14 Fisheries
14.1 The UK would remain a member of all key international fishing bodies 441
14.3 New fishing policy opportunities would become available453
14.1.1 Non-EU systems operate in the Atlantic already
442
14.1.2 The UK would cooperate better to help manage Third Party waters
14.3.1 The CFP has suffered from longstanding problems and enduring failure to reform
454
446
14.3.2 As long as we remain in the CFP, there will be a significant impact on the UK
456
14.3.3 The CFP has always been disastrous to stocks
459
14.3.4 Regulations could be set appropriate to needs
461
14.3.5 The UK has a number of possible alternatives to participating in the CFP
461
14.3.6 Withdrawing from the CFP enables, if needed, more radical action to be taken more responsively down the line
463
14.2 The UK could continue to cooperate with the EU on fishing
448
14.2.1 Preferential market access to the EU could continue 448 14.2.2 Current UK approaches differ hugely from countries that have looked after their fisheries and stayed out
449
14.2.3 Management cooperation would continue
450
14.2.4 EU ambitions for a Common Maritime Policy are even greater still, and will not go away451
14.3.7 Policy opportunities generate significant net gains for the UK463 Conclusion464
Fisheries
439
“The key issue is that British Governments have not prioritised protecting the fishing industry or national waters.”
The ‘pragmatic’ approach to European fisheries can be found in the Commission’s own booklet, How does the European Union manage Agriculture and Fisheries? The first paragraph states, ‘The Common Fisheries Policy responds to a host of legal, political, economic, social and environmental factors affecting both the fishing industry and the process of European integration. […] [The Common Fisheries Policy] can’t be ‘environmental’ – because these items are increasing the destruction of the marine resource. It can’t be ‘social’ – because people, especially in remote areas, are being thrown into turmoil. It can’t be ‘economic’ – because the fishermen are not allowed to sell the best and freshest fish from the quota share-out. So it leaves legal and political; for the process of European integration. John Ashworth, Environmental Spokesman of Save Britain’s Fish, June 1998494
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was skewed from its very inception. It was introduced into the acquis at the last minute, to the particular diplomatic embarrassment of the Dutch and to the benefit, in particular, of the French, to generate increased access for the fishermen of the Six to the home waters of the applicant states. This latter group consisted of four countries with particularly rich North Atlantic fishing grounds: the UK, Ireland, Norway, and Denmark (along with the latter’s fish-rich dependencies). In the event, the fix so angered the Norwegians that its Fisheries Minister resigned in protest, generating a political crisis that helped deliver a No vote in their accession referendum; the Faroes resolved to stay out of the EU; Greenland subsequently voted to leave; and Iceland has been motivated to stay out as well. As diplomacy goes, the policy has proven as counterproductive as it has been bluntly self-serving. The CFP has, however, operated in the interests of those member states that are prepared to place a premium on their fishing industry in negotiations (such as Spain, and unlike the UK), and for those prepared to use the policy as a lever elsewhere (such as Spain and France, particularly during accession talks495). The key issue is that British Governments have not prioritised protecting the fishing industry or national waters, preferring to put their limited chips into bartering in other areas.496 Some reforms have since been agreed to remove some of the CFP’s worst excesses. This has only happened after three decades of lobbying, they are partial reforms, and they are being phased in. Today the competence remains firmly within the EU Treaties and not where it can be best managed – by those with a direct stake in the commodity and who face the direct impact on their livelihoods.
494 The European Journal “The Fault of the Fishermen?” (1998), Volume 5 Number 8, page 8, accessed 30/04/2015 at: . 495 As displayed by Madrid and Paris’s attempts to lever preferential access for their fleets during 1994 negotiation talks. Norway’s accession consequently again hit the buffers in a referendum and for exactly the same reasons. 496 Or even just maintaining the status quo. The difficulty with defending the status quo against further integration is that effort is expended without gain merely in order to prevent further loss; countries that accept the principles of ever-closer union merely judge which gains outweigh which benefits, and trade the one off against the other. In this regard, Heath’s accession negotiators proved unusually integrationist from a UK perspective. But once accepted as acquis, the CFP was irreversible to any more robust successors.
440
Fisheries
“The CFP only applies within the 200 nautical mile limit of an EU member state, and is overwhelmingly focused on the rich Atlantic grounds.”
Removing the management of fisheries from the hands of the EU would enable the UK to regain control of a valuable commodity; allow for more environmentally-prudent management systems; increase national access to a resource that, under international law, is its right; and gain a major bartering chip over transitional fishing rights for states presently fishing within restorable UK territorial waters, and which may be obstructively protectionist towards other UK exports. But ultimately, if Norway can successfully manage its fisheries, then the UK and its devolved assemblies can do so too.
14.1 The UK would remain a member of all key international fishing bodies Key international bodies • Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN • International Council for the Exploration of the Sea • Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
The CFP only applies within the 200 nautical mile limit of an EU member state, and is overwhelmingly focused on the rich Atlantic grounds. The Mediterranean is still a multi-governmental arena through the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), which includes the Black Sea. The GFCM came into being in 1952 and consists of 23 member countries plus the EU corporately, with the authority to set “binding recommendations”. It has sub-committees: the Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC), the Committee on Aquaculture (CAQ), the Compliance Committee (CoC), the Committee of Administration and Finance (CAF), along with their respective subsidiaries. It is headquartered in a palace in Rome that is in the process of being part-shared with the Lithuanians as their embassy. Until recently, Baltic waters were largely run by an inter-governmental system under the Gdansk Convention. This ended only because EU territorial expansion made it redundant (Russia’s Baltic ports mean the process is now bilateral). The lesson here is that the EU is used to cooperating in an international environment to manage stocks where it does not have direct control. It does so with the non-EU Nordic Atlantic states. It could do so with the UK if it left the CFP. As Figure 14.i shows, aside from bilateral arrangements, there are already a number of multilaterals that govern how migratory and at-risk stocks are managed. The idea that there needs to be a CFP because fish cross borders ignores existing international management practices.
Fisheries
441
Figure 14.i: Territorial scope of leading international fisheries organisations ICCAT
WCPFC
AIDCP
IOTC
IATTC
CCSBT
NEAFC NASCO NAFO
SPRFMO
SEAFO LLAMLR NASCO
SIOFA
Source: Various
14.1.1 Non-EU systems operate in the Atlantic already With no CFP, the UK’s international agreements would largely be made bilaterally (or with as many partners as had a direct fishing interest). This would prune the number of diplomatic and administrative hangers-on and simplify decision-making. With limited participation, no Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), legal clarity over jurisdictions, and direct shareholding of the stocks, there would be a greater incentive to reach realistic quotas based on scientific advice and genuine community assessments of where stocks currently lie (geographically and numerically). A key part of the international framework is the UN. UNCLOS, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, defines basic rights and territorial limits. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the UN’s relevant body, including a Fisheries and Aquaculture Department. As its duties:
442
Fisheries
“Appeals to the WTO are not permitted by EU member states, since that is a corporate EU responsibility.”
• It collects, analyses and disseminates information on the sector’s operations (catch, production, value, prices, fleets, farming systems, employment); • It develops methodology, assesses and monitors the state of wild resources and elaborates resources management advice; • It monitors and advises on the development and management of aquaculture; • It provides socio-economic analysis of fisheries and aquaculture, and assists in the elaboration of development and management policies and strategies and institutions; • It supports and assists a network of regional fishery commissions and promotes aquaculture networks; • It monitors and advises on technology development, fish processing, food safety and trade.497 In practical terms, these duties include providing technical support to conservation authorities, supporting the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and advising on policy development. This is not a notional one desk operation. Component elements include the Programme and Coordination Unit (FIDP), FishCode Programme (FIDF), Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy and Economics Division (FIP), Policy, Economics and Institutions Branch (FIPI), Statistics and Information Branch (FIPS), Products, Trade and Marketing Branch (FIPM), Resources Use and Conservation Division (FIR), Aquaculture Branch (FIRA), Fishing Operations and Technology Branch (FIRO), and the Marine and Inland Fisheries Branch (FIRF). Its regional office covering Europe and Central Asia is, improbably from a maritime perspective, located in Budapest (since, as an FAO body, it covers agriculture as well). The UN agreements the FAO oversees include the UN Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. This 1982 agreement is fundamental in that it established that states should cooperate to ensure conservation and promote the objective of the optimum utilisation of fisheries resources both within and beyond their Exclusive Economic Zones. In essence, this sets the template for managing stocks that straddle borders. It includes tools for monitoring, compliance, and for enforcement. Disputes over caught fish are over a product, and are therefore subject to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and resolution. Note, however, that appeals to the WTO are not permitted by EU member states, since that is a corporate EU responsibility. In 2004, Scottish and Irish salmon farmers complained to the European Commission that Norway was engaging in dumping, selling salmon in the Single Market below market value on account of subsidy or state aid. The Commission imposed anti-dumping measures on Norwegian salmon, originally intended to last for five years, and it specified “a minimum import price of EUR2.80 per kilogram for whole fish and other minimum import prices for salmon fillets, etc.”.498 Norway challenged the Commission at the WTO, which found in November
497 FAO “Fisheries and Aquaculture Department”, accessed 17/04/2015 at: . 498 Norwegian mission to the EU “EU repeals anti-dumping measures against Norwegian salmon” (2009), accessed 17/04/2015 at: . Additional detail on the WTO website “DISPUTE DS337 WTO “European Communities – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway”, accessed 17/04/2015 at: and the EU trade website “WT/DS 337 – Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway”, accessed 17/04/2015 at: .
Fisheries
443
“Britain too would be able to defend its market access through the international bodies the Commission quietly obeys.”
2006 that the EU’s retaliation lacked evidence and was excessive, causing its measures to cease. The Norwegian Government summarised the triumph: Norway brought the matter before the WTO with two objectives in mind: to have the existing anti-dumping measure withdrawn, and to obtain clarification of various points that would make it more difficult for the EU to impose such measures against Norwegian salmon in the future. The Panel’s report provides a sound basis for achieving both of these objectives.499 This indicates that Britain too would be able to defend its market access through international bodies the Commission quietly obeys. This should quell fears that, if Britain leaves the Union, the EU would arbitrarily take every opportunity to block British exports out of spite – it simply cannot.
Figure 14.ii: ICES advice progress Data from members states
Advice Policy set by ACOM
Assessment Working Group
Review Group
Advice Drafting Group
ACOM WebEx
ICES advice published
Source: ICES500
The ability of the UK to run its own fisheries policy is again demonstrated by the existence of another international body covering the area, one that predates the UN. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES; CIEM in French) was founded by the UK and seven other states in 1902, following conferences held in Stockholm in 1899. It works to “promote and encourage research and investigations for the study of the sea particularly those related to the living
499 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “WTO Panel rules in favour of Norway in salmon case” (2007), accessed 01/05/2015 at: . 500 ICES “Follow our advisory process”, accessed 01/05/2015 at: .
444
Fisheries
resources thereof” (Art. 1) and its research work is focused on the North Atlantic. In 2002, its role was reaffirmed as being to act “as a strong and independent scientific organisation in order to improve its capacity to give unbiased, sound, reliable, and credible scientific advice on human activities affecting, and affected by, marine ecosystems.” 501 ICES is headquartered in Copenhagen, meets annually or as required, and works largely by simple majority voting. It has a staff of around 56, operating on a budget of about £4.5m.502 Its personnel coordinate around 150 pan-national working groups such as the Working Group on Commercial Catches; the Workshop on Age Reading of Horse Mackerel, Mediterranean Horse Mackerel and Blue Jack Mackerel; the Working Group on Biological Effects of Contaminants; and the Working Group on the History of Fish and Fisheries (covering reviews of historical data).
Figure 14.iii: UK and neighbouring EU waters in the context of ICES ecoregions
Source: ICES503
From the viewpoint of providing vital statistics, therefore, the European Commission is not an irreplaceable asset either, dealing as it does with the data provided by national counterparts. Then there is NAFO, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization.504 Its Fisheries Commission is responsible for the management and conservation of the fishery resources of the Regulatory Area (waters outside the Exclusive Economic Zones) and annually decides on the NAFO fisheries regulations, Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and quotas.505 These are based on advice from the Scientific Council, while internal and external relations are run through a General Council. It is managed from Nova Scotia, Canada. NAFO has 12 full members. Ukraine has a seat. Japan and South Korea both have seats. France has a seat, representing St Pierre et Miquelon. Denmark is present representing Greenland and the Faroes. The UK does not have a seat, as EU members are otherwise represented by the European Commission. Outside 501 The Copenhagen Declaration on Future ICES Strategy (2002). 502 Compare with the Commission’s DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, with a staff of 400 (as one of the smaller DGs), and which hands out that amount in subsidies on average every three days. 503 ICES Maps and spatial information, accessed 17/04/2015 at: . 504 This is the successor to ICNAF, founded in 1949, itself an offshoot of what was in its first incarnation in 1921 the NACFI. Fisheries management is again shown to predate the EU. NAFO’s geographical focus is further to the west. 505 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, accessed 17/04/2015 at: .
Fisheries
445
“The EU is instructing member states to comply with international law in order to comply with legally inferior EU law.”
the CFP, the UK would gain representation of its blue water fishing interests alongside Norway. Absurdly, as voting in NAFO is by membership, and typically through majority voting, the EU collectively has one vote whereas it previously had several through its member states.506 Other relevant international bodies include the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). This was set up after a conference in Rio in 1966 and actually covers around 30 species. It is credited by members as being the only authority capable of managing these stocks. The UK (as well as France) is a contracting party, but only on behalf of its Overseas Colonies and Territories (OCTs). The European Commission acts on behalf of EU member states themselves. Meanwhile, member states are still engaged at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) whose responsibilities include aspects of fisheries. The European Commission has encouraged member states to sign up to the IMO’s 1995 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (the STCW (F) Convention). The Convention introduces, for the first time, an international standard for the training and qualifications of fishermen, and the UK had not ratified it previously. The reason it is seeking to do so now is somewhat telling: “similar decisions arising in the context of the International Labour Organization impose, in practice, an obligation upon member states as failure to comply would be regarded by the Commission as a breach of EU law.” 507 In other words, the EU is instructing member states to comply with international law in order to comply with legally inferior EU law. In any event, it provides another example of how the EU is not operating in a vacuum.
14.1.2 The UK would cooperate better to help manage Third Party waters One of the enduring scandals surrounding the CFP has involved Third Party Agreements (TPAs). These deals, largely covering Spanish vessels, allow continued or extended access to developing countries’ waters. The impact on desperate small scale fishing communities in these countries is such that it has been identified as one factor behind the rise of Somali piracy.
Chart 14.iv: List of EU fisheries TPAs as at late 2014 Country
Expiry
Type
EU annual contribution (€)
Cape Verde
No protocol in force since 2014. New protocol initialled.
Comoros
2016
Tuna
600,000
Côte d’Ivoire
2018
Tuna
680,000
Gabon
2016
Tuna
1,350,000
Gambia
No protocol in force
Greenland
2015
Mixed
17,847,244
506 We are not aware of any audit of how frequent this diplomatic loss is across international organisations, but it would increase as Commission competences become total. Croatia, for instance, had to withdraw from ICCAT on accession. 507 European Scrutiny Committee “Safety standards for fishermen”, accessed 17/04/2015 at: . The situation is complicated by governments now recognising a conflict with EU employment law, and a challenge to the legal base at the ECJ.
446
Fisheries
Country
Expiry
Type
EU annual contribution (€)
Guinea
Agreement and Protocol provisionally applied during 2009 but subsequently withdrawn.
Guinea- Bissau
2017
Equatorial Guinea
No protocol in force
Kiribati
Mixed
9,200,000
2015
Tuna
1,325,000
Madagascar
2014
Tuna
1,525,000
Mauritania
Protocol expired on 2014
Mauritius
2017
Micronesia
No protocol in force since 2010
Morocco
2015
Mixed
30,000,000
Mozambique
2015
Tuna
980 000
São Tomé and Principe
2018
Tuna
710,000 / 675,000
Senegal
2019
Tuna (+ hake component)
1,808,000 / 1,668,000
Seychelles
2020
Tuna
5 000 000
Solomon Islands
No protocol in force since 2012
Tuna
660 000
NGOs have repeatedly raised concerns about not only the economic impact of highly competitive western vessels on subsistence fishing, but also about ecological damage, illegal and illicit overfishing, and in particular unlawful and dangerous practices undertaken to facilitate the latter without detection. Greenpeace, for instance, has highlighted the impact of TPA bulk catch on Mauritanian and Senegalese communities. The UN further assesses that Guinea alone loses €105m of stocks to illegal fishing.508 With one in five Senegalese employed in the fishing industry, the risk to its economy has obvious knock-on effects: increasing attempts to migrate to Europe for alternative livelihoods. The CFP is correspondingly a key element in the disjointed system generating the EU’s own migration crisis – its policies effectively export maritime unemployment, then the EU reaps what it sows in consequent legal and illegal immigration. The example of Bluefin tuna serves as a broader management warning. ICCAT fisheries experts in 2007 recommended setting a quota of 15,000 tonnes on that fish. Horse-trading at the Council of Ministers led to an EU quota bid set at 29,000 tonnes. There have been similar increases in the quota for North Sea cod, despite 93 per cent of its 2008 catch being immature. The Commission identifies 88 per cent of EU stocks as overfished, compared with 25 per cent of world stocks.509 EU management systems are simply not fit for purpose.
508 See Guardian “Is the EU taking its over-fishing habits to west African waters?”, J. Vidal (2012), accessed 17/04/2015 at: . 509 The European Journal, (2009), page 5, accessed 17/04/2015 at: .
Fisheries
447
“Through bilateral cooperation, Norway has remarkably good access.”
14.2 The UK could continue to cooperate with the EU on fishing Key issues • Management cooperation • Preferential market access
Of course, Britain would cooperate with interested parties in managing both migratory fish stocks and the transition of foreign fleets operating within UK waters to a new system if it left the EU. UK delegates would, however, have their negotiating strength restored, since they would be managing a national resource to which they had full legal title.
14.2.1 Preferential market access to the EU could continue The CFP is specifically not part of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, so states like Norway do not benefit from automatic tariff- and quota- free access to the Single Market for their major seafood exports. Nevertheless, through bilateral cooperation, Norway has remarkably good access. Over 60 per cent of Norway’s seafood exports were sold to the EU in 1999.510 Sales to Eastern European states may even have expanded recently due to the EU’s standoff with Russia over Ukraine. Protocol Nine of the EEA agreement exempts some white fish from tariffs and reduces tariffs on others, but “[i]mportant Norwegian export products such as herring, mackerel, salmon, prawns, scallops and Norway lobster are not covered by the tariff reductions in the agreement, and are thus subject to high tariff rates when exported to the EU.” This isn’t the whole story – on some products, tariffs are designed only to discourage Norway exporting processed products. So instead, unprocessed fish are sold to Denmark (at a lower tariff) and Denmark benefits from the value added of bringing the goods to final market.511 In recent years, the EU and Norway have agreed to drop many fish and agricultural tariffs, as foreseen in the EEA Agreement’s Article 19 biennial review clause. Previously, it had often been Norway that “resisted EU efforts for ambitious liberalisation”.512 Here, however, we see Norway successfully protecting its interests. The EU exempted Norway’s cod, saithe (pollock), haddock and halibut from duty altogether.513 Other tariff lines are extremely detailed so it is difficult to claim that ‘the tax on fish is X per cent’ or even ‘the tax on salmon is Y per cent’. Certainly, tariffs on Norwegian exports are extremely low. For example, while the EU’s general tariff on an average country’s sales of Atlantic Salmon, that is ‘whole or in pieces but not minced’, is 5.5 per cent, yet Norway enjoys a preferential rate of zero per cent.514 On a type of raw frozen herring fillets, Norway’s tariff from the EU is three per cent as compared to the world’s 15 per
510 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Part 6 – The EEA and Norway’s room for manoeuvre”, Report No.12 to the Storting (2000–2001). 511 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Part 6 – The EEA and Norway’s room for manoeuvre”, Report No.12 to the Storting (2000–2001). 512 European Commission “A review of the functioning of the European Economic Area” SWD (2012) 425, (2012), pages 11–12. 513 European External Action Service website “EU and Norway Trade Relations”, accessed 17/04/2015 at: . 514 European Commission “Taxation and Customs, TARIC database”, accessed 17/04/2015 at: .
448
Fisheries
“Several countries demonstrate how North Atlantic fisheries management can successfully operate outside the CFP.”
cent.515 Herring in airtight containers faces no tariff if exported from Norway, but 20 per cent if sold to the EU from a third country.516 There are numerous examples of these preferential tariff lines: herring, mackerel, caviar and caviar substitutes, frozen or cooked lobster, and smoked salmon. This shows that Norway is far from locked out of the EU market for its principal goods. In any case, many Norwegians who are critical of the current EFTA-EEA situation argue that tariffs are an unimportant consideration in fish sales, because factors like “purchasing power, consumer preferences, pricing policies at the wholesale and retail” all outweigh them. The removal of all EU tariffs on Norwegian exports would save 1.5bn Norwegian kroner (or about £144m at the time of writing).517
14.2.2 Current UK approaches differ hugely from countries that have looked after their fisheries and stayed out Several countries demonstrate how North Atlantic fisheries management can successfully operate outside the CFP, placing a higher premium on scientific evidence and banning discards. We will review some of the principles later, but how do these countries cooperate technically with the EU? Norway has three fisheries agreements with the EU. The Bilateral Arrangement covers the North Sea and the Atlantic, the Trilateral Agreement covers Skagerrak and Kattegat (Denmark, Sweden and Norway), and the Neighbourhood Arrangement covers the Swedish fishery in Norwegian waters of the North Sea. Notably, Sweden was first involved as an independent partner when it was outside the EU. The legal framework is renewed every six years and can be denounced with nine months notification. Fishing for mackerel, herring, cod, haddock and plaice are thus jointly managed and quotas are set by agreement, guided by the realities of what share of the waters fall within whose national Exclusive Economic Zone fisheries limits. Iceland’s arrangements with the EU are governed by the Northern Agreement, working along a similar renewable timeframe to Norway’s. Iceland is an iconic case study given its part in the three Cod Wars, revealing the significant national interests at stake in control of these fishing grounds.518 The Faroes is also a revealing example because of a recent dispute with the EU over mackerel, which led to restrictions being placed on EU (as it happens, Scottish) access. That was resolved, to Faroese advantage, with new mutual quota arrangements in late 2014.
515 “Fillets, raw, merely coated with batter or breadcrumbs, whether or not pre-fried in oil, frozen; Of the species Clupea harengus”, European Commission “Taxation and Customs, TARIC database”, accessed 22/05/2015 at: . 516 European Commission “Taxation and Customs, TARIC database”, accessed at: . 517 Nei til EU “Alternativrapporten: The Alternative EEA Report”, S. Gjelsvik et al (2012), pages 99–100. The Alternative Report argues that Russia, India and China have all increased their fish imports despite 15–30 per cent tariffs, yet Swiss imports declined despite no tariff existing. They argue there’s ‘no correlation’ between customs and fish exports, partially since it’s usually the customers who pay the difference, not the exporter (who gets the same profit regardless of destination). 518 The three clashes took place in 1958, over Iceland’s extension of the EEZ to 12 n.m.; 1972–3 over its extension to 50 n.m. (did this influence Heath’s negotiators?); and 1975 over the speed of the introduction of the new 200 n.m. limit. Iceland achieved its objectives and extended its sovereign waters. The UK, having ceded its EEZ fishing rights to the then-EEC, was unable to do likewise.
Fisheries
449
“Even without there being an EU bilateral agreement in place, structures exist through which obligations, limits and rules are still managed.”
Greenland withdrew from the EEC after gaining devolution from Denmark and with the victory of a withdrawalist party in its 1979 elections.519 Its intent was confirmed in a referendum in 1982. The Danish Government had previously pledged to honour the results of the vote, and negotiated on its behalf. The result was a deal that allowed for continued access to Community fisheries markets, in exchange for a ten-year transitional fishing agreement. The current bilateral had a new protocol negotiated in 2012, setting out a slightly reduced EU quota. The basic principle here involves both parties agreeing a quota for each species, in exchange for which the host country receives a payment. Additional funds may be provided for scientific research, allowing for the biomass to be better monitored so that future quotas can be more responsibly allocated. EU fishing vessels also pay the country a licence fee to be registered. A new development has been the inclusion within the text of a reference to suspending the deal if either side breaches “essential and fundamental elements of human rights”, though this appears to be largely included to mirror the text in other third party agreements where allegations have been made of major transgressions involving Spanish trawlers.520 Canada provides a further useful comparison, given the fisheries clash between its maritime authorities and Spanish trawlers in the 1995 Turbot War.521 The Grand Banks fisheries had collapsed due to over-exploitation, and in response the Canadians enforced strict control measures within their waters. However, responsibility for the stocks in international waters was less clear-cut. A Spanish trawler was seized outside the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone, having dumped nets illegal to Canadian waters. The boat turned out to be full of undersized fish, and (more seriously) was running double book-keeping and had a concealed hold containing moratorium stock. The breach in this case was not over a bilateral arrangement between the EU and Canada, but involving a higher treaty and an international organisation, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), that covered the High Seas. The key point is that, even without there being an EU bilateral agreement in place, structures exist through which obligations, limits and rules are still managed.
14.2.3 Management cooperation would continue Management of restored UK waters would naturally fall to the national authorities. In practice, it would be down to Britain to make decisions on issues such as fleet management, inspection, modernisation aid, and community grants onshore. Such market intervention may be restricted by any new agreement with the EU. Yet this could be offset by other aspects of the terms; in particular, they could address the minimum share of landings required at UK ports by vessels fishing in UK waters, generating increased economic activity in UK harbours. Certain other areas would also result in likely bilateral agreements. This is particularly true of food safety. With sea fishing, this would likely be limited to issues surrounding mutually-agreed authorised preservatives entering the food chain. In aquaculture, the same principles would apply as to food safety monitoring after the CAP.522 In essence it is about agreeing a commonly-applied 519 Aside from issues surrounding fisheries, which constituted half of the national income, Greenlanders were also dissatisfied as a massive food importer over high food prices resulting from the CAP. 520 Safety violations particularly from ‘darked out’ illegal fishing at night, resulting in collisions. 521 Known as the Halibut War in the UK: the particular sub-species have different names. 522 See Section 13.
450
Fisheries
“The EU is seeking wider control of its surrounding seas.”
list of chemicals that scientists determine are safe to use. In this, as with agriculture, international systems already apply.
14.2.4 EU ambitions for a Common Maritime Policy are even greater still, and will not go away A central concern over the policy underpinning common fisheries management is that it is merely one part of a move towards a much wider Common Maritime Policy. As long as the UK subscribes to the CFP, it is associated with a large number of flanking programmes and ambitions reaching beyond inter-governmental assistance. The EU is seeking wider control of its surrounding seas.523 Its ambition includes setting policies for renewable energy, shipyards and other infrastructure, cyclones, immigration, fisheries management (long seen as best achieved through a common European fleet), nutrition in seafood, environmental disasters such as those generated by oil slicks, port management, sea lanes (and therefore Dover Control), flag registers, maritime accident investigations, maritime research, dredging, climate change, coastal defences, terrorist threats, tourism, maritime surveillance, angling, smuggling, trafficking, piracy, naval defence, the coastguard, search and rescue, heritage (including museums and underwater archaeology), yachting, and so forth. The Commission is clear as to what is meant to emerge from this process: “A sense of common identity may well be one important side effect of bringing stakeholders together to participate in maritime planning processes.” 524 As one study has observed, noting the above list of EU ambitions: For as long as the UK is a part of the Common Fisheries Policy, all of these are at risk from being run by Brussels. The UK would be by default accepting the premise that there should be a Common Maritime Policy, constituting the above. Lift any item from that list, and the Commission is already planning a common policy around it. If it floats, swims, scuttles or rusts, it will increasingly be managed elsewhere – unless we extricate ourselves from the CFP, and even then that is no watertight guarantee525 An example of this in action is the development of an Action Plan for a Maritime Strategy in the Atlantic Area. This in turn is happening in the context of the Commission’s drive for “Blue Growth”, i.e. issues connected with the maritime economy. The implication is that the Commission has a responsibility to legislate since it identifies a sector with 5.4m EU jobs and €500bn GVA associated with it. When it does legislate, however, it will do so for the entire EU, and not for the specific benefit of the neighbouring ports whose resource under international law it otherwise would be. This is not to say that wider maritime policy is beyond the scope of bilateral cooperation. The UK has a vested interest in Mediterranean states policing their waters to interdict human traffickers and the flow of illegal migrants. Once in
523 The concept is for instance set out in European Commission “Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union” (COM (2006) 275 final), (2006), accessed 17/04/2015 at . 524 European Commission “Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union” (COM (2006) 275 final), (2006), accessed 17/04/2015 at . 525 See Civitas “Hard Bargains or Weak Compromises”, B. Binley & L. Rotherham (2015), page 71.
Fisheries
451
Andalucia or Calabria, migrants who arrive within Schengen potentially have free run across a borderless EU as far as Sangatte. Assisting with the patrolling of these waters is ultimately a matter of common interest, even if the nature of the assistance (financial or, for instance, aviation from Gibraltar) is open to debate.526
A view from abroad – and 10 years of possibilities since wasted “The Common Fisheries Policy is a joke – a cruel joke. That was what Struan Stevenson MEP and I were told by the fishermen of Iceland when we visited their country recently. They had nothing but contempt for a system that had driven British industry into penury and caused a widespread collapse of stocks. “This opinion was shared by officials who manage the Icelandic fisheries and even leading bankers on the island. One, who invests worldwide in successful fishing industries, has made it company policy not to invest in any fishing business in Russia or the EU because of arbitrary political decisions. “The Icelandic Fisheries Ministry explained that its core objective is to ensure that fishing is not a burden on the economy, but must contribute to it. They have certainly succeeded in doing that. Fisheries now accounts for 10 per cent of Iceland’s GDP. It employs 5,000 marine fishermen and another 5,000 ancillary workers and processors onshore. “As to the industry itself, its prosperity is obvious. There were modern, well-equipped trawlers tied up in the fish docks in Reykjavik, and modern fish processing plants. Prosperity was something the industry shared with the Faroes, which I visited earlier this year. Yet, in a country of 293,000 people that claims ownership of 260,000 mobile phones, the fisheries system could not be more different. “While the Faroes rely on effort control – with days at sea – the Icelanders dismiss this idea. They rely on an annual TAC and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Quotas can be bought and sold between fishing companies, none of whom are allowed to own more than 12 per cent of the total quota. “This has seen the consolidation of the industry, which is now owned by around a dozen major companies. However, because the fishermen themselves own the resource – the fish stocks – there is no landing of [illicit surplus to quota] ‘black fish’, very little discarding and a general drive towards a fully sustainable fishery, where no more than a quarter of any stock can be fished in a single year. “Although different in that respect from the Faroes, it is also successful. Cod stocks have fluctuated between 1.5 and 2.5m tons over the last decades and catches are lower than in the heady days of the 1980s when stocks of 1.2m tons were recorded. But they have clawed back from the disastrous ’90s, when they dropped to 600,000 tons, currently restored to a healthy 8-900,000 tons, allowing landings of over 200,000 tons. Total catches of all species amount to some 2m tons. Skippers and senior crew bringing home earnings of €100,000 a year are not abnormal. To achieve this, their system has commonalities with the Faroes – not least national control. Not only are discards banned, there is a premium on getting rapid, accurate information from the fishery, fast decision making and very rapid implementation. “With TACs calculated annually, allowing vessel quotas to be allocated (with specific quotas reserved for small vessels), the significant difference between the Icelandic system and the EU is the information flow. While the
526 Though such cooperation would obviously not be taken in isolation, but in conjunction with a reformed series of UK policies covering both push and pull factors. See Section 12.
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CFP is based on old and unreliable data, Icelandic TACs are determined with the most up-to-date information from landings, which is generally reckoned to be accurate, augmented by extensive data from government survey vessels. “Also, the fishing effort is constantly being fine-tuned. Reports of excessive juveniles being caught are radioed in to the Fisheries Directorate, which employs 95 staff, and the area affected is immediately closed. Public radio broadcasts are made to warn fishermen to steer clear of the designated area. Additionally, there are huge conservation areas, off-limits to fishing, to preserve spawning and juvenile stocks. “The Government sets the rules, and the fishermen are left to get on with it. There are no subsidies and no state aid. Those who break the rules are ‘named and shamed’ on the Fisheries Directorate internet site. Serious or serial offenders lose their licences. This light touch has seen the fleet contract from 2,500 registered vessels in 1992, to less than 1,700 in 2002, with fewer people employed. But capacity has not reduced significantly. The fleet has become more modern, and more efficient, as the stability afforded by the management system has encouraged vessel owners to invest. This is not just confined to the large vessels. Skippers of boats under ten metres are prospering as well. They have one of the most modern and efficient fleets in the world. “What gives the system some of its advantages is its flexibility. Skippers who land over quota are allowed to buy more quota to cover the excess, although they are only given 48 hours to do so, once the fish are landed. On the other hand, skippers who do not meet their quotas are not allowed to keep them – to prevent people making a living out of trading quotas. “Yet, despite their successes, they admit that they still do not fully understand the ecosystem on which they depend. They have thus invested in a world-class marine research centre, which employs 180 people, paid from a levy on fish auction prices. It is this that helps to keep Iceland in front, in a rapidly changing market, where quality and availability of stocks are at a premium. “Generally, the Icelanders are happy with their system. Certainly, the fact that they can make fishing pay made a refreshing change from the doom and despondency of Britain, where the British Government is pouring money into scrapping our best and most modern vessels and where crew members and skippers are thrown on the dole in large numbers. Their flexibility and imagination was in total contrast to the leaden bureaucracy of the CFP. “We were deeply impressed by a system that has been so successful that the Government is about to implement a special resource tax of 9.5 per cent on ‘excessive profits’ from the industry. “We left determined that, at the first available opportunity, we will restore national and local control to the British fishery. We will use the Iceland experience, and the experience from the other fisheries we have visited, to help us shape a successful UK policy [outside the CFP].” Rt. Hon. Owen Paterson MP 527
14.3 New fishing policy opportunities would become available Currently, the CFP is run by the European Commission. Restoring it to national control allows for the Government to completely rethink how it manages British waters, starting with the principle of handing powers down to local community
527 The European Journal Volume 11 Number 7, (2004), page 7.
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“Stocks collapse if no government can unilaterally protect them from foreign predator fleets.”
control. The UK and its devolved assemblies could be as radical as they wanted, and as restrictive with licensing as they considered appropriate, in rationally interpreting the scientific evidence on what actions safeguarding stock replenishment over the long term are needed. Presumably, the UK would draw upon the lessons learned by the Canadians from their attempts to undo the damage done to the cod industry in the Grand Banks. Unfortunately, there are many other collapsed industries that provide similar case studies. The primary lesson appears to be that stocks collapse if no government can unilaterally protect them from foreign predator fleets. The second is that stocks will take a long time to recover, and there is no magic wand to undo the damage already done.
14.3.1 The CFP has suffered from longstanding problems and enduring failure to reform The EU’s management system has always been flawed; the UK, in whose waters much of the resources would otherwise have fallen, is in a sense merely the worst loser – but by far. Recent reforms have started to acknowledge the inherent flaws in the system, but are doomed to only ever supply a partial relief. This is because any solution has to begin with the competence being removed from EU control and fully run by those with a vested interest in the resource. The problems with the system fall into 10 principal categories; • Financial: the UK has been contributing tax money to other countries, which have received hundreds of millions to support their fleets, without getting anywhere near a like amount back; • Competitive: these funds have been used to upgrade competitors – vessels, harbours, factories and infrastructure – rendering the UK fleet less able to compete on an equal footing; • Infractional: rules have been bent if not broken by the system of quota hopping, meaning that foreign owners have bought up larger UK permits and vessels from British owners who have been unable to compete at sea. Attempts to remedy this in law have been obstructed at the EU;528 • Territorial: the UK outside the CFP would be regulated under the UNCLOS (the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), giving it increased control rights. But while enjoying perhaps 80 per cent of the resource (seafood), the CFP allocated the UK 37 per cent by volume and perhaps 12 per cent by value;529 • Ethical: the UK has contributed to the funding of third party waters access, supporting similar undermining of third world fishing communities; • Equity: as a common policy, countries with no interests and even with no coast get to vote on traditional UK waters. This gives them a free bartering chip to claim against the UK elsewhere; 528 Particularly in the Factortame Case and its slow-burning aftermath. The background to this was an attempt by the UK Government to legislate to prevent quota hopping, by foreign owners buying UK vessels and their associated catch quota. This was eventually overturned as discriminatory. 529 Source: Save Britain’s Fish (SBF). Cited for example in Centre for Policy Studies “The Essential Guide to the European Union”, R. Lea, 2004, accessed 17/04/2015 at . pdf page 95. SBF notably accurately predicted the long term direction of EU travel.
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• Parity: there is no parallel system for the Mediterranean, Black Sea or Baltic. Baltic EU accession countries were not supposed to gain improved access for their fleets on joining. Instead, increased access has been permitted with just a potential option to restrict access to pre-accession boats within a 100nm limit, and only in extreme circumstances. Given that Polish vessels fished in the North Sea and Norwegian Sea prior to the collapse of herring and mackerel stocks there, even that caveat is open to challenge; • Continuity: the UK retains its six and 12 miles limits only at the cost of renewing a derogation every ten years.530 This comes at a potential negotiating price elsewhere; • Ecological: the CFP has been disastrously mismanaged and has wrecked the resource, which will take a very long time to recover. The EU has been dumping millions of tonnes of dead fish into the sea since first introducing a quota system in 1983 – the Total Allowable Catch; • Contextual: there is a broader integrationist maritime policy which threatens wider UK interests, including North Sea energy and maritime security. Despite the key location of the resource, the grants given to support the extracting fleets have not been favourable to the 1973 accession states. It is not even as if the communities doomed to decline have been cushioned, but rather those that are doing the most damage have seen their horsepower boosted, their vessel size increase, their catch capability grow, and their distribution network facilitated. Figure 14.v demonstrates the disparities.
Figure 14.v: Total European Fisheries Funds (€) received by a number of member states (2007–13) Germany Greece
€137.8m €155.9m
Spain
€207.8m
€246.5m
France Italy Poland Portugal United Kingdom €734.1m
€1,131.8m
€424.3m €216m
Source: HM Government531
530 Failure to achieve this on the first deadline led to the 1983–4 Kent Kirk Case, where a Danish skipper won a court case proving the default – i.e. that the absence of a continued derogation meant the loss of the waters. 531 HM Government “Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Fisheries Report” (2014), page 42
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The CFP in its modern form has been around since the early 1980s and these problems have only increased. The following map shows the UK’s actual and surrendered territorial rights. The UK retains its inner waters (six and 12 mile limits) but only under a rolling derogation; in this area only UK vessels (0–12 miles) along with non-UK vessels with traditional access (6–12 miles) can fish. Beyond that out to 200 nautical miles, or the median line with another state, is the UK economic zone in which fishing rights are pooled between EU nationals.532
Figure 14.vi: Surrendered UK fishing waters (light green)533
Land UK Territorial Seas Isle of Man Designated Area UK Continental Shelf Area British Fishery limit extent
Source: JNCC534
14.3.2 As long as we remain in the CFP, there will be a significant impact on the UK It is difficult to quantify the damage caused to the UK from this policy failure, but an attempt has been made. An audit in 2009 came to the conclusion that unemployment in the fishing fleet and in support industries cost £138m in that year; economic decline in coastal communities had a direct impact bill of £27m; the risk of pending damage to the recreational fishing industry (at the low estimate) ran at £11m; the UK share of support to foreign fishing fleets under EU grants was £64m; the UK share of support to foreign fisheries industries under EU grants was £1m; the redeemable UK share of EU third water fishing permits (allowing for half to be reinvested in development aid) was £12m; the loss of comparative competitiveness was calculated at £10m; the cost of decommissioning schemes added £4m; foreign flagging of UK vessels meant an economic loss of £15m; and the administrative burden cost £22m. By far the greatest impact was the opportunity cost due to loss of access to home waters under the 200 nautical mile principle – a surrender estimated 532 Since 1976, 200nm has been the new maximum limit for the exercise of UK sovereign rights in fisheries and renewable energy powers. Marine planning and nature conservation powers could extend further. 533 Boxed but unshaded waters around Rockall (amounting to 60,000 sq. miles) were unilaterally ceded by the incoming UK Government in 1997, though continental shelf claims remained applied. The motive appears to have been a trade-off, as legal rights to the latter under international law were strengthened at the cost of the former. Note also incidentally the exclusion of Channel Islands and Isle of Man waters. 534 Joint Nature Conservation Committee, accessed 17/04/2015 at .
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to run annually at £2.11bn. Higher food prices also needed to be factored into social security payments, calculated at £269m; while the loss of the economic value of dumped fish meant the physical destruction of £130m. That meant a total annual end cost estimated for the UK of the CFP running at £2.81bn.535 In practical terms, this is best seen by comparing the number of fishermen in the industry before the CFP was introduced and now. In 1970, employment ran at 21,443 full and part-time. Over the 1970s up to the mid-1980s, there was a small reduction in full-time work and a slightly larger increase in part-time work. UK vessels continued to land at more or less the same rate in UK ports. Accession of the huge Iberian fleets to UK waters changed matters: 20,703 British fishermen in 1994 became 12,152 in 2013. Gross vessel tonnage dropped from 274,532 in 1996 to 197,283 in 2013, as a quarter of the vessels went.536 Central to the damage has been the system of the Total Allowable Catch. The management system involves a political agreement being reached over the total tonnage of fish allowed to be caught in an area in a given timeframe. This is parcelled out among fishing nations, and it is in turn shared out among a nation’s fishermen. Once a Total Allowable Catch limit is reached by a boat or by a country, it has to stop fishing for that species. Where species live alongside one another, this obviously creates particular difficulties and the standard obligation has been for them to be dumped back overboard, regardless of their chances of surviving. As quotas vary from country to country and species to species, the other discordant result is often that trawlers in British ports a few miles from the shoals cannot go out to sea, while boats from further afield continue to go about their business. The accession of the large Iberian fleets, and their accelerated access to traditional British and Irish fishing grounds (in return for not vetoing accession applicants), made a difficult system of managing a finite resource impossible.
Figure 14.vii: Continuing decline of the UK fleet in recent years 300,000
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Source: UK Parliament537
535 TaxPayers’ Alliance “The Price of Fish: Costing the Common Fisheries Policy”, L. Rotherham (2009). 536 Marine Management Organisation “UK Sea Fisheries Statistics” (2013). 537 House of Commons “Sea Fisheries Statistics” (2015), page 9, accessed 17/04/2015 at: .
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“The UK outside the CFP would regain control of its extensive fisheries.”
The one item of the 10 on the above CFP failings list in which progress has been made is over dumping. But even that reform is being phased in, and has taken 30 years to negotiate. It remains a clear demonstration of the inflexibility of a system based on national self-interest, bartering, and a weak UK hand in meetings run by QMV. Unless the UK leaves the EU, the problems inherent in the system will be increasingly felt in particular by Scotland, which hosts an increasingly disproportionate rump of the surviving British interests and fleet.538 Moves to devolve power downwards have merely masked the ‘quangocracisation’ of the system rather than develop better management principles. The new EU attempt at localised fisheries management is a system of Regional Advisory Councils, which have representatives from the relevant fisheries industries as well as scientific experts. The North Sea Regional Advisory Council, for instance, has an Executive made up of 23 members. Its work covers waters IVc (properly the territorial interests of the Netherlands, Belgium, Picardy and England); IVb (the wider UK, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands); and IVa (Scotland, Norway, and the Faroes). Its promise is marred in practice. Several of the Executive’s members are not fishing groups but environmental campaigners. Of the fishing representatives, two represent Baltic Sea states. Only three come from the UK. There are more Brussels-based lobby members than English and Scottish representatives combined. It has little real power anyway – it can only make recommendations to the Commission, so the CFP remains extremely centralised. There are no Norwegian representatives, because this council advises the Commission, which is the actual intermediary with Oslo.539 The UK outside the CFP would regain control of its extensive fisheries, and end the decline in landings (see Figure 14.viii). How it chose to manage stocks would be a matter of national debate, along with the duration of the transitional period to be allowed for foreign vessels currently in national waters. This variable, along with the quota-equivalent to be assigned, provides the UK with a strong lever in renegotiating other aspects of the Treaties – providing fisheries patrol vessels are prepared to enforce it, and the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is prepared to fine and completely ban those caught transgressing.540
538 60 per cent of the resource by tonnage and value, 40 per cent of the fishermen. HM Government “Scotland analysis: EU and international issues” (2014), page 59, accessed 01/05/2015 at: , though this figure excludes some English waters ‘boundaried’ to be run by Edinburgh. The Scottish minister participates in quota talks with UK delegates and could take the lead. The CFP has been a notable area of discordance within the largely pro-EU SNP. 539 North Sea Advisory Council, accessed 17/04/2015 at . Thus in IVa, and indeed to the North West of Britain, true devolution should properly be to representatives of Scotland alone. That, however, would undermine there being a ‘common’ policy. 540 Policing could be made easier by requiring catches in UK waters to be landed in UK ports, other than for trusted boats. This would also have a knock-on effect for secondary economy links. ‘Klondiking’, or at-sea transferral to other vessels, would also need to be monitored. Given EU vessels would still need to be ‘tagged’ to comply with the EU’s own rules, this should be possible.
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Figure 14.viii: Decline of UK landings 1,000 900 800 700 Landings
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Demersal
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Source: UK Parliament541
14.3.3 The CFP has always been disastrous to stocks The extent of the opportunities available for sensible stock management outside the CFP becomes apparent when the scale of the mismanagement to date is considered dispassionately. Contrary to the global drive for vessels of under 30 feet, which fosters conservation and community links, the EU system supports what Greenpeace styles “monster boats”.542 As a result, 15 per cent of the Danish fleet by number catch 90 per cent of the national Total Allowable Catch, while one Dutch owned UK-flagged vessel has 23 per cent of the English quota. The system’s further complexities are shown by the example of the owners of one vessel selling landings in Africa in order not to comply with EU food safety law. By contrast, pre-accession Croatia was able to ban fishing by companies founded by foreign nationals. Foreign vessels and even fishermen were only allowed in if covered by a bilateral.543 Outside the CFP, working with other North Sea littoral states and Ireland, the UK could set stricter management terms over vessel tonnage, just as it could over mesh size, closed waters, gear types, damage to the marine food chain, and methods – including those that increase the risk of cetacean bycatch (accidentally catching dolphins, whales and porpoises). Boat size is not the only problem that has persistently damaged stocks. It has led to peculiar arrangements such as arose in 2004, where the Fisheries Council (by QMV) banned just the local Scottish vessels from the North Sea because their haddock included a five per cent rate of cod bycatch, leaving Danish, German and French vessels in the same grounds. In the meantime, no 541 House of Commons “Sea Fisheries Statistics” January 2015, accessed 17/04/2015 at: . 542 Of that organisation’s top 20 worst offenders, only two are British flagged, and both are foreign owned. Indeed, one is Icelandic, which makes a particular mockery of the EU bilaterals system. Greenpeace has its own name for quota-hopping: ‘flag milking’. Greenpeace “Monster Boats: Scourge of the Oceans”, page 8, accessed 22/05/2015 at: . 543 European Commission “Screening report: Croatia”, (2006), page 4, accessed 17/04/2015 at: .
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“The most obvious failings in the CFP have come through discards.”
account was taken of the industrial-scale dredging of hundreds of thousands of tonnes of sand eels, the bottom of the marine food chain, to turn into pig feed.544 Nor was any attempt made to allow for a reduction in cod catch by modifying the nets and trawl process. The most obvious failings in the CFP have come through discards – the policy of fish surplus to quota having to be dumped back into the sea, rather than landed and counted against future quotas, regardless of their survival rate. The extent of discards varies massively from year to year, particularly as individual fisheries are closed and quotas change. However, a Commission staff working paper from 2011 made the following remarks on discards: Most of the so discarded species die, but as TACs are based on landings, discarded fish are not taken into account. This unaccounted mortality reduces the effectiveness of the TAC system as a conservation tool and undermines scientific advice, which requires reliable data. Based on EUROSTAT data it can be estimated that in European fisheries 1.7m tonnes of (all species) are discarded annually, corresponding to 23 per cent of total catches.545 For context, 1.7m tonnes would keep Billingsgate fish market fully occupied for the next 68 years.546 In the same report, the Commission actively repudiates the CFP: Has the CFP performed as expected? The conclusions of the Green Paper are that the CFP has failed to achieve its key objectives: to ensure sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources in all three dimensions – environmental, economic and social. The stocks are overfished, the economic situation of most of the fleets is poor despite high levels of subsidies, jobs are mostly of low quality, while the situation of many coastal communities depending on fishing is precarious.547 Economically, environmentally and socially, the Commission admits that the CFP is unsustainable. It was set up to run individual species that turned out to intermingle. Levels were set by political barter. Discarded fish fall off the statistics. Interventions have been run in an ad hoc and occasionally contradictory manner. Of total stocks (and only then for those for which sufficient scientific evidence existed), in 2009, 21.5 per cent were being run to match potential yield, 35 per cent were over-exploited and 43 per cent were beyond safe biological limits.548 So it is hardly surprising that the Commission’s objectives, along with those of the Fisheries Council, have long been interpreted by UK fishermen as polit544 The brutal, blundering, unimaginative inflexibility of the Commission’s proposals is shown up elsewhere in British fisheries A long-line vessel in Grimsby, which catches only dogfish and skate and never catches cod, would still be bound to 15 days at sea, making it unviable. Jim Portus, Chief Executive of the South Western Fish Producer Organisation Ltd, said to me that he was bitterly critical of the Commission’s refusal to take account of technical changes, diversification and restructuring. He said: ‘The Commission only gives credit when a fleet is destroyed by a taxpayer funded decommissioning scheme.’”. European Journal “To Fish or Not to Fish – that is the question”, O. Paterson (2004), accessed 30/04/2015 at: . 545 European Commission “Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy “ (2011). 546 Billingsgate Market, accessed 20/04/2015 at: . 547 European Commission “SEC(2011) 891”, (2011), accessed 30/04/2015 at: . 548 European Commission “SEC(2011) 891”, (2011), accessed 30/04/2015 at: .
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“It is estimated that 400 pieces of EU legislation constrain the industry’s activities.”
ically motivated, cynically weakening the home fleets in order to better facilitate the establishment of a commonly-managed European one, operating in common waters. In January 2015, the Commission set out new rules to phase out discards, among other reforms designed to shift focus to regional consultation and scientific study. The fact that it has waited 30 years to act and still has not banned discards demonstrates the cost and risks of persisting with this dystopian experiment.549 Some species are particularly prone to migrate, such as salmon, sea trout, and eels. Leaving the CFP would not prevent the UK from signing up to common agreements, such as setting limits to fishing for such catch outside of coastal waters. The UK could opt into equivalent future versions of the EU Eel Regulations (Council Regulation (EC) 1100/2007) by passing domestic laws: after all, it was ICES (see above) and not the EU whose work was largely responsible for identifying the decline in Glass Eels, while the European Eel is listed as under threat in Annex II of the CITES agreement (the Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, of which the UK is one of 180 parties). The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO), meanwhile, includes a North Eastern Commission at which EU member states have ceded their seat to the Commission.550 Claims that the CFP is needed as ‘fish cross borders’ forget that fish cross the CFP’s outer maritime boundaries too. That Iceland, Norway and the Faroes can and do thrive proves that other joint management systems are viable.
14.3.4 Regulations could be set appropriate to needs As we have seen in regard to the CAP, regulations would still be required to ensure food safety is maintained.551 The remainder could be revisited, pruned, or repealed. Aquaculture (fish farming) supplies around one fifth of the EU’s fish, and with an annual turnover of £450m the UK after France has been its biggest producer. However, it is estimated that 400 pieces of EU legislation constrain the industry’s activities, encouraging competition from Chile and the Far East which does not have to comply with the same standards.552
14.3.5 The UK has a number of possible alternatives to participating in the CFP A comprehensive audit on possible post-CFP management structures already exists. Whether the policies appeal or not, the audit undertaken by Owen Paterson MP (before he became DEFRA’s Secretary of State) reveals that a radical reform package could be enacted.553 The Fishing Green Paper he proposed in 2005, after reviewing non-CFP systems, consisted of a number of proposals, some of which have been in part or in
549 There might be a case for re-examining the ban on a species basis: some reports suggest plaice may have a 60 per cent survival rating. This does not appear to be a significant consideration though. 550 Denmark participates, but only in respect of the Faroes and Greenland. 551 See Section 13. 552 European Foundation “The European Journal” (May 2009), page 14, accessed 20/04/2015 at: ; and more recently FISHupdate “Scots MEP warns of dangers to fish farming from EU red tape” (2014), accessed 20/04/2015 at: . 553 Conservative Party “Consultation on a National Policy of Fisheries Management in UK Waters” (2005).
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“The UK would cooperate with other states to manage littoral fisheries, especially Norway, the North Sea states, and Ireland, in a spirit of genuine cooperation.”
whole adapted as fundamental CFP reforms. Others might yet be implemented. The basic list includes effort control, based on ‘days at sea’ instead of fixed quotas; a ban on discarding commercial species; permanent closed areas for conservation; provision for temporary closures of fisheries; promotion of selective gear and technical controls; rigorous definition of minimum commercial sizes; a ban on industrial fishing; prohibition of production subsidies; zoning of fisheries; registration of fishing vessels, skippers and senior crew members; measures to promote profitability rather than volume; and effective and fair enforcement. However, what is completely incompatible with the current system is the proposal that power be shifted away from the EU and, in terms of day-to-day management, down from national capitals to local control. As part of this, the UK would assert full control of its own Exclusive Economic Zone, including full sovereignty of what lies within the 12 mile limit, and jurisdiction over its own vessels on the High Seas (subject to international law). One distinction to be made would be between inherited rights and acquired rights, allowing for foreign fishermen with genuine traditional access to these waters to remain, but allowing for the Government to be more constraining with more recent arrivals. Foreign fishermen would have access under permission or licence, not as an automatic gift. The UK would cooperate with other states to manage littoral fisheries, especially Norway, the North Sea states, and Ireland, in a spirit of genuine cooperation. That would include joint activity and even shared funding of research and stock monitoring. The survival of the stocks would take priority. This would require agreement on the extent of culling of predators such as seals, if this is the recommendation of the scientific community. Local management would be through Fisheries Management Authorities (FMAs), divided into two categories: inshore to 12 miles, and offshore to 200. Each would have a small executive board, responsible for policy-making, a consultative council, and an executive arm responsible for the public administration of the fishery. There would also be an enforcement agency. Most functions carried out at present by DEFRA staff would be devolved to the local level, with DEFRA maintaining only strategic and oversight functions. There would be an appeals tribunal, which might also function as a judicial body on enforcement matters, to deal with disputes and possibly infringements. Inshore boards would be appointed by councils; offshore ones as per other non-governmental bodies. They would be appointed on the basis of competence and independence. Their work would informed by input from advisory councils. The central benefit would be the UK regaining control of its own waters, and deciding who could fish there and how. It might be managed via a New Zealandstyle transferrable quota system.554 Or it could develop into a fisheries system based on property rights.555 Or the effort might simply be put into restoring past community strengths and traditional fleets.556 In any event, it is important to recognise that these sovereign waters, even if jointly-managed through inter
554 IEA “A road map for British exit from the European Union”, I. Murray & R. Broomfield (2014), pages 20–23, accessed . 555 IEA “A road map for British exit from the European Union”, I. Murray & R. Broomfield (2014), pages 18–20, accessed . 556 IEA “Britain revitalised and independence regained”, S. Bush (2014), pages 64–65, accessed 30/04/2015 at: .
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“Independence from the EU would allow the UK to explore more radical solutions than are currently feasible.”
national committees, would need to be policed, and there is always the possibility of confrontation.557 Other approaches also become possible. Prior to accession, Croatia elected to engage in state aid for its fishing industry. These grants included a blue-diesel scheme for commercial fishing vessels; a programme for the modernisation of the fishing fleet; a capital investment scheme; a programme for buying off trawler licenses; and an income support scheme.558 This might be compared with the example of salmon farms in the UK. Outside the EU competence, the UK could provide support to the industry if salmon exports were to face significant EU tariffs, although this could prompt anti-dumping measures. By contrast, its interests within the current system have been less than satisfactorily met. The Commission failed to support UK salmon interests when London and Dublin opposed the lifting of surveillance measures on Norwegian salmon during EU expansion in 2005 (after dumping had been claimed), and it has on multiple occasions overruled individual grants to particularly isolated Scottish fish farms intended to make them more competitive.
14.3.6 Withdrawing from the CFP enables, if needed, more radical action to be taken more responsively down the line If UK and global stocks continue to deteriorate, independence from the EU would allow the UK to explore more radical solutions than are currently feasible. For example, the New Economics Foundation think tank recommended in 2012 that the best way to address the problem of depleted fish stocks was to completely suspend fishing for many species and in many areas for four to nine years, and to compensate (current) fishermen for not fishing during that time. The New Economics Foundation calculated that there would be long-term returns of 148 per cent on every pound invested by 2052, due to the safe recovery of stocks and subsequent prudent reform to stop future overfishing.559 Under current EU rules, such action is simply unimaginable – it would need the agreement of 28 fisheries ministers, may well fall foul of state aid rules, and would require tortuous wrangling over the design of the compensation budget. Outside the EU, however, if the electorate so chose, Britain could pilot the ‘no fish’ policy in specific areas, or indeed lead the way in alliance with other non-EU states and show the potential benefits of the scheme (the viability of which has partially been demonstrated by Canada and Iceland). Less radically, the UK would be able to channel more funds directly into the technological improvement of the British fleet without falling foul of EU competition law. Incentives could be designed for fishermen to invest in cutting edge ‘smart nets’ which minimise by-catch and allow juvenile fish to escape; better equipment for monitoring stocks and relaying information to scientific advisers; satellite monitoring; e-logbooks; and wheelhouse CCTV.
14.3.7 Policy opportunities generate significant net gains for the UK It will not be possible to rescue Britain’s stocks or fleet overnight. It would likely take a generation. This is an improvement on the current state of affairs, how557 As there is now. Clashes between trawler men of differing nationalities, sometimes fatal, have occurred in several CFP-run locations. 558 European Commission “Screening report Croatia: Chapter 13” (2006), page 6, accessed 30/04/2015 at: . 559 NEF “No Catch Investment”, A. Esteban (2012), accessed 30/04/2015 at: .
Fisheries
463
“Leaving the CFP allows for the fleet and coastal communities to regenerate.”
ever, which is looking like a permanent national loss. As we saw earlier, this cost is ecological, societal, physical, and (at £2.81bn per annum) calculable. It is not just the fleet that would gain over the coming decades, but the UK’s significant fish processing industry (especially in Humberside and Grampian). Between 2010 and 2012, the number of units involved in this trade fell by 15 per cent.560 Worst hit have been the smaller businesses, which have shrunk in number by half since 2004. The statistics suggest that the number of start-ups in the industry has dropped markedly and new companies have higher failure rates.
Table 14.ix: UK sea fish processing industry population – FTEs and processing units Sea fish processors
2000
2004
2008
2010
2012
No. of UK full time (FTE) jobs
22,256
18,180
14,660
14,331
11,864
541
573
479
384
325
No. of processing units
Source: Seafish561
Seafood processing and packing shows how the CFP has had a wider negative impact. Indeed it is typically accepted by Government that the ratio of livelihoods affected runs at around nine jobs on land for every one at sea. Despite this, the UK fleet has for too long been treated as a peripheral interest by British diplomats and negotiators. The fishing industry’s economic significance is more important than has too often been given credit.
Conclusion Taking both the disastrous common food management systems together, the UK could successfully abandon both the CFP and its misaligned cousin the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Leaving the CAP allows for deregulation, cheaper food, targeted aid for needy farmers, a bigger dairy market, and a reduced state subsidy if such an approach is so desired. The scope to reduce subsidies may be limited by the nature of the new form of access to the European market, in which products would be competing against subsidised continental counterparts. The extent to which this skewed competition will be happening would be limited, however, given that the key exports will be whisky, fish and processed food. Leaving the CFP allows for the fleet and coastal communities to regenerate, but only if stocks are sensibly managed, foreign access is reduced (probably gradually), and the true benefits will even then only be felt over a generation. In both instances, the UK has a strong negotiating hand as a net loser under the current system. A robust negotiating position over transitional terms would generate advantages to be traded off elsewhere. Given that, under international law, the UK owns these waters, its hand is strong. An opportunity now emerges. While the CFP and CAP have squeezed British fishing and farming for four decades, the release of the clamps will lead to recovery over time.
560 Seafish “2012 Survey of the UK Seafood Processing Industry”, accessed 30/04/2015 at: . 561 Seafish “2012 Survey of the UK Seafood Processing Industry”, accessed 30/04/2015 at: .
464
Fisheries
