A Broad Perspective on Proliferation Assessment Bruce W. Moran Safeguards Concepts and Approaches IAEA

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

Strategic Objectives of the Department of Safeguards 1. Deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by detecting early the misuse of nuclear material or technology, and by providing credible assurances that States are honouring their safeguards obligations.

2. Contribute to nuclear arms control and disarmament, by responding to requests for verification and other technical assistance associated with related agreements and arrangements. Contribute to nuclear arms control and disarmament…

3. Continually improve and optimize departmental operations and capabilities to effectively carry out the IAEA’s verification mission.

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Departmental Strategic Objective 1 Deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by detecting early the misuse of nuclear material or technology, and by providing credible assurances that States are honouring their safeguards obligations. Addresses all States (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Voluntary Offer Agreements, INFCIRC/66 States)

‘Misuse’ in the sense of both nuclear materials diversion and undeclared materials or activities IAEA

Departmental Strategic Objective 3 Continually improve and optimize departmental operations and capabilities to effectively carry out the IAEA’s verification mission

• Commitment to continual improvement and striving for excellence • Responds to expectations for effectiveness and efficiency • Applies both to IAEA‟s capabilities and internal ways of working

• Applies to whole IAEA nuclear verification mission IAEA

Strategic Area Safeguarding new and advanced nuclear facilities Safeguarding new types of nuclear reactors • Gen III and advanced small and medium sized reactors • Expertise, knowledge and SG approaches • SG equipment • Safeguardability and Proliferation Resistance

• Gen IV

• Expertise, knowledge • Safeguardability and Proliferation Resistance

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State-Level Concept A holistic approach to safeguards implementation

• applicable to all States and • based on a comprehensive State evaluation and a Statelevel approach, • including specific safeguards measures for an individual State, • implemented through an annual implementation plan. The concept of considering the State as a whole provides the opportunity to take State-specific factors into consideration in all stages of safeguards implementation. IAEA

State-Level Concept State-level general objectives:

JNFL-2 Site: REP

• To detect diversion of declared nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside facilities

• To detect undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and locations outside facilities

• To detect undeclared nuclear material and activities anywhere in the State IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

State-Level Concept Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) “… Agency‟s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, …, on all source or special nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere…” IAEA

A CSA is a State-level agreement verifying both correctness and completeness of declarations

State-Level Concept Integrated Safeguards

• An optimized combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency‟s safeguards obligations within existing resources. The additional protocol provides the IAEA with declarations on nuclear-related materials and activities and broader access to information and locations. IAEA

State-Level Concept Information Driven Safeguards Safeguards whose planning, conduct and evaluation are based on an ongoing analysis of all relevant information available to the Agency about a State to focus verification activities in the field and at Headquarters. Such safeguards are responsive to changes in the analysis to ensure that the assurances provided to the international community remain up-to-date and credible. • States’ declarations – CSA, AP, and voluntary • Inspection results, including verification data and inspector observations • Open sources, including publications and satellite imagery • Other sources, including internal documents and third-party information

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Proliferation Assessment • State-Level • Detection and Deterrence

• Nuclear Energy Systems • Optimized Design

• Facilities • Detection and Deterrence

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Proliferation Assessment State Evaluation Process

• Evaluation of all information available to the IAEA to draw a conclusion on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. • Use of acquisition path analysis based on IAEA Physical Model of the nuclear fuel cycle and weapons development process • Declared fuel cycle, including manufacturing, and R&D activities • Technical knowledge, equipment, and experience with respect to potential undeclared activities IAEA

Proliferation Assessment State-Level Approach • The combination of safeguards measures to be taken at facilities, and within the State as a whole, to detect diversion and undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

• Applicable to all States with respect to their safeguards agreements and the safeguards tools available to the IAEA • Acquisition path analysis used to determine proliferation risks, detection objectives and priorities, performance criteria, potential indicators and signatures, and detection measures • Implemented through an annual implementation plan IAEA

Proliferation Assessment Facility-level Safeguards • Facility-specific measures for the „as-built‟ facility design • Acquisition path analysis used to determine all credible proliferation scenarios • Detection of diversion of declared nuclear material • Material accountancy verification supported by containment, surveillance, and monitoring

• Detection of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material • Information evaluation supported by random inspections and complementary accesses

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Proliferation Resistance That characteristic of a nuclear energy system that impedes the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material or misuse of technology by States in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. IAEA

The degree of proliferation resistance results from a combination of, inter alia, technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements and safeguards measures.

Proliferation Resistance Assessment Determination of the intrinsic features and extrinsic measures to be implemented throughout the life cycle of innovative nuclear energy systems to ensure that the systems will continue to be unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons programme.

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Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are considered essential, and neither will be considered sufficient by itself.

Strategic Objectives of the Department of Safeguards 1. Deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by detecting early the misuse of nuclear material or technology, and by providing credible assurances that States are honouring their safeguards obligations.

2. Contribute to nuclear arms control and disarmament, by responding to requests for verification and other technical assistance associated with related agreements and arrangements. Contribute to nuclear arms control and disarmament…

3. Continually improve and optimize departmental operations and capabilities to effectively carry out the IAEA’s verification mission.

IAEA

Enhancing Effectiveness and Efficiency 1. IAEA is seeking to optimize effectiveness and efficiency using State-level concept implemented through information driven safeguards. 2. ‘Safeguards by Design’ offers opportunity to further enhance effectiveness and efficiency by including the requirements for IAEA safeguards implementation from the beginning of facility design. 3. Proliferation Resistance offers further opportunities for effectiveness and efficiency through the selection of nuclear energy systems that make misuse and diversion more difficult and facilitate verification of nuclear material declarations. IAEA

Summary • Optimizing effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards implementation has three levels • State level: detailed sensitive information on States must be used to determine State-level approach.

• Nuclear Energy System: general information on State, system, and facility level to evaluate candidate systems

• Facility level: detailed sensitive information on facility must be used to determine safeguards measures.

• Each level has different proliferation assessment needs IAEA

Conclusions IAEA Safeguards and Proliferation Resistance Assessments must work together to maximize effectiveness and minimize total costs of ensuring the absence of diversion and misuse of facilities

• IAEA Safeguards and Proliferation Resistance are complementary • Effective and efficient IAEA safeguards requires facilities and systems designed to accommodate IAEA safeguards • Proliferation resistant designs help to allocate safeguards effort more effectively and efficiently • However, proliferation resistant designs still require IAEA safeguards to provide assurance of non-diversion and no misuse

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…Thank you for your attention IAEA