12 Approx. 4:10PM to 4:35PM

Date: August 22, 2012 Accident Report for incident: Mountain Creek – Gauley water slide on 7/25/12 – Approx. 4:10PM to 4:35PM Introduction Gauley Ride...
Author: Tracy Sparks
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Date: August 22, 2012 Accident Report for incident: Mountain Creek – Gauley water slide on 7/25/12 – Approx. 4:10PM to 4:35PM Introduction Gauley Ride at Mountain Creek – There was an accident where 11 passengers, including three adult males, three adult females, five children, and four lifeguards were trapped in the water slide. The victims became trapped under a vinyl liner that is part of the trough for the ride. The ride is a water slide that follows the contour of the ground. The ride is meant to simulate a white water rafting experience. It was comprised of a shotcrete trough that is lined with a layer of foam padding and two layers of vinyl liner in areas other than the tunnel. The tunnel was comprised of a concrete pipe with a layer of plastic and two layers of vinyl that extend midway up the sides of the tunnel. Riders traverse the course on single rider inner-tubes. The upper part of the course is unenclosed. Near the conclusion of the ride the course makes an approximately 360 degree change of direction and patrons enter a tunnel that is approximately 80 feet long. The tunnel is constructed from a pipe that is approximately 8 feet in diameter. At the termination of the tunnel riders are discharged into a receiving pool. A large portion of the ride is not visible from the dispatch operator’s vantage point at the top of the ride. The Incident At approximately 4:10PM on 7/25/12 passengers began to become trapped under one of the vinyl layers that line the tunnel portion of the ride. The liner is not continuous for the length of the tunnel and there are several lateral seams. A seam in the liner ruptured and the victims were driven under it by the flow of the water. There was a significant delay between the time the first person became trapped and when the staff took remedial action. This resulted in a significant number of people being trapped. At the top of the ride, the operator was apparently unaware of what was occurring. People were still being sent down the slide for approximately 5 minutes after the first victim had emerged from the discharge of the tunnel. Because of poor communication at least one more passenger was dispatched from the top of the ride 15 minutes after the incident was known to have started. Poor communication also hampered efforts to stop the flow of water during the incident. Maintenance was radioed to turn off the pumps about 5 minutes into the incident, but reportedly could only hear “Gauley” and reported to the top of the ride (Gauley). Based on witness statements, the flow of water was not stopped until approximately 20 minutes after the incident was known to have occurred. Based on witness statements the time from when the first person slipped under the liner and became entrapped, until the first person emerged from the ride who had been under the liner took about 5 minutes. During that time people were being sent into the ride, some got stuck, but most made it through. Because of the lack of light in the tunnel those who were not stuck likely could not identify that people were trapped under the liner. The first victim out appears to be Kyle Lord who entered through the seam and pushed

his way under the liner toward the discharge of the ride for about 20 feet until he came out the end of the section of vinyl liner and then out of the tunnel. He tried to alert the lifeguards about the problem. By his account he talked to four lifeguards but they did not respond. Tina Kurtenbach appears to be the second victim to emerge, she described wriggling out. She describes trying to convey what was happening to the lifeguards too. A 13-year-old boy and a girl emerged next. It is unclear if they made an attempt to alert the staff about the conditions in the tunnel, although an off duty police officer named Liam Flatley reported that he saw a boy in the tunnel with his tube, helped him out and told him to alert the staff about the conditions in the tunnel. The guards apparently at first did not comprehend the severity of the situation and did not react. The victims exhibited minor injuries such as cuts and bruises. At this point a patron (an off duty police officer named Liam Flatley) emerged from the tunnel, authoritatively told them that people were trapped inside the ride under the liner. Officer Flatley had not been under the liner but reported that he saw people going under it. Upon exiting the ride, he reportedly saw the lifeguard still sitting in her chair and yelled that people were drowning inside the tunnel (it is not clear whether this guard was responsible for the Gauley or an adjacent water slide). A lifeguard (Jason Walker) entered the discharge of the tunnel assisted by Officer Flatley. They observed lumps of people trapped under the liner. Lifeguard Walker left the tunnel to get a knife. Officer Flatley assisted another lifeguard (Matt McConville) into the tube against the water flow. Lifeguard Walker returned with the knife and Lifeguard McConville and Officer Flatley cut the liner and helped people from under the liner and out of the tunnel. Concurrent with the rescue being effectuated from the discharge of the ride, it was reported that four lifeguards entered the top of the tunnel and were subsequently trapped. During the rescue, witnesses report that patrons were still being sent down the slide. At some point during the rescue, Officer Flatley reports that he went to the end of the tunnel and yelled to shut off the water and stop sending people into the tunnel. Statements indicate that Phillip Szakzinger, a staff person, finally shut off the valves that supplied the ride about 20 minutes into the incident. The witness accounts report that by the time this occurred most of the people trapped were out. The following people were known to have been involved in the incident, and the level of involvement will be described briefly: Patrons: 1. Kyle Lord appears to have been the first patron stuck and, according to his account, traveled toward the ride discharge with the flow of water and was able to create or widen a discharge hole to allow him to get out from under the liner. This action may have assisted other people trapped by widening the available space for the others trapped under the liner. 2. Tina Kurtenbach was trapped under the liner, probably second in, first one noticed out. Her panic drew a lot of attention and may have served her getting out. 3. Anna Hurwitz, from her own description, appears to have been under the liner, and probably released by Officer Flatley and Lifeguard McConville. She apparently led another victim Lindsey McCormack out.

4. Lindsay McCormack hit her head and appears to have been knocked unconscious briefly; she appears to have been under the liner and was probably released by Officer Flatley and Lifeguard McConville. She followed Anna Hurwitz out. 5. Isabella Clemens appears to have been under the liner and rescued by one of the rescuers. 6. Liam Flatley, a Bergen County police officer, who was a patron this day, but appears to have directed the rescue. He reported that he saw a huge lump of people under the liner, and ran to get help. He helped two lifeguards (Jason Walker and Matt McConville) into the tunnel against the flow. He and Matt McConville began cutting people out. He released two female children. He reported that during the rescue more people were sent down and ran to stop that from happening and to appeal to them to stop the water flow. By his account he also released his girlfriend and another boy and assisted in looking for more victims. 7. Christine Pioggi, who accompanied Officer Flatley to the park that day. She was fully trapped under the liner and was rescued by Officer Flatley. 8. Joseph Rinardi, rescued by Officer Flatley and Lifeguard McConville. 9. William Michaels, rescued. 10. Gloria Cash, rescued. 11. William Bush, rescued by Officer Flatley and Lifeguard McConville. Mountain Creek Staff: 1. Liz Tripp -- top operator. Never made fully aware of the situation below and at one point was told to send more patrons; she reported that she sent one patron but other witnesses below said more. The confusion could be that some lifeguards entered from the top of the tunnel and got stuck themselves. Later in the event she was told to stop and make sure the ride stayed closed. 2. Kim Lucchesi -- mid-station lifeguard, no statement was available from her but it was reported that she tried to help in the rescue from the top and was trapped. 3. Jason Walker -- bottom operator, first in for rescue from bottom, brought the knife. 4. Jonathan Nelms -- went in from the top for rescue and became stuck under liner. 5. Enache Marius-Stefan (Steve) -- went in from the top for rescue and became stuck under liner. 6. Carlos Ruiz -- went in from the top for rescue and became stuck under liner. 7. Matt McConville -- went into bottom of tunnel with Officer Flatley’s help and was, with Officer Flatley, the primary rescuer. 8. Kaitlyn Riezer -- did morning operational inspection and saw nothing wrong. During the incident, eventually got water shut off. Then went to the bottom to help victims. 9. Angelina Turro -- bottom operator, blew the whistle to alert others of the situation as people started coming out. Tried to help and calm victims. 10. Caroline Hutcheson -- arrived late and helped victims below. 11. Philip Szakzinger -- actually shut the water off by shutting the valves supplying the ride about 20 minutes after they knew about the start of incident. 12. Josette Hutcheson -- provided help at bottom of ride and ordered the water shut off.

13. Beien Alverez de Cenfuegos -- helped passengers after they were out of the tunnel. 14. Eric Weber – helped people after they were out of the tunnel. 15. Christopher Cordero – After many tries, got in and helped the last people out from under the liner. Investigation: The Department collected witness statements from all available parties. The Department also conducted an inspection of the ride and reviewed the maintenance records for the ride. Prior to operation each day, the ride is “walked” by both a member of the maintenance staff and the operation staff. This is done with the trough empty so that the vinyl liner is visible. There is a checklist that they use to evaluate the ride. The checklist used did not indicate to specifically examine the seams of the vinyl, but presumably both staff members would be examining the overall condition of the trough prior to operation. Neither staff member reported seeing any anomaly in the liner in the tunnel. There was significant damage done to the liner during the rescue as patrons were cut free. The exact point of where the seam in the liner became open was not readily evident. However, it can be said with some certainty that at some point there was a breach in the seam. The park is unsure of when the liner was installed, but it is believed to have been in place for a period of well in excess of ten years. The age of the liner coupled with the velocity of the water in the tunnel are contributing factors in the failure of the seam. It is likely that the flow of tubes over the breach lead to a widening of the opening as tubes became snagged and tugged at the opening making it progressively larger to a point where people, and in some cases, people and tubes could be caught under it. The liner design made it possible to trap a massive number of people under it. This was not known to be an unsafe condition since nothing like this ever occurred before. Massive holes in the liner were not expected or reasonably predictable. Communication problems and a delayed response by the guards contributed to the amount of people becoming trapped. According to the witness accounts, it took time for the lifeguards to comprehend the severity of the situation and react. This allowed additional people to be discharged from the top of the ride. In addition, once the lifeguards became aware of the problem, they had difficulty communicating with those at the top of the ride who were discharging passengers. This allowed even more patrons to enter the tunnel, causing additional people to become trapped and hampering rescue efforts. Finally, witness accounts concur that efforts to shut off the flow of water to the ride were ineffective and likely did not occur until most of the victims had been rescued. There was no ride (water flow) shutoff at the ride. Emergency shutoff was not required, but an ordinary means of shutoff are typical for water rides. Pumps supplying this ride supplied three other rides and while there were valves that would shut off water to the ride, the operators had no idea where they were.

Conclusions and Recommendations: There were several contributing factors to the incident. Primarily, the design of the seam allowed it to become an entrapment hazard when it failed. The liner has been repaired in such a manner that seams are lapped in the direction of the flow of water similar to how shingles are applied to a roof. This will eliminate the likelihood of water getting under the liner and driving it up creating an entrapment hazard. The repair has been reviewed and certified by a licensed engineer. In addition, the daily pre-operational checklist for the ride has been amended to make the condition of the liner a focus of the daily “walk” inspection. The inability to shut off the flow of water in a timely manner contributed to both the continued discharge of passengers and impeded the rescue of those already trapped. The owner has also installed e-stops on the ride at the lifeguard stations, so that all lifeguards along the path of the ride can shut off the flow of water facilitating any necessary rescue and discontinuing the discharge of patrons. The e-stops and liner repairs, along with thorough inspections, and new daily inspections checklists will allow the ride to reopen for the remainder of the season. After the season, the liner design for the remaining portion of the ride will get a design review. There are several rides in the park with similar liners, they will also be reviewed. (8/22/12c)