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Ajani Crosley Philosophy November 1, 2012 Prof. Karbowski Rough Draft (1) Akrasia Socrates’ definition of akrasia is “weakness of will.” He asserts that this weakness stems from the deficiency in the of the akratic agent’s knowledge of pleasure and pain. This is essentially true, in the sense that if someone has the knowledge that an action is painful for them, they will naturally avoid that action. The reason that they perform the action is the result of their judging an action to give pleasure, after the consideration of the overall pleasure and the overall pain of the action. Pleasure and pain are the considerations that carry the heaviest weight during the decision-making process. In Socrates’ view of akrasia, the akratic agent can have knowledge of what is good and bad about the action, but ignore it by associating the pleasure and pain gained by the individual to mean that the action is overall good or overall bad, respectively. His subsequent investigation into the matter reveals the contrast between Socrates’ idea of akrasia and the traditional view’s opinion on the cause of akrasia. The traditional view of akrasia is one by which the akratic agent performs the wrong or unjust action while ignorant about the knowledge of what is good and bad about the action. In his initial examination, Socrates finds the view maintained by Protagoras to be such that “whoever learns what is good and what is bad will never be swayed by anything to act otherwise than as knowledge bids, and that intelligence is a sufficient succor for mankind…”(352c) That is to say, no one can act wrongly when they know what the proper course of action should be. According to Protagoras and the traditional view, people perform or avoid courses of action based on what they judge to be its overall pleasure or pain.

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For example, suppose a person on a strict diet notices a special, limited-edition coffee cake in the window of his favorite coffee store one morning. The traditional view maintains that in this situation, he would make a decision based off of his knowledge on the good and bad effects of coffee cake on his diet, self-esteem, and future habits. He has to consider the short term and long term benefits of eating that cake. In the short term, it’s going to taste REALLY good and set his day off to a great start. But in the long run, it can lead to a habitual breaking of his healthy diet, which can lead to weight gain and a relapse in overall health within the coming weeks or months. Therefore, eating the cake is an overall bad course of action. According to the traditional position maintained by Protagoras, the dieter’s decision to eat the cake would be a result of his lack of knowledge about the good and bad effects of cake consumption. If he has any idea that eating the cake will contribute to a steady development of bad behavior, with an akrasia that snowballs into something that affects more than the dieter’s choice in food, he will not eat it. However, from the Socratic perspective, he will eat the cake if he judges the overall pleasure of the action to be greater than the overall pain. Socrates’ view of akrasia is therefore based on the akratic agent’s consideration of pleasure and pain. Because instant gratification and short term pleasure have such a significant influence on one’s ability to weigh the overall pleasure and pain of everyday choices, the decision-making process can be severely hindered. Socrates sees akrasia plainly, as something that reveals the nature of weak-willed humans to be ignorant and pleasure seeking. It stands to reason that the decision between good and bad or pleasure and pain will be skewed if an individual has a depreciated knowledge of what is pleasurable and painful, by Socrates’ reasoning, or good and bad, by traditional reasoning.

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Socrates’ definition goes further during his dialogue with Protagoras. His supposition is corroborated by the idea that if someone is aware of what is the good decision versus what is the bad decision, they will perform the action they deem to be overall pleasurable. There is potential for the individual to perform the bad action, in full knowledge that it is bad, if and only if they assume it to be more good than bad. This contrasts with the traditional view, which maintains that a person cannot perform a bad action if they know it to be bad. When this happens, the individual is overcome by pleasure, and performs the action. This idea follows the assumption that humans seek pleasure and avoid pain throughout their daily lives, and that if they knew or considered what was pleasurable and what was painful, they would avoid anything and everything associated with the latter. This is the basis of the doctrine called Psychological Hedonism, and can be defined as such: an individual will perform an action if he judges it to be over pleasurable; and an individual will avoid an action if he judges it to be overall painful. Similarly, we can determine whether or not the action itself is good and just, or wrong and unjust, by observing the good and bad implications of the decision with respect to the overall pleasure and pain of the action. Normative Hedonism states that an action is good if it is overall pleasurable, and an action is bad if it is overall painful. This second doctrine is the consideration of Normative Hedonism; it provides a baseline by which to judge akratic agents and akratic actions. Through Normative and Psychological Hedonism, we can examine our previous case with the dieter and his cake. To reiterate, he believes that the taste and the feeling experienced during and after eating the cake are good, and he considers that to be the pleasure gained by making this decision. On the other hand, he is well aware of the unnecessary calories, sugar, disappointment, and other dangers hidden beneath the enticing layers of this cake-shaped

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rendition of his favorite pick-me-up beverage. This would be the pain. Should he value the inherent feeling or emotion of coffee cake over the consequences of breaking his diet, he would judge the action to be over all good act in accordance with Psychological Hedonism. And according to Normative Hedonism, he would be wrong in making that decision, which is overall bad. This follows Socrates definition of the akratic agents themselves. He believes them to be ignorant of that knowledge of overall pleasure and overall pain; otherwise they wouldn’t perform incorrect akratic actions. Therefore, they – the agents – are ignorant. Socrates uses these doctrines of Psychological Hedonism and Normative Hedonism, in conjunction, to determine why akratic actions are performed and whether or not they are acceptable decisions, respectively. Socrates speaks out against the traditional views and lays out an outrageously polar idea. That is to say, it’s interesting and in complete opposition to the current mindset of the people of the world at that point in time. His use of the two doctrines of Hedonism to support his perspective on akrasia and akratic agents is basic, yet intuitive. However, this extrapolation on these two simple ideas of human thought and action is lacking structure and definition. The combination of Normative and Psychological Hedonism used to extended the definition of good and bad to be pleasure and pain, respectively. This is referred to as Psychological Eudaimonism. Because he uses the assumption that an overall pleasurable action is a good action and an overall painful action is a bad action, he assumes that an individual would avoid the bad action and perform the good action if they had such knowledge. Those ignorant of such knowledge are subject to akrasia, as the overall pleasure and pain of an action are not always apparent to them. But what overall pleasure refers to and what overall pain means is a question that Socrates does not answer entirely.

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Normative Hedonism as Socrates describes it has a fatal flaw. It discusses the overall good of an action by using Psychological Eudaimonism to interchange good and bad with pleasure and pain. However, if this pleasure and pain is considered with respect to the individual, then in instances of extraordinary altruism, the individual would perform the overall painful action. In this situation, this would be the good action. For example, taking a bullet for someone is painful, but the action is considered overall good with respect to the situation, because a life would be saved. The overall good of an action is then considered not with respect to the individual, but with respect to the situation. If the individual acted not only for the good of the situation, but also with the consequences in mind, then they performed the action in full knowledge that it would be overall painful. Even though they judged it to be overall painful, they performed it, which is in direct opposition to the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism. So if it is possible to act in opposition to Psychological Hedonism while testing the definition of Normative Hedonism and in full knowledge of what’s going on, then Socrates definition of Normative Hedonism requires a re-parameterization of what ‘overall’ refers to. If the overall pleasure and pain of an action is therefore extended to apply to the general populous in this situation, then the overall pleasure of the action would, in fact coincide with the overall good of the action, and Socrates’ position could be maintained. The altruist would perform an overall pleasurable action that is painful to him but pleasurable to the populous. By the new definition of Normative Hedonism, this would be a good action.