NGA ARM ZMB MYS ARG TWN GRC KORDOM MNE CZE SVK SRB USA VEN TUR ROM IRL NIC TZA ECU AUT BRN AZE RUS NLD JPN FRA GBR DEU HKG SGP

DEU

.9

ITA CRI

BLR ZAF

0

FDI Inflows per capita 4000 6000

SGP

SAU

14

HKG BRA SGP

0

AMD Perception 3

DZA

400

4

YEM MDG

Total FDI Inflows (million) 50000 100000 150000 200000

USA

0

500

1000 1500 AMD Enforcement (# days)

2000

2500

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at the 1% level. The correlation is strong also after controlling for outlier (Pakistan).

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

The World Bank’s Doing Business assesses the efficiency of the judicial system yearly, with the Enforcing Contract indicators.12 The indicators follow the evolution of a commercial sale dispute over the quality of goods and track the time, cost, and number of procedures involved from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit up until payment is received. This includes the time to file the lawsuit, to serve the case, to issue and enforce a judgment. The AMD indicators have collected data on the length of judicial proceedings related to the recognition and the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. This data has been collected on the basis of a case study mentioned in Box 3. A strong positive correlation has been evidenced, after controlling for outlier economies, between AMD data on the length of recognition and enforcement proceedings (measured in days) and Doing Business Enforcing Contracts data (measured in days).

AMD correlations with the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Indicators The AMD data correlated with the data provided by World Economic Forum’s yearly report on Global Competitiveness show that economies which are more competitive, and particularly economies which have good public and private institutions, also tend to have better ADR regimes. The Global Competitiveness report provides an assessment of the competiveness of 144 economies.13 In order to measure the drivers of these economies’ productivity and prosperity, the report relies on the Global Competiveness Index (GCI), which covers both macroeconomic and micro/business aspects of competiveness. The GCI includes economic indicators divided into several different

Positive correlations have been identified with the GCI (Figure 14) and, more specifically, with those variables captured under its “institutions” component (Figure 15). These correlations are strong and their level of significance is robust. In addition, the same positive correlations have also been identified with the following specific variables: judicial independence, efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes, and efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations.

AMD correlations with MIGA’s World Investment and Political Risk data The AMD quantitative analysis shows that, in the 36 countries surveyed by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in 2009, companies perceive that political risks are higher in the countries where the ADR framework is weaker. MIGA, whose mission is to promote FDI into developing countries by insuring eligible projects against certain risks, publishes a yearly report examining perceptions of political risk and risk-mitigation strategies.14 The World Investment and Political Risk Report published in 2009 looks, in particular, at companies’ overall perception of the political risks related to investing in certain emerging markets (and it allocates high scores to economies where the political risk is perceived as high). This data shows that there is a negative correlation between the average of AMD indicators 1, 2 and 3 and the fact that some companies perceived political risks in a certain numbers of countries (Figure 16).

FIGURE 15: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and the GCI 1st Pillar on Institutions SGP NZL

6

6

FIGURE 14: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and the Global Competiveness Index 2012-2013

broad categories capturing aspects of the quality of institutions, the macroeconomic environment, skills and education, the efficiency of markets, business sophistication and Innovation, among others.

NLD NLD

USA JPN TWN SAU

KOR MYS IRL

BRN

ECU BIH

3

TCD

.5

TUR

MOZ

TWN

BRN

AUS RWA IRL JPN CHL MYS FRA

AUT

MUS CYPUSA

JOR ZAF ESP LKA MAR CRI POL ZMB GEO KOR AZE TUR KAZ ARM IND ETH IDN THAKHM GHA MKD BRA CZE ALB TZA VNM BFA SEN MEX PHL EGY ITA HRV UGA SVK PER KEN CMR BGR COL MDA GRC MOZ NIC PAK ROM NGA BOL NPL MLIHND DOM BGD CIVRUS SRB UKR MNE

BIH

SLE GTM

ECU

BDI

YEM HTI

BDI

HKG GBR DEU

CAN SAU

ARG DZA

TCD

MDG KGZ YEM HTI

VEN

2

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CANAUT

CHL ESP CZE POL ITA AZE BRA KAZ MEXZAF MUS CRI CYP IND PER BGR RWA JOR PHL RUS LKA MAR COL SVK UKRMNE VNMROMGEO MKD HRV ARM KHM ALB HND MDASRB ARG GRC ZMBDOM GHA BOL KEN NIC EGY DZA CMR BGDNGA SEN ETH PAKTZA UGA NPL VEN KGZ MLI MDG CIV BFA THA

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*OREDO&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV,QGH[ïEHVW) 4 5

SGP

.6  .8 Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.295 and significant at the 1% level. Source:

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

.9

.5

.6  .8 $YHUDJHRI$0'$0'DQG$0'3

.9

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.289 and significant at the 1% level. Source:

15

3.5

FIGURE 16: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and the perception, by companies, of political risks

UGA

3

VEN

UKR

NGA

YEM

Strong positive correlations have been identified between AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions and the following relevant issues measured by the WGI:

DZA CRI KENRUS BGD TZA THA

IDN

ZAF PHL

MAR PER TUR

1.5

MOZ

LKA VNM

EGY COL

2

ARG

MYS

IND ROM MEX GHA

BRA

ETH

.5

POL

.6 .7 .8 Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

.9

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.207 and significant at the 25% level.

This analysis is relative, and has to be put into perspective, given that this data reflects perceptions from a limited number of companies. However, it is consistent with the other correlations that have been identified and reinforce the fact that a well-functioning ADR regime is an indicator of a good business climate.

AMD correlations with the Worldwide Governance Indicators Finally, another correlation was identified between AMD subindicators 1 on the quality of the legal framework and some governance indicators developed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project15 of the World Bank. The WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996–2011, for six dimensions of governance: a) Voice and Accountability, b) Political

FIGURE 17: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Control of Corruption Indicators

WGI Government Effectiveness ï 0 

NZL AUS CYP IRLUSA JPN KOR BRN TUR MNE THA

CAN NLD AUT

FRA CHL

MYS MUS HRV ITA CRI COL

SVK POL GEO GRC MEXZAF

3. The Regulatory Quality indicators, which reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development (Figure 19); 4. The Rule of Law indicators, which gather perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Figure 20). Strong positive correlations have also been identified between AMD 1 and these four output variables. FIGURE 18: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicators NZL SGP AUS IRL CHL USA

HKG GBR DEU

NLD CAN

AUT CZE FRA ESP SVK POL KOR JPN MUS ITA ROM MYS GEO BGR HRV GRC PER CRI ZAF TUR COL MEX MKD ALB ARM JOR THA BRA GHA SRB SAU BIH MNE MDA LKA MAR HNDKEN Kos RWA GTM BFAUGA DOMTUN KGZ SEN PHL KAZ IDN EGYMLI NICIND AZE RUS MOZ ZMB TZA KHM PNG MDG VNM UKR PAK NGA SLE NPLYEM ARG BOL CMR BGD CIV ETH TCD BDI ECU HTI AGO DZA BLR

IRQ

AFG

BRN

HKG GBR DEU

CYP

VEN CRI

ï

ï .4

.5

.6 .7 .8 $YHUDJHRI$0'$0'DQG$0'3

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at at the 1% level.

16

2. The Governance Effectiveness indicators, which represent perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Figure 18);

TWN

ESP CZE

RWA JOR BGRINDGHA PHL BRA TUN LKA ARM MKD SRB PER ARG ALB MARKAZ VNM ROM IDN ETH RUS BOL SAU SENKos UGA BFA TZA KEN MOZ ECU DOMMDA HND EGY ZMB KGZ DZA PNGGTM BIH KHM NPL AZE UKR PAK MLI BGD NIC MDG CMR BDI BLR VEN NGA YEM AGO SLE CIV TCD AFG HTI CRI

IRQ

1. The Control of Corruption indicators, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests (Figure 17);





SGP

TWN

These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. Just as AMD indicators, they are scored with higher values corresponding to better outcomes (but scaled differently depending on individual data sources).

WGI Regulatory Quality ï 0 

MIGA Political Risk 2.5

PAK AFG

Stability and Absence of Violence, c) Government Effectiveness, d) Regulatory Quality, e) Rule of Law and f) Control of Corruption.

.9

.4

.5

.6 .7 .8 $YHUDJHRI$0'$0'DQG$0'3

.9

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at at the 1% level.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013



FIGURE 19: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Regulatory Quality Indicators NZL AUS IRL SGP USA FRA CHL JPN



TWN

WGI Rule of Law 0

BRN

CYP KOR MUS

NLD CANAUT

POL GRC

MYS CRI ITA

GBR DEU HKG

ESP CZE SVK

ï

JOR HRV ZAF TUR SAU MNE BRA ROM LKA BGRINDGHA TUN GEO MARCOL THA MKD RWA SRB BIH MDA BFA UGA ARM EGY ZMB VNM SEN MEX PHL TZA ALB MLI MOZ ARG Kos PER KAZ IDN NIC ETH BGDRUS DOM DZA PNG MDG UKR SLE AZE PAK HND BOLKHM NPL KEN GTM CMR BLR ECU BDI AGO NGA YEM KGZ CIV HTI TCD CRI VEN

IRQ

ï

AFG

.4

.5

.6 .7 .8 $YHUDJHRI$0'$0'DQG$0'3

.9

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at at the 1% level.

FIGURE 20: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Rule of Law Indicators



NZL AUS SGP

IRL JPN

NLD CAN

CHL FRA

HKG DEU GBR

AUT

WGI Control of Corruption ï 0 

USA TWN

BRN

ESP

CYP MUS CRI KOR

POL CZE SVK GHA JOR GEO ZAFMKD GRC BGR SRB ROM PERMAR MDG TUN MNE COL SAU BIH MEX BFA THA ARG BOL MOZ LKA ZMB GTM IND DZA TZA ALB MLI VNM Kos SEN MDA ARM EGY SLE ETHIDN BLR NIC PHL NPL DOM HND ECU UGA KEN CMR UKR PAK BGD KAZ RUS KHM CIV PNG BDI KGZ AZE NGA YEM VEN TCD HTI AGO CRI AFG TUR

ï

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.4

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.9

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at at the 1% level.

7. Policy implications and regulatory reform considerations Foreign investors, when facing a dispute, need to be able to rely on effective and updated ADR regimes. AMD data identifies those economies which have adopted generally accepted good practices, including consolidated ADR laws, regulations following the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

and laws encompassing substantially all aspects of commercial mediation and conciliation. The data also identify where functional ADR institutions exist to assure the efficient conduct of the arbitration proceedings, a greater likelihood that time limits assigned by the arbitral tribunal will be respected and greater certainty that the arbitral award will withstand the scrutiny of a domestic court. Several opportunities for improvement also arise out of the AMD data. First is greater flexibility in domestic arbitration regimes, through the recognition of international arbitration. The AMD indicators find that when an economy provides for two distinct regimes for domestic and international arbitration—either through its laws or case law—international arbitration laws are less restrictive than domestic arbitration laws. This affects rules on the appointment of arbitrators and counsels, the choice of the seat of the arbitration, the choice of the language of the arbitration proceedings, etc., which in turn affects the desirability for firms to use domestic ADR services. Access to domestic courts is also key—domestic court regulations in many jurisdictions do not adequately support arbitrator(s) when they need to obtain, through the courts, the production of witnesses or documents or certain enforcement measures (for example, the freezing of assets or ordering interim payments). In addition, the length of arbitration proceedings can be significantly reduced in many parts of the world. Online arbitration can be especially effective for small commercial disputes, making them shorter and less administratively demanding and cheaper than international disputes. One potential area of reform in many economies would be to offer such services through state agencies or by supporting private initiatives. A final policy implication from the AMD data applies to domestic court capabilities. Given the technical nature of arbitral awards, specialized courts have been most effective in a variety of jurisdictions. These are high-level courts or specially designated courts with the capacity and experience to deal with commercial arbitral awards. These economies have also acceded to the New York Convention to recognize and enforce arbitral awards. Reforms to ADR regimes allow economies to offer a more attractive investment climate to foreign investors. With commercial contracts becoming more and more complex, it is important that economies not only recognize and offer alternative dispute resolution mechanisms but also constantly adapt their laws and regulations to reflect the best practices in alternative dispute resolution.

17

ENDNOTES 1

2

3

4

18

Through commercial arbitration, the parties agree to submit their dispute to an independent and impartial arbitrator or arbitral tribunal which issues a final and binding arbitral award. Mediation is a structured and interest-focused process enabling the parties, facilitated by one or more mediators, to agree on the resolution of their dispute through a mediation agreement. Conciliation is a process where the parties are assisted in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute. This is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them out of a defined legal relationship. Investment arbitration is based on either: a) an investment treaty, such as the 1965 multilateral Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID); b) a bilateral treaty (BIT), which provides for particular and limited standards of protection of foreign investors such as, expropriation; c) an investment law issued by the host state, which protects foreign investors; or d) in some cases, an investment agreement. In practice, investment arbitration is typically brought under the ICSID Convention or ad hoc, using UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Differences between commercial and investment arbitration exist when it comes to the legal framework and applicable law, the selection of arbitrators, the type of jurisdictional issues that can be addressed, the case management, the confidentiality and transparency of proceedings, and the application of the New York Convention. See Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz. 2012. “Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? (Lalive Lecture 2012),” in Arbitration International 2012, Vol.28, Issue 4. Ad hoc arbitration allows the parties to determine and agree on their own arbitration procedure, rather than having a procedure imposed by a private arbitration institution.

5

The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted in 1985 and amended in 2006, aims at harmonizing national laws on international commercial arbitration. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation was adopted in 2002 and aims to harmonize national laws on international commercial conciliation. Please note that the FDI Regulations project only reports contributors’ explanations on whether their domestic laws follow UNCITRAL Model Laws. More information on the status of enactment of such Model Laws can be found on UNCITRAL’s website: http:// www.uncitral.org.

6

For detailed data on each economy measured, please see Annex 6.

7

Foreign arbitral awards are not considered to be domestic awards in the economy where the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award is sought.

8

Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Yemen.

9

However, some economies have arbitration institutions that also host arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in addition to their own rules (for instance, Germany).

10 The AMD topic collected data in 2012, and does not cover changes which have occurred after September 2012. It is worth mentioning that Mauritius amended its International Arbitration Act (IAA) on May 25, 2013, further reinforcing its’ pro-arbitration approach. 11 AMD contributors have indicated that the new Colombian law broadly follows UNCITRAL Model law. However, it excludes the UNCITRAL Model Law’s provision which states that arbitration is “international” when the place of arbitration is situated outside the state in which the parties have their places of business. It defines it more broadly, by stating that parties can agree on an international arbitration if the dispute referred to arbitration affects the interests of international commerce. This last definition incorporates the economic criterion of internationality, recognizing arbitration as international when international trade interests are at stake, and follows in that sense a few other economies which have adopted the same broad definition of international arbitration, for example France, in its Article 1504 of the Code of Civil procedure. 12 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/ enforcing-contracts 13 http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness 14 http://www.miga.org/resources/index.cfm?stid=1866 15 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

References Bangkok Post. 2012. “Thailand needs better arbitration to attract FDI.” June 9, 2012. Available at: http://www.intellasia.net/ thailand-needs-better-arbitration-to-attract-fdi-207998 Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz. 2012. “Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? (Lalive Lecture 2012),” in Arbitration International 2012 Vol.28, Issue 4. Choo, Jonathan. 2012. “Singapore amends International Arbitration Act increasing attractiveness of Singapore as arbitration venue,” Singapore International Arbitration Blog, April 12, 2012. Available at: http://singaporeinternationalarbitration .com/2012/04/12/singapore-amends-internationalarbitration-act-increasing-attractiveness-of-singapore-asarbitration-venue/ Gonzalez, Daniel E., George F. Hritz, Marcos Rios, and Richard C. Lorenzo. 2003. International Arbitration: Practical Considerations with a Latin American Focus. The Journal of Structured and Project Finance (Spring 2003): pp. 33–43. Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. 2013. Helpdesk research Report: The influence of international commercial and investment law and procedure on foreign investment and economic development/growth. Available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=881

PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University. 2006. “International Arbitration Study: Corporate Attitudes and Practices.” Available at: http://www.arbitrationonline.org/ docs/IAstudy_2006.pdf Schwartz, Eric A. 2009. “The role of international arbitration in economic development.” International Trade and Business Law Review 12: 127–139. UNCITRAL website on International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation. Available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ uncitral_texts/arbitration.html Wallace, Julian and Glen Rosen. 2012. “Recent Amendments to the International Arbitration Act and their Iinfluence on the Insurance Industry.” Singapore International Arbitration Centre Publication. Available at: http://www.siac.org.sg/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=344:recentamendments-to-the-international-arbitration-act-and-theirinfluence-on-the-insurance-industry&catid=56:articles&Item id=171 Zaiwalla, Sarosh. 2013. “Fast-track arbitration can help attract FDI.” Sudipto Dey, February 4, 2013. Available at: http://www. business-standard.com/article/opinion/fast-track-arbitrationcan-help-attract-fdi-sarosh-zaiwalla-113020400006_1.html

Hamilton, Jonathan C. and Michael Roche. 2010. White & Case Survey of Latin American Arbitration 2010. Available at: http://www.latinarbitrationlaw.com/ survey-of-latin-american-arbitration-201/

Zuleta, Eduardo. 2012. “Introduction – Latin America.” The Arbitration Review of the Americas. Available at: http:// www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/48/sections/165/ chapters/1859/introduction-latin-america/

International Chamber of Commerce. 2011. Statistical Report for 2010, Vol. 22, No. 1.

Word Bank. 2013. Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts. Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/ exploretopics/enforcing-contracts

International Chamber of Commerce. 2012. Statistical Report for 2011, Vol. 23, No. 1. MIGA. 2009. World Investment and Political Risk Report 2009. Available at: http://www.miga.org/resources/index. cfm?aid=2486 McLaughlin, Joseph. 1979. Arbitrating and developing countries. International Law 13: 211–232. Prager, Dietmar W. 2011. Costa Rica has a new arbitration law. Kluwer Arbitration Blog, June. Available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/06/04/ costa-rica-has-a-new-arbitration-law/

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

World Bank. 2012. FDI Regulations Database. Available at: http:// iab.worldbank.org/~/media/FPDKM/IAB/Documents/Whatis-Foreign-Direct-Investment.pdf World Bank. 2011. Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2011. Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ World Economic Forum, 2013 Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013. Available at: http://www.weforum.org/issues/ global-competitiveness

19

Annex 1. Methodology and coverage of the AMD indicators (100 economies across 7 regions) The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes (AMD) indicators were developed using data gathered about alternative dispute resolution laws, regulations, and practice relevant for FDI through a standard questionnaire of arbitration, mediation and conciliation experts in 100 economies, including lawyers, law professors, arbitrators, members of arbitration and mediation institutions, and government regulators, on a pro-bono basis. The questionnaire was distributed in late 2011, with responses received through mid-2012. The questionnaire was partly based on standard case studies so that responses can be comparable across economies. The responses were reviewed and harmonized and supplemented with desk research.

TABLE A1: Coverage of the AMD indicators: 100 economies across 7 regions Region

Economies

East Asia and the Pacific 11 economies

Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Singapore; Taiwan, China; Thailand; Vietnam

Eastern Europe and Central Asia 21 economies

Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Macedonia, FYR; Moldova; Montenegro; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Turkey; Ukraine

Latin America & the Caribbean 15 economies

Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Peru; Venezuela, R.B.

Middle East and North Africa 8 economies

Algeria; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Iraq; Jordan; Morocco; Saudi Arabia; Tunisia; Yemen, Rep.

High Income OECD 17 economies South Asia 6 economies Sub-Saharan Africa 22 economies

Australia; Austria; Canada; Czech Republic; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; Netherlands; New Zealand; Slovak Republic; Spain; United Kingdom; United States Afghanistan; Bangladesh; India; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka Angola; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Chad; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Cote d’Ivoire; Ethiopia; Ghana; Kenya; Madagascar; Mali; Mauritius; Mozambique; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

General presentation of the methodology The AMD indicators quantify three aspects of ADR regimes that are important for companies seeking to resolve commercial disputes outside of domestic courts. These factors are the strength of an economy’s commercial arbitration laws (including adherence to international conventions on commercial arbitration); the ease

20

of process for the parties initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings in that economy; and the extent to which domestic courts assist the arbitration process, both during the proceedings and regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. These three factors also measure, to a certain extent, other elements of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), that is to say mediation and conciliation. These elements are considered essential to the operation of an effective arbitration regime that prioritizes predictability, transparency, efficiency, due process and party autonomy. These indicators look exclusively at commercial arbitration—originating from the agreement of the parties—and do not cover investment arbitration. They look at all types of commercial arbitration involving all kinds of parties, whether private, state, or state entities involved in commercial relationships with private parties. It also examines a variety of arbitration cases, whether administered by private arbitration institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) or ad hoc arbitrations. There are two types of questions asked in the Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes indicators:

s Legal questions, measuring the quality of laws and regulations applicable to foreign-owned companies in the respective economy. Responses to these survey questions are based on the provisions of the laws, regulations and judicial precedents, if applicable. These questions are therefore de jure, meaning that they measure what the law states. s Procedural questions, measuring the duration and difficulty of arbitration related procedures. Responses to these survey questions are based on the contributors’ practical experience. These questions are de facto, meaning that they measure what exists in fact, or in other words, practice on the ground. This Annex presents a brief overview of the AMD indicators’ methodology. A complete methodology with question details for each sub-indicator is available from the author upon request.

Presentation of the methodology for the AMD indicators There are three sets of indicators, providing comprehensive information and analysis on ADR in the surveyed economies: 1. AMD indicators on the strength of laws and institutions (AMD 1)

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2. AMD indicators on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings (AMD 2) 3. AMD indicators on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (AMD 3). The first set of indicators, AMD 1, measures the strength of ADR laws and institutions, covering and including: 1. The domestic laws and regulations on ADR, their accessibility, and whether or not, according to contributors, they follow the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Laws on International Commercial Arbitration and on International Commercial Conciliation that states have the possibility to incorporate in their domestic legislation; it also covers the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (the New York Convention); 2. Data on ADR private institutions, whether they exist in the surveyed economies and follow specific rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976, revised in 2010; 3. Reporting on the specific ADR services available, such as fast-track or online arbitration. AMD 1 compares the strength of economies’ ADR regimes by examining the laws and regulations that an economy relies on to regulate its domestic and international arbitrations, as well the economy’s adherence to specific international conventions. Specifically, AMD 1 focuses on: (a) What laws on alternative dispute resolution are in place, whether different laws apply to domestic and international arbitrations taking place in that economy, and whether the economy has entered into leading international conventions on arbitration, specifically the New York Convention; (b) Whether the economy hosts arbitration and mediation institutions, and if yes, what is their structure, and if they offer specific services such as fast-track or online arbitration. The second set of indicators, AMD 2, looks at the ease of process, before and after initiating arbitration proceedings: 1. Before initiating arbitration proceedings, it measures whether or not an arbitration agreement can be easily concluded, and whether or not the economy surveyed allows for a distinction between domestic and international arbitration; 2. It also looks at possible restrictions that parties may face when appointing their arbitrators and counsels, and when conducting the arbitral process, for instance, freedom to choose the language of the proceedings or the arbitrating institution. In addition, it measures the ease of process once arbitration proceedings are initiated, and through a standard case study, the usual length of arbitration proceedings;

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

3. It captures judicial assistance during arbitration proceedings: whether domestic courts are willing to enforce an arbitration agreement by recognizing that they do not have jurisdiction, and whether there are other measures they could offer in support of arbitration proceedings. AMD 2 compares the ease of parties to design arbitration proceedings in their chosen manner and conduct fair and predictable arbitrations in the economy that respect due process. Specifically, it looks at several concepts: (a) Form of the arbitration agreement: whether the law restricts the form that an arbitration agreement can take in order to be legally binding on the parties; (b) Arbitrability: whether the law restricts the subject matter of commercial disputes being submitted to arbitration; (c) Party autonomy: this is an essential value underpinning arbitration as a dispute resolution tool, and laws may enshrine it by providing parties with the freedom to select integral elements of the arbitration process including, any seat of arbitration, any particular ADR institution, any arbitrators and foreign counsel; (d) Judicial assistance: how domestic courts assist the arbitral process; whether domestic courts support arbitration and have articulated a “pro-arbitration” policy, as well as upholding the parties’ agreement that the arbitration tribunal can rule on its own jurisdiction, whether the law expressly provides for courts to assist the arbitration process by ordering interim relief, the production of documents and the appearance of witnesses; (e) Practice: practitioners’ estimates regarding the average period of time to establish an arbitral tribunal in the economy’s most used arbitration institution. The third set of indicators, AMD 3, deals with judicial assistance in recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards: 1. All steps of the recognition and enforcement process are measured, whether or not there are specialized courts and to what extent these courts review the arbitral award; 2. Through a standard case study (Box 3), the length of the usual recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign arbitral awards is established. AMD 3 compares the ease of the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards across economies. It includes: (a) De jure and de facto questions relating to how domestic courts assist parties in the recognition and enforcement process of a foreign arbitral awards;

21

(b) Practice: practitioners’ estimates regarding the average period of time to enforce an arbitral award in a local court of the surveyed economy. The case studies used to measure the length of arbitration proceedings and the length of the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is standard. In both cases, contributors are asked to give an estimate where a hypothetical party is in breach of a supply agreement and the other party seeks to recover US$100,000 through arbitration, either by initiating arbitration proceedings or by initiating recognition and enforcement proceedings concerning a foreign arbitral award rendered in the same amount.

Limitations of the AMD indicators The methodology of Arbitrating Disputes indicators is primarily limited to analyzing verifiable data, such as the legal framework and most common practices in each economy. The survey uses a specific methodology that consists of mostly “Yes” or “No” questions and has few perception-based questions. Practice is therefore covered in a limited manner, given the survey methodology and the nature of arbitration, which is private and confidential. There is no such thing as a “one size fits all” arbitration regime. However, by asking a standardized set of questions in our survey, we aim to identify good practices that can assist countries in benchmarking the quality of their arbitration regimes. The AMD indicators represent a rather extensive measurement of economies’ alternative dispute resolution frameworks with a focus on commercial arbitration. However, the indicators do not cover many other issues related to dispute resolution such as: 1. Evaluation of arbitration clauses in bilateral investment treaties, investment chapters of free trade agreements, investment treaty arbitrations and enforcement of ICSID arbitration awards; 2. Level of awareness and acceptance of arbitration practices by the economies’ legal and business community; 3. Level of training of economies’ arbitration practitioners and judges; 4. Effectiveness of arbitral institutions; 5. Extent to which arbitration is preferred over other dispute resolution tools in each economy; 6. Effectiveness of commercial litigation (already measured by the World Bank Group’s Doing Business Enforcing Contracts indicator).

Glossary of terms s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) – Specific procedures for settling disputes by means other than court litigation.

22

These methods include among others mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

s Arbitrability – Whether the claim could be subject to arbitration. Certain categories of claims are considered as being incapable of resolution by arbitration and deemed “non – arbitrable” because of their perceived public importance. s Arbitration – ADR method, by which parties agree to submit their dispute to an independent and impartial arbitrator or arbitral tribunal appointed by mutual consent or statutory provision and to issue a final and binding arbitral award. s Arbitration Agreement – An agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship. s Commercial has the meaning ascribed to it in the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. A note to the text of the Model Law states: “The term ‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. […]” s Conciliation – The term “conciliation” is used as a broad notion encompassing mediation, and refers to ADR proceedings in which a person or a panel of persons assists the parties in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute. s Enforcement of an Arbitral Award – The conversion of the arbitral award into a court judgment with all the sanctions that a court judgment entails, such as the right to have the debtor’s assets seized. s Fast-track Arbitration – Time bound arbitration, which does not differ from traditional arbitration except that the parties or the arbitrator(s) have to observe specific time limits. s Foreign Arbitral Award – Foreign arbitral award has the meaning ascribed to it in the New York Convention. It is an arbitral award rendered outside of your state in arbitration proceedings conducted outside of your state (and, if applicable, awards issued in your country through international arbitration proceedings). s Interim Measures – Temporary measures issued by courts or arbitral tribunals to prevent immediate and irreparable injury (e.g., sequestration of property, attachment of bank accounts, and preservation of evidence). s Mediation – ADR method, by which a structured and interest-focused process enables the parties, with the faciliation of one or more mediators, to agree on the resolution of their dispute. s New York Convention or Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – Signed in

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

1958 and entered into force in 1959, the Convention requires national courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and recognize the validity of arbitration agreements. It also require national courts to refer parties to arbitration when they have entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate that is subject to the Convention.

s Seat of Arbitration – The location of the arbitration forum. The seat of arbitration has a number of significant effects upon the arbitration, including the potential of national court interference with arbitration proceedings, national court’s assistance with arbitration proceedings, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement if the parties have not agreed otherwise, and national court’s enforcement of arbitral awards.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

s Severable – The severability or separability doctrine provides that an arbitration agreement, even though included in and related closely to an underlying commercial contract, is a separate and autonomous agreement. s UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration – Adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1985 and amended in 2006, the Model Law aims at harmonizing national laws on international commercial arbitration. States may incorporate it into their domestic legislation. s UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation – Adopted by UNCITRAL in 2002, the Model Law aims at harmonizing national laws on international commercial conciliation.

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Annex 2. OHADA and the Uniform Act on Arbitration of 1999 Legal Framework

Arbitration Proceedings

In 1993, 14 countries along the Gulf of Guinea signed the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). Three States joined since then: Comorros, Guinea-Conakry, and Congo, Dem. Rep. Through OHADA, the States have to apply several uniform acts, including the Uniform Act on Arbitration of 1999 (AUA). As a consequence, the 17 OHADA member-States have their arbitration legal framework governed by the AUA. Under its Article 35, the AUA has a direct effect and applies to all arbitration proceedings initiated after its enactment in a member State. In addition, the ratifying countries are not allowed to enact conflicting laws.

The Uniform Act is modeled after the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, but applies widely to every arbitration case when the seat of the tribunal is in one of the OHADA member-States, regardless of whether the case is domestic or international or whether it is in a commercial or civil matter. The State itself and its entities can be brought before an OHADA arbitral tribunal. The AUA limits the time for completion of an arbitration case to 6 months from the time the last arbitrator accepted his mission, time which can be extended by the parties. Local courts may interfere with the proceedings, at the request of a party, for specific reasons mentioned in the AUA such as: choosing an arbitrator, extending the 6 months mandatory period, or administering evidence.

On June 26, 2012, the World Bank approved an International Development Association (IDA) US$15 million technical assistance grant to OHADA, in order to support investment climate reforms and provide businesses with a more secure and cost-effective business legal framework. Because judicial security is key and because international investors favor arbitration, one component of the project is the strengthening of the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration, the revision of the Uniform Act on Arbitration (to possibly introduce fast-track arbitration) and the creation of trainings and awareness programs on the best practices in ADR.

Arbitration Institutions The OHADA possesses its own arbitral institution, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). The CCJA has two roles. As an appellate court, the CCJA is a body acting as supreme court in the judicial systems of OHADA member States on matters of award enforcement. As a arbitration institution, the CCJA is an optional institution that parties may choose in order to administer and monitor their arbitration. Each year, the CCJA establishes a list of arbitrators, which is not binding as parties are allowed to appoint freely their arbitrators.

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Foreign Arbitral Awards An OHADA foreign award is not self-executing in an OHADA member State. These awards need an order of recognition by the national courts where enforcement is sought. For foreign award issued in one of the OHADA member States, the party seeking enforcement must produce the arbitral award and the arbitration agreement. For awards issued under rules different from the OHADA rules, including awards issued outside OHADA community, the UAU provides that the applicable treaties on recognition should apply (in most cases, the New York Convention) when the recognition is sought in an OHADA member-State. In the absence of an applicable treaty, the OHADA rules should apply.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

Annex 3. The Bangladesh International Arbitration Center (BIAC) BIAC is the first alternative dispute resolution center in Bangladesh and was launched on April 9, 2011 (http://biac.org.bd/). BIAC was established by a consortium of three key Bangladeshi business associations, the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the International Chamber of Commerce – Bangladesh, with support from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Uk-Aid (DFID) and the European Union (EU). It was formally inaugurated by the Honorable Minister of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Barrister Shafique Ahmed and Dr. Mashiur Rahman, Economic Advisor to the PM was the chief guest at the event - both extremely supportive of this private sector led initiative. IFC has been supporting the establishment of BIAC since March 2010 through the Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (BICF), following an ADR feasibility study prepared for IFC by the London-based Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR). In summary, the study found that the conditions for developing a viable ADR center were largely in place, and all key stakeholders were on board. The study also pointed out that engagement of the right people, and a lot of promotional and awareness-raising work would need to be done to make BIAC an effective venue for out-of-court dispute resolution.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

Since its establishment, BIAC has made significant progress towards becoming an arbitration center of excellence for businesses in Bangladesh. BIAC organized workshops for local lawyers, businesses, judges and other stakeholders on arbitration-related topics such as enforcement of arbitration awards, arbitration proceedings and drafting of arbitration agreements. After series of consultations with IFC, international experts and local legal community, BIAC finalized and formally announced its Rules of Procedure, Fee Schedule and Constitution of the Arbitration Committee in April 2012. Since 2012, BIAC publishes a quarterly newsletter informing the Center’s users of its most recent developments, including the ongoing initiative to introduce commercial mediation. Over 43 arbitrations have been administered at BIAC since the Center’s establishment under Rules chosen by the parties (in the absence of BIAC Rules). Fifteen of them involved a state company. The most recent initiatives carried out by BIAC are a negotiation course for businesses to be delivered by BIAC CEO, Dr. Toufiq Ali in July 2012, and developing an awareness-raising campaign to promote the use of BIAC Rules and model arbitration clause.

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Annex 4. Categories of disputes considered as non arbitrable, per economy TABLE A2: Categories of dispute Categories of dispute

Economy

Disputes involving rights over immoveable property

Afghanistan; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Cambodia; Egypt; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Macedonia; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovak Republic; Tanzania; Turkey; Ukraine and Vietnam

Intra-corporate disputes

Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Kazakhstan Montenegro; Romania; Russian Federation; Turkey and Ukraine

Patent law or intellectual property (IP) disputes

Azerbaijan; Belarus; Korea; Mexico; Nepal;a Russian Federation and Singapore

Finance and banking disputes

Bosnia and Herzegovina; Cambodia and Sierra Leone

Insolvency, bankruptcy or liquidation disputes

Albania; Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Dominican Republic; Egypt; France; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; India; Indonesia; Italy; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Macedonia; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Slovak Republic; Spain; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine and Zambia

Tax and customs disputes

Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Cameroon; Chile; Colombia; Congo; Dem. Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Ethiopia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Guatemala; Honk Kong; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Italy; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Macedonia; Madagascar; Mali; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Slovak Republic; Spain; Sri Lanka; Taiwan, China; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; United States; Venezuela; Vietnam and Zambia

Antitrust or unfair competition disputes

Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Chile; Colombia; Congo; Dem. Rep.; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Ecuador; Georgia; Guatemala; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Mexico; Montenegro; Nepal; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Romania; Russian Federation; Sierra Leone; Sri Lanka; Taiwan, China; Thailand; Ukraine; Venezuela; Vietnam and Zambia

Currency convertibility disputes

Algeria; Austria; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Chile; Congo; Dem. Rep.; Czech Republic; France; Georgia; India; Iraq; Korea; Montenegro; Mozambique; Nepal; Nicaragua; Romania; Sierra Leone; Thailand; Turkey; Ukraine and Venezuela

Employment contracts’ disputes

Algeria; Argentina; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Chile; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Egypt; France; Guatemala; Ireland; Italy; Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Mauritius; Mexico; Nepal;b New Zealand; Nicaragua; Philippines; Romania; Russian Federation; Sierra Leone; Thailand; Ukraine; Venezuela and Vietnam

a. In Nepal, even if most of these disputes could be arbitrable, disputes relating to infringement of IP rights are not arbitrable and are settled by the Department of Industries. b. In Nepal, if 10 or more employees are employed by a company, the Labor Law requires that employment disputes involving an employee should be settled by the Labor Court. However, managerial employment contracts generally provide for dispute resolution through arbitration.

26

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

Annex 5. Examples of administrative and constitutional courts before which a party can file an appeal once enforcement is granted TABLE A3: Examples of specialized courts Specialized courts

Economy and name of the court

Administrative court

Thailand: Supreme Administrative Court

No data

Armenia: RA Constitutional Court

4 to 6 months

Azerbaijan: Constitutional Court of the Republic

6 months

Brazil: Supreme Federal Court

1 to 2 years

Constitutional courts

Length of proceedings in practice

Colombia: Constitutional Court

1 month

Croatia: Constitutional Court

1 year

Czech Republic: Constitutional Court

6 months to 2 years

Dominican Republic: Supreme Court

6 months to 1 year

Honduras: Supreme Court

6 months

Japan: Supreme Court

2 to 4 months

Mexico: Federal Unitary Circuit Court or the Federal District Judge

2 months to 1 year

Peru: Constitutional Court

Up to 2 years

Philippines: Supreme Court

15 days

Poland: Supreme Court

No data

Slovak Republic: Constitutional Court

1 year

South Africa: Constitutional Court

18 months

Spain: Constitutional Court

No data

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

27

Annex 6. AMD Dataset

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration

Scattered provisions on commercial arbitration

Provisions on procedural aspects of commercial arbitration

Government-supported website

Adhesion to the New York Convention

Consolidated law on commercial mediation or conciliation

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation

Court referrals of cases to mediation /conciliation

Domestic ADR private institution

Online ADR

Fast-track arbitration

Brunei Darussalam

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

0

0

0

0.55

Cambodia

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.64

Hong Kong SAR (China)

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

0.82

Indonesia

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.75

Malaysia

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0.58

Papua New Guinea

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.58

Philippines

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.75

Singapore

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

0.73

Taiwan, China

1

1

0

0

1

N/A

0

N/A

1

1

0

1

0.60

Thailand

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.64

Vietnam

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

Economy

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average

0.73 0.67

Albania

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.58

Armenia

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.55

Azerbaijan

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.64

Belarus

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

0.83

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.73

Bulgaria

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.00

Croatia

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.75

Cyprus

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.55

Georgia

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.64

Kazakhstan

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.75

Kosovo

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.67

Kyrgyz Republic

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.73

Macedonia

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.83

Moldova

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0.58

Montenegro

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.73

Poland

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0.75

Romania

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0.83

Russian Federation

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.83

Serbia

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.75

Turkey

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.64

Ukraine

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.55

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of the answers collected for each data point.

28

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Score

Consolidated law on commercial arbitration

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Data and Score

0.71

(continued)

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

1

Bolivia

1

1

0

0

1

1

Brazil

1

1

1

0

1

1

Chile

1

1

1

0

1

Colombia

1

1

1

1

1

Costa Rica

1

1

1

1

Dominican Republic

1

1

1

1

Ecuador

1

0

1

Guatemala

1

1

0

Haiti

1

1

1

Honduras

1

1

0

1

Mexico

1

1

1

Nicaragua

1

1

0

Peru

1

1

Venezuela

1

1

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Score

1

Fast-track arbitration

Adhesion to the New York Convention

1

Online ADR

Government-supported website

1

Domestic ADR private institution

Provisions on procedural aspects of commercial arbitration

N/A

Court referrals of cases to mediation /conciliation

Scattered provisions on commercial arbitration

0

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration

Argentina

Consolidated law on commercial mediation or conciliation

Economy

Consolidated law on commercial arbitration

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Data and Score (continued)

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.64

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.67

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.64

1

0

N/A

1

1

1

0

0.73

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0.83

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

0.67

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.73

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.67

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.67

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.60

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.75

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.92

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.83

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.45

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.73

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.50

Latin America/Carib. Regional Average

0.70

Algeria

1

Egypt

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.55

Iraq

0

N/A

0

1

1

0

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.30

Jordan

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.67

Morocco

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0.58

Saudi Arabia

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.45

Tunisia

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.55

Yemen

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

Middle East/N. Africa Regional Average

0.45 0.51

Australia

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

1

0.73

Austria

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0.75

Canada

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.83

Czech Republic

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

0.91

France

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.67

Germany

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

0.82

Greece

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.75

Ireland

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.55

Italy

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.75

Japan

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0.67

Korea

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

1

0.64

Netherlands

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

1

1

0.64

New Zealand

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

1

0.73

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of the answers collected for each data point.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

(continued)

29

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration

Scattered provisions on commercial arbitration

Provisions on procedural aspects of commercial arbitration

Government-supported website

Adhesion to the New York Convention

Consolidated law on commercial mediation or conciliation

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation

Court referrals of cases to mediation /conciliation

Domestic ADR private institution

Online ADR

Fast-track arbitration

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Score

(continued)

Consolidated law on commercial arbitration

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Data and Score

Slovak Republic

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.92

Spain

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

1

1

0.73

United Kingdom

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

1

1

0.82

United States

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

1

1

Economy

High Income OECD Regional Average

0.64 0.74

Afghanistan

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0.58

Bangladesh

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

1

0.82

India

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.00

Nepal

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.67

Pakistan

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.64

Sri Lanka

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0.83

Angola

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

N/A

0

0

0

0

0.27

Burkina Faso

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

1

0.64

Burundi

0

N/A

1

0

1

0

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.30

Cameroon

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.73

Chad

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.36

Congo, D.R.

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.55

Côte d’Ivoire

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.64

Ethiopia

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.30

Ghana

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0.67

Kenya

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.73

Madagascar

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.55

Mali

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.64

Mauritius

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.75

Mozambique

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.83

Nigeria

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.75

South Asia Regional Average

0.76

Rwanda

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.67

Senegal

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

0

0.64

Sierra Leone

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.45

South Africa

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

N/A

0

1

0

1

0.73

Tanzania

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

0.64

Uganda

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0.67

Zambia

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

N/A

1

1

0

0

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average

0.55 0.59

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of the answers collected for each data point.

30

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

0

1

1

0

0.93

0.72

0.75

0

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.60

Hong Kong SAR (China)

0.67

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.94

Indonesia

0.67

0.67

0

0.13

0.75

1

1

1

0.5

0.79

0.65

Malaysia

0.67

1

0

0.63

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.83

1

No data

N/A

N/A

1

0

0

0

No data

0.00

0.33

Papua New Guinea

AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Score

1

0.88

Freedom of the parties to choose the modality of the arbitration proceedings *

0.88

0

Legislated use of interim measures by arbitrators

1

0.33

Legislated arbitrator impartiality

Elements that, if foreign, make the arbitration international* **

0.78

0.67

Legislated arbitrator independence

Economic definition of international arbitration **

0.67

Cambodia

Freedom of the parties to choose foreign counsels

Types of arbitrable disputes *

Brunei Darussalam

Freedom of the parties to choose arbitrators*

Economy

How arbitration agreements are concluded *

AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Data and Score

Philippines

0.67

0.78

1

0.75

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.92

Singapore

0.67

0.89

0

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.93

0.77

Taiwan, China

0.67

0.75

0

0.38

1

1

1

1

0

0.86

0.66

Thailand

0.67

0.44

N/A

N/A

1

0

1

1

0

0.86

0.62

Vietnam

0.67

0.56

N/A

N/A

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.57

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average

0.82 0.72

Albania

0.50

0.78

0

0.63

1

0

1

1

1

0.71

0.66

Armenia

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.90

Azerbaijan

0.67

0.33

1

0.88

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.79

Belarus

0.67

0.11

1

0.13

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.93

0.73

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.67

0.44

N/A

N/A

0.50

0

0

0

0

0.71

0.29

Bulgaria

0.83

0.22

1

0.13

0.75

1

1

1

0.5

0.79

0.72

Croatia

0.67

0.67

0

0.50

1

0.5

1

1

0.5

0.79

0.66

Cyprus

0.67

0.67

1

0.13

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.80

Georgia

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.92

Kazakhstan

0.67

0.44

0

0.25

0.75

1

1

1

0.5

0.79

0.64

Kosovo

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.90

Kyrgyz Republic

0.50

0.56

N/A

N/A

0.75

1

1

1

1

1

0.85

Macedonia

0.67

0.67

1

0.88

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.79

0.85

Moldova

0.67

0.67

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.87

Montenegro

0.67

0.33

0

0.13

1

1

0

0

0

0.85

0.40

Poland

0.67

0.78

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.93

Romania

0.67

0.33

1

0.50

0.88

0.5

1

1

1

0.79

0.77

Russian Federation

0.67

0.33

1

0.63

0.88

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.84

Serbia

0.83

0.67

0

0.88

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.64

0.75

Turkey

0.67

0.44

0

1

1

0.5

1

1

0.5

0.57

0.67

Ukraine

0.67

0.22

1

0.88

0.88

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average

0.80 0.75

Argentina

0.50

0.56

N/A

N/A

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.38

Bolivia

0.50

0.44

0

0.50

0.88

0

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.57

Brazil

0.67

0.56

N/A

N/A

1

0

1

1

1

0.86

0.76

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question. ** Score only for economies recognizing international arbitration.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

(continued)

31

Legislated arbitrator impartiality

Legislated use of interim measures by arbitrators

Freedom of the parties to choose the modality of the arbitration proceedings *

AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Score

0.75

0.75

0.5

1

1

0.5

0.64

0.73

1

0.63

0.63

0.5

1

1

0.5

0.43

0.70

Legislated arbitrator independence

1

0.78

Freedom of the parties to choose foreign counsels

0.50

0.50

Freedom of the parties to choose arbitrators*

0.67

Colombia

Elements that, if foreign, make the arbitration international* **

Chile

Economy

Economic definition of international arbitration **

Types of arbitrable disputes *

(continued)

How arbitration agreements are concluded *

AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Data and Score

Costa Rica

0.67

0.78

1

0.75

0.75

0.5

1

1

0

0.71

0.72

Dominican Republic

0.83

0.78

0

0.38

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.75

Ecuador

0.50

0.67

1

0.63

0.75

0

0

0

0.5

0.86

0.49

Guatemala

0.67

0.56

1

0.75

1

1

1

1

1

0.93

0.89

Haiti

No data

No data

N/A

N/A

0.75

1

1

1

No data

0.80

0.91

Honduras

0.83

1

0

0.88

0.88

0

1

1

0

0.93

0.65

Mexico

0.67

0.33

0

0.63

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.93

0.71

Nicaragua

0.67

0.44

1

0.75

0.75

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.80

Peru

0.83

0.67

0

0.63

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.76

Venezuela

0.67

0.56

0

0.75

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.79

0.75

1

0.63

0.38

1

1

0

0.5

0.93

Latin America/Carib. Regional Average

0.70

Algeria

0.67

0.44

Egypt

0.67

0.56

1

N/A

1

1

0

1

1

0.75

0.77

Iraq

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

0

0

0

0

1

0.42

Jordan

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.96

Morocco

0.67

0.78

1

0.50

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.83

Saudi Arabia

1

1

0

0.25

0.63

1

1

1

1

0.07

0.69

Tunisia

0.83

0.71

1

0.88

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.88

Yemen

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

No data

1

Middle East/N. Africa Regional Average

0.95 0.77

Australia

0.67

0.78

0

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.77

Austria

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.90

Canada Czech Republic France

1

1

0

0.75

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

0.83

0.67

0.56

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

0

0.86

0.76

1

0.67

1

0.25

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.83

Germany

0.83

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.97

Greece

0.83

0.89

0

0.88

1

1

1

1

0

0.93

0.75

Ireland

0.67

0.89

0

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.93

0.77

Italy

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.79

Japan

0.67

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.82

Korea

0.67

0.33

N/A

N/A

0.75

0

1

1

1

1

0.72

Netherlands

0.83

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.95

New Zealand

1

0.67

0

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.79

Slovak Republic

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.71

0.88

Spain

0.83

0.78

1

0.63

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.93

0.87

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question. ** Score only for economies recognizing international arbitration.

32

0.65

(continued)

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

Elements that, if foreign, make the arbitration international* **

Freedom of the parties to choose arbitrators*

Freedom of the parties to choose foreign counsels

Legislated arbitrator independence

Legislated arbitrator impartiality

Legislated use of interim measures by arbitrators

Freedom of the parties to choose the modality of the arbitration proceedings *

1

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

1.00

United States

1

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

1

0

0

1

1

0.74

Afghanistan

0.33

0.89

1

0.88

0.50

0

1

1

0

0.57

Bangladesh

0.67

0.56

0

0.75

1

0

1

1

0.5

1

0.65

India

0.67

0.56

0

0.38

0.88

1

1

1

0.5

0.86

0.68

Nepal

0.67

0.50

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.71

0.86

Pakistan

0.67

0.67

0

0.25

1

1

0.5

0

0.5

0.58

0.52

Sri Lanka

0.50

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

0

1

1

1

0.71

High Income OECD Regional Average

AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Score

Economic definition of international arbitration **

United Kingdom

Economy

How arbitration agreements are concluded *

Types of arbitrable disputes *

AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Data and Score (continued)

0.83

South Asia Regional Average

0.62

0.74 0.68

Angola

0.67

0.89

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.96

Burkina Faso

0.67

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.93

Burundi

1

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.98

Cameroon

0.67

0.89

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.93

Chad

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

No data

1

1

1

0.86

0.93

Congo, D.R.

0.67

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.90

Côte d’Ivoire

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.71

0.92

Ethiopia

0.33

0.89

N/A

N/A

0.75

0

1

1

1

1

0.75

Ghana

0.67

0.78

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.93

Kenya

0.67

0.67

0

0.63

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.75

Madagascar

0.67

0.89

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.91

Mali

0.50

0.89

N/A

N/A

0.75

No data

1

1

1

0.86

0.86

Mauritius

0.67

0.89

0

0.38

1

0.5

1

1

0

0.64

0.61

Mozambique

0.67

0.67

1

0.88

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.79

0.85

Nigeria

0.67

0.67

0

0.75

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.76

Rwanda

0.67

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.97

Senegal

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.94

Sierra Leone

0.67

0.56

N/A

N/A

1

1

0

0

0

0.00

0.40

South Africa

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.96

Tanzania

0.67

0.89

0

0.13

0.63

1

0.5

1

0.5

0.62

0.59

Uganda

0.67

1

N/A

N/A

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.96

Zambia

1

0.67

N/A

N/A

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.83

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average

0.85

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question. ** Score only for economies recognizing international arbitration.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

33

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

1 1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question

0

Kazakhstan

0

1

0

1

Cyprus

Georgia

1

1

1

1

Bulgaria

Croatia

1

1

1

1

Belarus

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1

0

1

1

Armenia

Azerbaijan

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0.5

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.67

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

No data

0

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

0.75

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.25

1

No data

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

No data

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

No data

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

1

(continued)

0.82

0.84

0.89

0.82

0.68

0.71

0.76

0.93

0.86

0.71

0.79

0.79

0.48

0.63

0.86

0.79

0.50

1

0.79

0.79

0.86

1

0

1

1

1

1

No data

1

1

1

1

1

0.74

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

Albania

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average

0

0

Thailand

Vietnam

1

1

0

0

Singapore

Taiwan, China

1

No data

1

0

Papua New Guinea

Philippines

1

1

0

0

Indonesia

Malaysia

1

1

1

1

Cambodia

Brunei Darussalam

Hong Kong SAR (China)

1

0

Economy

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Data and Score

Specialized court for arbitration cases

Possible appeal against a judgement on an arbitration agreement or award

Courts decline to hear a case where there is valid arbitration agreement Courts control only the validity of the arbitration agreement and not the merits of the case Recognition of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz

Possibility for the courts to appoint an arbitrator when a party is defaulting Possibility for the courts to assist during arbitration proceedings by ordering: the production of documents; the appearance of witnesses or the appearance of experts *

34 In practice, courts issuing injunctions to assist the arbitration process Possibility for the courts to order interim measures to assist the arbitration process In practice, courts ordering interim measures to assist the arbitration process Possibility for a party to request enforcement of an arbitral award granting interim relief Existence of a specialized court for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards In practice, courts apply the New York Convention In practice, courts favorable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Score

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

35 1 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

No data

1

1

1

1

1

1

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question

0

Haiti

0

No data

0

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0.17

1

0

1

1

1

No data

0

1

0.5

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

0.5

1

0

0

0.5

1

No data

0.5

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

0.5

No data

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1 1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

(continued)

0.63

0.54

0.83

0.82

0.93

0.68

0.71

0.89

0.75

0

0

1

Ecuador

Guatemala

1

1

1

1

1

0

Costa Rica

Dominican Republic

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0.79

0.48

0.71

0.93

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.79

0.86

0.76

0.92

0.71

0.92

0.93

Chile

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Colombia

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

No data

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

No data

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Bolivia

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

Brazil

1

1

0.17

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

0.81

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

0.67

0

1

1

0.86

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Argentina

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average

1

1

0

0

Turkey

Ukraine

1

1

0

1

Russian Federation

Serbia

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

Poland

Romania

1

Moldova

Montenegro

1

1

1

1

1

0

Kyrgyz Republic

Macedonia

1 1

1

1

Kosovo 1

1

Economy

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Data and Score (continued)

Specialized court for arbitration cases

Possible appeal against a judgement on an arbitration agreement or award

Courts decline to hear a case where there is valid arbitration agreement Courts control only the validity of the arbitration agreement and not the merits of the case Recognition of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz

Possibility for the courts to appoint an arbitrator when a party is defaulting Possibility for the courts to assist during arbitration proceedings by ordering: the production of documents; the appearance of witnesses or the appearance of experts * In practice, courts issuing injunctions to assist the arbitration process Possibility for the courts to order interim measures to assist the arbitration process In practice, courts ordering interim measures to assist the arbitration process Possibility for a party to request enforcement of an arbitral award granting interim relief Existence of a specialized court for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards In practice, courts apply the New York Convention In practice, courts favorable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Score

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

1 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question

1

Greece

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

(continued)

0.93

0.89

0.86

0.86

0.93

1

1

1

1

France

Germany

1

1

1

1

1

0.77

0.95

0.71

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.71

0.93

0.82

0.60

0

1

0.5

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

Canada

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

Czech Republic

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0.82

1

0

1

0.75

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.33

1

0.79

0.84

Australia

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.79

0.86

Austria

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.86

0.78

1

0

Yemen

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

Middle East/N. Africa Regional Average

1

1

1

1

Saudi Arabia

Tunisia

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

Jordan

Morocco

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0.75

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

Egypt

0.5

0

1

1

0

1

Iraq

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.71

0.5

1

1

1

1

0

0.78

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

Peru

Venezuela

1

1

1

Algeria

0

1

0

Mexico

Nicaragua

1

(continued)

Latin America/Carib. Regional Average

1

1

0

0

Honduras

1

1

0

Economy

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Data and Score

Specialized court for arbitration cases

Possible appeal against a judgement on an arbitration agreement or award

Courts decline to hear a case where there is valid arbitration agreement Courts control only the validity of the arbitration agreement and not the merits of the case Recognition of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz

Possibility for the courts to appoint an arbitrator when a party is defaulting Possibility for the courts to assist during arbitration proceedings by ordering: the production of documents; the appearance of witnesses or the appearance of experts * In practice, courts issuing injunctions to assist the arbitration process Possibility for the courts to order interim measures to assist the arbitration process

36 In practice, courts ordering interim measures to assist the arbitration process Possibility for a party to request enforcement of an arbitral award granting interim relief Existence of a specialized court for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards In practice, courts apply the New York Convention In practice, courts favorable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Score

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

37 1

Cameroon 1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

No data

1

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question

0

1

Burkina Faso

Burundi

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

No data

0

No data

1

1

1

1

1

No data

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

No data

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

0.92

0.85

0.42

0.79

0.79

0.79

0.67

(continued)

No data

0.68

1

1

1

1

1

0.73

1

1

1

1

0

0.93

0

0

1

1

0

1

No data

Angola

1

0

1

1

1

No data

South Asia Regional Average

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

0

0.86

0.93

0.93

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0.81

0.86

Pakistan

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

0.79

0.86

Sri Lanka

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

0.67

0.79

0.86

1

1

No data

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

No data

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

0

1

1

India

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Nepal

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0.45

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.33

1

1

1

1

1

1

No data

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

Spain

United Kingdom

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Afghanistan

1

1

1

1

New Zealand

Slovak Republic

1

1

1

1

1

Bangladesh

1

1

1

0

Korea

Netherlands

1

1

1

0.86

1

1

0

0

Italy

Japan

United States

1

1

0

0

Ireland

High Income OECD Regional Average

0

1

Economy

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Data and Score (continued)

Specialized court for arbitration cases

Possible appeal against a judgement on an arbitration agreement or award

Courts decline to hear a case where there is valid arbitration agreement Courts control only the validity of the arbitration agreement and not the merits of the case Recognition of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz

Possibility for the courts to appoint an arbitrator when a party is defaulting Possibility for the courts to assist during arbitration proceedings by ordering: the production of documents; the appearance of witnesses or the appearance of experts * In practice, courts issuing injunctions to assist the arbitration process Possibility for the courts to order interim measures to assist the arbitration process In practice, courts ordering interim measures to assist the arbitration process Possibility for a party to request enforcement of an arbitral award granting interim relief Existence of a specialized court for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards In practice, courts apply the New York Convention In practice, courts favorable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Score

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

0.5

1

No data

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point. * Average of the scores collected for each sub-question

1

1

Zambia

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average

1

1

1

1

Tanzania

Uganda

1

1

1

0

Sierra Leone

1

1

1

1

South Africa

0

1

Rwanda

Senegal

1

0

Mozambique

Nigeria

1

0

0

1

Mali

Mauritius

1

1

1

1

Kenya

Madagascar

1

1

0

1

Ethiopia

Ghana

1

1

1

1

0

1

Congo, D.R.

Chad

Côte d’Ivoire

1

0

Economy

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Data and Score (continued)

Specialized court for arbitration cases

Possible appeal against a judgement on an arbitration agreement or award

Courts decline to hear a case where there is valid arbitration agreement Courts control only the validity of the arbitration agreement and not the merits of the case Recognition of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz

Possibility for the courts to appoint an arbitrator when a party is defaulting Possibility for the courts to assist during arbitration proceedings by ordering: the production of documents; the appearance of witnesses or the appearance of experts * In practice, courts issuing injunctions to assist the arbitration process

38

1

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Possibility for the courts to order interim measures to assist the arbitration process

1

1

1

1

1

1

0.5

1

0.5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

In practice, courts ordering interim measures to assist the arbitration process

1

1

No data

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

No data

Possibility for a party to request enforcement of an arbitral award granting interim relief

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Existence of a specialized court for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

1

1

1

1

No data

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

In practice, courts apply the New York Convention

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

In practice, courts favorable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

0.86

0.79

0.77

0.86

0.67

0.86

0.75

0.86

0.82

0.86

0.71

0.89

0.79

0.86

0.79

0.93

0.79

0.79

0.67

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Score

Average of AMD 1, 2 and 3 Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

Economy

Brunei Darussalam

0.69

Honduras

0.75

Cambodia

0.67

Mexico

0.83

Hong Kong SAR (China)

0.92

Nicaragua

0.81

Indonesia

0.63

Peru

0.69

Malaysia

0.73

Venezuela

0.75

Papua New Guinea

0.51

Latin America/Carib. Regional Average

0.73

Philippines

0.84

Algeria

0.62

Singapore

0.76

Egypt

0.71

Taiwan, China

0.58

Iraq

0.44

Thailand

0.66

Jordan

0.85

Vietnam

0.78

Morocco

0.71

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average

0.71

Saudi Arabia

0.57

Albania

0.70

Tunisia

0.79

Armenia

0.79

Yemen

0.73

Azerbaijan

0.76

Middle East/N. Africa Regional Average

0.68

Belarus

0.78

Australia

0.77

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.58

Austria

0.86

Bulgaria

0.80

Canada

0.84

Croatia

0.74

Czech Republic

0.84

Cyprus

0.73

France

0.80

Georgia

0.82

Germany

0.93

Kazakhstan

0.74

Greece

0.81

Kosovo

0.83

Ireland

0.73

Kyrgyz Republic

0.76

Italy

0.74

Macedonia

0.87

Japan

0.76

Moldova

0.79

Korea

0.74

Montenegro

0.63

Netherlands

0.87

Poland

0.84

New Zealand

0.79

Romania

0.80

Slovak Republic

0.87

Russian Federation

0.79

Spain

0.84

Serbia

0.81

United Kingdom

0.92

Turkey

0.70

United States

0.74

Ukraine

0.61

High Income OECD Regional Average

0.81

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average

0.76

Afghanistan

0.55

Argentina

0.62

Bangladesh

0.80

Bolivia

0.65

India

0.82

Brazil

0.76

Nepal

0.73

Chile

0.80

Pakistan

0.65

Colombia

0.74

Sri Lanka

0.78

Costa Rica

0.74

South Asia Regional Average

0.72

Dominican Republic

0.77

Angola

0.68

Ecuador

0.56

Burkina Faso

0.80

Guatemala

0.54

Burundi

0.57

Haiti

0.71

Cameroon

0.86

Economy

Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

(continued) ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

39

Average of AMD 1, 2 and 3 (continued) Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

Economy

Brunei Darussalam

0.69

Honduras

0.75

Cambodia

0.67

Mexico

0.83

Hong Kong SAR (China)

0.92

Nicaragua

0.81

Indonesia

0.63

Peru

0.69

Malaysia

0.73

Venezuela

0.75

Papua New Guinea

0.51

Latin America/Carib. Regional Average

0.73

Philippines

0.84

Algeria

0.62

Singapore

0.76

Egypt

0.71

Taiwan, China

0.58

Iraq

0.44

Thailand

0.66

Jordan

0.85

Vietnam

0.78

Morocco

0.71

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average

0.71

Saudi Arabia

0.57

Albania

0.70

Tunisia

0.79

Armenia

0.79

Yemen

0.73

Azerbaijan

0.76

Middle East/N. Africa Regional Average

0.68

Belarus

0.78

Australia

0.77

Bosnia and Herzegovina

0.58

Austria

0.86

Bulgaria

0.80

Canada

0.84

Croatia

0.74

Czech Republic

0.84

Cyprus

0.73

France

0.80

Georgia

0.82

Germany

0.93

Kazakhstan

0.74

Greece

0.81

Kosovo

0.83

Ireland

0.73

Kyrgyz Republic

0.76

Italy

0.74

Macedonia

0.87

Japan

0.76

Moldova

0.79

Korea

0.74

Montenegro

0.63

Netherlands

0.87

Poland

0.84

New Zealand

0.79

Romania

0.80

Slovak Republic

0.87

Russian Federation

0.79

Spain

0.84

Serbia

0.81

United Kingdom

0.92

Turkey

0.70

United States

0.74

Ukraine

0.61

High Income OECD Regional Average

0.81

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average

0.76

Afghanistan

0.55

Argentina

0.62

Bangladesh

0.80

Bolivia

0.65

India

0.82

Brazil

0.76

Nepal

0.73

Chile

0.80

Pakistan

0.65

Colombia

0.74

Sri Lanka

0.78

Costa Rica

0.74

South Asia Regional Average

0.72

Dominican Republic

0.77

Angola

0.68

Ecuador

0.56

Burkina Faso

0.80

Guatemala

0.54

Burundi

0.57

Haiti

0.71

Cameroon

0.86

Economy

Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

(continued)

40

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

Average of AMD 1, 2 and 3

(continued)

Economy Chad

Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3 0.65

Congo, D.R.

0.74

Côte d’Ivoire

0.78

Ethiopia

0.61

Ghana

0.84

Kenya

0.78

Madagascar

0.75

Mali

0.74

Mauritius

0.75

Mozambique

0.83

Nigeria

0.79

Rwanda

0.79

Senegal

0.81

Sierra Leone

0.51

South Africa

0.85

Tanzania

0.67

Uganda

0.83

Zambia

0.75

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average

0.74

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

41

AMD data on the length of arbitration proceedings and of recognition and enforcement proceedings

Economy

42

AMD length of arbitration proceedings (# days)

AMD length of recognition and enforcement proceedings (# days)

AMD length of arbitration proceedings (# days)

Economy

AMD length of recognition and enforcement proceedings (# days)

Cambodia

90

75

Venezuela

246

567

Hong Kong (SAR)

361

83

Latin America/Carib. Reg. Average

285

627

Indonesia

200

773

Egypt

540

247

Malaysia

482

353

Iraq

910

No data

Philippines

278

281

Jordan

435

448

Singapore

336

47

Morocco

226

No data

Taiwan, China

259

479

Saudi Arabia

229

906

Thailand

450

No data

Tunisia

249

300

Vietnam

154

93

Yemen

280

No data

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average

290

273

Middle East/N. Africa Reg. Average

410

475

Albania

210

292

Austria

410

410

Armenia

118

153

Canada

495

77

Azerbaidjan

337

615

Czech Republic

158

477

Belarus

213

1168

France

386

116

Bosnia and Herzegovina

232

204

Germany

332

128

Bulgaria

241

551

Greece

377

482

Croatia

679

869

Ireland

238

126

Cyprus

347

706

Italy

385

527

Georgia

212

No data

Japan

289

96

Kazakhstan

196

No data

Korea

252

494

Kosovo

74

No data

Netherlands

281

400

Kyrgyz Republic

89

No data

New Zealand

340

No data

Macedonia

164

No data

Slovak Republic

355

68

Moldova

180

No data

Spain

226

345

Montenegro

313

818

United Kingdom

431

397

Poland

304

143

United States

403

388

Romania

294

365

High Income OECD Regional Average

335

302

Russian Federation

119

138

Bangladesh

278

836

Serbia

325

678

India

569

1654

Turkey

449

625

Pakistan

479

5610

Ukraine

141

598

South Asia Regional Average

442

2700

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average

249

528

Congo, D.R.

307

No data

Argentina

343

395

Ethiopia

571

No data

Kenya

172

No data

Mali

525

No data

Bolivia

228

221

Brazil

560

2,325

Chile

496

592

Mauritius

526

155

Colombia

316

917

Mozambique

536

No data

Costa Rica

162

433

Nigeria

521

523

Dominican Republic

185

616

Senegal

201

No data

Ecuador

320

320

South Africa

528

1178

Guatemala

341

No data

Tanzania

515

196

Honduras

112

336

Uganda

583

No data

Mexico

254

521

Zambia

No data

217

Nicaragua

116

157

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average

453

454

Peru

317

752

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

Contributors GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTRIBUTORS

Mostefa Traritani UNIVERSITÉ D’ORAN, FACULTÉ DE DROIT

Suren Petrosyan INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSULTING (ILC)

Arzu Hajiyeva ERNST & YOUNG HOLDINGS (CIS) B.V.

Sergio Mostajo MOSTAJO SOCIEDAD CIVIL - FIRMA LEGAL

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA)

CABINET HERICHE

David Sargsyan AMERIA C.J.S.C.

James Hogan SALANS UK LIMITED (AZERBAIJAN BRANCH)

Liana Voskerchyan GRIGORYAN & PARTNERS LAW FIRM

Ruhiyya Isayeva SALANS UK LIMITED (AZERBAIJAN BRANCH)

Claudia Paccieri CONCILIATION AND COMMERCE ARBITRATION CENTER (CAINCO)

ARMENIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

Nuran Kerimov DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC

BAKER & MCKENZIE DELOITTE DLA PIPER ERNST & YOUNG GIDE LOYRETTE & NOUEL JOHN W FFOOKS & CO KPMG

ANGOLA Maria Manuela Cunha MARIA MANUELA MORAIS CUNHA ADVOGADOS Itweva Nogueira CFRA | ADVOGADOS ASSOCIADOS Nair Pitra CFRA | ADVOGADOS ASSOCIADOS

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (PWC)

Candice Saraiva Maria Manuela Morais Cunha Advogados

SALANS

GABINETE LEGAL ANGOLA

MAYER BROWN

TALAL ABU-GHAZALEH LEGAL WHITE & CASE

ADROGADOS

ARGENTINA

WORLD LAW GROUP

Ricardo Barreiro Deymonnaz RATTAGAN, MACCHIAVELLO, AROCENA & PEÑA ROBIROSA

AFGHANISTAN

Alejandro Juan Pablo Breit NEGRI & TEIJEIRO LAW FIRM

Abdul Basir Baktash AFGHANISTAN INVESTMENT SUPPORT AGENCY

Federico Campolieti M. & M. BOMCHIL

ALBANIA

Leandro Caputo BRUCHOU, FERNANDEZ MADERO & LOMBARDI

WOLF THEISS

Jonida Braja (Melani) WOLF THEISS RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH Eniana Dupi AECO. CONSULTING Dorant Ekmekçiu HOXHA, MEMI & HOXHA Valbona Gjoncari BOGA & ASSOCIATES Elona Hoxhaj BOGA & ASSOCIATES Alexandros Karakitis ERNST & YOUNG ALBANIA Denita Katragjini APICELLA & PARTNERS Jonida Lakuriqi ERNST & YOUNG ALBANIA Fatos Lazimi KALO & ASSOCIATES Florian Piperi OPTIMA LEGAL & FINANCIAL Alban Ruli DRAKOPOULOS LAW FIRM Gerti Tartale DRAKOPOULOS LAW FIRM Mario Vangjeli DELOITTE ALBANIA Gerhard Velaj BOGA & ASSOCIATES

ALGERIA Adnane Bouchaib BOUCHAIB LAW FIRM Ahmed Djouadi DJOUADI & HAMOU LAW FIRM Abdelkader Habibi HABIBI LAW FIRM Amine Sator C.M.S. BUREAU FRANCIS LEFEBVRE

AUSTRALIA Robert Clarke ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Tim Maxwell ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Rachel Nicolson ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON Robert Regan CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH Cameron Scholes CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES CENTRE (AIDC) FREEHILLS

Vugar Mammadov DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Mubera Brkovic PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

BANGLADESH

Sabina Celik PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

Galib Al-Nahiyan SHAWN NOVEL & ASSOCIATES Shamsud Doulah DOULAH & DOULAH Anamul Kabir AF KABIR & ASSOCIATES

AUSTRIA

Ishrat Nabila SHAWN NOVEL & ASSOCIATES

Günther J. Horvath FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Shawn Novel SHAWN NOVEL & ASSOCIATES

Matthias Brzezinski WOLF THEISS RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

BELARUS Kira Bondareva VLASOVA MIKHEL AND PARTNERS LLC

Juan Pablo De Luca RATTAGAN, MACCHIAVELLO, AROCENA & PEÑA ROBIROSA

Anne-Karin Grill BINDER GRÖSSWANG RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Natallia Kazlouskaya CIERECH, NEVIADOUSKI & PARTNERS

Mariano Fabrizio DFG ABOGADOS

Christian Herbst SCHOENHERR RECHTSANWAELTE GMBH

Alexander Khrapoutski STEPANOVSKI, PAPAKUL & PARTNERS

Gonzalo García Delatour ESTUDIO BECCAR VARELA

Christian Klausegger BINDER GRÖSSWANG RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Sergei Makarchuk CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD HLAWATI

Gonzalo Sanchez SANCHEZ, LUPI & ASSOCIATES Octavio Sillitti DFG ABOGADOS Santiago Soria MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL Pablo Staszewski STASZEWSKI & ASOC Guido Santiago Tawil M. & M. BOMCHIL Emilio Vogelius ESTUDIO BECCAR VARELA ALFARO ABOGADOS ESTUDIO MOLTEDO

Christoph Liebscher WOLF THEISS RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH Barbara Helene Steindl BRAUNEIS KLAUSER PRÄNDL RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Uladzimir Nescier KPMG LLC (BELARUS) Tatiana Ostrovskaya KPMG LLC (BELARUS) Volha Parfenchyk CERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD HLAWATI Tamara Sakolchyk SORAINEN & PARTNERS FLLC

Eva Wiesinger FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Dennis Turovets EGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Alma Zadic FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Maryia Yahorava EGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Dieter Zandler C.M.S. REICH - ROHRWIG HAINZ RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Maria Yurieva SORAINEN & PARTNERS FLLC

AZERBAIJAN

ARMENIA

Sharafat Ahmadli DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC

Sayad Badalyan INVESTMENT LAW GROUP

Rashid Aliyev BAKER & MCKENZIE (BAKU)

Arshak Karapetyan INVESTMENT LAW GROUP

Elnur Aliyev BHM BAKU LAW CENTRE

Edith Khachatourian INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSULTING (ILC)

Anar Baghirov BHM BAKU LAW CENTRE

Naira Meliksetyan AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

Natavan Baghirova BM INTERNATIONAL LLC

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

Elena Hmeleva BUSINESSCONSULT LAW FIRM

Carmen Thornton C.M.S. REICH - ROHRWIG HAINZ RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

AUSTRIAN BUSINESS AGENCY

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS S.R.L.

Turkan Yusibova BAKER & MCKENZIE (BAKU)

Alexander Forster C.M.S. REICH - ROHRWIG HAINZ RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Ignacio Minorini Lima MARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL

Fernando Rodriguez Mendoza CONSULTORA JURIDICA RODRIGUEZ MENDOZA SOC. CIV.

Mustafa Salamov BM INTERNATIONAL LLC

Pedro Luis de la Fuente RATTAGAN, MACCHIAVELLO, AROCENA & PEÑA ROBIROSA

Monica Lupi SANCHEZ, LUPI & ASSOCIATES

Alejandro Pelaez INDACOCHEA & ASOCIADOS, ABOGADOS

BOLIVIA Enrique Barrios GUEVARA & GUTIERREZ S.C. Mauricio Becerra de la Roca Donoso BECERRA DE LA ROCA DONOSO & ASOCIADOS (BDA ABOGADOS) Ramiro Moreno Baldivieso MORENO BALDIVIESO LAW FIRM Carlos Mostajo MOSTAJO SOCIEDAD CIVIL - FIRMA LEGAL Denise Mostajo MOSTAJO SOCIEDAD CIVIL - FIRMA LEGAL

Femil ,urt FEMIL ,URT LAW FIRM Visnja Dizdarevic MARIC & CO Dina Durakoviü-Morankiü WOLF THEISS Nusmir Huskic MARIC & CO Nevena Jevremoviü WOLF THEISS FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY

BRAZIL Andre Abbud BARBOSA, MÜSSNICH & ARAGÃO ADVOGADOS Letícia Barbosa e Silva Abdalla WALD E ASSOCIADOS ADVOGADOS Antonio Barbuto Neto TOZZINI FREIRE ADVOGADOS Luciano Benetti Timm CARVALHO, MACHADO, TIMM & DEFFENTI ADVOGADOS Eliane Carvalho MACHADO, MEYER, SENDACZ, OPICE ADVOGADOS (MMSO) Fabiano Deffenti CARVALHO, MACHADO, TIMM & DEFFENTI ADVOGADOS Renato Fernandes Coutinho LOBO & DE RIZZO ADVOGADOS Ana Gerdau de Borja WALD E ASSOCIADOS ADVOGADOS Gilberto Giusti PINHEIRO NETO ADVOGADOS Renato Grion PINHEIRO NETO ADVOGADOS Ana Paula Hubinger Araujo LOBO & DE RIZZO ADVOGADOS Gustavo Kulesza BARBOSA, MÜSSNICH & ARAGÃO ADVOGADOS Giovanni Nanni TOZZINI FREIRE ADVOGADOS Rafael Passaro MACHADO, MEYER, SENDACZ, OPICE ADVOGADOS (MMSO) Fernando Eduardo Serec TOZZINI FREIRE ADVOGADOS

43

Rafael Soares MACHADO, MEYER, SENDACZ, OPICE ADVOGADOS (MMSO) Jorge Vargas Neto PINHEIRO NETO ADVOGADOS

Olivier Kry DFDL MEKONG LEGAL & TAX ADVISERS Vathana Sar DFDL MEKONG LEGAL & TAX ADVISERS

Arnoldo Wald WALD E ASSOCIADOS ADVOGADOS

CAMEROON

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

David Etah Akoh ETAH - NAN & C (ATTORNEYS)

Ahmad Jefri Abd. Rahman ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CHAMBERS

BULGARIA Anton Andreev ANDREEV, STOYANOV & TSEKOVA Metodi Baykushev DIMITROV, PETROV & CO LAW FIRM Kina Chuturkova BOYANOV & CO. LAW FIRM Assen Georgiev CMS CAMERON MCKENNA LLP - BULGARIA BRANCH/DUNCAN WESTON

Henri Pierre Job HENRI JOB LAW FIRM

Ivan Markov PENKOV, MARKOV & PARTNERS - ATTORNEYS AT LAW Juliana Mateeva KPMG BULGARIA Boyana Milcheva DIMITROV, PETROV & CO LAW FIRM Galina Nencheva YORDANOVA, RIZOVA & PARTNERS Diana Pashova BOYANOV & CO. LAW FIRM

Marcela Blanco DIAZ, REUS & TARG LLP Juan Sebastián Cañón PROEXPORT

Alfredo Lewin LEWIN Y WILLS

Sadjo Ousmanou CENTRE PERMANENT D’ARBITRAGE ET DE MÉDIATION DU CADEV

Nicolás Lozada MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND LAW (MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DEL DERECHO)

Charline Patricia Wandjou Ngatcha ETAH - NAN & C (ATTORNEYS)

Fabián Moreno LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

Mariana Naranjo LLOREDA CAMACHO & CO

Christina Beharry FOLEY HOAG LLP

Ivan Lutskanov KPMG BULGARIA

Carlos Gustavo Arrieta ARRIETA MANTILLA & ASOCIADOS

Reagan Mboule Esone HENRI JOB LAW FIRM

Velyana Hristova PENKOV, MARKOV & PARTNERS - ATTORNEYS AT LAW

LAW FIRM

Mario Andrade Perilla DELOITTE

Michael Diaz DIAZ, REUS & TARG LLP

CANADA

Ilya Komarevski TSVETKOVA, BEBOV AND PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, A PWC CONNECTED

Pedro Alvarez POSSE HERRERA RUIZ

Gaston Kenfack Douajni

Milena Gineva I.K.ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM - BRANCH BULGARIA IOANNIS ROKAS

Dimitar Karabelov DIMITROV, PETROV & CO LAW FIRM

Henri Alvarez FASKEN MARTINEAU DUMOULIN LLP

Young Park FRASER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP Rahim Punjani FRASNER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP INVEST IN CANADA

CHAD Kossi Mangua Nabia FECMA AUDIT FIRM JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

CHILE Félix Antolín BOFILL MIR & ÁLVAREZ JANA ABOGADOS Charles Bunce ERNST & YOUNG LTDA. CHILE Gonzalo Cordero MORALES & BESA LTDA.

Hernando Otero 1492 AMERICAS Carolina Posada POSSE HERRERA RUIZ Santiago Wills LEWIN Y WILLS

CONGO, DEM. REP. Grégoire Bakandeja wa Mpungu UNIVERSITÉ DE KINSHASA, UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DU CONGO, UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 - SORBONNE Nicaise Chikuru CHIKURU & ASSOCIÉS, AVOCATS/LAWYERS Kolongele Eberande UNIVERSITÉ DE KINSHASA ET UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DU CONGO Ndela Kubokoso David Luboya Kayaya EBIC EXPERTISE BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

COSTA RICA

Ines de Ros C.

Rafael E. Cañas FACIO ABOGADOS

Vladimir Penkov PENKOV, MARKOV & PARTNERS - ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Ramon Dominguez NOGUERA LARRAIN & DULANTO

Roberto Esquivel OLLER ABOGADOS

Milena Rizova YORDANOVA, RIZOVA & PARTNERS

Felipe Frias NOGUERA LARRAIN & DULANTO

Yavor Ruskov YORDANOVA, RIZOVA & PARTNERS Lyubomir Talev I.K.ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM - BRANCH BULGARIA IOANNIS ROKAS Ralitza Tihova I.K.ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM - BRANCH BULGARIA IOANNIS ROKAS SCHÖNHERR RECHTSANWÄLTE

BURKINA FASO Boli Bintou CENTRE D’ARBITRAGE DE MÉDIATION ET DE CONCILIATION DE OUAGADOUGOU JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

BURUNDI Déo Nitereka Gustave Niyonzima JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

44

CAMBODIA

CROATIA Iskra Bubaš VERŠI© MARUŠI© LAW OFFICE

Lenka Nemcova AMBRUZ & DARK LAW FIRM / DELOITTE LEGAL LAW FIRM

Ivan *uk VUKMIR & ASSOCIATES

Michal Nulicek HOGAN LOVELLS (PRAGUE) LLP

Tonka Gjoi© LAW FIRM GLINSKA & MIŠKOVI© LTD.

Rostislav PekaĜ SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, V.O.S.,

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Leysser León ESTUDIO FERRERO ABOGADOS - PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DEL PERÚ

Mojisola Olugbemi KENNA PARTNERS Anthony Omaghomi GEORGE ETOMI & PARTNERS Tolulope Omidiji PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LIMITED Ivie Omorhirhi GEORGE ETOMI & PARTNERS Temitayo Pitan KPMG PROFESSIONAL SERVICES Tope Solola SOLOLA & AKPANA Abdulhakeem Tijani Abdulqadir OLANIWUN AJAYI LP

PAKISTAN Danish Afzal KHAN & PIRACHA Taimur Ali Mirza MOHSIN TAYEBALY & CO. Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam AZAM & RAI (ADVOCATES & LEGAL CONSULTANTS) Alizeh Bashir KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN

Bruno Marchese RUBIO LEGUÍA NORMAND Maria del Carmen Tovar Gil ESTUDIO ECHECOPAR ATTORNEYS AT LAW PRO INVERSION - PRIVATE INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY

PHILIPPINES Arveen Agunday CASTILLO LAMAN TAN PANTALEON & SAN JOSE LAW OFFICES Maria Pia Altea-Urgello MANABAT SANAGUSTIN & CO., CPAS (MEMBER FIRM OF KPMG INTERNATIONAL) Camille Aromas QUISUMBING TORRES (MEMBER FIRM OF BAKER & MCKENZIE INTERNATIONAL) Donemark Joseph Calimon QUISUMBING TORRES (MEMBER FIRM OF BAKER MCKENZIE INTERNATIONAL) Vladi Miguel Lazaro CAGUIOA & GATMAYTAN ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW Mel Macaraig CASTILLO LAMAN TAN PANTALEON & SAN JOSE LAW OFFICES

Warda Bhatti AZAM & RAI (ADVOCATES & LEGAL CONSULTANTS)

Roberto Manabat MANABAT SANAGUSTIN & CO., CPAS (MEMBER FIRM OF KPMG INTERNATIONAL)

Amin Fakir KABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN

Ricardo Ongkiko SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & GATMAITAN

Amel Kansi MOHSIN TAYEBALY & CO.

Maricef Valderrama SYCIP SALAZAR HERNANDEZ & GATMAITAN

Amna Piracha KHAN & PIRACHA

Ben Dominic Yap CAGUIOA & GATMAYTAN ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Sehrsih Tasneem AZAM & RAI (ADVOCATES & LEGAL CONSULTANTS)

PUYAT JACINTO & SANTOS

Ammad Yasin RIZVI, ISA, AFRIDI & ANGELL

Wojciech BagiĔski Siemi¦tkowski & Davies

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Grzegorz Barszcz Hogan Lovells

Kari Rea ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & ATTORNEY GENERAL

POLAND

Gonçalo de Almeida Costa Garrigues Justyna Dubielak Garrigues

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

Roseti Adrian DRAKOPOULOS LAW FIRM Cristina Emilia Alexe POPOVICI NITU & ASOCIATII Valentin Berea BULBOACA & ASOCIATII SCA Oana Caminof NEMOIANU ATTORNEYS AT LAW (CORRESPONDENT LAW FIRM OF KPMG IN ROMANIA) Emilia-Timeea Ciudin WHITE & CASE, PACHIU SCA Cezar Diaconescu NEMOIANU ATTORNEYS AT LAW (CORRESPONDENT LAW FIRM OF KPMG IN ROMANIA) Adriana Dobre PACHIU & ASSOCIATES

Doran Doeh SNR DENTON (CIS) LIMITED

David Lasfargue GIDE LOYRETTE & NOUEL Andrey Novakovskiy LINIYA PRAVA Ekaterina Tulaeva WHITE & CASE LLC SNR DENTON (CIS) LIMITED

RWANDA Désiré Kamanzi KAMANZI, NTAGANIRA & ASSOCIATESCORPORATE LAWYERS JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

SAUDI ARABIA Ayedh Alotaibi SAUDI ARABIAN GENERAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY Abdullah Alsaab BAKER BOTTS L.L.P Sattam Al-Tayyar ATTAYYAR LAW FIRM

Adriana - Florentina Dobre RADU TARACILA PADURARI RETEVOESCU S.C.A. (IN ASSOCIATION WITH ALLEN & OVERY LLP)

Christiane Boukhater MENA LEX PRACTICE

Roxana Dobrila GILESCU & PARTENERII

Alain Sfeir BERYTUS LEX PRACTICE

Horia Draghici CMS CAMERON MCKENNA SCA

TAG LEGAL

Cristian Gavrila RADU TARACILA PADURARI RETEVOESCU S.C.A. (IN ASSOCIATION WITH ALLEN & OVERY LLP) Claudia Hutina DRAKOPOULOS LAW FIRM Ioana Iftode GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL - LEROY SI ASOCIATII Alexandru Mocanescu BULBOACA & ASOCIATII SCA Ioana Narosi BULBOACA & ASOCIATII SCA Mirela Nathanzon GILESCU & PARTENERII Daniela Nemoianu NEMOIANU ATTORNEYS AT LAW (CORRESPONDENT LAW FIRM OF KPMG IN ROMANIA) Zizi Popa GILESCU & PARTENERII Luminita Popa MUSAT & ASOCIATII

Floyd Davies CENTRE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT, DECENTRALISATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT

SINGAPORE Lawrence Boo THE ARBITRATION CHAMBERS, SINGAPORE Ho Choon Chia KHATTARWONG Chai Chong Low RODYK & DAVIDSON LLP Zhul Rahim RODYK & DAVIDSON LLP DLA PIPER SINGAPORE

SLOVAK REPUBLIC Martin ,abák HILLBRIDGES, S.R.O. Daniel Futej FUTEJ & PARTNERS, S.R.O. Michal Hulena RUŽIĮKA CSEKES S. R. O. Iveta Kaštielová RUŽIĮKA CSEKES S. R. O. Michal Kilian HILLBRIDGES, S.R.O. Martin Krendl RUŽIĮKA CSEKES S. R. O. Martin Magál ALLEN & OVERY BRATISLAVA, S.R.O. Jana Palþiková WOLF THEISS Martin Provazník BNT ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

SENEGAL

Andrej Schwarz WOLF THEISS

Thiaba Camara Sy DELOITTE

Rudolf Sivak FUTEJ & PARTNERS, S.R.O.

Nziengui Alioune Mboup SCP MAME ADAMA GUEYE & ASSOCIÉS

ALLEN & OVERY BRATISLAVA, S.R.O.

Daouda Niang DELOITTE

SOUTH AFRICA

Sylvain Sankalé 2S CONSULTING Makhtar SY DELOITTE Ndeye Khoudia Tounkara ETUDE ME MAYACINE TOUNKARA & ASSOCIÉS ERNST & YOUNG JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

SERBIA

Doron Block EDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC. John Brand BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC. Lloyd Chater BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC. Natasha Rech BOWMAN GILFILLAN INC. Tania Steenkamp EDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC. Roger Wakefield WERKSMANS

Žarko Borovþanin JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC UNLIMITED PARTNERSHIP

Anca Puúcaúu iUCA ZBÂRCEA & ASOCIAğII (iUCA ZBÂRCEA & ASOCIAğII )

Vuk Bozovic O.A.D. MARIĬ - MALIŠIĬ - DOSTANIĬ (CORRESPONDENT LAW FIRM OF GIDE LOYRETTE & NOUEL)

Corina Radu PACHIU & ASSOCIATES

Tijana Lalic LAW OFFICE PRICA & PARTNERS

Adelina Somoiag PACHIU & ASSOCIATES

Dejan Nikolic KARANOVIC & NIKOLIC

Cristina Togan GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL - LEROY SI ASOCIATII

Ðor¯e NovĬiĬ JANKOVIC, POPOVIC & MITIC UNLIMITED PARTNERSHIP

WHITE & CASE, PACHIU SCA

IKRP ROKAS & PARTNERS

Alexey Barnashov WHITE & CASE LLC

Okechukwu Ekweanya GEORGE IKOLI & OKAGBUE

Tomasz Ludwik Krawczyk Drzewiecki, Tomaszek & Partners Law Firm

Darko Spasic SPASIC AND PARTNERS

47

SPAIN

TUNISIA

UGANDA

Jorge Angell L.C. RODRIGO ABOGADOS

Maya Boureghda JURISMED

Enoch Barata

Tim Sales NABARRO LLP

Sandra Cajal B. CREMADES & ASOCIADOS

Imed Chorfi ERNST & YOUNG

Jackie Katende JN KIRKLAND AND ASSOCIATES

Audley Sheppard CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP

Bernardo M. Cremades B. CREMADES & ASOCIADOS

Molka Ellouze Ossanlou CABINET DONIA HEDDA ELLOUZE

Hellen Mukasa JN KIRKLAND AND ASSOCIATES

Camilla ter Haar FIVE PAPER

Alberto Fortún Costea CUATRECASAS, GONÇALVES PEREIRA

Karim Hammami JURISMED

Benson Ndung’u KPMG

Stuart Young WRAGGE & CO LLP

Miguel Ángel Malo Valenzuela CUATRECASAS, GONÇALVES PEREIRA

Donia Hedda Ellouze CABINET DONIA HEDDA ELLOUZE

Maribel Rodríguez Vargas CUATRECASAS, GONÇALVES PEREIRA

Mohamed Kallel ERNST & YOUNG

Miguel Virgós URÍA MENÉNDEZ

TURKEY

Marta Zamora L.C. RODRIGO ABOGADOS PÉREZ-LLORCA ABOGADOS S.L.P. Y CÍA. S.COM.P.

SRI LANKA Raneesha de Alwis F. J. & G. DE SARAM, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW Avindra Rodrigo F. J. & G. DE SARAM, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Zehra Betül Ayrancı MEHMET GUN & PARTNERS Gökçe Çiçek Balcıo÷lu ÖZEL & ÖZEL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW Haluk Bilgiç GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL (WITH CORRESPONDENT FIRM ÖHB) Bilge Binay BIRSEL LAW OFFICES

Taras Aleshko BAKER & MCKENZIE - CIS, LIMITED Olga Glukhovska EGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS Andrii Grebonkin CLIFFORD CHANCE LLC Denys Kopii INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM INTEGRITES Yuriy Korchev INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM INTEGRITES Volodymyr Kutsenko PJSC “DELOITTE & TOUCHE USC” Grigory Pavlotsky PJSC “DELOITTE & TOUCHE USC”

Hang Mai RUSSIN & VECCHI

Jennifer Gorskie CHAFFETZ LINDSEY LLP

Viet Hoa Ngo RUSSIN & VECCHI

Jonathan Greenblatt SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

Lang Nguyen FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

James Hosking CHAFFETZ LINDSEY LLP

Thi Minh Phuong Nguyen MAYER BROWN JSM (VIETNAM)

David Kay DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP

Suong Dao Nguyen MAYER BROWN JSM (VIETNAM)

Raúl Mañón SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY (US) LLP

FRASERS LAW COMPANY

Christopher Ryan SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

YEMEN, REP.

Aslı Budak HERGÜNER BILGEN ÖZEKE ATTORNEY PARTNERSHIP

Meng-Ying Fang PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL

Aliúya Bengi Danıúman MEHMET GUN & PARTNERS

Hsin-Ying Kuo PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL

Aslı Ersanlı MOROöLU ARSEVEN

Chung Teh Lee LEE, TSAI & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Can Ertugrul ICTEM LEGAL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

(Anita) Yu-Chin Liao FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Kurtcebe Noyan Göksu HERGÜNER BILGEN ÖZEKE ATTORNEY PARTNERSHIP

Alan T.L. Lin LEE AND LI, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Tevfik A. Gur GUR LAW FIRM

Glib Tsvyetkov AS CONSULTING

Angela Y. Lin LEE AND LI, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Göksan Gürel ÖZEL & ÖZEL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Anna Tyshchenko INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM INTEGRITES

George Lin LIN & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Gönenç Gürkaynak ELIG ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Vladimir Zakhvataev SALANS

Eric Tsai PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL

Serkan Ictem ICTEM LEGAL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Julia Zozulia GRISCHENKO AND PARTNERS

Yang-Hung Wei LIN & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Fulya Kazbay BIRSEL LAW OFFICES

SQUIRE SANDERS

Angélica María Marcano Peña RODNER, MARTÍNEZ & ASOCIADOS

TANZANIA

Asena Aytu÷ Keser MEHMET GUN & PARTNERS

UNITED KINGDOM

Rodrigo Moncho Stefani ARAQUE REYNA SOSA VISO & ASOCIADOS

Svitlana Romanova BAKER & MCKENZIE - CIS, LIMITED

Serhii Sviriba EGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Luis Alfredo Araque Benzo ARAQUE REYNA SOSA VISO & ASOCIADOS

Nina Sydorenko PETERKA & PARTNERS LLC

Dailyng Ayestarán MENDOZA, PALACIOS, ACEDO, BORJAS, PÁEZ PUMAR & CÍA

Benjamin Barrat CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP Oliver Browne LATHAM & WATKINS

THAILAND

S. Tunc Lokmanhekim ELIG ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Jennifer Buckby LATHAM & WATKINS

Chotiwit Ngamsuwan HUNTON AND WILLIAMS (THAILAND) LTD.

Erhan Seyfi Moro÷lu MOROöLU ARSEVEN

Lee Coffey JONES DAY

James Rix MAYER BROWN JSM (THAILAND) LIMITED

Akúit Berkay Noyan GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL (WITH CORRESPONDENT FIRM ÖHB)

Antony Crockett CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP

Maythawee Sarathai MAYER BROWN JSM (THAILAND) LIMITED Pakpoom Suntornvipat HUNTON AND WILLIAMS (THAILAND) LTD. DLA PIPER

Aslı Pamukkale BIRSEL LAW OFFICES Ferhat Pekin PEKIN & BAYAR LAW FIRM Burcu Tuzcu Ersin MOROöLU ARSEVEN Zeynep Unluturk ICTEM LEGAL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Luisa Acedo de Lepervanche MENDOZA, PALACIOS, ACEDO, BORJAS, PÁEZ PUMAR & CÍA Ramón Alvins DESPACHO DE ABOGADOS MIEMBROS DE MACLEOD DIXON S.C

Mehmet Köso÷lu GIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL (WITH CORRESPONDENT FIRM ÖHB)

Filip Tack MKONO & CO ADVOCATES

VENEZUELA, RB

Yaroslava Sakhno AS CONSULTING

Andriy Tsvyetkov AS CONSULTING

Jamie Drinnan WRAGGE & CO LLP Susan Kennedy LATHAM & WATKINS Felix Lautenschlager George Maling NABARRO LLP

Quang Thuan Dinh PHUOC & PARTNERS LAW CO., LTD

Stephen Anway SQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY (US) LLP

Chun-yih Cheng FORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Alexander Poels PETERKA & PARTNERS LLC

VIETNAM

Kevin Hawkins MAYER BROWN JSM (VIETNAM)

TAIWAN, CHINA

Olena Perepelynska SAYENKO KHARENKO

Cristhian Zambrano MENDOZA, PALACIOS, ACEDO, BORJAS, PÁEZ PUMAR & CÍA

UNITED STATES

Sarper Boz HERGÜNER BILGEN ÖZEKE ATTORNEY PARTNERSHIP

Karel Daele MKONO & CO ADVOCATES

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UKRAINE

MAYER BROWN INTERNATIONAL LLP

Anhelisa Villarroel VENEZUELA COUNCIL FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION - CONAPRI

Adel Aldhahab ALSANABANI & ALDHAHAB LAW OFFICE

ZAMBIA Mulambo Haimbe MALAMBO AND COMPANY

Milagros Betancourt C. CENTRO EMPRESARIAL DE CONCILIACIÓN Y ARBITRAJE CEDCA Hernando Diaz-Candia WDA LEGAL, S.C. Eugenio Hernández-Bretón BAKER & MCKENZIE Fulvio Italiani D’EMPAIRE REYNA ABOGADOS

Greyza Ojeda CENTRO EMPRESARIAL DE CONCILIACIÓN Y ARBITRAJE CEDCA Pedro Luis Planchart Pocaterra ARAQUE REYNA SOSA VISO & ASOCIADOS Eduardo Porcarelli VENEZUELA COUNCIL FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION - CONAPRI Melissa Puga VENEZUELA COUNCIL FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION - CONAPRI James Otis Rodner RODNER, MARTÍNEZ & ASOCIADOS Pedro Saghy DESPACHO DE ABOGADOS MIEMBROS DE MACLEOD DIXON S.C Paula Serra Freire D’EMPAIRE REYNA ABOGADOS

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES

49

50

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 2013