Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding

ISSN: 1750-2977 (Print) 1750-2985 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/risb20

Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific Julien Barbara To cite this article: Julien Barbara (2008) Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2:2, 123-149, DOI: 10.1080/17502970801988040 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502970801988040

Published online: 24 Apr 2008.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 716

View related articles

Citing articles: 5 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=risb20 Download by: [37.44.207.78]

Date: 25 January 2017, At: 00:51

JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING

VOLUME 2

NUMBER 2

(JUNE 2008)

Antipodean Statebuilding: The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Australian Intervention in the South Pacific Julien Barbara This essay analyses Australian-led statebuilding efforts in Solomon Islands, through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI has often been offered as a successful example of statebuilding worthy of international consideration. Here, some of the limitations of the RAMSI mission and its progress in rebuilding the ‘failed’ South Pacific state will be carefully assessed. Despite significant short-term statebuilding successes in restoring security and stabilizing the economy, RAMSI faces long-term challenges centred on the complex politics of political community-building. As an example of ‘best practice’ statebuilding, RAMSI highlights the complexities involved with the two-level game of international intervention: the (conflicting) challenge of reconciling the need to respect sovereign sensitivities with the need to undertake robust political engagement. Keywords Solomon Islands; RAMSI; statebuilding; South Pacific; Australian regional policy

Introduction The international community continues to struggle with its post-cold war statebuilding project centred on rebuilding failed states as a bulwark against regional disorder and as a basis for effective security and development (Chesterman 2004, Fukayama 2004, Chandler 2006, Chomsky 2006). Prominent statebuilding interventions have been notable for their outright failures (Iraq) or, at best, the fragility of their success (Afghanistan, East Timor). One recent statebuilding exercise with better claims to success than most is the Australianled Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). RAMSI arrived in Solomon Islands in July 2003 following a six-year period of civil conflict (1998
/2003) and made rapid progress in restoring security and kick-starting the difficult process of post-conflict statebuilding. Its early and substantial successes won RAMSI plaudits as an example of ‘best practice’ intervention. Australian foreign policy analyst Michael Fullilove (2006a, p. 4) described RAMSI as a ‘small ISSN 1750-2977 print/1750-2985 online/08/020123-27 – 2008 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/17502970801988040

124

BARBARA

but significant’ statebuilding example because of its innovative approach. The OECD Development Co-operation Directorate is using RAMSI as a pilot case study to test its principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States (OECD DAC 2005). Four years on, RAMSI remains a highly informative example of international statebuilding. This is partly due to its early successes in building sustainable institutions, but equally for the long-term challenges it now faces in consolidating its early gains. The circumstances leading to RAMSI’s intervention suggested Solomon Islands would prove particularly amenable to statebuilding (in the sense of RAMSI restoring successfully an independent, economically and administratively viable state apparatus capable of providing for the human security needs of its citizens). RAMSI enjoyed unprecedented local support from a Solomon Islands population eager for peace. The Solomon Islands Government (SIG) invested RAMSI with a comprehensive, long-term mandate to work with it to build its capacity and restore its effective sovereignty. The Australiandominated mission also brought enormous resources to bear on the small island state and used these effectively to quickly restore security and stabilize the economy. But the eruption of violent riots in the capital, Honiara, following national elections in April 2006, pointed to significant long-term problems in Solomon Islands and raised important questions about the purchase of RAMSI’s governance reforms. Since that election, RAMSI has faced increasing political resistance from a small but politically significant section of the elite that has regrouped and sought to play the ‘sovereignty card’ in an effort to undermine its influence. RAMSI is struggling to reconcile its functional statebuilding mission with broader nation-building challenges facing Solomon Islands, including those of political, economic and social reconstruction. These latter challenges are demanding ‘political’ responses that RAMSI is poorly placed to undertake, not the least because of its deliberately constrained structure in response to regional sovereign sensitivities. Given the seemingly propitious basis for intervention in Solomon Islands, these challenges make RAMSI an interesting case study through which to examine statebuilding’s limitations as an international aspiration. This essay investigates Australia’s engagement with the international statebuilding discourse through its role as lead-nation in RAMSI, which in many respects may be said to exemplify the philosophies and practices behind contemporary (Western-led) intervention efforts. While RAMSI is a regional mission, Australia wields considerable influence over its design, leadership and financing, such that it can reasonably be offered as example of antipodean statebuilding. The essay begins with a consideration of the statebuilding discourse and the imperative for international intervention. It then reviews briefly the Solomon Islands conflict that precipitated state failure necessitating international intervention. Claims to interventionary ‘success’ will then be considered with regard to progress made by RAMSI in terms of the core statebuilding dimensions of security, economic development and political

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

125

reform. As an Australian-dominated mission, RAMSI will then be located in the broader context of Australia’s changing South Pacific policy, with the mission itself reflective of, and complicated by, deeper shifts in Australia’s regional priorities and orientation. The essay will conclude with a consideration of RAMSI’s significance for the international community: its exposure of the myth of ‘apolitical’ intervention and the complications which conflicting political pressures pose for effective statebuilding. These pressures*/the simultaneous need to allay the sovereign anxieties of local political communities at the same time as meeting the transformative goals of the good governance agenda asserted as necessary by the broader international community of states*/constitute a form of two-level game (Putnam 1988) which complicates the prospect of successful intervention by statebuilding coalitions.

The Messy Politics of International Statebuilding Centred on ‘constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security’, David Chandler (2006, p. 1) observes that statebuilding is ‘widely held to be one of the most pressing policy questions facing the international community today’. Nevertheless, statebuilding remains highly controversial. Requiring powerful states to intervene in the sovereign affairs of weak or failed counterparts, it constitutes a profound challenge to the foundation principles of modern international law based on state sovereignty, non-intervention and the equality of nation states. The international community has struggled to delineate new international legal principles capable of accommodating the post-Westphalian statebuilding paradigm (ICISS 2001, Finnemore 2003, Bartholomew 2006), even as it embarked upon ever more complicated statebuilding missions (such as in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq). The statebuilding ‘imperative’ reflects the international community’s controversial judgement that a particular state has forfeited its right to selfdetermination, necessitating intervention to restore state authority in the interests of development and security. Statebuilding proponents argue that shifts in the international security environment and changing humanitarian expectations warrant a radical departure from established norms of nonintervention (Fukuyama 2004). The securitization of underdevelopment and state failure has created powerful, self-interested security imperatives for (Western) states to intervene to stabilize the state-based global order and prevent the emergence of governance black holes within which security risks can fester. The strengthening of cosmopolitan sensibilities in the post-cold war world has lent legitimacy to the notion of humanitarian intervention to uphold human rights, restore the human security of individuals suffering from state failure and lay the foundations for economic development. Critics argue that ‘humanitarian’ statebuilding is a cover for less benign motives. Chandler (2006) has described statebuilding as a form of ‘empire in

126

BARBARA

denial’ which allows Western states to clandestinely re-establish hierarchical power relations under the obfuscating developmental veil of good governance, partnership and capacity building. He cites the example of the informal Bosnian trusteeship, established by the European Union and the United States following the Dayton agreement, which makes ‘opaque the relations of authority and accountability’ (Chandler 2006, p. 124) and supports continued EU political influence over the shape of the post-conflict state at the expense of local selfdetermination. William Bain argues that the renewed interest in pre-colonial concepts, such as international trusteeship, which has accompanied the statebuilding paradigm has allowed Western states to legitimately question the conceptual framework of post-colonial international society. This has undermined the UN order, ‘premised fundamentally on the universal equality of all its members’ in favour of a ‘world order that is formally tolerant of some form of political hierarchy’ (Bain 2003, p. 60). Such critics argue that recent Western-led efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have discredited the humanitarian justifications ascribed to many statebuilding exercises while exposing the imperial underbelly of the statebuilding paradigm. The controversy surrounding international statebuilding has raised the bar for evidence of interventionary success. But this is limited. Few re-built states in the post-cold war period are in a position to resume fully their sovereign independence. Most have remained fragile and prone to recidivist violent conflict. Reviewing international efforts in the post-cold war period, Monika Franc ¸ois and Inder Sud (2006) conclude that rebuilt post-conflict states have performed poorly across core criteria such as economic development and political stability. Those that have not ‘failed’ again remain heavily dependent on international sponsorship. The fragility of rebuilt states was underlined when East Timor, long considered a statebuilding success story, was rocked by a renewed bout of political violence in 2006, requiring further international intervention. This patchy record suggests that statebuilders have failed to engage effectively with the processes leading to state failure. A major challenge facing statebuilders centres on the distinction between statebuilding and nation-building and whether states can be rebuilt at the institutional level without complementary intervention at the level of society. Referring to UN-led efforts in East Timor, Andre Borgerhoff (2006) makes the important observation that in undertaking intervention the international community is actually faced with a ‘double task’ of statebuilding and nation-building. While the East Timor mission arguably represented a high-water mark for robust intervention through comprehensive state- and nation-building, the international community has more recently tended to focus on the narrower, institutionallyfocused challenge of functional statebuilding (Fukuyama 2004, Schwartz 2005). In this sense, Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005) have described statebuilding as the largely administrative challenge of closing the ‘sovereignty gap’ by restoring the state’s Weberian or functional capacity across a range of core institutional areas (for example, the state monopoly on the exercise of violence, bureaucratic control, sustainable public finances, core infrastructure

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

127

investment, citizenship rights and support for market economies). Statebuilding in Afghanistan has been notable for its ‘light footprint’ (Chesterman 2002) as the international community works with a sovereign state in an intensified, capacitybuilding partnership. Many argue that this functional approach is inadequate as a basis for rebuilding viable states. For example, Shahar Hameiri criticizes the statebuilding paradigm for its crude state-society dichotomization and its failure to locate the state as a socially contextualized ‘expression of political power’ in which the state would be better understood as the institutional embodiment of ‘a set of complex societal relationships that is dynamic and shapes the use of the state apparatus’ (Hameiri 2007, p. 420). Understanding the state from this perspective leads to the recognition that statebuilding needs to be accompanied by the arguably more difficult task of nation-building if it is to have any hope of succeeding. Nationbuilding requires a different form of intervention oriented towards building stable coalitions of interest capable of agreeing to and sustaining ‘acceptable’ institutional compromises as a basis for the narrower objective of statebuilding. Borgerhoff, for example, defines nation-building as the ‘deliberate interest- and ideology-based formation of a national format which creates collective identity and affiliation of the population with the nation-state’ (2006, p. 103). Nationalist efforts to construct modern ‘nations’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries point to the important role played by the mass media, public education and economic modernization in supporting processes of national community-building (Anderson 1991, Smith 1998, Gellner 2006). Truth and reconciliation processes have more recently formed an important starting point for post-conflict nationbuilding. Despite its awareness of the need for complementary nation-building, the international community has struggled to develop clear or effective modalities in support of it (Hopp and Kloke-Lesch 2005). More importantly, the historical experience of West European nation-state formation provides a sobering warning that it is a long and fraught process in which a competent and authoritative state has itself an important, often coercive role to play (Tilly 1975). Reconstructing post-conflict political communities as a basis for sustainable statebuilding has proven particularly difficult for the international community. There has been a tendency to superficially equate the formal institutionalization of democracy with effective nation-building. But the experience of post-election Iraq indicates that a considerable gap can exist between the conduct of democratic elections and the formation of peaceful political communities. Hostile political elites pose particular challenges for statebuilders. Where states have failed as a result of ‘dysfunctional’ internal politics, tackling the problem of ‘compromised’ political elites may be a necessary part of the reconstruction process. But it is equally a fraught one. Attempts to purge political communities of malevolent factions will in all likelihood activate nationalist opposition and raises very real but awkward questions about the neo-colonial motives of intervening states. Moreover, there is no guarantee that deep forms of political intervention (or political ‘re-engineering’) will be successful. Alternatively,

128

BARBARA

international efforts to support the emergence of pluralistic post-conflict political communities capable of overcoming past societal animosities have superficially papered over deep societal divides, creating a poor foundation for re-built institutions. Thus, ambitious but fatally flawed US-led efforts to ‘deBathify’ the state apparatus in Iraq, for example, have simultaneously undermined state capacity and fuelled significant nationalist resistance to the occupation. The ‘double task’ of nation-statebuilding can therefore be said to pose real challenges for statebuilders forced to reconcile the often-contradictory demands of state and nation reconstruction. It could be said that international statebuilders face something akin to Robert Putnam’s (1988) two-level game: in the first instance, they must allay concerns over the sovereign implications of intervention by pursuing a policy of ‘respectful’ and ‘collaborative’ state reconstruction; but, secondly, they must also seek to recast social relations within the failed state through intrusive and unsettling forms of nation-building with a view to overcoming the social dysfunction which led to state failure in the first place. These pressures play out in terms of the distinction between statebuilding and nation-building and are often resolved in an uncomfortable and arguably ineffectual focus on statebuilding, constructed in apolitical terms but with an ambitious project of change, seen to be achievable through a focus on institutional and governance reform. In practice, of course, statebuilding (whether narrowly or broadly conceived) is inherently political. The liberal-democratic model directly or indirectly foisted onto failed states as a condition of international assistance restricts political processes of collective national self-determination. As Simon Chesterman observes, ‘contradictions arise between the stated end of transitional administration*/legitimate and sustainable national governance*/and the available means*/benevolent autocracy under the rule of the UN Security Council or some other international actor’ (2007, p. 6). While diplomatically and politically much more acceptable, the emphasis on apolitical statebuilding constitutes a prescription for ineffectual intervention. Sensitive to neo-colonial accusations, but not so sensitive as to not intervene, the international community has found it difficult to balance the contradictory demands of partnership and domination inherent in intervention. Statebuilders enjoy just enough power to muddy the local political waters but not enough to attempt to impose a political settlement on local communities in line with their asserted goals for postconflict political order. As an international aspiration, statebuilding can be said to suffer from a political disconnect which denies the interventionary implications behind the asserted goals and thus limits its scope of action. It is the contradictions inherent in the statebuilding paradigm which make its politics so messy and efforts so fraught. The challenge of reconciling processes of statebuilding and nation-building has been a central one facing RAMSI in Solomon Islands.

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

129

The Solomon Islands Conflict and the Necessity of Intervention The civil conflict that beset Solomon Islands from 1998
/2003 was of low intensity (less than 200 fatalities) compared to many other civil wars in the post-cold war period. It was nevertheless highly destructive. Over the sixyear course of Solomon Islands’ ‘tensions’, the small South Pacific Melanesian island state was brought to the brink of collapse (Kabutaulaka 2004a, McDougall 2004, Moore 2005). An ethnicised conflict, with many ‘new war’ characteristics (Kaldor 1999, Newman 2004), it fatally undermined the capacity of an already weak post-colonial state, causing a humanitarian disaster and raising the alarm of the Solomon Islands’ South Pacific neighbours. The conflict arose following the collapse of Solomon Islands’ primary export markets following the Asian financial crisis. This precipitated an economic crisis which exacerbated deep-set developmental and governance problems, including ethnicised grievances over the distribution of land and economic opportunities between local Guale and economically-dominant Malaitan groups centred around the Guadalcanal-based capital Honiara (Hameiri 2007, pp. 425
/428). As Solomon Islands’ already precarious economy faltered, these grievances flared into violent conflict and the prolonged lawlessness which eventually overwhelmed the state. Social and political tensions sparked when aggrieved Guale militants established the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army in 1999 (later becoming the Isatabu Freedom Movement) and seized control of the countryside around Honiara, causing 20,000 Malaitans to flee rural Guadalcanal (either to the Guadalcanalbased capital, Honiara, or the island of Malaita). Displaced Malaitan settlers then responded in kind by establishing the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), escalating the conflict. A state of emergency was declared on Guadalcanal in June 1999 but internationally assisted efforts to resolve the tensions, including the negotiation of the Commonwealth-brokered Honiara Peace Accord and the arrival of a Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group, proved ineffectual. In 2000, the MEF conducted a ‘joint operation’ with disaffected elements of the Malaitandominated Royal Solomon Islands Police Field Force, seizing control of strategic positions in Honiara and kidnapping and forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Bart Ulufa’alu. An ascendant MEF then took effective control over the Solomon Islands state. The 2000 coup entrenched a period of political disorder which saw some Solomon Islands political leaders collaborate with MEF militants to plunder the state of its scarce resources. Sinclair Dinnen describes how the administration of Ulufa’alu’s successor, Mannaseh Sogavare, ‘contributed significantly to the instrumentalisation of disorder . . . by using [culturally-grounded ideas about] compensation as a key instrument of peacemaking’ (Dinnen 2002, p. 289). Dependent upon Malaitan support, Sogavare implemented a ‘justice before peace’ policy, based on the payment of state ‘compensation’ to (MEF-aligned) ‘victims’ of the conflict (Fraenkel 2004a). From October 2000 to May 2001 the SIG

130

BARBARA

paid over US$3.7 million in compensation to 270 claimants (Hameiri 2007, p. 429). The December 2001 election of the Kemakeza government raised ‘the spectre of deepening collusion between corrupt political leaders and armed criminals’ (Dinnen 2002, p. 295) as some high profile ex-Malaitan militants themselves became Cabinet members. By 2003, overt violence had subsided but the state was mortally wounded. Solomon Islands had suffered major reversals across a host of economic and social indicators with the state itself unable to provide even rudimentary services, let alone security, to the majority of its citizens. If at this point the Solomon Islands state had perhaps not technically reached the point of collapse, by the time of RAMSI’s arrival in July 2003 there was a regional consensus that state failure was imminent. Solomon Islands’ political system proved incapable of facilitating a peaceful political solution to the tensions and itself contributed to the conflict (Fraenkel 2004a, Hameiri 2007). With its reliance upon personality politics, government within Solomon Islands was determined by a small, Honiara-based, political and bureaucratic elite. In the absence of stable party political foundations, Solomon Islands’ Westminster-style parliamentary system has been characterized by high member turnover (around 50 per cent at each election) and shifting political coalitions. As a consequence, ‘governments in Solomon Islands have been unable to maintain their cohesion through common purpose but have had to rely on patronage’ resulting ‘in a highly competitive political system in which reelection is far from guaranteed and governments seldom complete their four year terms’ (Hameiri 2007, p. 422). Political competitiveness was thus an important factor leading to the outbreak of the conflict. Hameiri argues that the initial Isatabu uprising in 1998 was sparked by the deliberate appeal of certain Solomon Islands’ leaders to ‘real or imagined grievances in order to mobilise popular support’ and that the conflict escalated when these leaders lost control of the situation (2007, p. 426). The collapse of political order also complicated peace-building efforts. These were constantly undermined by what Dinnen has described as a dynamic of entrenched ‘criminalization’ and elite efforts to capitalize the ‘spoils of ‘‘peace making’’’ (2002, p. 292). Civil society groups including church, women, youth and private sector groups valiantly sought to foster peace but struggled to make serious headway in the prevailing environment (Dinnen 2002, p. 290). State weakness was itself also a factor shaping the conflict. The Solomon Islands state had been perpetually weak since independence in 1978. Efforts to build a ‘modern’, post-colonial nation-state had been hampered by an indifferent colonialism, hasty independence process and fragile economic base. The sheer diversity of Solomon Islands was also a factor. Its geographic and ethnic fragmentation (around 80 languages for a population base of around 500,000 spread over 992 islands) ensured ‘the arrival of independence before nationalism’ (Hameiri 2007, p. 422) and made it difficult for the newly independent state to forge a cohesive national community as a stable foundation for national development. Several scholars have questioned the applicability of the very concept of modern statehood to Solomon Islands, arguing that the state had ‘yet to be properly built’ before the conflict erupted in 1998 (Dinnen 2004), and that,

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

131

to the degree that modern statebuilding had commenced, the incomplete and inappropriate nature of the institutions constructed actually precipitated ‘divisions between various parts of the Solomons’ (Reilly 2004, p. 488). However, Hameiri makes the crucial point that while the post-independence Solomon Islands state was weak, it nevertheless enabled a state-centred patronage system which allowed political elites to establish ‘coalitions of interest’ as a basis for (an admittedly unstable) political order (2007, pp. 419
/425). While this system did not accord with Western standards of good governance, it was functional to Solomon Islands in terms of reconciling disparate societal interests in the context of a highly constrained economic and political environment. It was only when this state-centred patronage system came under pressure following the economic crisis that it was no longer able to underwrite political order. Under pressure from international donors, Prime Minister Ulufa’alu introduced a 1997 Public Sector Reform Program which sought to restore fiscal stability and introduce economic reforms as a basis for economic recovery. While conforming with international ‘good governance’ standards, the thrust of this package had the effect of alienating political elites who saw their access to state resources (which formed the basis of their patronage networks) threatened, magnifying political grievances which eventually took on a violent form (Hameiri 2007, pp. 424
/427). Solomon Islands’ regional significance as one of the largest Pacific Island states guaranteed that conflict there would become a major regional concern. With the leading regional governance institution, the Pacific Islands Forum, playing only a limited role in peacebuilding efforts (itself a matter of regional frustration feeding into calls for its reform), the focus turned to key regional donors, like Australia, New Zealand and the EU, to use their bilateral influence to encourage resolution. Regional expectations focused most heavily on Australia (and to a lesser extent New Zealand), as a leading regional power and major donor. In October 2000, Australia and New Zealand successfully brokered the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) which provided for a weapons and general amnesty, police force restructuring and demilitarization. While the agreement provided a framework for peace, it failed to engage with the fundamental weakness of the Solomon Islands state, ensuring that the Kemakeza Government, elected in December 2001, was unable to enforce many of its provisions. In spite of the TPA, Solomon Islands continued to suffer from recurrent violence, corruption and economic decline. The efforts of coup leaders to establish a new political order proved unstable, with ‘the highly exploitative and exclusive nature of the post-coup patronage networks [making] . . . them unsustainable, particularly considering the harsh economic realities’ (Hameiri 2007, p. 430). Eager to disengage from their former militant allies, some political leaders saw external intervention as providing the only hope for a ‘circuit breaker’ to end the violence (Hameiri 2007, p. 431). In April 2003 Kemakeza, with widespread bipartisan and community support, wrote to Australian Prime Minister Howard seeking international assistance.

132

BARBARA

Australian Engagement in Solomon Islands As a major regional power with significant economic and security interests in Solomon Islands, Australia’s participation would always be key to regional peacebuilding efforts. However, for most of the conflict Australia proved reluctant to consider more radical forms of intervention. For example, in 1999 it rejected a request from Prime Minister Ulufa’alu for Australia to provide a small police contingent (Shibuya 2006, p. 73). Despite its successful participation in the UNled mission to East Timor, it took a long time before Australia seriously considered the option of intervening directly to end the conflict. Australia’s reluctance to countenance a statebuilding response to the Solomon Islands conflict was conditioned in part by regional sensitivities. Australia’s colonial history in the South Pacific (Thompson 1980) complicated the prospect for more robust forms of engagement, limiting its interventionary options. But it also reflected a deeper malaise in its regional approach in the decades preceding the conflict. Australia had for some time found it difficult to reconcile what it considered to be its largely thankless obligations as a regional power with the minimal returns it could expect to gain from the region. Australia’s ‘disinterest’ in the South Pacific prior to the conflict had already seen it criticized for its regional aloofness*/for being ‘in but not of’ the region (Shibuya 2006, p. 71). Calls for greater Australian involvement in the conflict before 2003 therefore went against the grain of Australia’s regional disposition. Up until mid-2003 the Australian Government steadfastly resisted demands for a more robust form of intervention in Solomon Islands, preferring instead to redouble its existing bilateral and regional approach. It increased bilateral assistance to Solomon Islands with a view to fortifying domestic peacebuilding initiatives and ameliorating the developmental consequences of the conflict (by contrast, the EU reduced its assistance). It hosted peace talks in October 2000 leading to the TPA. Australia also worked through regional fora to pressurize Solomon Islands’ leaders to reach a sustainable peace (Dinnen 2004). For example, it successfully encouraged Pacific Island Forum leaders to adopt the Biketawa Declaration in 2000, which established a (limited) framework for intervention in the affairs of member states to resolve conflict (Shibuya 2006, p. 76), providing a limited basis for more direct regional engagement in the Solomon Islands conflict. (The declaration was promulgated in the context of a perception of growing instability across the South Pacific such as the 2000 Fiji coup, governance challenges in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands conflict itself.) However, Australia resisted calls for it to intervene directly even as regional pressure mounted. This reflected its concerns over the enormous challenge that such an intervention would entail, but also the absence of a discernable ‘exit strategy’ and the associated view that if Australian troops ‘went in’ they would be ‘running the place for the next 50 to 100 years’ (Shibuya 2006, p. 73). As Eric Y. Shibuya has pithily observed, ‘[c]aught in a no-win situation, Canberra then erred on the side of inaction’ (2006, p. 73). The Australian Government refused

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

133

again a Solomon Islands’ request*/this time by Prime Minister Sogavare*/for the provision of a police contingent to support law and order in the lead up to the December 2001 elections. As late as January 2003, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer dismissed the idea of Australian intervention in Solomon Islands arguing: Australia is not about to recolonise the South Pacific, nor should it. These are independent sovereign countries . . . Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is that it would not work*/no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or a Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. The fundamental problem is that foreigners do not have answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon Islands. (Downer 2003a, p. 11)

Therefore, the Australian Government’s announcement, in May 2003, that it had decided to lead a regional intervention mission to Solomon Islands, was greeted with some surprise. Within Australia, the decision was justified explicitly through the related discourses of state failure and statebuilding. Australian Prime Minister Howard argued that RAMSI’s deployment would send the very important signal to ‘other countries in the region that help is available if it is sought’ and also demonstrate Australia’s ‘desire to help all the peoples of the Pacific to have conditions of law and order and hope and peace and stability for their future generations’ (Howard 2003). In September 2003, Downer declared to the UN General Assembly that it was ‘no longer open to us to ignore the failed states’ and that ‘[o]ld shibboleths*/such as excessive homage to sovereignty even at the expense of the preservation of humanity and human values*/should not constrain us’ (Downer 2003b). If ever a compelling case for external intervention existed it was in Solomon Islands. The six-year conflict had brought the resource-rich state to the brink of collapse. The need for external intervention was expressed widely by many within Solomon Islands itself. Nevertheless, Australia’s decision to lead RAMSI constituted a significant shift in policy and a challenge to the regional status quo. The following section will consider how successful RAMSI has been in rebuilding the Solomon Islands state. The reasons for Australia’s own decision to intervene will then be considered in further detail.

Statebuilding in Solomon Islands Contemporary approaches to post-conflict statebuilding emphasize the need for comprehensive institutional reconstruction focused on: the restoration of security; support for socio-economic development; and the promotion or restoration of state legitimacy, primarily through the establishment of democratic institutions (Schwartz 2005, p. 433). Internationally-led statebuilding

134

BARBARA

missions differ, however, in the degree of authority they enjoy to promote such changes. Richard Caplan (2005) distinguishes different types of transitional administration according to where they reside on a continuum tracing levels of legal or sovereign authority. According to this schema, the UN mission in East Timor (UNTAET), for example, can be located at one extreme as a (high-water) example of significant international authority. At the other end of the spectrum, Chesterman has described the current UN mission in Afghanistan as a ‘light footprint’ mission designed primarily to work with the Afghan state to ‘bolster Afghan capacity’ (2002, p. 37). While RAMSI represents an ambitious response to state failure in Solomon Islands in terms of its institutional objectives, it nevertheless constitutes a heavily circumscribed example of international intervention in terms of its legal authority. Fullilove argues RAMSI could not properly be located on Caplan’s continuum as ‘it does not even have supervisory authority’ and is ‘all about regime maintenance, not regime change’ (2006b, p. 33). Not properly an international administration, RAMSI is better characterized as an intensive state capacity-building programme. In Fullilove’s summation, ‘RAMSI has a unique kind of authority in the world of statebuilding*/it has substantial practical influence but works within and inside the SIG, which remains the repository of executive, legislative and judicial authority’ (2006b, p. 33). The decision to work through the SIG was considered essential to RAMSI’s endeavours not only to ensure the mission’s legitimacy*/both regionally and within Solomon Islands*/but also because its governance focus required the close cooperation of SIG authorities. RAMSI’s influence within Solomon Islands derives in no small measure from the considerable resources it has brought to its statebuilding mission*/around AU$800 million over the period 2003
/6 (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, p. 1103)*/and the operational price extracted from the SIG for its provision. For example, RAMSI’s assistance package was made conditional on the placement of ‘in-line’ (predominantly Australian) advisors in key public service*/notably treasury and finance*/and statutory positions within the SIG. These officials work as Solomon Islands’ public servants and give RAMSI’s backers confidence in being able to progress necessary reforms quickly. Of course, RAMSI also enjoys significant influence because of its substantial popular support derived from the contribution it has made to restoring order in Solomon Islands. However, despite being deliberately designed to work through the SIG, RAMSI was from its inception institutionally ambitious. The mission was structured as not ‘simply a law-enforcement operation . . . [but as] a long-term exercise aimed at helping create the conditions necessary for a return to stability, peace and a growing economy’ (DFAT 2006). It was to help rebuild the Solomon Islands state through a comprehensive governance reform package focused ‘simultaneously on the political, security, social, development and economic spheres . . . consistent with emerging international consensus on ways to effectively deal with state fragility’ (AusAID 2006a, p. 6). Consistent with this approach, RAMSI has focused on three main areas of governance reform: law and justice, economic governance and the machinery of government.

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

135

RAMSI has been very successful in restoring physical security within Solomon Islands. Its forward elements, led by a Participating Police Force (PPF) of around 330 personnel backed up by around 2,500 troops*/with Australia providing the majority of police and troops but with important contributions by New Zealand and other Forum member states (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, p. 1102)*/quickly asserted control over Honiara, and the provinces shortly thereafter. RAMSI quickly disarmed militants and oversaw a successful firearms amnesty (over 3,600 guns were handed in and destroyed). It also made important progress in arresting militia leaders and commencing reform of the deeply compromised and politically sensitive Royal Solomon Islands Police force. This included dismissing over 600 police (around 25 per cent of the total force) and laying charges against 160 police officers (Carroll and Hameiri 2007, p. 421). Having restored physical security, RAMSI began the longer-term challenge of supporting governance in the law and justice sector, which continues to this day. Its focus has been on improving local capacity, including through the provision of support to key judicial and administrative institutions such as the public solicitor’s office and the Solomon Islands Prison Service (Carroll and Hameiri 2007, p. 420). RAMSI has faced some criticism for the slow pace of its justice reforms, including the perception that it deliberately held off pursuing ‘big fish’ implicated in 1998
/2003 crimes, in favour of political stability (Carroll and Hameiri 2007, p. 422; see also EPG 2005, para. 46), and over its police capacitybuilding programmes in light of the negative perceptions of the police response to the April 2006 riots (see below) (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, p. 1102). Despite this, RAMSI’s unambiguous and early successes in restoring physical security invested it with considerable local legitimacy, which continues to underwrite its subsequent statebuilding efforts. In particular, RAMSI continues to be recognized as a fundamental security guarantor by the locals who overwhelmingly support its continued presence (Kabutaulaka and Kabutaulaka 2007, p. 602). A performance review survey conducted by RAMSI in mid-2006 found that 65 per cent of respondents expected violence to return should it leave ‘in the near future’ (RAMSI 2006, p. 8). Solomon Islands faces profound economic challenges which were exacerbated by, but predate, the conflict. As an isolated small island economy, Solomon Islands had for some time struggled to engage effectively with the global economy. An economic development model predicated on primary resource extraction provided an unstable and diminishing resource foundation for national development, leaving Solomon Islands heavily dependent on foreign investment and donor support and the vagaries of international commodity markets (Hameiri 2007, pp. 420
/421). The collapse of these markets in the late 1990s left the Solomon Islands state exposed and unable to facilitate the political compromises needed to sustain a fragile political equilibrium. Aware of the importance of economic recovery to its long-term statebuilding agenda, RAMSI has sensibly devoted considerable attention to stabilizing Solomon Islands’ economy and laying the foundations for sustainable economic growth. RAMSI’s arrival was made conditional on SIG agreement to a comprehensive economic reform

136

BARBARA

package. Informed by familiar neo-liberal development orthodoxies, this reform agenda has focused on ensuring public financial sustainability and supporting private sector development. To this end, RAMSI has enjoyed short-term success in stabilizing government finances and improving fiscal capacity in areas such as budget, audit, treasury, revenue collection, customs, and payroll and debt management (AusAID 2006a). But it remains unclear whether RAMSI’s economic governance focus will be sufficient to catalyse private sector-led economic growth as a basis for long-term political stability. As has been the experience with other international statebuilding missions, RAMSI’s arrival has stimulated economic recovery, with economic growth averaging 6 per cent since mid-2003 (IMF 2007, p. 5). Private sector investment has picked up in key sectors, such as forestry, palm oil development and gold mining. But Solomon Islands’ economy continues to face significant long-term challenges and important questions remain about the sustainability of this growth. The IMF recently described these challenges as ‘daunting’, with its forestry resources*/to take one example, accounting ‘for 70 per cent of its exports, 15 per cent of domestic government revenue, and 10 per cent of GDP’*/expected to be exhausted by 2014 due to unsustainable harvesting (2007, p. 6). With its focus on governance, RAMSI has also been criticized for failing to invest directly to overcome the significant infrastructure deficits in the Solomon Islands and for not doing more to tackle the politically sensitive but crucial economic (and political) challenge of land reform (which key donors, including Australia, are engaging with separately through their pre-existing bilateral donor programmes). Deeper questions remain about the appropriateness of RAMSI’s neo-liberal reform approach in the context of Solomon Islands’ post-conflict economy (Slatter 2006). Hameiri draws parallels between RAMSI’s economic governance agenda and the 1997 Public Sector Reform Program, with the former’s focus on ‘the supposed ‘‘trickle-down’’ effect of improved economic growth through export-oriented, market-driven reform’ marginalizing Solomon Islanders further from ‘important political and economic processes’ (2007, p. 432). According to Hameiri, RAMSI’s economic governance reforms have simultaneously exacerbated economic inequalities in Solomon Islands*/by favouring a small ‘Honiarabased bourgeoisie’, including an influential Chinese business community*/while precluding the development of new ‘coalitions of interest’ capable of bridging significant social, political and economic cleavages which remain there (2007, p. 433). RAMSI’s ‘state-centred’ economic governance approach has also been criticized by civil society groups for not engaging fully with community priorities or providing obvious ‘peace dividends’ (Kabutaulaka 2004b, Oxfam 2006a,b). Its focus on ‘apolitical’ economic governance reform has arguably excluded a more concrete consideration of how economic reconstruction could be used to foster alternative coalitions of interest necessary to the restoration of political equilibrium, stability and peace: ‘RAMSI impedes the development of such coalitions by imposing conditions that are detrimental to their formulation and

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

137

by promoting certain interests that neither enjoy wide bases of support nor demonstrate any inclination to cultivate them’ (Hameiri 2007, p. 433). It is in the political domain that RAMSI has struggled most to progress its statebuilding agenda. As noted above, RAMSI is a non-sovereign mission whose presence in Solomon Islands is conditional on an act of Solomon Islands’ parliament*/the Facilitation of International Assistance Act (FIA 2003)*/and its continued parliamentary support. Given the sovereign sensitivities surrounding the intervention, RAMSI was not designed to undertake deep political restructuring in the Solomon Islands and is therefore poorly placed to address the root political causes of the conflict itself. Instead, RAMSI has had to focus indirectly on governance reform to encourage better political behaviour. It has sought to do this through a ‘Machinery of Government Program’ which forms a major plank of its intervention. That programme ‘seeks to address serious ongoing deficiencies in government functions, including a lack of public sector and workforce planning, limited capacity and training opportunities and a lack of accountability, by providing support for capacity building and infrastructure to core government and accountability institutions’ (AusAID 2006a, p. 9). RAMSI’s need to work through the SIG to progress its statebuilding agenda has made it particularly vulnerable to local political developments and been an increasing source of political tension in Solomon Islands. With its governance reforms constituting a direct challenge to the old political order in Solomon Islands, RAMSI has been drawn ever deeper into the sphere of local politics as it has sought to progress them. Following the initial euphoria surrounding its arrival in mid-2003, RAMSI has come under increasing criticism from factions within Honiara’s political and bureaucratic elite who have much to lose from the mission’s continued presence in Solomon Islands. Such criticisms centred initially on the influence wielded by the ‘in-line’ advisors within core SIG institutions, most notably financial and treasury positions, and RAMSI’s ‘partisan’ support for the Kemakeza government (Carroll and Hameiri 2007, p. 422). They have more recently expanded to question the continued need for RAMSI’s presence given the ‘end’ of hostilities. These tensions came to a head with the fall of the Kemakeza government following national elections in April 2006, which set in train a series of events which have exposed the limitations of RAMSI’s governance approach. That election saw the usual turnover of seats in Solomon Islands’ parliament. While half the sitting members were replaced, many ‘big fish’ that had played prominent political roles during the conflict were returned, including Sogavare and Ulufa’alu (Kabutaulaka and Kabutaulaka 2007, p. 598). The ensuing jockeying for political position amongst the old guard saw Snyder Rini*/Kemakeza’s deputy from the previous government*/elected as Prime Minister on 18 April, effectively returning a government with a similar political complexion to its predecessor. His election sparked riots which left large sections of Honiara’s commercial centre (Chinatown) destroyed. According to Andrew Goldsmith and Sinclair Dinnen, Rini’s election ‘angered many Solomon Islanders anticipating a clean break from the corrupt and dysfunctional politics of recent years’ (2007, p. 1102). The riots

138

BARBARA

forced Australia to send extra troops to restore order and raised serious questions about the actual progress RAMSI had made. After a brief period of political instability, Rini was forced to resign on 26 April when Sogavare and a small group of his followers crossed the floor. On 4 May, Sogavare was elected Prime Minister of a ‘Grand Coalition’ Government. Sogavare’s election heralded a difficult period for RAMSI, placing it on the wrong side of local politics. The new Prime Minister was no big fan of RAMSI, having expressed reservations about the mission*/and Australia’s lead role within it*/on several occasions (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, p. 1104). Following his election, he stepped up his attacks on RAMSI, focusing on the poor performance of its police forces during the riots and its ‘partisan’ political role in the arrest of two opposition MPs, Charles Dausabea and Nelson Ne’e, charged with allegedly inciting the riots (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, p. 1103). From this point, relations between Australia and Solomon Islands deteriorated dramatically. Sogavare’s provocative appointment of the detained Dausabea and Ne’e to the Cabinet resulted in local and international condemnation. Sogavare also sought, with limited success, to undermine RAMSI by playing the ‘sovereignty card’. He proposed in May 2006 to ‘review’ RAMSI, arguing that the mission was not meant to be a ‘partnership to enhance Australian paternalism in Solomon Islands’ and noting that: ‘As things stand at the moment, Australia seemed to have used the provisions of the current partnership as a license to infiltrate almost all sectors of the public sector.’ (Sogavare 2006) In September, Sogavare expelled Australian High Commissioner Patrick Cole for alleged political interference, elevating what had already become an acrimonious diplomatic crisis with Australia to new heights. Sogavare also worked hard behind the scenes to undermine RAMSI’s influence within the SIG. For example, he centralized decision-making in the Policy Advisory Unit, based in his Office, and has repeatedly threatened to remove RAMSI’s statutory protections (Wickham 2006). In arguably the most serious challenge to RAMSI, in early 2007, Sogavare moved to re-arm a ‘hand-picked’ close protection force within the Solomon Islands police (raising concerns that he was moving to re-establish a paramilitarystyle force similar to that which wreaked havoc during the conflict), but later abandoned such efforts following strong public opposition (Alpers 2007). Relations with Australia reached a nadir in October 2006 with the Moti affair, when Sogavare provocatively moved to replace his Attorney General, Primo Afeau, with an Australian lawyer, Julian Moti. Moti was a close associate of Sogavare and shared the latter’s antipathy towards Australia (Kabutaulaka and Kabutaulaka 2007, p. 601). The decision to appoint him was taken as a direct rebuff to Australia and set in train a further deterioration in relations which spilled into the broader region. The Australian government responded to Moti’s foreshadowed appointment by seeking his extradition for a 1997 statutory rape charge; a move which, given Australia’s delay in bringing it forth, fuelled speculation about its political motivations. The Australian government was outraged when members of the Papua New Guinea military helped Moti escape extradition from Port Moresby, where he had been detained en route to the

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

139

Solomon Islands, and return covertly to Solomon Islands (where he was arrested on arrival for immigration offences) (Kabutaulaka and Kabutaulaka 2007, p. 601). PNG’s support for Moti soured its relations with Australia and resulted in a temporary ban on PNG politicians travelling to Australia, providing a further complication for a mission requiring regional support (and to which PNG had been an important contributor). Despite Australia’s efforts to dissuade Sogavare from appointing Moti, he was confirmed as Attorney General in July 2007. Moti has subsequently continued Sogavare’s oppositional policy towards RAMSI, including by proposing a review of the FIA (Tuhanuku 2007). Australia’s ‘clumsy’ and ‘belligerent’ (Hyland 2006) response to the turn of events in Solomon Islands drew significant criticism within Solomon Islands, Australia and the region. Sogavare sought to capitalize on mounting regional anxieties when in October 2006 he went to the Pacific Island Forum and asked Pacific leaders to revise the terms of RAMSI’s operation and curtail Australia’s influence within it. Recognizing that RAMSI could not operate without Australian leadership, Forum leaders rebuffed Sogavare’s requests, but the meeting itself was notable for their underlying concerns over Australia’s increasingly ‘hard line’ reaction to Sogavare (Skehan 2006). Australia was, of course, deeply frustrated at the turn of events in Solomon Islands and their implications for RAMSI’s statebuilding agenda. It matched Sogavare’s obstructionism with an increasingly firm diplomatic line since his election in 2006. Australian frustration reached its fullest expression on 9 February 2007 when Alexander Downer took the unusual step of publishing an ‘open letter’ to the people of Solomon Islands in the Solomon Star newspaper (Downer 2007). The letter expressed Australia’s general grievances over the turn of events in Solomons and its specific concerns over Moti’s appointment as Attorney-General and Sogavare’s moves to re-arm local police. In it, Downer warned that Solomon Islands was ‘once again at a cross roads’ and that, while ‘Australians and indeed your regional neighbours who make up RAMSI remain committed to working with you to prevent a return to those bad old days’, recent events had made it ‘hard for it to continue its work’. Downer continued: It would appear that you, the people of Solomon Islands, are currently facing two very important decisions: 1. Whether RAMSI and its partnership with you is to continue and 2. Whether certain units of the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF) should be re-armed. Moves by the government to re-arm the SIPF are of very great concern. RAMSI has acknowledged that the SIPF will need to use some arms in the future. But despite what has been achieved so far in building the capacity of the SIPF, it is clear that it is too early yet for such a sensitive step.

The letter concluded: Australia wants to continue to help Solomon Islands face the challenges of your nation’s future. But we are finding this increasingly difficult due to the obstacles being placed in our path. The coming weeks and months will be a critical time. The decisions that your country is currently considering on RAMSI and the question of re-introducing guns to the police will lay the foundations for the

140

BARBARA future. I urge Solomon Islanders to consider these issues very carefully, and to go out of your way to encourage your leaders to listen to you, their people, and make wise decisions for the future of your country. (Downer 2007)

This significant deterioration in bilateral relations between Australia and Solomon Islands has formed a greatly complicating backdrop for RAMSI and its statebuilding agenda. It has also underscored important structural tensions arising from RAMSI’s construction as a legally non-sovereign but institutionally ambitious statebuilding mission whereby: ‘The twin requirements of political stability and uniform law enforcement have entailed a difficult balancing act’ (Goldsmith and Dinnen 2007, p. 1104). In 2004, David Hegarty et al. foreshadowed the myriad political risks facing RAMSI after its successful initial phase including: the galvanization of political opposition, the bestowal of ‘false legitimacy’ on an unrepresentative government, and the perception of ‘overinterference’ in Solomon Islands’ domestic politics (2004, pp. 13
/14). Events leading up to and following the April 2006 riots suggest that RAMSI has struggled to keep its balance as it has been drawn ever deeper into local politics. According to Goldsmith and Dinnen: ‘Maintaining an appearance of political neutrality has . . . been a challenge [for RAMSI] given the fractious character of local politics and the dominant role of Australian personnel in critical decision making’ (2007, p. 1104). This has complicated RAMSI’s attempts to progress politically sensitive institutional reforms, such as in the police sector. In many respects, the April riots could be said to constitute a form of political ‘blowback’ (Johnson 2000): while RAMSI’s non-sovereign structure required it to cultivate productive relations with the incumbent Kemakeza government this had the paradoxical effect of concentrating the anti-RAMSI sentiment which surfaced with Sogavare’s re-election. RAMSI’s statebuilding focus has also arguably precluded a more concerted consideration of the nation-building challenges facing post-conflict Solomon Islands, for which it has been criticized. Solomon Islands academic Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (2004a, p. 7) has called on RAMSI to focus less on propping up a weak state and more on building a ‘functional society’. In a similar vein, Oxfam Australia has warned that: ‘If Solomon Islanders at all levels of society are not genuinely engaged in the process of reconstruction and reconciliation, the causes of conflict will not dissipate but instead retreat to the shadows and margins of the statebuilding enterprise.’ (2006a, p. 18) Hameiri goes further by arguing that RAMSI’s governance focus has actually impeded the assembly of ‘stable coalitions of interest’ as a necessary basis for peace by ‘imposing conditions that are detrimental to their formulation and by promoting certain interests that neither enjoy wide bases of support nor demonstrate any inclination to cultivate them’ (2007, p. 433). Alexander Downer’s ‘open letter’ to the people of Solomon Islands, which sought to leverage RAMSI’s considerable popular support as a means of undermining Sogavare’s political obfuscation, in many respects constitutes a belated recognition of the importance of nation-building to RAMSI’s specific statebuilding mission.

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

141

While RAMSI’s reluctance to move beyond the narrow parameters of functional statebuilding is understandable given the political sensitivities surrounding the intervention and its legal construction as a non-sovereign mission, it is also ironic given the level of local support it enjoyed and the popular expectation that its arrival marked a break with the old political order in Solomon Islands. Kabutaulaka (2004b, p. 401) argued shortly after RAMSI’s arrival that one ‘positive twist’ arising from the devastating conflict in Solomon Islands was that it forced ‘Solomon Islanders to come to terms with the challenges of building a nation-state out of culturally and ethnically plural societies and [to] reflect on the social, political, and economic challenges for the future’. Many Solomon Islanders saw the intervention as a chance to break with the past and begin the long process of nation-building. RAMSI’s non-sovereign structure meant that it was poorly placed to benefit from this goodwill.

Complicating Factors RAMSI’s difficult task of promoting apolitical institutional reform within Solomon Islands has been further complicated by the mission’s broader regional significance. The politics of intervention in Solomon Islands must be understood in the context of a broader regional development and security discourse centred on the notion of a deepening governance ‘crisis’ in the South Pacific and the corresponding need to construct a new regional order. As a leading regional power, Australia has found itself at the centre of this debate. Its decision to lead RAMSI in an effort to rebuild Solomon Islands state in many respects reflected a major re-assessment of its decades-long approach to the region as a whole. The statebuilding paradigm has provided Australia with an unprecedented opportunity to legitimately recast its regional policy and carve out a ‘new role’ for itself in its neighbourhood (Dobell 2007, p. 7). But the conflation of the very specific task of Solomon Islands statebuilding with the much broader challenge of Australian regional re-engagement has complicated the prospect of successful intervention in Solomon Islands. Of all the reasons behind Australia’s decision to support RAMSI, its security interests in the context of a changing South Pacific security environment loom particularly large. The Australian Government justified intervention on the grounds that a failed state in the region would become a haven for transnational security threats (such as terrorism and organized crime) and that action was required to prevent Solomon Islands from collapsing. In this sense, the state failure discourse linked powerfully with a mounting Australian concern about the ‘Africanisation’ of the South Pacific (Reilly 2000, Fraenkel 2004b, May 2004), manifest in the ‘faltering’ ring of fragile states stretching across Australia’s north-eastern shores known as the ‘Arc of Instability’ (comprised of the archipelagic Indonesia, East Timor, PNG and the South Pacific island states). In the years leading up to the decision to intervene in Solomon Islands, a kind of South Pacific domino theory had emerged within Australian strategic policy

142

BARBARA

circles, linking the need for preventative action in Solomon Islands to a broader challenge of re-casting governance to stabilize the South Pacific region. This theory implied that, if left unchecked, state failure in Solomon Islands would contaminate the region which would become a development and security nightmare for which Australia would have primary responsibility. The statebuilding imperative also provided Australia with a legitimate opportunity to re-affirm its regional commitment in the context of increasing ‘outside’ interest in the South Pacific. Whereas Australia has historically regarded the South Pacific as its ‘special patch’, its influence can no longer be taken for granted in the region. Most significant in this regard has been the rise of China and its increased engagement with the South Pacific (Zhang 2007). Australian foreign policy elites have become increasingly concerned that state failure in the region will make it more vulnerable to the overtures of external states with scant regard for its long-term security and development interests. China and Taiwan’s ‘dollar diplomacy’ has been particularly worrying in this regard. Their ‘no strings attached’ developmental approach has proven increasingly attractive to cash-strapped Pacific Island states but equally unsettling for traditional donors like Australia, keen to use ‘tied’ aid to encourage good governance and sustainable development. In the case of Solomon Islands, Graeme Dobell claims that Taiwanese ‘loans’ helped intensify the conflict on two occasions by ‘sparking a greedy grab for cash that descended from rent-seeking into banditry’ (2007, p. 10). The concern is that China and Taiwan’s ‘hands off’ approach might portend a period of greater political instability across the entire region. Yongjin Zhang offers the important corrective that China has become ‘a regional power by default’ but concedes that its ‘growing power in the Pacific has not been accompanied by an expressed willingness to take more responsibility for regional affairs in that area’ (2007, pp. 367, 376). Seen in this context of increased geo-political competition, RAMSI provided Australia with an interventionary beachhead from which to re-assert its regional influence. The decision to support intervention in Solomon Islands also reflected a renewed self-confidence on the part of Australia and its understanding of its South Pacific role. According to James Cotton, following its largely successful statebuilding efforts in East Timor, the conservative Howard government ‘developed a novel understanding of Australia’s regional role . . . implicit in the Prime Minister’s claim that Australia was both a Western and a regional country, and thus occupied a special status, being able to bring Western as well as global forces to bear on regional problems’ (2004, p. 138). Greg Fry observes that: ‘The most important aspect of the new push for region building from Australia is the return of a very old Australian discourse in relation to the South Pacific, that of ‘‘special responsibility’’.’ This is based on the idea that Australia ‘has a special responsibility to manage things in the Pacific Islands region . . . as being expected of it by distant and powerful friends’ (Fry 2006, p. 208). It could be argued that the decision to lead RAMSI saw Australia cross the ‘neo-colonial’ Rubicon; having made the momentous decision to intervene it came to feel less inhibited in

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

143

pressing for regional reform. This was best reflected in Prime Minister Howard’s own rhetorical justification for Australia’s more assertive regional approach, which arguably began to take on a more idealistic*/even neo-conservative*/hue in its self-confident belief in its ability to transform the region through preemptive intervention: Australia has entered a new phase in its regional role in the Pacific*/confident to lead, confident in what we offer, and confident we are seen as partners for progress. There was a time not so long ago when sensitivities about alleged ‘neocolonialism’ perhaps caused Australia to err on the side of passivity in our approach. Those days are behind us as we work constructively with others to address the challenges faced by our immediate neighbourhood. (Howard 2004, p. 17)

A weakening of Australian inhibitions in the region has also been reflected in a more demanding donor policy towards it, of which Australia’s support for RAMSI has become a major expression. As a major regional donor, Australia has become increasingly frustrated with the apparent intractability of the development challenges facing the Pacific and has looked for ways of increasing the ‘return’ on its regional investment (Atkinson 2007, p. 353). It has sympathized with the World Bank’s criticism of the ‘Pacific paradox’, whereby comparatively large per capita aid volumes, combined with positive resource endowments and reasonable economic management, have proven incapable of overcoming slow economic growth rates and generally poor economic performance (World Bank 1993). In what Alexander Downer has described as a policy of ‘cooperative intervention’ (Fry 2006, p. 204), the government has moved to more tightly link development assistance to discernible improvements in governance and development, with a view to promoting a state-centric Pacific community characterized by good governance, democracy and neo-liberal economic policies. The Solomon Islands intervention was important in crystallizing changing Australian sentiments in relation to its donor approach, as ultimately reflected in the Australian government’s 2006 White Paper on overseas development assistance (AusAID 2006b). Taking the size of its commitment to Solomon Islands as a sign of its good faith to the region, the Government has felt increasingly justified in demanding more from regional states. Howard confidently responded to regional criticisms of increasing Australian paternalism, through its aid approach, in an interview at the 2006 Pacific Islands Forum: ‘We’ll give significant aid, all we ask is that in return for that there be an improvement in governance standards and there will also be an improvement in economic management and greater economic growth. I don’t think they are unreasonable conditions and what is more, I don’t think my fellow Australians think they are unreasonable conditions either.’ (Howard 2006)

144

BARBARA

RAMSI and the Significance of Antipodean Statebuilding It is impossible to understand Australia’s substantial and long-term statebuilding commitment to Solomon Islands without reference to its broader regional aspirations and interests. But crudely accusing Australia of neo-colonialism in Solomon Islands simply misconstrues the nature of RAMSI and downplays the very real challenges that faced Solomon Islands in the period leading up to the intervention. Costing Australia around AU$200
/250 million per annum (compared with around AU$30 million in development assistance in the year prior to RAMSI’s arrival), its commitment goes well beyond that necessary to cordon off a failing state as a security threat. As RAMSI’s first Special Coordinator, (Australian) James Batley observed in 2006: ‘The idea that Australia or other participating countries are here simply to take advantage of Solomon Islands economically, or to dominate the country, is frankly ridiculous . . . there are much easier ways for Australians to make money’ (Batley 2006, p. 4). Certainly, Australia made the decision to intervene because the prospect of state failure in Solomon Islands challenged its vital regional interests. But addressing state failure in Solomon Islands was widely supported by regional states as a necessary part of a broader process of regional governance reform (for an overview of this debate see Fry 2006). Nevertheless, Australia’s particular interests in the region have complicated its statebuilding efforts in Solomon Islands by allowing its opponents to impugn its political motives within RAMSI. RAMSI’s broader significance lies in its illustration of the disjuncture between statebuilding and nation-building and the impossibility of ‘apolitical’ intervention. As an exercise in functional statebuilding, RAMSI has made important progress in restoring the ‘good life’ (Bain 2003) to Solomon Islands. Life in Solomon Islands with RAMSI is without doubt better than before its arrival. RAMSI has restored security and helped stabilize the economy. Less clear is the degree to which RAMSI has laid the foundations for a viable independent state, and the basis for its eventual departure. RAMSI has always conceived of itself as a longterm mission. However, the 2006 riots and subsequent political tensions point to serious, ongoing political challenges that will continue to complicate its statebuilding efforts in Solomon Islands. They also raise the possibility that RAMSI’s governance and capacity-building reforms have, to date, had only a shallow impact. This essay began with the observation that if any international statebuilding mission will be likely to succeed, it will be RAMSI, given its significant influence and legitimacy within Solomon Islands. However, RAMSI has found it increasingly difficult to play the two-level game associated with the intervention. On the one hand, RAMSI’s desire to respect sovereign sensitivities (within Solomon Islands and the broader region), and to work with the SIG in support of statebuilding, has complicated its ability to promote deep-seated political reform in line with its desired vision of post-conflict political order. On the other hand, RAMSI’s very influence has seen it drawn ever deeper into a messy local political arena.

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

145

RAMSI’s influence*/and specifically Australia’s within it*/has thus raised its own complications, not the least being the temptation to wield Australian influence to overcome political obstacles to reform. RAMSI’s experience in Solomon Islands thus points to the broader difficulty facing the international community and its commitment to respectful intervention when seeking to rebuild failed states. Statebuilding is by its very nature a deeply political act and, by its own logic, needs to be. The international community has justified statebuilding as a necessary response to state failure. State failure in turn is understood to occur because of the breakdown of indigenous political processes. Indeed, the decision to intervene follows a judgement by external states that local elites have in some way forfeited their right to govern a territorial state. By extension, a core task for statebuilders should be the ‘reform’ or ‘reconstruction’ of local political communities, to ensure they ‘fit’ the rebuilt state. Failure to ensure this fit means the newly built state will not resonate with the society it purportedly seeks to serve, making it again prone to failure. But ‘reforming’ local politics is an inherently colonial task which statebuilders have been keen to avoid (or at least avoid admitting to). The problem is that statebuilders that avoid or deny the political implications of the decision to intervene will struggle to construct durable institutions compatible with local politics. The challenge with getting involved in local politics is of course that it is messy. Efforts to endow a mission with significant authority will be resisted by local elites. More importantly, history indicates that efforts to re-cast local politics in line with an externally imposed vision of political order (as in Iraq and Afghanistan most recently) have little guarantee of success. Arguably, the greatest challenge facing RAMSI within Solomon Islands lies in how to engage a political opposition determined to derail the mission while keeping within the boundaries of ‘acceptable international behaviour’ in the context of what is a regional statebuilding partnership with the SIG. What is perhaps most interesting about RAMSI’s ‘non-sovereign approach’ and its need to work through the SIG is the degree to which it has allowed what remains a small opposition group to so complicate its statebuilding endeavours. Paradoxically, despite it careful efforts to respect sovereignty in Solomon Islands, political opposition to RAMSI has sparked an increasingly frustrated Australian reaction that has lent some credence to the perception of a creeping neo-colonial Australian disposition within the region.

Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Bruce Edwards for his research assistance and constructive comments.

146

BARBARA

References Alpers, P., 2007. Guns for the palace guard in Honiara: we should worry [online]. Austral Policy Forum, 8 February. Available from: http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/forum-reports/ 0703a-alpers.html [Accessed 3 March 2007]. Anderson, B., 1991. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 2nd ed. London: Verso. Atkinson, J., 2007. Vanuatu in Australia-China-Taiwan relations. Australian journal of international affairs, 61 (3), 351
/366. AusAID, 2006a. Solomon Islands: transitional country strategy 2006 to mid-2007 [online]. March. Available from: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/solomons06_07. pdf [Accessed 4 February 2008]. AusAID, 2006b. Australian aid: promoting growth and stability: a White Paper on the Australian Government’s overseas aid program [online]. Canberra: AusAID. Available from: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/whitepaper.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2008]. Bain, W., 2003. The political theory of trusteeship and the twilight of international equality. International relations, 17 (1), 59
/77. Bartholomew, A., ed., 2006. Empire’s law: the American imperial project and the ‘war to remake the world’. London: Pluto Press. Batley, J., 2006. RAMSI: rebuilding sovereignty in Solomon Islands [online]. Address by Special Coordinator James Batley at the Honiara Campus of USP, 24 July. Available from: http://www.ramsi.org/files/news/key_speeches/060724_RAMSI_ Third_Anniversary_USP_Centre_speech.doc [Accessed 23 March 2007]. Borgerhoff, A., 2006. The double-task: nation- and state-building in Timor-Leste. European journal of East Asian studies, 5 (1), 101
/130. Caplan, R., 2005. International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction. Oxford University Press. Carroll, T. and Hameiri, S., 2007. Good governance and security: the limits of Australia’s new aid programme. Journal of contemporary Asia, 37 (4), 410
/430. Chandler, D., 2006. Empire in denial: the politics of state-building. London: Pluto Press. Chesterman, S., 2002. Walking softly in Afghanistan: the future of UN state-building. Survival, 44 (3), 37
/46. Chesterman, S., 2004. You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration and state-building. Oxford University Press. Chesterman, S., 2007. Ownership in theory and in practice: transfer of authority in UN statebuilding operations. Journal of intervention and statebuilding, 1 (1), 3
/26. Chomsky, N., 2006. Failed states: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy. New York: Metropolitan Books. Cotton, J., 2004. East Timor, Australia and regional order: intervention and its aftermath in Southeast Asia. London: RoutledgeCurzon. DFAT (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) 2006. Solomon Islands country brief [online]. Available from: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/solomon_islands/solo mon_islands_brief.html [Accessed 21 November 2006]. Dinnen, S., 2002. Political chronicles. Winners and losers: politics and disorder in the Solomon Islands 2000
/2002. Journal of Pacific history, 37 (3), 285
/298. Dinnen, S., 2004. Lending a fist? Australia’s new interventionism in the Southwest Pacific [online]. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper, 2004/5, Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. Available from: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/discussion_papers/04_05_ dp_dinnen.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2008].

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

147

Dobell, G., 2007. China and Taiwan in the South Pacific: diplomatic chess versus Pacific political rugby: what is the problem? [online] Lowy Institute for International Policy Policy Brief, January. Available from: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication. asp?pid 533 [Accessed 4 February 2008]. Downer, A., 2003a. Neighbours cannot be recolonised. The Australian, 8 January. Downer, A., 2003b. Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September [online]. Available from: http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030924_ general_assembly_ny.html [Accessed 25 January 2006]. Downer, A., 2007. A letter to the people of Solomon Islands. Solomon Star, 9 February. EPG (Eminent Persons Group), 2005. Mission helpem fren: a review of the regional assistance mission to Solomon Islands: report of the Pacific Islands forum eminent persons group [online]. May. Available from: http://www.ramsi.org/files/epg_report_ final.doc [Accessed 4 February 2008]. FIA, 2003. Facilitation of International Assistance Act [online]. Solomon Islands sessional legislation 1/2003. Available from: http://www.paclii.org/cgi-paclii/disp.pl/sb/legis/ num_act/foiaa2003386/foiaa2003386.html?query foiaa2003386 [Accessed 4 February 2008]. Finnemore, M., 2003. The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Fraenkel, J., 2004a. The manipulation of custom: from uprising to intervention in the Solomon Islands. Wellington, NZ: Victoria University Press. Fraenkel, J., 2004b The coming anarchy in Oceania? A critique of the ‘Africanisation’ of the South Pacific thesis. Commonwealth & comparative politics, 42 (1), 1
/34. Franc ¸ois, M. and Sud, I., 2006. Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states Development policy review, 24 (2), 141
/160. Fry, G., 2006. Whose Oceania? Contending visions of community in Pacific region-building. In: M. Powles, ed. Pacific futures. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra: Pandanus Books, 184
/194. Fukuyama, F., 2004. State-building: governance and world order in the twenty-first century. London: Profile Books. Fullilove, M., 2006a. The testament of the Solomons: RAMSI and international statebuilding [online]. Lowy Institute Analysis, Lowy Institute for International Policy, March, Sydney. Available from: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid  351 [Accessed 4 February 2008]. Fullilove, M., 2006b. RAMSI and state building in Solomon Islands. Defender: national journal of the Australia defence association, Autumn, 31
/35. Gellner, E., 2006. Nations and nationalism. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Ghani, A., Lockhart, C. and Carnahan, M., 2005. Closing the sovereignty gap: an approach to state-building [online]. Overseas Development Institute Working Paper, No. 253, ODI, September. Available from: http://www.odi.org.uk/Publications/working_ papers/wp253.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2008]. Goldsmith, A. and Dinnen, S., 2007 Transnational police building: critical lessons from Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. Third world quarterly, 28 (6), 1091
/1109. Hameiri, S., 2007. The trouble with RAMSI: reexamining the roots of conflict in Solomon Islands. The contemporary Pacific, 19 (2), 409
/441. Hegarty, D., et al., 2004. Rebuilding state and nation in Solomon Islands: policy options for the regional assistance mission [online]. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project Discussion Paper, 2004/2. Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. Available from: http://rspas.anu. edu.au/papers/melanesia/discussion_papers/04_02_dp_hegarty_etal.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2008].

148

BARBARA

Hopp, U. and Kloke-Lesch, A., 2005. External nation-building vs. endogenous nationforming*/a development policy perspective. In: J. Hippler, ed. Nation-building: a key concept for peaceful conflict transformation. London: Pluto Press, 1
/12. Howard, J., 2003. Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard address at the Solomon Islands task force farewell. RAAF Base Townsville, 24 July. Available from: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2003/speech387.cfm [Accessed 9 October 2007]. Howard, J. 2004. Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Westin Hotel, Sydney, 18 June. Available from: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Speech/2004/speech921.cfm [Accessed 9 October 2007]. Howard, J., 2006. Interview transcript, doorstop interview, Sheraton Fiji Resort, Denarau Island, 23 October. Available from: http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2006/ Interview2198.cfm [Accessed 9 October 2007]. Hyland, T., 2006. Pacified Pacific: the strings attached, The Age, 5 November. Available from: http://www.theage.com.au/world/pacified-pacific-the-strings-attached/2006 [Accessed 16 November 2006]. ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), 2001. The responsibility to protect. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre. IMF (International Monetary Fund), 2007. Solomon Islands: 2007 Article IV consultation, June 29 [online]. Available from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07304. pdf [Accessed 24 September 2007]. Johnson, C., 2000. Blowback: the costs and consequences of American empire. New York: Henry Holt and Co. Kabutaulaka, T.T., 2004a. ‘Failed state’ and the war on terror: intervention in Solomon Islands. AsiaPacific issues, 72. Hawai’i: East West Centre, 1
/8. Kabutaulaka, T.T., 2004b. Solomon Islands. The contemporary Pacific, 16 (2), 393
/401. Kabutaulaka, T.T. and Kabutaulaka, L., 2007. Melanesia in review: issues and events, 2006: Solomon Islands. The contemporary Pacific, 19 (2), 597
/605. Kaldor, M., 1999. New and old wars: organized violence in a global era. Stanford University Press. McDougall, D., 2004. Intervention in Solomon Islands. The round table, 93 (374), 213
/223. May, R.J., 2004. Weak states, collapsed states, broken-backed states and kleptocracies: general concepts and Pacific realities. New Pacific review, 2 (1), 35
/58. Moore, C., 2005. Australia’s motivation and timing for the 2003 intervention in the Solomon Islands crisis. Royal historical society of Queensland journal, 19 (4), 732
/748. Newman, E., 2004. The ‘new wars’ debate: a historical perspective is needed. Security dialogue, 35 (2), 173
/189. OECD DAC, 2005. Piloting the principles for good international engagement in fragile states, fragile states group concept note, OECD 17 August [online]. Available from: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/25/35238282.pdf [Accessed 10 January 2007]. Oxfam, 2006a. Bridging the gap between state and society: new directions for the Solomon Islands [online]. July. Oxfam Australia and Oxfam New Zealand. Available from: http://www.oxfam.org.nz/imgs/pdf/bridging_the_gap_july2006.pdf [Accessed 23 March 2007]. Oxfam, 2006b. Conflict prevention or promotion? An analysis of economic planning and performance in the Solomon Islands [online]. April. Available from: http://www. oxfam.org.au/world/pacific/solomons/docs/conflict-prevention-or-promotion.pdf [Accessed 23 March 2007]. Putnam, R., 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International organization, 42, 427
/460. RAMSI, 2006. People’s survey pilot 2006: Solomon Islands [online]. Available from: http:// www.ramsi.org/files/People%20Survey%20Pilot%202006.pdf [Accessed 25 March 2007.

ANTIPODEAN STATEBUILDING

149

Reilly, B., 2000. The Africanisation of the South Pacific. Australian journal of international affairs, 54 (3), 261
/268. Reilly, B., 2004. State functioning and state failure in the South Pacific. Australian journal of international affairs, 58 (4), 479
/493. Schwartz, R., 2005. Post-conflict peacebuilding: the challenges of security, welfare and representation. Security dialogue, 36 (4), 429
/446. Shibuya, E.Y., 2006. Pacific engaged, or washed away? Implications of Australia’s new activism in Oceania. Global change, peace and security, 18 (2), 71
/81. Skehan, C., 2006. Howard to fly into diplomatic storm in Pacific, The Age, 20 October. Available from: http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/howard-to-fly-into-diplo matic-storm-in-Pacific/2006 [Accessed 20 October 2006]. Slatter, C., 2006. Neo-liberalism and the disciplining of Pacific Island states*/the dual challenges of a global economic creed and a changed geo-political order. In: M. Powles, ed. Pacific futures. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra: Pandanus Books, 91
/110. Smith, A.D., 1998. Nationalism and modernism. London: Routledge. Sogavare, M., 2006. Response to Minister Downer’s condemnation of appointment of two ‘jailed’ MPs as ministers in the new Solomon Islands government. Solomon Islands Government Communications Unit Press Release, 7 May. Available from: http:// www.pmc.gov.sb/?q=node275 [Accessed 9 May 2006]. Thompson, R.C., 1980. Australian imperialism in the Pacific: the expansionist era 1820
/1920. Melbourne University Press. Tilly, C., ed., 1975. The formation of national states in western Europe. Princeton University Press. Tuhanuku, Q., 2007. RAMSI voices concern over basis of proposed review of FIA act. Published on Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (http://www.ramsi.org) 20 September. Available from: http://www.ramsi.org.node/229 [Accessed 12 October 2007]. Wickham, A., 2006. Pacific: tangled webs [online]. New Matilda, 27 September. Available from: http://www.newmatilda.com/node/1836?ArticleID1836&HomepageID162 [Accessed 4 February 2008]. World Bank, 1993. Pacific Island economies: towards efficient and sustainable growth. Vol. 1: Overview, Report No. 11351-EAP, 8 March. Zhang, Y., 2007. China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific. Australian journal of international affairs, 61 (3), 367
/381.